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# Impact Evaluation of the G-SAM Project in Ghana: Midline Report

**September 2016**

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by Heather Huntington (Cloudburst Consulting Group), Brett Gall (Duke University and Social Impact), and Erik Wibbels (Duke University and Social Impact).

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## **DISCLAIMER**

*The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.*

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# ACRONYMS

AAP	Annual Action Plan
ARIC	Audit Report Implementation Committee
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DA	District Assembly
DACF	District Assemblies' Common Fund
DAPRC	District Assembly Public Relation Committee
DCE	District Chief Executive
DDF	District Development Fund
EA	Enumeration Area
FOAT	Functional and Organizational Assessment Tool
GAS	Ghana Audit Service
G-SAM	USAID/Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms
GSS	Government Statistical Services
HH	Head of Household
IE	Impact Evaluation
ISSER	Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana
MMDA	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly
MP	Member of Parliament
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	The New Patriotic Party
ODK	Open Data Kit
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PM	Presiding Member
RCC	Regional Coordinating Council
SI	Social Impact
VSLA	Village Saving and Loan Association
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Since decentralization reforms were initiated in 1988, Ghana has attempted to devolve service delivery to lower levels of government in hopes of improving governance outcomes. Unfortunately, local and district-level service delivery has fallen short of expectations and sub-national officials are often perceived to be unaccountable. Efforts to improve accountability could take two approaches. Accountability could be obtained from the bottom-up, through interventions focused on citizen participation and oversight, or from the top-down, through interventions focused on improving central government oversight mechanisms. This impact evaluation (IE) asks whether bottom-up or top-down approaches lead to greater accountability and improved service delivery.

## THE INTERVENTIONS

USAID/Ghana's Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms program (G-SAM) focuses on the district level of governance in Ghana, the Metropolitan, Municipal, or District Assemblies (MMDAs) democratically elected by residents. The following two activities are currently ongoing:

- *Performance audits:* The central government collects revenue and shares it with MMDA governments based on a revenue sharing formula. Prior to G-SAM, the Ghana Audit Service (GAS) conducted only a financial audit to ensure that this money was properly spent. Over the course of 2015 and with G-SAM funding, the GAS engaged in performance audits of 50 districts. In these audits the auditors went well beyond checking for receipts for purchases to assess the nature of project planning and contracting, the quality of service delivery outcomes and development project outputs. This information has been used to develop citizen scorecards that were presented at district assemblies in April and May 2016; the scorecards are now being presented and discussed in public forums across the 50 districts.
- *Civil society-led information campaign:* Citizens struggle to hold their MMDA officials accountable, partially because they have very limited information about MMDA-level government budgets and activities. As such, a civil society-led effort under contract to CARE International and a coalition of Ghanaian CSOs has been conducting social audits on district capital projects and education and health service quality. This information will be used to develop citizen scorecards that will be presented and discussed in public forums over the course of the summer of 2016.

## THE MIDLINE RESEARCH DESIGN

The G-SAM research design involves random assignment of 150 districts into one of three groups: a treatment group that has now received central government performance audits; a second treatment group that is now receiving civil-society led social audit; or a control group that will not receive either intervention. Given delays in the civil society organization (CSO)-led programming, this midline report only covers the 50 GAS performance audit districts and the 50 control districts. Moreover, while the baseline report provided data on citizen attitudes toward district governance and capital projects, the midline was carried out before any of the major citizen outreach efforts that will occur in both treatment arms in Summer 2016. The data collection only occurred among district administrators and politicians with the goal of determining if the GAS audits unto themselves, and without any significant citizen outreach, have had any effect on the planning, contracting and implementation of district capital projects.

As such, this midline represents an exploratory assessment of the GAS performance audits. In comparison, the endline analysis—planned for early 2017—will enable the team to rigorously test the causal effects of the program using household data. Because the diffusion of results to citizens had not yet begun, the midline can only uncover the direct effect of the audits on internal District Assembly (DA) processes in the absence of citizen information and engagement; this represents a very hard test for the initial impact of the performance audits. Uncovering significant effects is also unlikely in the sample of political officials, more than half of whom were newly elected in October 2015 and have had very limited opportunity to be impacted by the GAS audits. Thus, we present indicators with substantively large treatment/control differences. While in many cases these differences are not statistically significant, we clearly state when there is statistical significance.

## **MAIN MIDLINE FINDINGS**

At midline, Social Impact (SI) worked with the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research, University of Ghana (ISSER) to collect baseline data in 100 districts—50 GAS audited and 50 control. Data collection included an administrative official survey and a survey of district politicians. A total sample of 486 district administrators and 487 politicians across 98 districts were interviewed.

DA administrators are well aware of audit processes, and there is some indication that even in the absence of an information campaign, the GAS audits are influencing how districts operate:

- Nearly all of the respondents reported that their DA experienced one (62 percent) or two (32 percent) audits, although a small number of respondents (nine) reported more than three audits. This includes both GAS audits and other financial audits.
- Ninety-three percent of respondents indicated that the audit process (including both financial and GAS performance audits) had a positive effect on DA practices over the last year.
- Nearly all respondents (99 percent) reported their DA having an Audit Report Implementation Committee (ARIC). However, administrators in treatment districts were 12 percent more likely than those in control districts to report that the ARIC influenced the district's contracting and oversight in the past 12 months.
- Sixty-five percent of respondents stated that the GAS audits were positive, four percent indicated the results were negative, and the remaining 31 percent reported neutral results.
- Seventy percent of administrative respondents in treatment districts indicated that the GAS audit motivated the DA to make changes in how it is preparing the coming year's budget and Annual Action Plan (AAP).
- Among administrators who perceive the performance audits to have affected budgeting practices for the coming year, the most common reported changes were the adoption of better documentation of the award of contracts and better monitoring of projects. Administrators also indicated that the audit had motivated an emphasis on completion of old projects prior to beginning new projects.

Administrators reported the GAS audits having a more modest effect on recent practices. This is not surprising given the relatively short time since the audits took place and the absence of an extensive information outreach campaign on the basis of the audit results. While there are a number of areas in which GAS-audited districts and control districts are statistically indistinguishable, there is some indication

that even in light of limited opportunity for changes since the audits, they are having some effect on DA behavior:

- Administrators in the GAS audit districts are approximately seven percentage points less likely to expect that either a “large number” or “some” important changes will be made to the initial draft budget for the coming year. This might reflect better preparation of the draft budget in GAS-audited districts.
- There are several pieces of evidence that administrators have greater knowledge of problems with capital development projects in their districts than their peers in control areas. Administrators in the GAS audit districts are five percentage points more likely to report having observed abandoned projects in the last six months (11 percent in control districts). Administrators in the GAS audit districts are also eight percentage points more likely to report that there were an insufficient number of contractors bidding (off a baseline of 32 percent in control districts). These findings might reflect better attention to ongoing projects courtesy of the GAS audits.
- As at baseline, administrators appear reluctant to acknowledge problems of corruption. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the GAS audits affected perceptions of corruption. For instance, GAS audited districts are somewhat more likely to report corruption as a problem in the execution of the AAP (19 percent vs. 13 percent in control), and a survey experiment shows that GAS audited district officials report a higher incidence of political use of government resources. These findings might reflect the evidence brought to bear by the audits themselves or the increased sensitization to these issues courtesy of the GAS’ efforts.
- Unsurprisingly, the audits have had limited effect to date on the responsiveness of officials to the public. Any such effect is only likely to be detectable at endline.

Our survey of elected officials yielded few interesting results, probably because so many of the key respondents were newly elected in the DA elections of October 2015. These newly elected officials were not present for the GAS audits, the exit meetings on those audits, and of course they had not yet been exposed to the joint CARE/GAS dissemination meetings, which had not happened at the time of data collection. As a result, and unsurprisingly, we find little evidence of statistically significant effects of the GAS audits with this group. The main findings from the survey of this group include the following:

- Fifty-two percent of these political officials were newly elected.
- Political officials on a whole are not well informed on district budgeting and capital projects, at least not in the detail that we asked. This lack of knowledge is reflected in high rates of non-response and “don’t know” responses. It is also reflected in the fact that 57 percent could not state the number of DA audits that had taken place in the previous 12 months; a small share of those who did provide an estimate of the number of audits could provide details on them. Only 37 of the 487 respondents clearly identified the GAS/G-SAM audit.
- Despite the generalized lack of knowledge, respondents in GAS audited districts are 13 percent more likely to report that a draft AAP had been produced by the time of the interviews. Given that this result did not emerge among the more knowledgeable administrators leads us to believe that it may be an artifice of the small number of respondents.

- Politicians in the GAS audit districts have an approximately seven percent lower probability of believing the planning will proceed as in the past—consistent with the idea that the audits may have already affected AAP development in ways that may be unmeasured at midline.
- Eighty-three percent of politicians indicated that the ARIC has influenced how their district contracts and oversees projects over the last year. This is substantially higher than the proportion reported in the administrative official survey. Politicians in GAS audited districts are slightly more likely to report an influential ARIC, though the difference is not statistically significant.
- As at baseline, politicians have a rosy picture of governance in their DA. Nevertheless, and consistent with findings on administrators above, we find that politicians in the GAS-audited districts are approximately eight percentage points more likely to report that corruption in the execution of the AAP is either a significant problem or somewhat of a problem.

# INTRODUCTION

This report describes the midline survey findings for the IE of USAID/Ghana's local governance and service delivery program conducted through USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. The G-SAM program represents a five-year, \$10 million project supported by USAID/Ghana's Democracy and Governance Office. The objective of the program is to improve local governance in Ghana by strengthening both top-down and bottom-up accountability. The program was launched at the beginning of 2015 and will end in 2018.

The IE is designed as a randomized control trial to assess two activities in the governance program: (1) a top-down series of performance audits of District Assemblies (DAs) conducted by the central government's Ghana Audit Service (GAS) and focused on the quality of services provided; and (2) a bottom-up civil society organization (CSO)-led campaign also focused on the quality of district-level public services. Both activities will be followed by extensive citizen outreach to diffuse the findings of the top-down and bottom-up audits. The evaluation rigorously assesses the impact of performance audits and CSO-led social audits on improving accountability and service delivery outcomes by randomly assigning one of the two activity treatments or control group status to 150 districts in Ghana. Specifically, 50 districts have been subject to performance audits and have begun to receive a scorecard campaign, 50 DAs are receiving social audits, which will be followed by a scorecard campaign, and 50 districts serve as a pure control group. As designed, this is one of the largest IEs conducted on governance activities at the district level, and one of the first to explicitly compare top-down and bottom-up interventions for promoting accountable local governance.

Prior to the rollout of project activities, baseline data collection was carried out in all 150 districts. This data collection effort sought to gather information on baseline conditions on the key outcomes of interest and on other important contextual factors that might have an interaction effect with project activities. The primary outcomes of interest include:

1. The quality of district capital projects and health and education service delivery outcomes;
2. The quality of district governance, with special reference to district capital projects;
3. The responsiveness of district officials to public pressure; and
4. Citizen satisfaction and engagement with district-level democratic procedures.

The midline survey covered administrators and political officials in the GAS-audited and control districts. It did not focus on the fourth outcome above because the citizen outreach component of the programming had not yet occurred. The midline survey analysis has two objectives. The first is to assess whether overall levels of service delivery, corruption, governance effort, budget procedures, and the like varied between control and GAS-audited districts. The second is to measure differences in these indicators across the GAS treatment and comparison group that will be used to explore the influence of GAS audits to date. Given extensive evidence of balance at baseline reported in Appendix 5, we take statistically significant differences between GAS and control districts to reflect the impact of the project.

The report is organized as follows: the next section will provide background on the project as well as a brief description of the study design, followed by a description of the midline survey design and implementation. The next two sections discuss midline findings on key indicators of interest. The final section outlines the conclusions.

# PROJECT BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION DESIGN

## PROJECT BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION OBJECTIVE

In 1988, Ghana launched its comprehensive local government and public administration reform via six pillars of decentralization: political, administrative, fiscal, planning, market, and spatial. The reform sought to transfer power and competence to a local government system in which Metropolitan, Municipal, or District Assemblies (MMDAs) consist of assembly members who are elected or appointed to office. Local citizens are represented by elected DAs, while central authorities are represented by a District Chief Executive (DCE), who is appointed by the President. “The MMDAs are nominally non-partisan, as candidates are not sponsored by political parties,” but presidents have appointed members from their own parties (Ayee and Dickovick, 2010). MMDAs are closely analogous in scale to county-level governments in the United States. As of April 2012, there were 212 MMDAs in Ghana.

In Ghana, MMDAs are the only substantively meaningful level of government below the national administration, and they are primarily responsible for improving service delivery outcomes through “local-level policy and planning, [which is] based on, and informed by, national policies and programs” (Ayee and Dickovick, 2010). MMDAs rely on several sources of revenue to fund local government policies and activities. The District Assemblies' Common Fund (DACF) serves as the most important source of revenue and provides intergovernmental transfers to MMDAs. These funds are distributed using a revenue sharing formula. Internally Generated Funds (IGFs) are derived from taxes and levies imposed by DAs. Additional sources of revenue include the District Development Fund (DDF) and rents derived from local extractive industries (Ayee and Dickovick, 2010).

In Ghana, decentralization has been justified as a means to promote participatory governance, improve service delivery, and facilitate socioeconomic development (Ohene-Konadu 2001). Consistent with decentralization initiatives in other countries, reforms have been guided by the belief that local governments are closer to their citizens, better able to respond to their needs, and therefore more accountable. The expectation has been that well-managed local governments are an important means to achieve democracy, “good governance,” and the efficient mobilization and allocation of scarce resources to meet citizens’ needs.

Ghana’s ambitious decentralization reform process and various foreign donor initiatives notwithstanding, the MMDA system is failing to achieve its essential mandate of efficient, effective and equitable local service delivery (Ayee and Dickovick 2010, CDD-Ghana 2008, Fox et al. 2010). Decentralization reforms have failed to address many of the basic problems associated with poor governance and service provision at the local level. In many cases, the devolution of power and responsibilities to local governments has failed to yield more efficient, effective and equitable local service delivery outcomes. Corruption, clientelism, rent-seeking, and low effort continue to characterize some local governments. These characteristics combine to facilitate the capture of decentralized politics by local elites and interest groups, distort democratic processes and obfuscate lines of accountability. In the absence of accountability, local elected officials and technocrats face weak incentives to address the needs of broad groups of local citizens. This state of affairs has significant negative implications on the quality of local public services.

Therefore, the overarching development problem that this program aims to address is unaccountable or weakly accountable MMDAs. They are unaccountable to the central government, which funds the largest share of MMDA budgets. They are also unaccountable to local citizens, who are the most important consumers of local public services. Building on cutting-edge development projects elsewhere, the IE of this program will involve the randomized assignment of G-SAM's two main project interventions— central government performance audits and a citizen scorecard campaign—along with the randomization of control group status to a third group of districts. Given this design, the IE will allow the evaluation team to assess the effectiveness of each activity.

## **INTERVENTION I: PERFORMANCE AUDITS**

As part of G-SAM, the GAS implemented performance audits of the DAs to strengthen hierarchical accountability. The GAS is legally mandated to conduct financial audits of all MMDAs. However, financial audits provide very limited information on the quality of local governance because they do not address the quality of local public services or capital spending. Performance audits, on the other hand, are explicitly aimed at evaluating the value-for-money in public budgeting. They go well beyond accounting to cover each step in the process of planning and building development projects, including: 1) the identification and budgeting for projects in district budgets; 2) the tendering and award of contracts; 3) the monitoring, evaluation, and payment of contractors as projects are being built; and 4) post-completion assessments of project quality and impacts on citizen welfare. Although the GAS had previously conducted performance audits, it had no staff or capacity to do so at the district level. These capacities were developed in advance of the audits courtesy of G-SAM funding.

For G-SAM, GAS conducted performance audits of the top two most expensive capital projects as reported in each of the 50 districts' Annual Progress Report.<sup>1</sup> Such projects include classroom block construction and other infrastructural projects. Auditing performance on the implementation of these projects offers an opportunity to assess how effectively the districts have been in strengthening accountability mechanisms for capital expenditure and responding to calls for improved accountability of public finances.

The purpose of the performance audits was to ascertain whether the selected DAs are capable of identifying, planning, procuring contractors, supervising and monitoring capital projects in accordance with sound administrative principles and practices. The performance audits also assessed the degree to which DAs are able to measure resource leakage and the quality of service provision. The performance period reviewed covered a three-year period, 2012-2014.

The performance audits were implemented as follows. The GAS notified 50 randomly selected DAs—including the DCE, members of the Assembly, the budget and development committees, and the District Coordinating Director—that they would each receive a performance audit. The letter explained that performance audits are much more involved than standard GAS audits. The audits themselves were carried out by GAS on the two largest school capital development projects; the choice was made to focus on schools as they are the most common district-built project. A typical audit took two weeks and involved a combination of interviews, document review, and fieldwork.

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<sup>1</sup> These reports are required and their filing is a precondition for receiving the following year's fiscal transfers from the central government. They include information on each project, including project type, location, funding source and level of completion.

On completion of the performance audits, GAS conducted exit meetings with district officials to provide preliminary feedback. Thereafter, the GAS completed audit reports. All of the performance audits were completed by late spring 2015.<sup>2</sup>

To present the findings, widely advertised, public information-sharing sessions with DA officials and CSOs were conducted in all 50 districts in April and May 2016. This activity and the ongoing scorecard campaign aimed at diffusing the results to citizens and described below aim to shorten the informational link between audits conducted by the central government and citizens within those MMDAs. Following the completion of the performance audits in the 50 districts, the results are being compiled by the GAS and translated into the local language of the district for public presentations.

Information on how districts did in the performance audits was distributed in public meetings with DA officials in April and May 2016. The results are currently being diffused via a scorecard campaign that relies on community meetings and radio programming. Through December 2015 and January 2016, the evaluation team worked closely with GAS and CARE International (the contractor for the dissemination of the information to district officials and citizens) on how to score the audit reports with an eye to the development of clear and accessible scorecards. This resulted in a sensible and simple way of scoring the reports. CARE and GAS scored the reports separately and then compared notes in order to ensure that the scores reflected GAS' intent. The resulting scorecards are quite straightforward and include both objective scores and information on how the district did compared to others. The scorecards include simple graphics for those citizens that are illiterate and/or innumerate.<sup>3</sup>

GAS and CARE conducted public rollout events to present the results to DA officials and CSOs throughout April and May 2016. This timing proved a serious difficulty for the midline survey team (see below), but the GAS/CARE scorecard events appear to have gone well. It seems DA officials were appropriately concerned about the findings, and some citizen groups reported that this was the first time they had heard that they could complain about incomplete and poorly constructed projects.<sup>4</sup> The scorecards are now in the process of being distributed to DA citizens along with information on which DA officials are responsible for service quality, including their district representative, members of the relevant DA committees, and the district administrators. CSOs will also engage with DA citizens to demand accountability for the results. Local meetings in 50 communities per district, facilitated by the coordinating CSOs and district-level community-based organizations (CBOs), will provide a forum for discussing the scorecards and mobilizing citizens around the results. This hands-on approach will be complemented by efforts to diffuse the results via print and radio.

The audit reports might influence DA planning, budgeting, and project oversight via two mechanisms: First, the presence of the performance audits might have promoted changes in district practices. Indeed, GAS, CARE, and our own team noted that DA officials were made nervous by the arrival of the GAS and the content of the initial reports as conveyed in the exit interviews. Second, citizen attention to audit results may be a prerequisite for behavioral change in the DA. In DAs that receive positive reports, it is expected that the campaign will improve citizen attitudes about the quality of local governance. In DAs that receive negative reports, it is expected that citizens will demand improved services and potentially vote out non-performing assembly incumbents. This exercise in transparency will provide the 50 DAs with stronger incentives to perform well in the face of increased probability of sanctions from performance audits, and provide national officials and local citizens with timely information on the audit outcomes. With improved

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<sup>2</sup> See Annex 1 for an example of one GAS' comprehensive performance audit reports.

<sup>3</sup> See Annex 2 for an example of the scorecards.

<sup>4</sup> The schedule of these events is available upon request.

information, both national officials and citizens will be empowered to hold district governments accountable for their management of the public purse.

It is important to note that this midline evaluation focuses only on the first mechanism described above. Because the diffusion of results to citizens had not yet begun, the midline can only uncover the direct effect of the audits on internal DA processes in the absence of citizen information and engagement. Uncovering significant effects is also unlikely in the sample of political officials, more than half of whom were newly elected in October 2015 and who have had very limited opportunity to be impacted by the GAS audits. As such, this midline represents a more exploratory assessment of the GAS performance audits. In comparison, the endline analysis (planned for early 2017) will enable the team to rigorously test the causal effects of the program using household data.

## **INTERVENTION 2: CSO-LED INFORMATION CAMPAIGN**

The CSO social audit campaign is being implemented in another 50 randomly selected districts. It is designed to strengthen social accountability by providing DA citizens with detailed information on the quality of district capital projects that is collected via social audits. This portion of the programming has been contracted to CARE International. CARE is leading a consortium of implementing partners to build on its preexisting network of 245 CSOs, over 10,388 farmers' groups, youth groups, and 2,400 village saving and loan associations (VSLAs). These networks and relationships provide the on-the-ground infrastructure for sustained social audits involving community-gathered information on the planning, passage, implementation and use of district development budgets. The CARE consortium is capitalizing on tested social accountability models and best practices from consortium partners, developing cascaded capacity building programs (training of trainers) and adapting these approaches to the specific institutional context of the targeted districts. The information on capital projects is collected by citizen groups using cell phone and tablet technology and then aggregated via a web-based platform that CARE is developing.

The local training for the social audits was scheduled to begin in the second quarter of 2015; however, difficulties in building and coordinating CSO capacity in so many districts delayed programming until the last quarter of 2015. This delay has two significant implications: first, it rendered a midline evaluation of the CSO-led campaign moot since too few activities had taken place; second, it placed considerable time pressure on the CSO social audit activities so that the requisite information will be in the hands of citizens by the summer of 2016, (i.e. before the DAs complete their budgets and with plenty of time for citizens to take an active part in the budgeting process).


Despite these difficulties, brief fieldwork by the evaluation team in three districts in March 2016 indicated that social audit programming is on target to meet its summer goal, even though it will require substantial effort. The fieldwork showed a motivated field team, an enthusiastic citizenry, and some positive examples whereby citizens had held sub-par construction contractors account by involving the district engineer and preventing the use of shoddy bricks.

## **IMPACT EVALUATION DESIGN**

The effects of the central government performance audits and the CSO-led social audit will be identified by randomly assigning each intervention to 50 districts. As summarized in Figure 1, 50 districts have received performance audits, 50 districts are receiving the CSO-led social audit campaign, and an additional 50 districts serve as a control group. Overall, the evaluation involves data collection in a total of 150 districts; however, because the CSO intervention is still in its early phases, this midline assessment only covers the 50 control and 50 central government audited districts.

## MATCHING AND RANDOMIZATION PROCEDURE FOR G-SAM

Figure 1: Program implementation design




A matching procedure was used for the random assignment of districts to audit, CSO and control groups for G-SAM. The goal of the matching and randomization procedure is to ensure that districts in the audit, CSO and control are as similar as possible. The more similar they are before the programming, the easier it will be to detect effects of the programming.

In order to ensure the districts are as similar as possible, we conducted two procedures. First, we created triplicate matches of districts that are as similar as possible. Second, once all the districts were matched into similar triplicates, we randomly placed one district from each triplicate into the audit, CSO and control groups. Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the matching and randomization procedure, which we detail below.

When pre-programming data are available, matching before the randomization procedure is a standard approach to ensure that the study units (districts, in

this case) are as similar as possible on key characteristics likely to impact program outcomes. Absent initial matching, randomization could produce very different groups of districts in the audit, CSO and control groups simply as a result of bad luck; this potential problem is particularly stark with sample sizes below 300.<sup>5</sup> In such cases, pre-matching units (districts) before randomization ensures that the treatment and control groups are as comparable as possible, thereby increasing estimation efficiency and statistical power.

Figure 2: Matching and randomization procedure



The goal of matching was to produce sets of districts that are as similar as possible on key characteristics. Doing so required identification of several key characteristics that seemed likely to impact the quality of capital projects and political accountability across districts (i.e. the outcomes G-SAM aims to improve).

<sup>5</sup> See Bruhn and McKenzie (2008) and Greevy et al. (2004).

We selected six background characteristics (at the district level) for the matching procedure that we expected to be strongly correlated with the outcomes of interest:

1. Exact match on geographic region (north vs. south) and if the district is new or not,
2. Poverty index,
3. Ethnic fragmentation of the district,
4. Electoral competitiveness,
5. Most recent (2011) Functional and Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT) score, and
6. Previous experience of a performance audit by the GAS.<sup>6</sup>

Having identified these key background characteristics, we deployed a statistical algorithm to match the districts on those characteristics. There are several approaches to statistical matching. The G-SAM program adds a layer of complexity to standard matching procedures. Most matching algorithms are developed to match pairs of units, but G-SAM has three arms: control, audit, and CSO. Thus, our design represents a randomized cluster matched triplet. We used a modified version of Robert Greevy and Cole Beck's R code for an optimal nonbipartite algorithm to create matched triplets. The algorithm performed better than a standard greedy algorithm and ensured better balance across our treatment and control groups than we could achieve without matching. Further details on the matching methodology are available in the G-SAM baseline report.<sup>7</sup>

Once the triplets of districts were identified, the randomization procedure was straightforward. One district of each triplet was randomly placed in the audit, CSO, and control groups by a random number generator. Within each triplet, the district with the highest number was assigned to the control group, the one with the middle number was assigned the CSO programming, and the one with the lowest was assigned to the audit programming.

The baseline report on the G-SAM IE provides evidence that pre-matching contributed to balance across control and treatment districts both in the characteristics of respondents and in survey responses. The midline data also shows good balance. Given data constraints, the matching and randomization procedures generated good balance between treatment and control districts.

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<sup>6</sup> These performance audits were done in ten MMDAs in conjunction with DANIDA.

<sup>7</sup> The G-SAM baseline report is available on the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00KQ26.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KQ26.pdf).

# MIDLINE METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

## INSTRUMENT DESIGN

The midline focuses on three of the outcomes of interest:

- 1) The quality of district capital projects and service delivery,
- 2) Perceptions of the quality of district governance, and
- 3) Attitudes toward accountability and responsiveness of district officials.

In addition, we also explore G-SAM awareness and perceived influence. These outcomes of interest were measured via surveys of households, elected officials, and local administrators at baseline. As extensive citizen outreach had not occurred as of midline, our data collection efforts focused only on elected and administrative officials associated with the district budgeting process in the GAS and control districts.

The evaluation team designed the midline surveys using up-to-date knowledge on question and survey design; we also aimed for consistency with the baseline instruments. We modified some questions after local data collection partner ISSER provided inputs to ensure appropriateness for the local Ghanaian context. The evaluation team took several steps to ensure data quality, including:

- Pre-programming the questionnaires into Open Data Kit (ODK). This eliminated the slow and tedious coding process, which is often subject to various types of errors.
- Using tablet-based electronic data capture to enter responses by the interviewer and frequent uploading of the data to the cloud, to ensure that the data was subject to regular diagnostics by the evaluation team.
- Constant contact between the evaluation team, ISSER management, and field teams via WhatsApp to address any challenges that arose during fieldwork.

This report presents the midline findings for the elected official and administrative official surveys.

## MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION

### *Enumerator Training and Field Management*

ISSER trained and fielded a total of 24 field assistants. ISSER recruited the enumerators and field supervisors from advanced students (mostly MA and PhD candidates), most of whom had extensive previous experience conducting fieldwork. A very large share of the enumerators and supervisors had worked on the baseline. As a result, they were familiar with the survey instruments and the field locations. The evaluation team was very impressed with the quality of the team assembled for the fieldwork.

The 24 assistants were organized into five teams. Each survey team was made up of a supervisor and four or five enumerators. In each team, the enumerators were responsible for conducting the interviews of both elected and administrative officials.

The work started with six days of training with the enumerators and supervisors the week of March 14, 2016. This included a review of the two field instruments, subsequent revisions to the instruments, and

reprogramming the instruments in ODK. ISSER hired translators from the University of Ghana, Legon, to reverse translate the instruments. After training on the instruments, the enumerators and supervisors were trained in the use of electronic tablets, ODK software, and procedures for managing the devices and uploading data. This progressed quickly as most of the enumerators had prior experience with the baseline instruments and procedures.

The instruments were pre-tested amongst the enumerators and later in neighboring communities in the Greater Accra Region. A pilot was undertaken on March 17. Piloting the elected official survey was a challenge, as it was difficult to make appointments on short notice. That aside, the pilot revealed only minor issues of question wording and a common sense that officials were finding the instrument too long. This was reflected in frequent interruption of interviews by staffers. Subsequent cuts made the length somewhat more manageable, and revisions improved the flow of some questions.

Fieldwork was conducted from March 28 to May 6. The survey teams visited 101 districts; one of the targeted district capitals proved impossible to reach and was replaced with another. The replacement district was chosen (independently from the IE team) from the CSO list of districts; rather than analyze that data, we removed the district and the corresponding matched district from the analysis. Thus, the final midline sample includes 486 district administrators and 487 politicians in 98 districts.

The evaluation team, ISSER management, and field teams were in nearly daily contact via mobile message platform WhatsApp. Survey responses were uploaded to ODK regularly, and the data was subject to regular checks by the evaluation team. This allowed the evaluation team to identify and address potential problems bearing on survey length, scheduling, etc. as they were developing.

Informed consent was received from each participant after reading a statement about the purpose of the research, the content of the survey, any risks or benefits, and the time commitment. Participants were assured their participation was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any point and that their answers would be kept confidential.

## **Sampling**

In selecting officials for the elected and administrative officials surveys, enumerators were told to prioritize officials involved in the development and management of the district's development project budget. The list of political officials, in order of priority, included:

- District Chief Executive
- Presiding Member (PM) of the DA
- Chair of the Works Sub-committee
- Chair Development Planning sub-committee
- Chair of the Finance Sub-committee
- Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or PM of the DA)
- Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee

Administrative officials included:

- MMDA Internal Auditor
- District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council
- District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration)
- Chair of District Tender Board (Note: only if it is not the DCE)

- District Finance Officer/ Comptroller
- District Planner/Director of the Physical Planning Department
- MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one)
- District Works Engineer
- Assistant District Engineer
- District Procurement Officer

Enumerators and field supervisors were instructed to use these lists until they reached the target sample size (ten) for each district. Enumerators and field supervisors were also instructed to aim for balance between political and administrative officials in each district. District officials were contacted in advance in an effort to establish meetings.

### **Midline Challenges**

1. **DA elections in October 2015:** More than half of political officials in the sample were newly elected in October 2015. As a result, uncovering significant effects from this group is unlikely due to their limited opportunity to be impacted by the GAS audits. This may change as these elected officials receive more exposure to G-SAM via the diffusion exercises. It should be noted that some part of this difficulty resulted from a delay of the programming, which had originally been scheduled for a year earlier. But in any case, this election generated a new set of officials with no experience with G-SAM.
2. **Dissemination events by GAS/CARE:** The evaluation team learned in mid-March that the GAS/CARE dissemination events were scheduled to begin in early April. This overlapped with the period that the midline survey team was to be in the field. This forced a difficult choice: we could try to beat GAS/CARE to the districts, in which case our data would reflect entirely the impact of the audit, or we could delay until after GAS/CARE had been to the districts, in which case our data would reflect the effect of both the audit and the dissemination events. For both administrative and learning reasons, we chose the latter approach. This required careful planning with GAS/CARE.
3. **Delay in social audits:** As discussed above, programming for the social audits was delayed from the second quarter of 2015 to the last quarter of 2015. This delay eliminated the research team's ability to assess the effects of the CSO-led campaign as part of the midline since too few activities had taken place.
4. **Lack of cooperation from some politicians and administrators:** As at baseline, some local officials were reluctant to complete the survey. In some cases, this seemed to reflect lack of familiarity with the issues. In others, it seemed they were just very busy. This was made worse by the fact that the GAS/CARE dissemination exercises were also consuming their time, and the FOAT review team had recently been in some districts.
5. **Technical difficulties:** Some of the supervisors had a difficult time uploading a small set of surveys. Uncovering those "lost" surveys took a few days after the fieldwork was done.

This report often uses statistical tests of differences between the treatment districts and control districts concerning statistics of interests (such as means and expected counts estimated from survey responses)

to identify treatment effects. When reporting the outcomes of hypothesis testing, a treatment effect is considered "significant" if the p-value is less than or equal to 0.10 and an imprecise estimate refers to an estimate both insignificant and with large confidence intervals.

# MIDLINE FINDINGS: ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY

This section presents the findings of the survey of district administrators. Emphasis is placed on four different thematic areas: (1) G-SAM influence and awareness, (2) capital development projects and service delivery, (3) governance, and (4) accountability.

Overall, the findings from the administrative official survey show promise for the next phase of the G-SAM project. Administrators in districts subject to G-SAM performance audits report a number of changes in district planning, auditing, and procurement as a result of the audit. While we find some statistical evidence of effects of the audits, it is worth noting the challenges to identifying statistically significant effects via the midline survey. In addition to the midline survey estimates relying on a relatively small sample size, it is expected that many of the anticipated effects of the performance audits require a longer period of time to manifest themselves than the duration of the period between the performance audits and the start of the midline interviews. We are optimistic that the endline will offer an opportunity to not only reliably identify the total effect of the G-SAM project, but also to further explore the findings highlighted in this report.

## RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

Interviews were completed with a total sample of 486 district administrators across 98 districts. Due to scheduling and transportation difficulties, the sample covers slightly less than the entirety of the 100 districts assigned to the audit and control experimental conditions and 500 administrators in those districts.

The demographic composition of the midline administrator respondents exhibits remarkable similarity to the demographic composition of the baseline survey administrator sample. The population of district administrators is predominantly male: 446 (92 percent) of the interviewed administrators are male and 40 (8 percent) of the administrators are female. In addition, the administrator population reports attaining relatively high levels of education. 183 (38 percent) administrators report their highest level of education as consisting of the completion of post-graduate education while 432 (89 percent) administrators report having completed university studies or additional education beyond their university studies. As illustrated in Table 1, a diverse array of ethnic/cultural groups is represented in the sample.

**Table 1: Distribution of administrators by tribe/ethnic/cultural group**


	Percentage	Frequency
Mande	0%	1
Gurma	2%	8
Ga-Adangbe	4%	21
Grusi	4%	20
Guan	6%	27
Other	8%	39
Ewe	17%	84
Mole-Dagbani	18%	89
Akan	41%	197
Total	100%	486

While the mean age of the respondents is 41, the average administrator has spent three years living in the administrator's current district of residence. This is likely an artifact of redistricting throughout the country, given that the average administrator reports having spent four years working in his or her current position.

Both the average midline administrator's reported total hours of work and the allocation of the time spent at work on various tasks is nearly identical to that found in the baseline. Respondents report working an average of 42 hours per week at both baseline and midline. The average respondent spends four hours per week training, skill building, or in workshops. While this is a surprisingly large percentage of the typical workweek, it is nevertheless less than the baseline report's finding that employees are spending 25 percent of a typical work month in workshops. The midline also found similar patterns to those in the baseline regarding how administrators spend the remainder of their time—for example, the midline administrators spending 48 percent of their working week on administrative tasks and documentation.

As at baseline, there are also no significant differences between administrators in the audited districts as compared to the control districts regarding any of these characteristics, except for age. Given that these demographic features are not expected to have changed as a consequence of the performance audits, this lends credibility to the balance of the districts following the random assignment of districts into experimental conditions at baseline.<sup>8</sup> Figure 3 below displays the distribution of administrator respondents by position.

**Figure 3: District administrator respondents by position (n=486)**



<sup>8</sup> Annex 5 presents the results of balance tests for 71 key indicators. We identified seven cases where there was a statistically significant difference between two treatment and/or control arms. However, among these seven cases, we did not identify any cases where the standardized percent bias between treatment and control arms was greater than 25 percent. Therefore, while the differences were statistically significant in seven cases, they were substantively small.

As shown Figure 3, the midline sample successfully targeted administrators directly involved in fiscal and financial affairs and development planning in accordance with the sampling strategy and whom the G-SAM performance audits are particularly likely to affect.


## G-SAM AWARENESS AND INFLUENCE

This section focuses on administrator perceptions and awareness of the G-SAM performance audit and other audits. Directly asking administrators about the GAS audit could potentially prime the respondents on our primary interest in the performance audit and plausibly encourage respondents to overstate the successes of the program. To avoid biased responses, enumerators instead asked administrators about all audits that occurred over the last year. The performance audit was later identified via respondents' responses and district affiliations. Generally speaking, GAS audited administrators perceive that the audit has had a positive influence on various aspects of governance.

To learn more about the perceptions and awareness of administrators of the GAS audit, enumerators read the following to administrators: “Now we would like to ask you about audits of your DA over the last 12 months. We know you are audited quarterly by the RCC, but we are only interested in the most recent RCC audit. Including the most recent RCC audit, how many external audits has the DA been subject to in the last 12 months?” Administrators were then asked about details of each of the audits and the overall audit process. Nearly all of the respondents reported that their DA experienced one (62 percent, 282 respondents) or two (32 percent, 148 respondents) audits, although 17 of 456 total respondents reported three audits and nine respondents reported more than three audits.

Overall, administrators report that the auditing process is an important motivation for DA change. Figure 4 shows that approximately 93 percent (385 of 412) of respondents believe the overall audit process has had at least some influence on changes in their DA over the past year.


Figure 4: Overall audit influence on change in DA (n=412)



Ninety-nine percent of respondents in both the audit and control groups report their DA having an Audit Report Implementation Committee (ARIC). Seventy-two percent (306 of 427 respondents) indicate that the ARIC influenced the process for how the district contracts and oversees projects in the year preceding the interview. While the ARIC is reported to have influenced contracting and oversight on average in both

the performance audit and control districts, administrators in audited districts are significantly more likely to report that the ARIC influenced the district's contracting and oversight in the 12 months prior to their interviews than administrators in control districts. As shown in Figure 5, the performance audit increased the probability of reporting the ARIC has influenced (either a little or a lot) contracting and oversight by approximately 12 percentage points. Given the nature of the performance audits, this is likely an area where the effects of the audits will be more pronounced, at least in the short run.

**Figure 5: Percentage of respondents reporting ARIC influenced contracting and oversight (n=427)**



We identify responses specifically concerning the GAS audit by examining responses to the question, “What was the focus of the audit?” We adopt a conservative strategy and first identify any audit that the respondents report to be a performance audit or both a financial and performance audit. In cases where a respondent offered open-ended responses to describe the type of audit (rather than select a specific type of audit from the default categories offered by the enumerators), we determine the nature of the audit by matching the text responses to the words “performance,” “both,” or “financial” using a matching algorithm. We then manually check the matches to ensure success. We repeat this process for each audit reported by each respondent. To further reduce the probability that we falsely identify an audit as the GAS audit, we drop all cases where more than one performance audit is reported and subset the data to keep only interviews with those administrators in the districts we know were subject to performance audits. This conservative approach leaves us with 93 interviews where we can reliably infer that individual responses to questions about a specific audit are describing the GAS audit.


Respondents generally perceived the GAS audit results to be positive and to have had a positive effect on district outcomes and processes. Sixty-five percent of respondents stated that the results were positive, four percent indicated the results were negative, and the remaining 31 percent reported neutral results. When prompted to provide a qualitative summary of the results of the GAS audit, one administrator acknowledged non-participation of the community in the planning of the initial stages of projects was cited as an area for improvement. Another reported that the audit found that DDF projects were more likely to be completed on time than Common Fund projects since the former funds are more regular and less subject to delay. Administrators also indicated that the audit had motivated an emphasis on completion of old projects prior to beginning new projects. Among those who do not perceive a change in budgeting, the most common reported reason was that the audit raised no issues concerning the AAP.

Among those indicating that the GAS audit led to changes in the preparation of the coming year's budget and AAP, 64 percent (28 of 44 respondents) further report that the audit encouraged changes to current contracting and procurement processes. For example, some administrators report the audit led to the

adoption of a policy of communication with the losers of bids. One respondent mentions an emphasis on working with VAT registered companies.

Finally, 56 percent (24 of 43 respondents) who perceive the performance audits to have affected DA budgeting practice for the coming year report the audit encouraged changes to internal auditing processes. The most common specified change is the adoption of pre-auditing of PVs. These findings are summarized in Figure 6.

**Figure 6: Percentage of respondents reporting different changes due to performance audit (n=43)**




## **OUTCOME I: DISTRICT CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SERVICE DELIVERY**

A key goal of G-SAM is to improve the procedures adopted in the development and execution of Annual Action Plans (AAPs), the district budget plans directing spending to specific projects within the district. In this section we explore the evidence from the midline survey regarding the extent to which G-SAM influenced the ongoing development of the district AAPs and service delivery. Specifically, we look at (1) the AAP development process, (2) project location decisions, and (3) contracting and construction. At the time of the midline interviews, 69 percent of respondents indicated that their district had prepared a draft AAP for the forthcoming fiscal year. Somewhat contrary to the previous section, in this section, experimental evidence does not show the expected positive midline impacts on capital development projects. Nonetheless, the audits could be having some positive consequences. Respondents in audit districts are somewhat more likely than their peers to report problems; this could indicate greater awareness of problems as a result of the audits.

### **AAP DEVELOPMENT PROCESS**

One mechanism by which the performance audits may influence the budgeting process is to reduce the extent of changes to the initial draft budget. As Figure 7 shows, administrators in the performance audit districts are approximately seven percentage points less likely to expect that either a “large number” or “some” important changes will be made to the initial draft budget for the coming year – a difference that falls just below statistical significance. Instead, they are more likely to believe that few or no important changes will be made.

**Figure 7: Percentage of respondents expecting "a lot" or "some" changes to initial draft budget**




We find that 84 percent (390 of 467 respondents) expect the preparation of the upcoming year's AAP to proceed in about the same manner as in previous years and 89 percent (409 of 455 respondents) perceive the execution of the current/ongoing AAP to be proceeding in about the same manner as in previous years. Furthermore, we fail to find significant differences in the administrators' expectations between the treatment districts and the control districts. The endline offers an opportunity to explore in more detail the patterns of change following the initial draft budget to develop a clearer understanding of the processes that can connect the changes in expectations surrounding the number of changes that will be made to the initial draft and the actual changes. As of midline, however, there is little evidence of a significant impact of the audits on the AAP development process.

## **PROJECT LOCATION**

While district politicians and administrators may allocate resources in response to political pressures that reflect legitimate needs and concerns, in other cases development projects may be located in areas where need is less pronounced and the relative returns to the allocation of projects is low. Figure 8 summarizes the distribution of administrators' perceptions of the single most important determinant of the preferences of District Assembly members over the locations of development projects in their own district.

**Figure 8: Perceived determinants of assembly project location preferences (%) (n=486)**




As shown Figure 8, administrators believe that their DA allocates development projects largely on the basis of three factors: local needs (70 percent), equity concerns (14 percent), and the rewarding of political supporters (8 percent). The finding that the needs of the community play an important reported role in the location of projects but that other, political interests also are reported as influential mirrors the findings of the baseline report. Similar results are found for administrator perceptions of the motivations of the DCE: most administrators believe the DCE prefers to allocate development projects largely on the basis of local needs, equity concerns, and the rewarding of political supporters. In general, however, administrators are more likely to view the motivation of the DCE in allocating projects as more political than the motivation of the DA members.

While it is possible that the GAS audits might indirectly alter the motivations driving the development project location preferences of the DCE or DA, it is not surprising that we do not find evidence that the audits affected administrator perceptions of the motivations of the DCE and DA. The performance audits themselves were not primarily aimed at addressing the politicization of project location. It is likely that any such changes will be realized through public pressure rather than internal incentivization and therefore would become manifest only following the dissemination campaign.

## **CONTRACTING AND CONSTRUCTION**

Contracting decisions and construction also offer numerous opportunities for the inefficient and fraudulent distribution of public resources. As seen at baseline, there is some evidence of political influence in the contracting process, although as shown in Figure 9, administrators report that the most important factor in determining the selection of contractors for large development projects is the contractor's qualifications. The second most commonly perceived determinant of contractor selection is the contractor's political affiliation. There is no evidence of significant differences between the treatment and control districts in the prevalence of perceptions that contracts are foremost awarded through political affiliation. These perceptions may be quite persistent and therefore a better test of changes in perceptions of the important determinants of the distribution of projects may emerge in the endline.


**Figure 9: Most important determinant of large project contracts (% of respondents)**



Outside of the favoring of party loyalists in the contracting process, contracting outcomes could be hampered through other mechanisms that reduce the competitiveness of contracting or lead to inefficiencies in budgeting. To assess the prevalence of these outcomes and whether the audits affected outcomes in contracting and construction, respondents were asked how often they observed various events relating to inefficiencies, lack of competition, or fraud in contracting and construction in the six months prior to their interviews. We converted these to binary variables indicating if the respondent reports seeing the event “very frequently,” “frequently,” or “occasionally” as opposed to “rarely” or “never.”


Contrary to expectations, we find that administrators in audited districts are approximately six percentage points more likely to report observing contractors abandoning projects for which they had received advance payment with high frequency in the six months prior to their interviews, although this is estimated imprecisely and is not statistically significant. This could result from the findings of the GAS audit itself or greater sensitivity on the part of officials to this issue courtesy of the audit process. Figure 10 shows the percentage of audited districts and control districts that report abandoned projects after payment.

**Figure 10: Percentage of respondents reporting abandoned projects after payment "very frequently," "frequently," or "occasionally"**



In the same vein, we also examined differences between the audited and control districts with regard to the frequency with which administrators observed fewer than the required number of qualified contractors for competitive bidding submit bids. As illustrated by the difference in the percentages in Figure 11, administrators in audited districts are approximately eight percentage points more likely to report observing a lack of bidders for competitive contracting with high frequency in the six months prior to their interviews, although the differences are statistically insignificant.


**Figure 11: Proportion reporting insufficient contractor bids "very frequently," "frequently," or "occasionally"**



While the results are estimated imprecisely, the confidence intervals are not enormous for these estimates. If we invite the possibility that we may be imprecisely identifying an effect of the audit, this could indicate that things are getting somewhat worse in the GAS treatment districts, but that seems very unlikely given the nature of the programming. It seems more likely that the performance audits would have increased administrators' access to information about these problems or sensitized them to these issues in a way they were not before the audits.

Furthermore, we do not find evidence of differences in the frequency with which construction costs exceed their budgeted amounts and projects finish on time. This last null finding is notable given that many respondents reported that major capital projects often are not completed on time, as demonstrated in the below illustration of the distribution of administrator estimates of the percentage of major capital projects that had finished on time in the six months prior to the interviews.

**Figure 12: Distribution of reported proportions of capital projects completed on time in the past 6 months**




## OUTCOME II: GOVERNANCE QUALITY

This section focuses on administrators’ perceptions of corruption and the politicization of the management of public resources, particularly paying attention to the role of corruption in the development of the AAPs and obstacles to realizing better development projects in their districts. It is important to note that many of questions are subject to social desirability bias, as public officials are likely to understate problems like corruption. In fact, baseline evidence demonstrated large differences between perceptions of corruption between public officials and citizens. In anticipation of this problem, the evaluation includes several innovative survey experiments that avoid such bias. In this section, we find that administrators in treatment areas are more likely than their peers in control districts to report corruption in their district. As suggested above, this could be the result of greater awareness of corruption. The survey experiment also suggests that political favoritism is lower in treatment areas.

The baseline report found that an “overwhelming majority of respondents do not find corruption to be a significant problem in the development of AAPs.” The midline echoes this: 81 percent (382 of 473 respondents) of respondents report that corruption is “not at all” a problem in the development of AAPs while a lower 65 percent (305 of 470 respondents) of respondents report that corruption is not at all a problem in the execution of AAPs. The occurrence of a performance audit is associated with a modest increase in the propensity to report problematic corruption in the execution of ADPs, although the effect is estimated imprecisely ( $p=0.15$ ). As above, this could either indicate an increase of corruption in treatment areas, or more probably increased awareness of corrupt practices in AAP execution. The

proportions of respondents in the audit and control districts responding that corruption in the execution of AAPs is either a “significant problem” or “somewhat of a problem” are presented in Figure 13.

**Figure 13: Percentage of respondents reporting corruption as a "significant problem" or "somewhat of a problem" in AAP execution (n=473)**



While corruption in AAP development and execution is generally not seen to be a significant problem overall, there is some evidence that corruption is recognized as an obstacle to building better development projects. In looking ahead to the next budget year, 59 percent (276 of 469) of respondents "strongly agree" or "agree" that corruption among contractors will represent a significant obstacle to obtaining better development projects in their district in the next AAP. Similarly, 56 percent (266 of 477) of respondents strongly agree or agree that corruption among district public officials will represent a big obstacle to building better development projects.


The finding that corruption is generally not reported to be a problem even by respondents who acknowledge that corruption among contractors and public officials represents large obstacles to better development projects is on its face contradictory. This could be evidence of a social desirability bias as administrators have little incentive to provide accurate responses and strong incentives to avoid reporting corruption or clientelistic practices. On the other hand, some respondents may view corruption overall to be largely unproblematic but recognize the problems created by specific corrupt practices.

We can minimize social desirability bias through a list experiment. As in the baseline, respondents were asked, "How many of the following things have you seen regularly?" The question was followed up with the statement, "Please do not tell me the specific answers, only how many." Respondents were randomly assigned to observe one of two different sets of events. In one condition, respondents are provided with a list of three different events they might typically observe in their communities: citizens requesting financial assistance, office supplies running short, and employees attending job training seminars. In the other condition, respondents receive the same list plus (for a total of four) one additional event: government officials providing members of their political party with privileged access to public resources. Using this design, we can infer that the difference in the mean number of events reported between the two groups reflects an estimate of the proportion of the population that has seen government officials providing members of their political party with privileged access to public resources.

At baseline, we estimated through the list experiment that 40 percent of administrators had seen such behavior of government officials. Figure 14 presents the mean response for four possible treatment

conditions at midline: GAS audited districts that did not receive the sensitive list item; GAS audited districts that did receive the sensitive item; control districts that did not receive the sensitive item; and control districts that did receive the sensitive item. We find that the proportion of respondents (486 in total) who report having observed government officials providing members of their political party with privileged access to public resources varies significantly between audited and control districts, with a lower proportion in the audited districts. The lack of a difference between treatment and control in GAS audited districts and the substantial difference between them and the true control group provides further clues that the performance audits have increased information about the amount of corruption and perhaps sensitized officials to it such that reporting corruption is less sensitive than it used to be.

**Figure 14: Mean reported survey experiment items by audit and survey experiment condition**



In addition to administrators reporting that corruption represents an obstacle to better development projects, a large portion of administrators strongly agreed or agreed that a host of other factors were obstacles to building better development projects. Table 2 presents the percentage of respondents in each of the control and audit groups identifying different factors as such obstacles.

**Table 2: Percentage of administrators' "agree/strongly agree" factors are obstacles to building better development projects in their districts by experimental condition**

Obstacle	Control	Audit
Citizen Non-Participation in Planning and Oversight	72	82
Political Pressure to Start Too Many Projects	61	63
Insufficient or Underqualified Staff	55	61
Need to Respond to Central Government	58	64
Influence of the Chiefs	44	42
Limited Discretionary Authority over DA Common Fund Resources	69	69

One finding from the table of obstacles to development is that many administrators believe political pressure incentivizes the initialization of many projects. This could impede better economic development by stretching resources too thinly. More fundamentally, it suggests there are incentives to start but not complete projects or not complete them at a high level of quality. Administrators were asked specifically about the extent of their agreement that district politicians win votes by starting development projects in an area, even if the projects are not completed. Sixty-six percent of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement.

## **OUTCOME III: ACCOUNTABILITY**

This section examines the accountability of administrators and other public employees, specifically hiring and turnover rates of administrative official and the responsiveness of administrators' offices to public, private, and non-profit actors. We observe no improvements in recruitment practices or responses in treatment districts *vis-a-vis* control districts; however, it is likely too early in the intervention to observe such impacts.

### **RECRUITMENT AND TURNOVER**

As the audit results had not been publicized as of the midline interviews, it is unlikely that notable changes to recruitment and turnover have taken place. We expect the information campaign to exhibit a much larger effect on employment decisions. Our finding that the number of years respondents had spent in their current professional position (a proxy for turnover) does not differ across the audit and control districts reinforces this notion. We further examined whether there were any reported differences between the audit and control districts in the degree to which hiring decisions relied on meritocracy versus connections (such as knowing the hiring manager, party connections, and tribal connections), bribery, and favors, but found little systematic evidence that hiring practices had changed as of the midline interviews.

### **RESPONSIVENESS**

Understanding the responsiveness of administrators to different entities assists in identifying the incentives and pressures placed on administrators to pursue certain behaviors, such as their response to the performance audits. Administrators were read a list of people and agencies that their offices might involve in the preparation of the coming year's AAP and were asked toward which entity their office was most responsive and toward which entity their office was second most responsive.

It is clear that administrators consider their office as typically most responsive to the public. Of 403 respondents who ranked only two options as instructed, 55 percent ranked the public as the entity to which their office is most responsive. In comparison, only five percent of respondents indicate that their office is most responsive to the national agency overseeing their work and 12 percent indicate that their office is most responsive to the DCE. As expected, we do not find sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that the audits affected the degree to which administrators' offices are responsive to the public, as measured by administrators reporting their offices being most responsive to the public.

# MIDLINE FINDINGS: POLITICIAN SURVEY

This section presents our summary of findings from the midline survey of district-level politicians. This sample includes elected members of the District Assemblies, presidentially appointed members of the DAs, and DCEs, who are also appointed by the President. We follow the baseline sampling strategy and intentionally aimed to sample the political officials most closely associated with the development and implementation of the AAPs.

While the administrators were often extremely knowledgeable about the details and history of audits, budgeting, and contracting, the politicians were typically much less so. This might reflect the possibility that politicians do not necessarily immerse themselves in contracting or hiring decisions on a routine basis (at least at the level of detail we asked), but it also likely reflects the fact that many of those in our sample had been elected to office for the first time in October 2015. As a result, they had yet to develop a strong knowledge of the history and details of many of the processes of interest to the evaluation. Combined with the relative scarcity of politician time, this led to much higher rates of "Don't Know" responses and non-response than found in the administrative official results.

## RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS

The midline survey covered a total politician sample of 487 politicians across 98 districts. As was the case of the administrative officials, the total sample covers slightly less than the entirety of the 100 districts assigned to the audit and control experimental conditions and 500 politicians in those districts.

The demographic composition of the midline politician sample differs slightly from the demographic composition of the baseline sample. Ninety-five percent (464) of the interviewed politicians are male (compared with 91 percent in the baseline). The politician sample is significantly less educated than the administrative official sample: 77 (16 percent) of the interviewed politicians report their highest level of education as the completion of post-graduate education and 261 (54 percent) politicians report having completed university studies or additional education beyond university studies. As the distribution of the ethnic/cultural group representation in the politician survey shows, the politician sample is also diverse in its representation of ethnic and cultural groups.

**Table 3: Distribution of politicians by identity group**

Identity Group	Percentage	Frequency
Mande	1%	4
Gurma	2%	10
Ga-Adangbe	4%	20
Grusi	5%	26
Guan	6%	29
Ewe	12%	57
Mole-Dagbani	12%	57
Other	12%	58
Akan	46%	226
Total	100%	487

The politicians in our sample have, on average, spent 34 years living in their current district of residence, and the average politician is 45 years old. Despite the relatively long residential tenure of the population, a large portion (52 percent) of the politician sample (excluding DCEs) are currently serving their first term in the DA. Prior to their current job, 64 percent worked in another public sector institution and 16 percent worked in the private sector. Excluding the DCE, about 93 percent of elected respondents reported their own savings as one of the two most important sources for financing their campaign. However, about 30 percent of non-DCE respondents were appointed rather than elected, which matches the 30 percent of representatives of the DAs that are officially appointed by the President. The midline politician samples in the audited and control districts are not significantly different on sex, education, residential tenure, and professional tenure, although politicians in the audited districts are about two years younger in age on average.

## **G-SAM AWARENESS AND INFLUENCE**


This section focuses on politician perceptions and awareness of the G-SAM performance audit and other audits. Many of the same questions asked of administrative officials were asked of politicians, and due to space considerations, we therefore have minimize repeating the descriptions of procedures and survey wording that is discussed earlier in the administrative survey section where possible.

As previously noted, non-response and missing values were highly prevalent in the politician survey for the more specific questions concerning auditing, budgeting, and procurement. Most significantly, only 277 politicians (57 percent of the total politician sample) were able to report the number of audits in their districts. Additional non-response on follow-up questions regarding the details of each specific audit further reduces the sample size. This non-response is likely a systematic result of politicians possessing little awareness of the auditing process and its ramifications. For example, when asked, “Overall, how influential do you think the audits have been in motivating change in your DA?” more than half of the total sample (52 percent of the 487 interviewed politicians) responded that they did not know. Given the limited statistical power in such instances, we focus more on description rather than statistical analysis.

Of the 487 total politicians interviewed, 378 reported that their DA has an ARIC, 96 respondents reported that they did not know if their DA has an ARIC, and 13 reported that their DA does not have an ARIC. In general, the ARIC is seen as influential in district affairs. Of the 308 politicians providing an opinion on the influence of the ARIC, eighty-three percent of respondents indicated that over the last year the ARIC has had a lot or a little influence on how their district contracts and oversees projects (versus having no influence). This is substantially higher than the proportion reported in the administrative official survey.

Figure 15 shows the proportion of politicians (among the aforementioned population who provided an opinion) reporting the ARIC has some (non-zero) influence on district contracts and project oversight, broken out by the audit and control districts. While those in the audit districts tend to report the ARIC has influenced outcomes at higher rates than in the control districts, the result is statistically insignificant.

Figure 15: Percentage of respondents reporting ARIC influenced contracting and oversight



Of those politicians reporting audits in their district, approximately 79 percent reported one audit in their district while 19 percent reported two audits. Although those who reported audits in their districts therefore inadvertently facilitated identification of the GAS audit by virtue of only requiring us to identify the GAS audit out of a small number of audits, few reported strictly performance audits which could be easily identifies as the GAS audit. We nevertheless repeat the same strategy to identify the GAS audits as discussed in the administrative survey section. Our sample is reduced dramatically and we are left with 37 responses identifiable as GAS audits. Given the small sample size and plausibly systematic non-response, any descriptive statistics we report should be interpreted with caution.

Politicians knowledgeable about GAS audits in their district generally indicate that the GAS audit results were positive and affected district outcomes and processes. Twenty-seven of 37 (73 percent) state that the results were positive, two (five percent) indicate the results were negative, and the remaining eight (23 percent) report the results were neutral. The findings of the audits varied in a non-systematic fashion. Notably, it was reported that in one case there was a lack of citizen input into project locations.

Twenty-three of the 37 (63 percent) indicated that the GAS performance audit motivated the DA to make changes in how it was preparing the coming year's budget and AAP. This is substantially lower than the percentages reported by the administrators. Among those who perceive the performance audits to have affected DA budgeting practices regarding the coming year's budget, the most common reported changes from the politicians' qualitative responses are the adoption of better documentation of the award of contracts and better monitoring for projects. Administrators also indicated that the audit had motivated an emphasis on completion of old projects prior to beginning new projects. As above, the most common reported reason for why no changes occurred following the audit was that no issues were raised concerning the AAP. Due to limited sample sizes, we are unable to examine additional ways in which the audits may have motivated change in the DA.

## OUTCOME I: DISTRICT CAPITAL PROJECTS AND SERVICE DELIVERY

In this section we explore the evidence from the politician midline survey regarding the extent to which G-SAM influenced the development of the district AAPs and service delivery.


In line with the administrator survey, three positions/entities are seen as exhibiting the greatest influence on the development of the first budget draft in districts where draft budgets had been developed at the time of the interviews: the District Budget Officer (38 percent of the 281 respondents choosing from among major political and fiscal actors) followed by the District Planning Coordinating Unit (26 percent of respondents) and the District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council (17 percent of respondents).

## AAP DEVELOPMENT AND PROCESSES

Development of a draft AAP earlier in the fiscal year may be indicative of a more efficient budgetary system or perhaps of greater consensus over fiscal priorities. A performance audit may yield both by coordinating expectations of the appropriateness of certain procedures and substantive decisions that are part of budget development and planning.

Unlike in the administrator survey, we find a significant effect of the performance audits on the propensity of politicians to report an initial AAP for the upcoming fiscal year had been developed as of as of the time of their respective interview. Those in districts subject to the audits were nearly 13 percentage points more likely to report that a draft AAP had been prepared, as demonstrated in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Percentage of respondents reporting draft AAP prepared for coming fiscal year




The fact that we did not find this result in the administrator survey may be the result of a lack of statistical power or it could alternatively indicate poor information flows between the administrators and the DA. Whether the performance audit affects consensus and expectations regarding what an AAP should look like and how it should be developed is an open question that could be explored in the endline. While approximately 84 percent of administrators thought that the preparation of the upcoming year's AAP would proceed in about the same manner as in previous years and 89 percent thought the execution of the current AAP would also proceed in the same manner, politicians have somewhat different views on planning relative to execution. We find that 78 percent of politicians (312 of 402 respondents) expect the preparation of the upcoming year's AAP to proceed in about the same manner as in previous years and 90 percent (339 of 375 respondents) to perceive that the execution of the current/ongoing AAP is proceeding in about the same manner. This difference suggests that the politicians believe the planning of the upcoming AAP may be somewhat more controversial than the execution of the current AAP.

Politicians in the performance audit districts have an approximately seven percent lower probability of believing the planning will proceed as in the past, although this is not a significant difference.

## PROJECT LOCATION

In the administrative official section, we examined administrative officials' perceptions of the determinants of DCE and DA members' preferences for the locations of development projects. Here we examine the self-reported determinants of DA members' preferences over the locations of development projects. Although the performance audits are not primarily focused on project location, the implementation of the audits may nevertheless nudge politicians away from choosing locations based on rewarding political supporters if doing so detracts from performance elsewhere. In other words, the implementation of the performance audits may have altered the calculus by which politicians develop preferences over different locations, such as by making it more difficult to use projects to reward political supports or otherwise increasing the risks of moving project away from their area of greatest return. Figure 17 illustrates the distribution of responses to the question: "What is the single most important influence on where you want development projects to be located?" The results are remarkably consistent with the administrators' perceptions of the motivations of DA members.

**Figure 17: Assembly member development project location preferences (n=487)**



While a vast majority stated that targeting areas with the highest relative need most heavily influenced where they want development projects to be located, making sure everyone gets an equal share was the second most common greatest influence and rewarding political supporters the third most. Somewhat surprisingly, some respondents even openly acknowledge that they prefer to target projects toward undecided voters. Recognizing potential social desirability bias, we should anticipate little effect of the audits on reported project location preferences, if only because there is little room for improvement. However, the promulgation of information about the audits is expected to heavily influence a host of other aspects of projects.


## CONTRACTING AND CONSTRUCTION

Contracting for infrastructure is a fairly common event in many districts. Seventy-four percent (359) of the politicians in our sample report that in the last six months their DA has been involved in contracting for infrastructure. While politicians may be hesitant to report corruption in their districts, let alone specifying the specific areas where they have observed that corruption, we rely on another list experiment to discern the extent to which politicians are aware that contracts are being awarded corruptly in their districts. Using a list experiment, we can estimate the prevalence of politician awareness of corrupt contracting and examine whether the observance of corruption in contracting varies across audited and control districts.

The list experiment began by stating to the politician, “Now I will provide you with a list of things that people mention as part of awarding a contract in some DAs. Please tell me how many of them happen regularly in your DA. Please do not tell me the specific answers, only how many.” Respondents were then randomly assigned to view a list of three events relating to contracting or to view a list of four events related to contracting. In the three-events case, this list included the comparison of multiple competing bids, potential contractors lobbying the President to get the contract, and the district engineer reviews the contract. The only difference between the list of three events (the control group) and the list of four events (the treatment group) was the inclusion of “contracts being awarded corruptly” as an additional event.

The plot below shows the means for the four possible experimental conditions (the same four conditions described above for the similar list experiment on administrators). Given that the differences between the treatment and control groups in reported counts of events are expected to reflect the proportion of respondents perceiving the regular occurrence of contracts being awarded corruptly, we estimate that ten percent of respondents to the survey experiment perceived regular corruption in the awarding of contracts. Meanwhile, we estimate that approximately 25 percent of politicians in the control districts perceived regular corruption in the awarding of controls. While in general we find that politicians on average have observed corrupt contracting in their districts, we do not find evidence that these effects vary significantly between audit and control districts.

Figure 18: Contracting survey experiment mean items by audit and survey experiment condition




## OUTCOME II: GOVERNANCE QUALITY

While we previously examined the perceptions of governance quality from the administrator sample, the perceptions of politicians are likely to differ in systematic ways. Expectations of their constituents - either the President in the case of appointees or voters in the case of elected members – seem likely to weigh more heavily on them. This has an important implication for the consequences of the performance audits and information campaign: changes in motivations to engage in poor governance practices may differ between the administrative official and politician populations.

Overall, politicians report that corruption in the AAP process is quite low. Seventy-two percent (322) of respondents (445) indicate that corruption is "not at all" a problem in the preparation of the AAP while only six percent (25) indicate it is a "significant problem." The distribution of politician responses to a question assessing respondent's perceptions of how problematic corruption is in AAP development is shown in Figure 19.


Figure 19: To what extent is corruption a problem in AAP preparation? (n=445)



These findings are comparable to the findings in the administrator survey that corruption in the development of the AAP is not generally perceived as a significant problem. While the politicians in the audit districts on average are more likely to think that corruption in the development of the AAP is a significant problem or somewhat of a problem than those in the control districts, the difference is not significant.


While corruption is generally not perceived to be a problem in AAP development, it is seen as slightly more of a problem in the execution of the AAP. Figure 20 shows the distribution of politician responses to a similar question soliciting assessments of how problematic corruption is in the execution of the AAP. While 64 percent (of respondents think corruption is “not at all a problem” in the execution of the AAP, approximately 22 percent think it is somewhat of a problem or a significant problem. The key insight is that politicians tend to view corruption in the execution of the AAP as more problematic than corruption in the development of the AAP. This distribution is similar to the perception of administrators.

Figure 20: To what extent is corruption a problem in AAP execution? (n=442)



In the administrative official survey, we found some evidence for a small increase in the probability of reporting problematic corruption in the execution of the AAP as a result of the performance audit. The findings from the politician survey reinforce this. We find that politicians in the audited districts are approximately eight percentage points more likely to report that corruption in the execution of the AAP is either a significant problem or somewhat of a problem. This effect is statistically significant. These findings are summarized in Figure 21.

Figure 21: Perception of corruption in AAP execution as a "significant problem" or "somewhat of a problem"



### OUTCOME III: ACCOUNTABILITY

We do not expect meaningful exercises of accountability in instances of underwhelming politician and administrative official performance prior to the information dissemination campaigns. As a result, to

untangle the mechanisms by which politicians may be held accountable following the information meetings, we examine the actors toward whom the politicians in our sample are most responsive. As in the case of the administrator sample, politician respondents were read a list of people and agencies that their offices might involve in the preparation of the coming year's AAP. Enumerators then asked them to rank the entity toward which their office was most responsive and the entity toward which their office was second most responsive.

Unsurprisingly, the politicians consider their office as typically most responsive to the public. Of 411 respondents who ranked only two options as instructed, 77 percent ranked the public as the entity toward which their office is most responsive. In comparison, only two percent of respondents indicate that their office is most responsive to the national agency overseeing their work and seven percent indicate that their office is most responsive to the DCE.

While these results are not unexpected, it is reassuring that politicians indeed report to be most responsive to the public. If the politicians are indeed most responsive to the public then not only should we be able to map the public's responses to the informational meeting to the responses of the politicians, but it also holds promise for the possibility of realizing substantial improvements in the project's outcomes of interest.

# CONCLUSION

Overall, the midline findings suggest that the GAS audits are having some influence on how DAs function, despite the fact that the data collection occurred before GAS/CARE's dissemination events and broader efforts to inform the public of the results. These results are more evident among DA administrators than politicians. In particular, administrators in districts subject to G-SAM performance audits report a number of changes in district planning, auditing, and procurement. Indicators show awareness of audit procedures with evidence that those processes have improved DA monitoring and contract practices. The data also point to a greater influence of ARICs and planned improvements to budgets and the AAP in GAS districts. Furthermore, the results highlight several early behavioral changes that the GAS intervention may have prompted, including changes to budget drafting and improved administrative oversight and monitoring of projects. Finally, both administrators and politicians in GAS districts seem more likely to report corruption in the execution of the AAP, which may be driven by increased sensitization and awareness due to the GAS audits. As indicated above, some of these findings are suggestive, if not statistically significant.

Responsiveness to the public remains unchanged since baseline, and represents a key endline outcome of interest. We expect to see some movement on these indicators following the implementation of the public information and scorecard campaigns.

While we find some statistical evidence of effects of the audits, it is worth noting the challenges to identifying statistically significant effects via the midline survey. In addition to the midline survey estimates relying on a relatively small sample size, especially for politicians, we expect that many of the anticipated effects of the performance audits require a longer period of time to manifest themselves than the duration of the period between the performance audits and the start of the midline interviews. Nevertheless, the findings from the administrative official survey show promise for the next phase of the G-SAM project. We are optimistic that the large n household data collected during endline will offer an opportunity to not only reliably identify the total effect of the G-SAM project, but also to further explore the findings highlighted in this report.

# ANNEX I: EXAMPLE OF GAS PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT



## DRAFT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CAPITAL PROJECTS BY WA EAST DISTRICT ASSEMBLY

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BoQ	Bills of Quantity
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DA	District Assembly
DACF	District Assembly Common Fund
DCE	District Chief Executive
DDF	District Development Facility
DPCU	District Planning Coordinating Unit
DWD	District Works Department
FOAT	Functional Organisational Assessment Tool
GAS	Ghana Audit Service
GoG	Government of Ghana
G-SAM	Ghana's Strengthening Accountability Mechanism
HND	Higher National Diploma
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
LI	Legislative Instrument
IPC	Interim Payment Certificate
KVIP	Kumasi Ventilated Improve Pit
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MTDP	Medium Term Development Plan
NCT	National Competitive Tendering
NVTI	National Vocational and Technical Institute
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
PRO	Public Relations Officer
PV	Payment Voucher
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WEDA	Wa East District Assembly

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **I. Reasons for the Audit**

Ghana's Strengthening Accountability Mechanism (GSAM) project is a five (5) year USAID funded project. It focuses on strengthening citizens' oversight of capital development projects to improve local government transparency, accountability and performance. District Assemblies spend large sums of the tax payer's money in executing capital projects in various communities within their jurisdiction. For example the Wa East Assembly (WEDA) between 2010 and 2014 spent GH¢ 252,483.91 on capital projects. This significant amount budgeted and expended by WEDA in executing its capital projects makes it imperative to ensure value for money in managing them.

2. As a result, GSAM is designed to strengthen social accountability by improving information to Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) to enhance their capacity to demand accountability. Ghana's decentralisation process was to build the capacity of Government departments and agencies in order for them to manage their development process at the local level. The District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) and the District Development Fund (DDF) are the two main sources of funding capital projects of the District Assemblies.

3. Concerned with the purpose of the GSAM programme, and the monies involved in executing capital projects, USAID/GHANA Mission is supporting the Ghana Audit Service to audit 50 selected District Assemblies (DAs). Against this background, the Auditor General in line with the Audit Service Act, Act 584, Section 13e, commissioned a performance audit of capital projects in each of the selected District Assemblies in the areas of planning, budgeting, procurement, monitoring and evaluation and post project evaluation of capital projects.

#### **I.1 Purpose of the Audit**

4. The purpose of the audit was to ascertain whether:
- the measures in place for the Assembly to provide accountability to the public in relation to capital projects were effective, and
  - the Assembly implemented capital projects in accordance with sound administrative principles and practices.

#### **I.2 Scope of the Audit**

5. The team carried out the audit in the Wa East District Assembly from April 2015 – June 2015. The audit covered the period 2010 to 2014 and focused on:

##### **I.2.1 Initiation of the project**

- i. identification, selection and planning of the projects
- ii. budgeting and financing of the project

##### **I.2.2 Pre-contract service**

- i. tendering and award of contract

##### **I.2.3 Post contract Service**

- i. monitoring and supervision of contractors/consultants
- ii. evaluation and payment for work done
- iii. status reporting, governance and accountability (variation, fluctuations and approvals)

#### 1.2.4 Post contract evaluation

- i. assessment of the impacts of completed projects on the communities.

### **Audit Questions and Assessment Criteria**

6. The audit questions we sought to answer with the corresponding assessment criteria are provided in Appendix A.

## **1.4 Methods and Implementation**

### 1.4.1 Selection of projects

7. The team selected the construction of a 3-Unit classroom block with ancillary facilities at Saawobe and the construction of the Ghana Education Service (GES) office block at Finsi out of 28 educational related projects executed by the WEDA within the audit period. The cost of the 3-Unit classroom block with ancillary facilities at Saawobe was GH¢120,695.46 being the most expensive followed by the GES office the cost of which was GH¢92,012.87. The Saawobe project was funded from the District Development Facility (DDF) whilst the Finsi project was funded through the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF).

### 1.4.2 Documents reviewed

8. The audit team reviewed documents to obtain information on how the Assembly's selected projects were planned, initiated, selected and executed. Details of documents reviewed are attached as Appendix B.

### 1.4.3 Interviews

9. We interviewed officials of the Sissala East District Assembly to enable the team obtain information on the planning, initiation, and execution of the selected projects. List of officials interviewed is attached as Appendix C.

### 1.4.4 Inspections

10. The audit team inspected the two selected projects to gather detailed information on their status and whether the projects were executed according to specifications.

## **CHAPTER TWO: DESCRIPTION OF THE AUDIT AREA**

### **2.0 Historical Background**

11. Since gaining independence in 1957, successive governments in Ghana have looked to a vibrant local government system to aid the country's development. Attempts at decentralisation were introduced, particularly, in 1983 under the PNDC regime. The Government of Ghana (GoG) in 1988 embarked upon the implementation of a comprehensive decentralization policy and local government reform programme aimed at establishing efficient decentralised government machinery as a means to provide strong support for participatory development. This was further given a boost in Article 240 (1) of the 1992 Constitution.

12. In March 2007, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development issued a Draft Comprehensive Decentralisation Policy Framework with the objective to "...deepen political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation in Ghana and to reaffirm the Government's commitment to the policy of decentralisation in conjunction with people's participation." District Assemblies are the local government units in Ghana. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides that a District Assembly is the highest political authority in the district, and that the District Assembly has deliberative, legislative and executive powers.

13. The District Assemblies deliver many services, such as pre- and primary education, social welfare, health clinics, libraries, water and sanitation, refuse collection, environmental protection and many more. The provision of all these services requires the execution of capital projects. To improve the performance of the District Assemblies (DAs)' efficiency, accountability and delivery of basic community services Ghana introduced the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) and a performance based grant system, the District Development Facility (DDF).

### **2.1 Wa East District Profile**

14. The Wa East District was carved out of the former Wa District and made a district by L.I. 1746 in July 2004. The district is located in the southeastern part of the Upper West region. Funi, the district capital is about 115 km East of WA which is the regional capital. The district shares boundaries with West Mamprusi to the northwest, West Gonja to southeast, Wa Municipality to the Southwest, Nadowli to the North East and the Sissala East District to the North. It has a landmass of about 3,196.40km<sup>2</sup>, which is located between latitudes 9°55'n and 10°25'n and longitude 1°10'W and 2°5'W. The district occupies 17.3 percent of the total landmass of the region (18,478.4Km<sup>2</sup>). It has a population of 72,0749 as at the year 2010.

### **2.2 Statutory Mandate**

15. The composition, powers and duties of the different types of District Assemblies are prescribed in the Local Government Act of 1993. The main legislative texts pertaining to local government are:

- Civil Service Law 1993 (PNDCL 327)
- Local Government Act No. 462 of 1993
- National Development Planning (System) Act 480 of 1994
- National Development Planning Commission Act 479 of 1994
- District Assemblies' Common Fund Act 455 of 1993
- Local Government (District Tender Boards) Establishment Regulations (which has now been repealed)

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<sup>9</sup> 2010 Population and Housing Census

- Local Government Service Act 656 of 2003, (and other legislation pertaining to administration of local government and central government personnel at local level)
- Institute of Local Government Studies Act 647 of 2003, and
- A range of finance legislation, such as the District Assemblies Common Fund Act No. 455 of 1993, and local government fiscal regulations.

### 2.3 Functions of the Wa East District Assembly

16. The District Assembly is required to perform all the functions conferred on District Assemblies by the Local Government Act, and the Legislative Instrument of the Assembly. Some of the functions the Assembly is required to perform are:

- monitoring and evaluate development plans, projects and programmes to ensure they conform to the District and national objectives
- formulating and executing plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation and utilisation of resources for the overall development of the district, and
- overall development of the district through the preparation, submission and implementation of development plans and budgets to the government and other relevant agencies.

### 2.4 Organisational Structure

17. The District Assembly is headed by the District Chief Executive (DCE). The next in command is the District Coordination Director (DCD) who is responsible for the administrative processes of the Assembly by coordinating all the activities of the departments with the Assembly. The Departments are Works, Planning, Finance, Budget and Health and Environment Unit. The heads of the departments with the Assembly report to the DCD whereas the DCD also reports directly to the DCE. The organogram of the Assembly is attached as Appendix D.

### 2.5 System Description

18. Assembly Common Fund (DACF) and the District Development Fund (DDF). Under the DDF system, the District Assemblies are assessed on agreed indicators on yearly basis using the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT). Assemblies are rewarded with financial resources from Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development's (MLGRD) performance based grant system. Table I shows the budgeted expenditure and the actual expenditure of WEDA on capital projects from 2010-2014.

**Table I: Budget and actual expenditure for capital projects**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Variance</b>
2010	-	157,811.10	157,811.10
2011	708,809.19	284,819.41	(423,989.78)
2012	353,563.19	188,178.03	(165,385.16)
2013	81,666.67	543,717.18	461,600.51
2014	513,779.87	245,323.72	(268,456.15)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,657,818.80</b>	<b>1,419,849.40</b>	<b>-238,419.30</b>

Source: Extracts from WEDA Budget Statement

## **CHAPTER THREE: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **3.0 Introduction**

19. The Wa East District Assembly (WEDA) identifies, plans and budgets for capital projects to be executed by conducting needs assessment in consultation with the stakeholders of the Assembly. The identified projects are then captured in the Assembly's Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) for execution. The team assessed how WEDA implemented capital projects with funds from the DACF/DDF. Our findings were grouped under the following:

- project initiation
- pre-contract service
- project implementation, and
- post-contract evaluation.

### **3.1 Project Initiation**

20. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) Guidelines Chapter 3 step 2 (ii) requires the Assemblies to conduct Needs Assessment to solicit the needs of communities in their electoral area. Chapter 3 Step 4 (a) also requires the Assemblies to prioritize the needs of the communities identified by conducting Needs Assessment through stakeholder consultation workshops.

21. We reviewed the project files for the audit period and found that the Wa East District Assembly (WEDA) involved community members and the decentralised agencies in the district in the selection of capital projects. We found applications from communities and decentralised departments within the district to the Assembly for projects to be sited in their localities. The Assembly organised public hearing and durbars where communities presented their project needs for consideration. The projects were prioritised per the needs of the communities in consultations with the decentralised organisations within the district. The District Planning Coordinating Unit (DPCU) conducted an assessment on the submitted projects from all the stakeholders of the Assembly. The submitted projects were validated considering resources (funds) available and whether the submitted projects are in the Assembly's Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP).

22. With reference to the INo 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe, we found requests from the community members requesting for the roof of the KG block to be replaced as a result of a heavy rain storm that ripped off the roof of the building. Opinion leaders we interviewed in the districts said that as a result of the rain ripping off the roof of the KG Block, pupil had no option than to study in an open roof classroom which exposed them to the weather. As a result, the District Directorate of Education on the 31 May 2012 wrote to the Assembly for urgent action to be taken to provide the roof for the KG block at Saawobe. The District Assembly inspected the ripped off KG block at Saawobe and realised that it was prudent to provide a INo. 3-Unit Classroom Block rather than renovating the ripped off one. In consultation with the District Director of Education, the Assembly decided to provide the INo. 3-Unit Classroom Block for Saawobe Community.

23. We found in our review of the 2010-2013 Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) and the 2013 District Annual Action Plan (DAAP) that the Assembly captured the construction of the 3-Unit classroom block with ancillary facilities at Saawobe in both documents.

24. The provision for the construction of the GES Block at Finsi was not captured in either the MTDP or the Action Plans of the Assembly even though GES staff interviewed said that they were involved in

the initiation of the project. The District Human Resource Director of GES said that, the Education office requested for an office block from the Assembly, as the GES office was then located in a rented apartment which was not suitable for a District Education Office. Staff of the District Education Office of GES were satisfied with the project. However, the District Human Resource Director of GES said the Education Office was not involved in the design of the project. He said that the small room measuring 3.0m x 4.0m designed to be the storeroom was small and could not contain the educational materials of the District Education Office. The conference room was thus converted to a storeroom as a result, as shown in Picture 1.

*Picture 1: GES conference hall converted to a store room*



*Source: Field Survey, 2015*

25. The Officer also said that, if the office had been consulted in the design process they would have opted for a building with a court yard to provide for more offices for their 45 staff and ease of movement within the structure.

### **Conclusion**

26. WEDA involved community members in initiating and selecting the projects. The Saawobe school project was captured in the 2013 Annual Action Plans and the 2010-2013 MTDP of the Assembly. The GES project was neither captured in the MTDP nor Annual Action Plans of the Assembly. Officials of the District Directorate of Education though participated in the project initiation were not consulted in the design of the GES block.

### **Planning and Budgeting**

27. According to the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) Guidelines for District Assemblies, the Assemblies are required to prepare a 4-year Medium Term Development Plan (DMTDP) under the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) based on the prioritised, needs/aspirations of the people in the district. The Local Government Act of 1993 section 92(3) requires that the assembly prepares a budget to include the annual development plans and programmes of the Assemblies.

28. The NDPC District Assemblies Planning Guidelines (2010-2013) Step 16.1 also requires the Assemblies to use the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) process in costing the activities as outlined in the District Medium Term Development Plan. It is the duty of the District Planning Coordinating Unit (DPCU) and the Budget Officer of the Assembly to prepare the Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) by incorporating inputs from all departments of the Assembly. After a project has been selected through an evaluation of the needs of the District and prioritised, it is followed by planning for the procurement and execution of the project. The planning stage involves budgeting for the projects, identifying sources of funding and preparing for procurement. This process is undertaken by the District Planning Officer.

29. We found from our review of the 2010-2013 Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) that WEDA planned and budgeted an amount of GH¢2,464,000.00 for the construction of 28 No 3-Units Classroom block within the district with the DDF as the source of funding. The 2013 Annual Action Plan of the Assembly captured the construction of the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe with a budgeted cost of GH¢120,000.00 to be funded from the DDF. The project was expected to be completed within a period of three months.

30. In the 2010 Procurement Plan of WEDA we found that the Assembly budgeted an amount of GH¢100,000 for the construction of the GES Office Block at Funsu. The source of funding for the project was the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). The project covered a period of four months.

## **Conclusion**

31. The Assembly planned and budgeted for the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe in its 2010-2013 MTDP and 2013 Annual Action Plan respectively. The GES Office Block was not captured in the 2010-2013 MTDP of the Assembly. However, the 2010 Procurement Plan of the Assembly budgeted for the construction of the GES Block at Funsu.

### **3.2 Pre-contract service**

#### **3.2.1 Procurement of consultants and contractors**

32. The Public Procurement Act, 2003, Act 663, provides guidelines and directions for procuring the services of contractors and consultants. Schedule 3 of the Act provides thresholds that procuring entities should pay regard to when engaging in procurement activities. For example, a contract below the estimated cost of GH¢50,000.00 can be procured under price quotation from a minimum of three contractors. Whereas if the estimated cost of the project exceeds GH¢50,000.00, a National Competitive Tendering (NCT) is required to allow more bidders to participate in the tendering.

33. We reviewed the project files to examine how WEDA invited tenders for the two selected projects and how the tenders were evaluated and the lowest bidder selected. Our examination covered the project advertisement, tender evaluation and contractor selection.

## **Project Advertisement**

34. Regulation 5.5.4 of the Public Procurement Manual requires adverts of a NCT to be made in the Public Procurement Bulletin, Public Procurement Website and at least two local daily newspapers of general circulation in Ghana. Also, the adverts should last for a minimum of two weeks from the date of first publishing. This is to allow for as many tenderers as possible and to increase spread for competition.

35. From our review of the project files, we found that the value of the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe and the GES Office Block at Funsu were GH¢120,695.46 and GH¢92,012.87 respectively hence the WEDA used a National Competitive Tendering (NCT) as the contracts sums were above the minimum threshold of GH¢50,000.00.

36. Our review of the Procurement file showed that the Assembly advertised for bids for the construction of the GES Office Block at Funsu and the construction of the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe in the Ghanaian Times edition of 9 December 2009 and 7 October 2012 respectively. Tenders were received from interested contractors who submitted their bids for the two projects. We reviewed the Tender Evaluation Reports for the two projects and found that tenders were delivered to the Secretary of the Wa East District Assembly Tender Committee, Funsu on 5 January 2010 and 4 December 2012 respectively. The acceptance of tenders by the Tender Evaluation Committee closed at 10 am on the 5 January 2010 and 4 December 2012.

37. We found from our review of the Procurement file a copy of a letter the Assembly sent out to the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation-Upper West Region on a request for Expression of Interest on the 27 July 2009 for consultancy services on 13 projects. The projects were to be funded by the DDF and the DACF which included the GES Office Block at Funsu. However, we found no request for proposal from the Assembly for the provision of pre and post consultancy services on the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe from our review of the Procurement file on the project. Consequently, there was no evidence of how A&QS Consortium Limited was engaged to provide consultancy services for the two projects.

### **Evaluation of Bids**

38. Regulation 5.13 of the Public Procurement Manual requires that Tenders are opened on the scheduled date and this activity is to be coordinated by the procurement unit of the entity. All interested parties are expected to attend but this is not mandatory. The tender prices are read openly to all to hear and to participate in the initial pricing responsiveness.

39. A constituted Tender Evaluation Panel with a minimum of three qualified persons evaluates all bids presented and recommends the winners to the entity tender committee for further action. The evaluation is based on the Invitation to Tender (ITT) and on the tenets of the PPA. The Panel is to prepare a tender evaluation report to be submitted to the entity tender committee. The report includes, among other things, a recommendation to award the contract to the lowest evaluated responsive tenderer or other appropriate recommendations such as the cancellation of the procurement process (Regulation 5.14.4 of Public Procurement Manual refers).

40. Our review of the Tender Evaluation Report (TER) for the GES Office Block at Funsu showed that the tender opening and selection was presided over by the District Coordinating Director (DCD) in the presence of the District Chief Executive (DCE). The tender opening and selection took place on the 5 January 2010 at the Assembly's Conference Hall. Also, the TER for the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe showed that the tender opening and selection was presided over by the Deputy District Director in the presence of the members of the District Tender Committee, interested tenderers and their representatives. The Tender opening and selection took place at the District Director's Office on 4 December 2012 at 10 am.

41. Preliminary examination of the tenders for the two selected projects was carried out to identify and reject tenders that were incomplete, invalid or substantially non-responsive to the tender documents and therefore were not considered. A three-member Tender Evaluation Committee was formed by the WEDA to evaluate bids from interested tenderers for the two projects. The committee submitted reports on the two projects to the WEDA on the evaluated contractors who had submitted their bids for consideration.

### **Selection of Contractors**

42. Upon the approval from the Tender Evaluation Panel, the contract is awarded to the contractor with the lowest quotation. The assembly has to write to the successful and unsuccessful bidders. The winning contractors are informed of their successful bids and asked to submit documents such as performance bonds and programme of work before the contract is signed. The losing contractors are also written to and given reasons why they lost the bids. According to regulation 5.17.3 of the Public Procurement Manual, all bid securities are to be returned to the tenderers once a winner has been determined and a binding contract signed.

43. The evaluation panel writes to the entity tender committee communicating the recommended contractor for the award while the assembly signs a binding contract with the contractor for execution of the said project.

44. From our review of the Tender Evaluation Report for the GES Office Block at Funsu, we found that four tenders were responsive. The contract award was given to Messrs Lemvenu Construction Works on 14 January 2010 with the lowest quotation at GH¢92,012.87. Messrs Lemvenu wrote to WEDA on the 21 January 2010 to accept the contract to construct the GES Office Block at Funsu. The WEDA signed a contract agreement with Messrs Lemvenu Construction Works for the construction of the GES Office Block at Funsu on 29 January 2010 to be completed four months. We found no evidence on the project file showing whether WEDA wrote to unsuccessful bidders and stating reasons why they lost the bid.

45. Also, our review of the Tender Evaluation Report for the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe showed that four contractors were responsive. The contract was awarded to Messrs Masalf Enterprise on 16 January 2013 with the lowest quotation at GH¢ 120,695.46. Messrs Masalf wrote to the Assembly on 22 January 2013 to accept the contract to construct the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe. The contract file for the Saawobe project showed that WEDA signed a contract agreement with Messrs Masalf Enterprise on the 23 January 2013 to construct a 3-Unit Classroom Block with ancillary facilities at Saawobe. The contract was to be completed within three months.

### **Conclusion**

46. The Assembly followed due process in contracting the services of contractors for the two projects under review. However, we could not assess how the consultant was engaged to provide consultancy services for the two projects as there were no records to that effect.

### **Recommendation**

47. We recommended that the Assembly should:

- publish all adverts in the National Dailies for interested consultants to submit their proposals for consideration, evaluation and selection, and
- document all activities relating to the tendering processes.

### **Project Implementation**

48. Project implementation is a post-contract stage of the project cycle, covering the Project status from supervision and monitoring to payment for work done.

#### **3.3.1 Monitoring and supervision of projects**

49. Section 5.19 of the Procurement Act stipulates that contract supervision and administration is undertaken by the Project Manager (Consultant) in consultation with the Procurement Unit and the Technical Department of the Assembly. It stated that the Project

Manager/Supervision should Maintain close supervision of the contractor's performance, work done, materials used, equipment and labour force at site to ensure that potential problems are identified as early as possible.

50. Per the agreement for the consultancy services, it is expected of the consultant to conduct routine inspections on the project to ensure all specifications are adhered to in the execution of the project. In our interview with the Works Engineer, he said that the Works Department is supposed to carry out weekly inspections on all capital projects within the jurisdiction of the Assembly while the District Planning Coordinating Unit (DPCU) carries out quarterly monitoring on ongoing projects.

51. We found from our review of the project file for the GES Office Block at Funsu that the consultant (A&QS) carried out three site inspections on the project. We also found that the District Works Department (DWD) and the Planning Unit carried out three site inspections on the GES Office Block project instead of the 16 times as in the schedule of activity of the WD. With regards to the Saawobe School project, the District Works Department together with the Planning Unit carried out three site inspections on the project whilst the consultant carried out one site inspection on the project. The inspection reports prepared by the DWD and the Planning Unit were used as evidence for work done by the contractor and were attached to the IPCs prepared by the consultant for payment.

52. The Works Engineer said the WD could not conduct the routine inspections because the Assembly had only one Engineer responsible for all projects. He also said that the unit did not have a vehicle to carry out their operations as expected and in some cases they had to use the vehicle of the DCD for inspections. The DCD confirmed the assertion of the Works Engineer. We however found no quarterly monitoring reports on the two projects by the DPCU.

53. The Assembly could not show evidence of regular site meetings the consultant had with the contractor. Rather, we saw on the project file an evidence of handing over of site to the contractor and a site meeting for handing over the completed project to the Assembly.

54. We however noted visible cracks running from the corners of all the windows to the foundation of the building at the Saawobe School project. Though an attempt was made to conceal the cracks by patching them, they were still very visible. There were also cracks and pot holes on the floor of the classrooms and the corridor. We found other visible cracks on the gables and a major crack on the wall of the KVIP. Pictures 2 shows the defects noted.

*Picture 2: Cracks on the floor of the classrooms and on the KVIP wall*



*Source: Field Survey, 2015*

55. We also found similar conditions with the GES project, where there were visible cracks on the floor and on the walls with some of the wooden frames of the doors rotten after two and half years of use. Picture 3 depicts defects.

Picture 3: Defects on the wooden frames of the doors and cracks on the floor



Source: Field Survey, 2015

### Conclusion

56. DWD and DPCU carried out fewer inspections than was stipulated in the schedule of activities. No quarterly monitoring reports were provided. The inability of the Works Department to conduct regular inspections to identify defects and instruct the contractor to make good the defects affected the quality of work delivered by the contractor.

### 3.3.2 Evaluation and payments for work done

57. Part of Section 5.19 of the Procurement Act sates that the Project Manager/Supervisor should Conduct detailed checks on the Contractors valuation of work performed, re-measure as appropriate, and prepare Interim Payment Certificates, deducting any retention percentage specified in the Contract. We found that, the Works Department did not conduct detailed checks on the contractors' valuation of work performed. We reviewed Bills of Quantities for the construction of the INo. 3-Unit classroom block at Saawobe and compared it with the work done on site. We found that the Assembly paid for works which were not fully supplied and some double counted by the contractor.

58. For example, we found from the BOQs for the Saawobe project that, the total area quantified for roofing was 440 m<sup>2</sup> amounting to GH¢11,000.00 which the Assembly paid, but per the drawings, and from our own measurement at the project site, the actual roofing area was 318.26 m<sup>2</sup> amounting to GH¢7,956.50. Hence an amount of GH¢3,043.50 was overpaid for overestimated roofing area of 121.74 m<sup>2</sup>.

59. We also found that, the Assembly paid GH¢375.00 for 15 aluminum roofing sheets meant for roofing the KVIP for the school children, when they should have paid GH¢125.00 per the bill of quantities for the five roofing sheets used to roof the KVIP. Thus the Assembly overpaid GH¢250.00 for roofing the KVIP. The Assembly also made an overpayment of GH¢ 38.88, when it paid GH¢213.84 for 88 pieces of louver blades at GH¢2.43 each to be fixed at the teachers' common room and the Headmaster's office instead of paying GH¢174.96 for 72 louver blades provided by the contractor at the same price.

60. The Bill of Quantity (BoQ) for the GES Block at Funsu indicated the supply of 23 pieces of 1200mm florescent fitting amounting to GH¢513.82 at GH¢22.34 each, but the contractor supplied 25 pieces of 1200mm florescent fitting amounting to GH¢ 558.50. Hence the contractor incurred an additional cost of GH¢ 44.68 for the supply of 1200mm florescent fitting. On the other hand, the contractor was supposed to have provided 7 pieces of 600 mm florescent fitting for a total cost of GH¢144.41 at GH¢20.63 each but that was not provided by the contractor. In all, the Assembly overpaid GH¢99.73 for the supply of florescent fitting. Also, our review of the BOQ indicated that 13 ceiling fans were paid for at a unit cost of GH¢65.00 with total cost of GH¢845.00 but our inspection at the project site showed

that 11 ceiling fans were provided. Hence, the Assembly overpaid an amount of GH¢130.00 for the supply of ceiling fans.

61. We also found from the review of the BOQ that the Assembly paid for three sets of Twyford ceramic water closets at a unit cost of GH¢147.00 totaling GH¢441.00. But our inspection at that project site showed that two sets of the Twyford ceramic water closet were provided implying, the Assembly made an overpayment of GH¢147.00. The team also found that the contractor was supposed to have provided a Rambo 250 Polytank which was estimated to be GH¢700.00 but provided Sintex 22 which has a market price of GH¢400.00 as at the time of the audit (May 2015). Hence there was an overpayment of GH¢300.00.

62. Part XIII of the Ghana Gazette of August 20, 2004 states that, “Notwithstanding the general duties of the Internal Auditor of the Assembly as described in Section 120 of the Local Government Act, and Regulation 32 (8) of LI 1589, the Internal Auditor shall pre-audit all payment vouchers with all appropriate attachments.

63. We found from our review of PVs in respect of the payment for the GES project that PV numbers 08/03 and 02/07 with amounts of GH¢13,801.93 and GH¢22, 051.41 respectively were not vetted for payment by the Internal Audit Unit of the Assembly.

64. We also found that five payment schedules were made for the GES project but four PVs were made available to the audit team for examination. Again we found that four PVs were raised for payment of works done for the Saawobe project but the Finance Unit of the Assembly produced three PVs for our examination. The District Finance Office could not provide the audit team with the PV numbered 0583484 showing payment of an amount of GH¢12,069.55.

## **Conclusion**

65. The consultant did not maintain close supervision of the contractors’ performance for both projects considering the visible cracks on the structures and the fact that some specifications were not met yet paid for by the Assembly. We also maintain that both the consultant and the Works Department of the Assembly did not conduct detailed checks on the Contractors valuation of work performed before making payments. The Assembly made payment without the Internal Audit Unit vetting some of the PVs which could lead to over payment, fraud, irregularity or corruption.

## **Recommendations**

66. We recommended that:

- the DWD should conduct weekly, monthly and quarterly monitoring and supervision with site meetings. The Assembly should document all activities in connection with the projects and keep them for reference purposes
- the DWD should conduct detailed checks on the consultant’s valuation of work performed by the contractor before final PVs are raised and payment effected
- the consultant for the Saawobe and GES projects should be surcharged to pay to the Assembly amounts of GH¢646.73 and GH¢3,289.38 respectively being the total overpayment that he recommended to be paid to the contractor, and the Assembly should ensure that the internal audit vets all PVs before payments are made.

## **Post-contract evaluation**

### **3.4.1 Impact of the projects**

67. The Assembly has handed over the two projects to the communities and they are being used for their intended purposes. In particular, the Saawobe community is very happy with the classroom project. We found that before the construction of the INo-3 classroom block, the community had a 1 No 2 classroom block built with mud swish but its roof was ripped off by a storm. According to the community members it was the only school in the community and was congested.

68. The community members said that the problem of classroom congestion still persists even with the classroom block, however, they were grateful to the Assembly for providing them with the structure. We observed that even with the new structure, two classes such as class one and two, etc. are combined in each classroom making teaching and learning difficult.

69. We also observed that as a newly created District Assembly in a deprived area, the construction of the GES Office was very appropriate since education is a priority and there is the need to have an education office to enhance the supervision of the schools in the district.

### **3.5 Overall Conclusion**

70. Wa East District Assembly planned and budgeted for the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe in the Assembly's 2010–2013 MTDP as well as in the 2013 Annual Action Plan of the Assembly. However, the GES Office Block was planned for in the 2010 Procurement Plan of the Assembly though it was not captured in the Assembly's MTDP.

71. The Assembly evaluated and engaged the services of two contractors Messrs Lemvenu Construction Works and Messrs Masalf Enterprise for the construction of the GES Office Block at Funsu and the 3-Unit Classroom Block at Saawobe. The Assembly could not provide records to the audit team on how the consultant (A&QS) was assessed and engaged for the pre and post consultant services for the two projects.

72. The consultant for the two projects did not effectively supervise the implementation of the projects. There were cracks on the floors of the two projects and on the wall of the KVIP attached to the School block at Saawobe. The consultant did ensure that the contractor supplied all items specified in the BOQs for the two projects. This led to the Assembly making overpayments to the contractors for the projects to the tune of GH¢646.73 and GH¢3,289.38 for the Saawobe project and GES project at Funsu respectively.

73. The GES Office Block at Funsu has provided the District's education office with office accommodation to facilitate their work. However, the District Education Office converted the conference room of the office block to a storeroom because the storeroom by the design of the building was small and could not serve its purpose. The residents of Saawobe were happy they had a new school for the community.

## Appendix A: Audit Questions and Assessment Criteria

- Q1. To what extent did Wa East District Assembly ensure that educational projects that were awarded for construction were selected through participatory approach?  
**Criteria:** Selection of school projects for construction is to be based on the needs assessment conducted by the assembly in consultation with stakeholders of the community as contained in the District Medium-Term Development Plan (DMTDP) that seeks to serve as a concrete representation of the development needs and priorities of the people resident within the jurisdiction of the Assembly.
- Q2. Were the selected educational projects planned and adequately budgeted for by the Assembly?  
**Criteria:** All capital projects of the Assembly are captured in the District Medium-Term Development Plan (DMTDP) which the Assembly prepared within the context of the National Medium-Term Development Policy Framework which seeks among other things to enhance infrastructure development.
- Q3. Were the assembly's tender practices competitive?  
**Criteria:** Wa East District Assembly should follow the Public Procurement Act, Act 663, 2003 for the procurement of works.
- Q4. To what extent was the assembly able to ensure contractors/consultants executed contracts according to the contract terms?  
**Criteria:** School projects should be executed in accordance with the specifications in the contract.
- Q5. Were assemblies able to procure the necessary funds to pay the contractors on time?  
**Criteria:** The Assembly should follow the Financial Administration Act and Financial Administration Regulation in raising funds for executing projects. Again the Assembly must ensure that contractors are paid within the allowable time frame after IPCs have been raised and vetted.
- Q6. Were accountability arrangements operating in the assembly able to provide the necessary information for decision making?  
**Criteria:** Management of the project is the responsibility of the District Coordinating Director with the necessary oversight provided by the District Chief Executive. The District Works Department is responsible for the day to day management of the technical aspects of the subcomponent.
- Q7. Did the Works Engineer/Consultant maintain close supervision of the contractor's performance to ensure that potential problems are identified early?  
**Criteria:** Section 5.19 of the Procurement Act, Act 663 states that the Project Manager/Supervision should maintain close supervision of the Contractor's performance, work done, materials used, equipment and labour force at site to ensure that potential problems are identified as early as possible.
- Q8. Did the Works Engineer/Consultant conduct detailed checks on the contractors valuation of works performed before Interim Payment Certificates (IPCs) are prepared?  
**Criteria:** Section 5.19 of the Procurement Act, Act 663 also states that the Project Manager should conduct detailed checks on the Contractors valuation of work performed, re-measure as appropriate, and prepare Interim Payment Certificates, deducting any retention percentage specified in the Contract.
- Q9. Were the intended objectives of the projects met?  
**Criteria:** Chapter 4 of the NDPC guideline of the District Monitoring and Evaluation Plan requires that, the DPCU ought assess the performance of each project when completed to ascertain if the intervention has achieved its original objectives and assess the overall changes by the intervention.

## Appendix B: List of Documents Reviewed

1. Medium Term Development Plan
2. Contract document:
  - a. Instruction to tenders
  - b. Architectural Drawings
  - c. Bill of Quantities (BoQ)
  - d. Specifications
  - e. Conditions of contract
  - f. Form of Tender
  - g. Securities
  - h. Award and acceptance letter
3. Tender opening minutes and attendance list
4. Tender evaluation report
5. Procurement Plan
6. Advance guarantee bond
7. Minutes of site meetings
8. Progress report
9. DWD reports to DCE/Works Committee
10. Interim Payment Certificates (IPCs)
11. Monitoring Reports
12. Executive Committee File
13. Planning Committee file
14. Planning file
15. PVs for payment under the contract
16. Book of entry of transactions
17. Contract register

## **Appendix C: List of Officials Interviewed**

- District Chief Executive
- District Coordinating Director
- Planning Officer
- Procurement Officer
- District Works Engineer
- District Finance Officer
- District Accounts Officer
- Head of District Works Department
- Works Committee Chairman
- Planning Committee Chairman


Opinion leaders and community members were also interviewed to get information on their expected impact of the educational projects implemented in their localities.

We also interacted with Members of Parliament to learn what informed the selection of the projects.

## Appendix D: Key Players and Their Responsibilities

<b>Key Player</b>	<b>Activity</b>
<b>Ministry of Finance</b>	Releases funds to the Administrator of the District Assemblies Common Fund.
<b>Fund Administrator of the District Assemblies Common Fund</b>	Applies the formula for sharing the District Assemblies common fund and Releases the Share of the Assemblies' common fund.
<b>Ministry of Local Government</b>	Oversee the activities of the various District Assemblies and give policy direction to the assemblies.
<b>District Chief Executive</b>	Oversee the administration of the Assembly, Raise revenue to finance capital projects, Supervises and monitors the execution of capital projects and authorises payment for works done.
<b>District Coordinating Planning Officer</b>	Plan the development of the Assembly and budget for capital projects, prepares contracts and project bids for advertisement and selects contractors for executing capital projects
<b>District Works Engineer</b>	Provide drawings for capital projects, estimate Bill of Quantities for projects, monitor and supervise projects, raise and vets IPCs for payment.
<b>District Finance Officer</b>	Plan for revenue generation and pay for works done.
<b>District Accounts Officer</b>	Enters cost and revenue in the appropriate accounts and provide accounting information for decision making in the Assembly
<b>Contractors</b>	Bid for capital projects and execute them according to specifications
<b>Assembly members</b>	Seek the views of the people they represent and present them at the Assembly level. They also lobby for development projects for their localities

## Appendix E: Organizational Chart



## **Appendix F: System Description**

### **Project identification and selection (initiation)**

1. The Assembly identifies and selects projects using the participatory approach. This approach involves all stakeholders within the assembly and it takes the bottom up approach. The DPCU solicits Ideas, suggestions and projects from community members through the conducting of needs assessment. The DPCU working together with the assembly men and women organise community meetings to explain the concept of needs assessment and the end product of this needs assessment – the DMTDP.
2. Selected community members are then trained in data collection and resourced to collect data from the communities. This collected data includes the current profile of the community, the expectations of the community as well as their needs. This information is collated by the DPCU and sent back to the communities. The DPCU then leads the communities in prioritising the needs identified in the collated documents. The prioritised needs are then compiled into community action plans.
3. While the community action plans are being compiled, the DPCU writes to inform other departments such as the GHS, MoFA and GES to submit their identified projects and plans for the planning period. The planning period is usually 4 years as prescribed by the NDPC for the preparation of the DMTDP.
4. These plans are then put together with the compiled information from the community action plans into one comprehensive document. The DPCU then organises public forum where all stakeholders are invited to deliberate upon the identified programmes and plans and to be prioritised. This final prioritisation is done by the DPCU, the stakeholders such as the GHS, GES and the community members. Community members as used here refer to chiefs, opinion leaders, women groups, NGO's and so on.
5. When this is done, the DPCU compiles the final product together with the profile of the district into a draft DMTDP. The DMTDP is often broken down into annual plans.

### **Planning and budgeting**

6. After the DPCU compiles DMTDP into annual plans, the various projects (capital) are given to the experts (usually the DWD and DBO) to estimate the cost of these projects. These estimations are to be done to serve as a guide to the assembly in their entire budgeting processing as well as in giving out contracts. The assembly expects that with the expertise of the DWD, estimations made will be as close as possible to the real cost of projects.
7. When the estimations are done, the figures together with the projects are given to the DPO and the Budget sub – committee. The planning office is expected to properly align the annual plans with the assembly plans and then submit to the management of the assembly for review. The management of the assembly includes the DCE, DCD and heads of the various department. After management review, the plans are given to executive committee for further review and approval. From there, the plans are presented to the general assembly for final approval. When approval is given by the general assembly, copies are sent to the regional coordinating council (RCC), the national development planning commission (NDPC) and the sector ministry (MLGRD) for monitoring purposes.

8. The budget committee uses these figures together with other figures generated from the assembly with regards to their recurrent expenditure and other investments to prepare their composite budget. The draft composite budget also goes through the same process as the annual plans in the approval process.
9. The approved annual plans are then given to procurement officers at the assembly to prepare their annual procurement plans. These plans detail what projects are to be procured, when, and the form of procurement it should take. The procurement plans are also taken through the same process as the composite budget and the annual plans for approval. Once approval is reached, the plans become working documents of the assembly.
10. Cost estimates in the annual plans, composite budgets and the procurement plans are expected to be same or close depending on the timing.

### **Procurement of contractor and consultant**

11. The assembly is expected to secure funding for their capital projects and for the implementation of the plans drawn out. When funding has been secured, the assembly rolls out the processes for procuring a contractor and /or consultant for the projects. The process begins with estimation of project, advertisement, tendering and evaluation, recommendation and award of contract.

### **Estimation of project**

12. When the assembly selects a particular project to carry out, the DWD is made to prepare estimates for the project – the engineers' estimate. This estimate is to guide the assembly in the selection of lowest evaluated tender. The estimates are an internal document used in assessment of the evaluated tenders. These estimates are not to be leaked out to any member of the assembly or the bidders.
13. The estimates are prepared based on drawings made by or for the assembly for the project. These drawings are also the bases for the preparation of bills of quantities for the project. These are documents that are used together with the instructions to tenders to advertise the project.

### **Advertisement of projects**

14. The Public Procurement Act requires the publication of tender in at least two daily local newspapers of general circulation in Ghana for national competitive tendering. The publication should also be made two weeks before submission of Tenders. The Act also requires the announcement to be made on PPB website and bulletin. Additionally, the Act requires that the advert should contain certain basic information such as the source of funding, the works to be procured and the qualification requirements (Section 31 (1 &2) of Act 663 and the PPB Manual 5.5.4 and 5.5.5).
15. The objective is to ensure that the advert is made properly and allows space for qualified prospective tenderers to purchase, prepare and submit tender documents.
16. The DWD prepares the draft instructions to tenders and the whole advert. This advert is reviewed by the Entity Tender Committee (ETC) headed by the DCD. The Accounts/finance office then prepares vouchers for payment of the adverts to be done in newspapers of wide circulation as prescribed by the PPA.

17. The advert should contain the type of project, bid amount, source of funding, contract duration and brief specifications for the project. It should also contain the scheduled date for the opening of tender, the venue and time of opening.

### **Evaluation of bids**

18. The tenders are sold to all interested parties and as many as are interested are allowed to buy the tender documents. The tender documents as bought contain the BOQ, the drawings, the form of tender and the instructions to tenders (ITT). A District Tender Evaluation Committee is constituted to do tender evaluation.
19. Tenders are opened on the scheduled date and all interested parties are expected to attend but this is not mandatory. After opening in the view of the participants, the tender prices are read openly to all to hear and to participate in the initial pricing responsiveness.
20. The constituted evaluation committee carefully evaluates all presented but responsive tender and recommends the winners to the entity tender committee for further action. The evaluation is based on the ITT and on the tenets of the PPA.

### **Selection of contractor**

21. After evaluation, the assembly has to write to the winning and non-winning bidders. The winning contractors are informed of their successful bids and told to produce certain documents before signing of contract. The losing contractors are also written to and informed of the reasons why they lost the bids.
22. The evaluation panel writes to the entity tender committee communicating the recommended contractor for the award. The assembly signs a binding contract with the contractor for execution of the said project.

### **Project execution**

23. After contractor has been selected and contract signed, the site is handed over to the contractor by the DWE. Handing over of site is usually witnessed by the DCE, community members (beneficiaries), and representatives of the works sub-committee. This is followed with a letter to commence work given to the contractor to officially start working.
24. When work starts, DWD staff are to regularly supervise work done by the contractor if consultancy for the project is carried out by the DWD otherwise, if there is a consultant on the project, then the DWD undertakes regular monitoring visits to the site to ascertain work done. In instances where DWD has the consultancy role, then they are expected to supervise works carried out to ensure that the contractor builds according to specification and to report on supervision carried out. As part of supervision, the DWD is to ensure that contractors keep a site inspection book at site where all instruction given are recorded and signed off.
25. At this stage of projects, the district monitoring team is also responsible for monitoring the progress of work done and reporting on it regularly. The monitoring team is also responsible for recommending for payments to be made to contractors after request for funds are submitted.

## **Payment for work done**

26. Payments for work done on capital projects are done in line with provision made in the BoQs. The contractors request for payment through the DCE. This request is forwarded to the DCD and then the DWE for inspection and preparation of certificates. After the DWE has inspected work done and is satisfied, he prepares an interim payment certificate (IPC) and sends it to the DCD for processing. The IPC together with the original request letter from the contractor is sent to the monitoring team, headed by the DPO for action. The monitoring team is usually made up of 11 offices, these include, DCE, DCD, DPO, DBA, DFO, DIA and Beneficiary department (GES,GHS).
27. The monitoring team after monitoring progress of work done by the contractor presents a report of their activity to the DCD. Their reports often include a recommendation for payment/honoring the IPC or not. The IPC, original request letter and the monitoring report now goes through an approval channel.
28. The document is sent to the budget officer to raise a warrant for the payment. The warrant is raised to ensure that, spending on the project is not done out of the assembly's budget. After the warrant, the document is sent to Internal Audit for pre auditing. This is done as an internal control measure to ensure that, spending on the project is done with due regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. After pre audits, the document is sent to the DCD and DCE for final authorisation. By this action, the DCD and DCE are expected to know what spending is being done by the assembly. After authorisation, the document goes to the DFO who records the transaction in a contract register and raises a cheque for payment. The cheque is signed by all due members and paid to the contractor. The DFO is also responsible for deducting withholding tax for all payments and remitting the GRA's office within 15 days of deduction.
29. After the contractor has picked up his cheque, the DFO should ensure that, all documents regarding this transaction are stamped PAID to avoid re use of the same documents and consequently double payment for same job done. The DFO should also ensure that, the contractor after receiving the cheque issues a receipt to acknowledge receipt of the money.

## **Project completion**

30. When the project is completed, the assembly is required to inspect and ascertain that all specifications are met and to issue a practical completion certificate to the contractor. When this is done, the contractor hands over the project to the assembly and then to the user agency. The project is expected to be used after words for six months constituting the defect liability period. During this period, a percentage of the contractor's money is kept by the assembly as retention. This is done so that, after the defect liability period, if the assembly finds any defects on the project, the contractor is made to correct it or the retention amount used by the assembly to correct it.
31. After the defects liability period, the assembly is expected to issue an actual completion certificate and a final account to the contractor. This officially brings closure to the project.

# ANNEX 2: EXAMPLE OF SCORECARD FROM GAS PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

## Ghana's Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms Project Assessment of District Assemblies Capital Project Performance Bulisa North District Assembly

The Bulisa North District Assembly was one of the 50 District Assemblies that Ghana Audit Service (GAS) conducted performance audits (based on two capital projects) to determine how they plan and implement capital development projects such as health facilities, classroom blocks, water facilities, markets, etc. This forms part of the Ghana's Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms (GSAM) project, which seeks to strengthen citizens' oversight of capital development projects to increase local government accountability, transparency and improved performance. Below is the result of the Bulisa North District Assembly in the performance audit.



### Assessment Areas

#### Did you know?

District assemblies spend over 70 per cent of their funds on capital projects

A lot of these projects are not adequately planned and implemented, resulting in ineffective use of public funds

Citizens remain impoverished as a result


You (as citizens) can help to ensure your assemblies do better

**Get Informed Now and Demand Accountability!!!**

Visit: [www.gsamonline.org](http://www.gsamonline.org)  
or  
[www.facebook.com/gsamproject/](https://www.facebook.com/gsamproject/)  
to learn more.




Initiation of Project




Procurement and Contracting



Execution



Project Benefits



# ANNEX 3: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL SURVEY

Section A: Basic Information and Consent		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
A1	Date of Survey	[Date]
A2	Name of Enumerator	1. Beauty 2. Bimpor 3. Diana 4. Dzakuma 5. Baffoe 6. Joana 7. Lawrence 8. Abutima 9. Anderson 10. Dickson 11. Alhassan 12. Ama 13. Samuel Wieh 14. Owuraku 15. Eric 16. Sethina 17. Bontii 18. Christopher 19. Desmond 20. Stephen 21. Samuel Okae Ansah 22. Kpadam 23. Bernice 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
	<b>[If A2 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
A3	Name of Supervisor	[Text]
A4	Region	1. Ashanti 2. Brong-Ahafo 3. Greater Accra 4. Central 5. Eastern 6. Northern 7. Western 8. Upper East 9. Upper West 10. Volta
A5	District	See variable in data for complete list of districts.

**INFORMED CONSENT: PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING CONSENT FORM WORD FOR WORD**

Good morning/good afternoon, my name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am a research assistant working with the University of Ghana, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Social Impact on a study of neighborhood relations and public services across Ghana. I would like to ask you some questions to better understand your district. Your participation is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate, our discussion will last for around 30 minutes. Please rest assured that your answers will remain confidential. This device will help me enter your answers, but I assure you that it is not recording your voice. We will not provide your name and answers to anyone. While your answers would help us understand important features of your district, but do not feel obligated to answer any question that you are not comfortable with and do not hesitate to ask me for a clarification if you think that a question is a bit difficult or unclear. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the research manager in Ghana, Peter Quartey of the University of Ghana. His contact information is 0264522350

<b>SECTION A: Basic Information and Consent</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
A8	Did the respondent consent? <b>[If YES, go to A11]</b> <b>[If NO, go to A9]</b>	0. No 1. Yes
A9	Can you please tell me why you have chosen not to participate? <b>[End survey]</b>	[Text]
<b>Read: Let's begin by recording a few facts about yourself.</b>		
A11	What is your current position?	1. MMDA Internal Auditor 2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration) 4. Chair of District Tender Board ( <b>NOTE:</b> that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one) 5. District Finance Officer/ Comptroller 6. District Planner/Director of the Physical Planning Dept 7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one) 8. District Works Engineer 9. Assistant District Engineer 10. District Procurement Officer 97. Other (specify)
A12	<b>[If A11 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]

SECTION A: Basic Information and Consent		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
A13	Respondent's sex	0. Male 1. Female
A14	How old are you?	_____ # of years (Age at last birthday)
A15	How many years have you lived in this district?	_____ # of years (Round to the nearest year (i.e. 5 months = 0. 1 year and 7 months = 2 ))
Section B: Education and Position		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
B1	What is the highest level of education you have attained?	1. No formal schooling 2. Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling) 3. Some basic schooling 4. Basic school completed 5. Some secondary school/high school 6. Secondary school/high school completed 7. Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college 8. Some university 9. University completed 10. Post-graduate 999. Prefer not to respond
B2	How many years have you worked in your current position?	_____ # of years (If < 6 months, enter 0; if more than 6 months, enter 1.)
B3	How many hours per week do you work in the average working week?	_____ # of hours
B4	In a TYPICAL working week, how many hours do you spend on each of the following tasks? <b>[Remind respondent of # of work hours from previous question]</b>	
	Meeting with district officials	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))
	Meeting with national officials	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))

<b>SECTION A: Basic Information and Consent</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
	Meeting with employees	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))
	Providing services/responding to citizen concerns	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))
	Working with civil society or community groups	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))
	Administrative tasks and documentation	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))
	Training, skill-building, or workshops	_____ # of hours (Hours (NOT minutes))
B5	Has how you spend your time at work changed since the most recent DA election?	0. No 1. Yes -997. Does not apply (new in position/don't know past practice)
	<b>[If B5 is 1. 'Yes']</b> If 'Yes,' please explain how.	[Text]
<b>Section C: Recruitment, Promotions, and Transfers</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
<b>Read: Now I would like to ask you some questions about factors that help people obtain a position in the public administration. These are not questions about you in particular but about the district administration in general.</b>		
C1	What percentage of the public employees in your district was hired primarily on the basis of merit?	_____ % (input as % (0 to 100)) 888: Don't know 999: Prefer not to respond
C2	Even if most employees are hired on the basis of merit, we hear that some are hired for other reasons—maybe because of connections, gifts, or whatever. Which of these are important in your district? (Select all that apply).	1. Family connections 2. Political party connections 3. Ability to build public support for the political party in power 4. Tribal connections 5. Payment or gift to some public authorities 6. Knowing the hiring manager.

<b>SECTION A: Basic Information and Consent</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
		7. None/No other reasons/Only merit matters 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )  888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to respond
	<b>[If C2 is 97. 'Other']</b>  If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
<b>Read: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.</b>		
C3	Party leaders can easily punish public employees who do not follow the orders of the ruling government.	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to respond
C4	District politicians win votes by starting development projects in an area, even if the projects don't get completed.	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C5	Since the most recent DA elections, have elected officials or political party officials influenced any hiring decisions, promotions, or transfers in your organization?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C6	<b>[If C5 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Is this happening less often, more often, or about the same as in past?	1. More often 2. Less often 3. The same 888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to answer

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
D1	Has the district government prepared a DRAFT budget (i.e. a DRAFT ANNUAL ACTION PLAN) for this coming fiscal year?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know
D2a	<b>[If D1 is 1. 'Yes']</b> Who produced the first draft? <i>(Select all that apply)</i>	1. DCE 2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Tender Board 4. District Coordinating Director 5. District Finance Officer 6. District Budget Officer 7. Finance Subcommittee 8. District Planning Coordinating Unit 9. Presiding member of the DA 10. Physical Planning/Works Department 11. Town/Area Councils 12. Social Services Subcommittee 13. Works Subcommittee 14. Health Department 15. Education Department 16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department 17. Ministry of Local Government 18. National Development Planning Commission 97. Other <i>(specify)</i> 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D3a	<b>[If D2a is 97. 'Other']</b>	[Text]

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	If 'Other', please specify.	
D4a	<p><b>[If D1 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>If you had to choose, who would you say had the most influence in producing the first draft?</p>	<p>1. DCE</p> <p>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</p> <p>3. District Tender Board</p> <p>4. District Coordinating Director</p> <p>5. District Finance Officer</p> <p>6. District Budget Officer</p> <p>7. Finance Subcommittee</p> <p>8. District Planning Coordinating Unit</p> <p>9. Presiding member of the DA</p> <p>10. Physical Planning/Works Department</p> <p>11. Town/Area Councils</p> <p>12. Social Services Subcommittee</p> <p>13. Works Subcommittee</p> <p>14. Health Department</p> <p>15. Education Department</p> <p>16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department</p> <p>17. Ministry of Local Government</p> <p>18. National Development Planning Commission</p> <p>97. Other (<i>specify</i>)</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
D5a	<p><b>[If D4a is 97. 'Other']</b></p> <p>If 'Other', please specify.</p>	[Text]

**Section D: Capital/Development Projects**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
D2b	<p><b>[If D1 is 0. 'No' OR 888. 'Don't know']</b></p> <p>Who do you EXPECT to produce the FIRST DRAFT?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DCE</li> <li>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</li> <li>3. District Tender Board</li> <li>4. District Coordinating Director</li> <li>5. District Finance Officer</li> <li>6. District Budget Officer</li> <li>7. Finance Subcommittee</li> <li>8. District Planning Coordinating Unit</li> <li>9. Presiding member of the DA</li> <li>10. Physical Planning/Works Department</li> <li>11. Town/Area Councils</li> <li>12. Social Services Subcommittee</li> <li>13. Works Subcommittee</li> <li>14. Health Department</li> <li>15. Education Department</li> <li>16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department</li> <li>17. Ministry of Local Government</li> <li>18. National Development Planning Commission</li> <li>97. Other <i>(specify)</i></li> </ol>
D3b	<p><b>[If D2b is 97. 'Other']</b></p> <p>If 'Other', please specify.</p>	[Text]
D4b	<p><b>[If D1 is 0. 'No' OR 888. 'Don't know']</b></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DCE</li> <li>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</li> <li>3. District Tender Board</li> </ol>

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	If you had to choose, who would you EXPECT to have the single most influence in producing the first draft?	4. District Coordinating Director 5. District Finance Officer 6. District Budget Officer 7. Finance Subcommittee 8. District Planning Coordinating Unit 9. Presiding member of the DA 10. Physical Planning/Works Department 11. Town/Area Councils 12. Social Services Subcommittee 13. Works Subcommittee 14. Health Department 15. Education Department 16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department 17. Ministry of Local Government 18. National Development Planning Commission 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
D5b	<b>[If D4b is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D8	How many important changes do you expect to be made to the initial draft budget for this coming year?	1. A lot of changes 2. Some changes 3. A few changes 4. No changes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
D9	<p><b>[If D8 is NOT 4. 'No changes' AND NOT 888. 'Don't know' AND NOT 999. 'Prefer not to respond']</b></p> <p>Who do you expect to be important sources of those changes?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DCE</li> <li>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</li> <li>3. District Tender Board</li> <li>4. District Coordinating Director</li> <li>5. District Finance Officer</li> <li>6. District Budget Officer</li> <li>7. Finance Subcommittee</li> <li>8. District Planning Coordinating Unit</li> <li>9. Presiding member of the DA</li> <li>10. Physical Planning/Works Department</li> <li>11. Town/Area Councils</li> <li>12. Social Services Subcommittee</li> <li>13. Works Subcommittee</li> <li>14. Health Department</li> <li>15. Education Department</li> <li>16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department</li> <li>17. Ministry of Local Government</li> <li>18. National Development Planning Commission</li> <li>97. Other <i>(specify)</i></li> </ol>
D10	<p><b>[If D9 is 97. 'Other']</b></p> <p>If 'Other', please specify.</p>	[Text]

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
D11	<p><b>[If D8 is NOT 4. ‘No changes’ AND NOT 888. ‘Don’t know’ AND NOT 999. ‘Prefer not to respond’]</b></p> <p>Which of these do you think is likely to be the single most important source of change?</p> <p><i>(This choice should have been mentioned by respondent in previous question.)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DCE</li> <li>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</li> <li>3. District Tender Board</li> <li>4. District Coordinating Director</li> <li>5. District Finance Officer</li> <li>6. District Budget Officer</li> <li>7. Finance Subcommittee</li> <li>8. District Planning Coordinating Unit</li> <li>9. Presiding member of the DA</li> <li>10. Physical Planning/Works Department</li> <li>11. Town/Area Councils</li> <li>12. Social Services Subcommittee</li> <li>13. Works Subcommittee</li> <li>14. Health Department</li> <li>15. Education Department</li> <li>16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department</li> <li>17. Ministry of Local Government</li> <li>18. National Development Planning Commission</li> <li>97. Other (<i>specify</i>)</li> </ol>
D12	<p><b>[If D11 is 97. ‘Other’]</b></p> <p>If ‘Other’, please specify.</p>	[Text]
D13	<p>Do you expect the PREPARATION of THIS COMING YEAR’S Annual Action Plan to proceed in about the same manner as in previous years?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0. No</li> <li>1. Yes</li> <li>-997. Does not apply (new in position/don’t know past practice)</li> </ol>
D14	<b>[If D13 is 0. ‘No’]</b>	[Text]

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	If 'No,' how do you expect it to be different?	
D15	Did both the District Assembly and District Chief Executive approve the MOST RECENT Annual Action Plan (i.e. the current, ongoing budget)?	1. No, only the DA approved the AAP 2. No, only the DCE approved the AAP 3. Yes the AAP was approved by both the DA and DCE 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D16.	Is the EXECUTION of the CURRENT/ONGOING Annual Action Plan proceeding in about the same way as it has in previous years	0. No 1. Yes -997. Does not apply (new in position/don't know past practice)
D17.	<b>[If D16 is 0. 'No']</b>  If 'No,' what have been the important differences?	[Text]
D18	In your district, how much discretion does the District Chief Executive have over which development projects are built <b>AFTER</b> the Annual Action Plan is approved?	1. A lot 2. Some 3. A little 4. None 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D19	In a typical year, about how many important changes are made to the AAP after it is approved by the General Assembly?	1. A lot of changes 2. Some changes 3. A few changes 4. No changes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D20	What are some of the more important factors that influence where assembly members in your district want development projects to be located?  <i>(Select all that apply. Note: we want to know about which villages get projects, NOT the precise location in a village.)</i>	1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share 2. Rewarding political supporters 3. Trying to win over undecided voters 4. To switch the loyalty of party supporters 5. Targeting areas with the most need 6. Developing the district capital 7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied 8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
D21.	<b>[If D20 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D22	What do you think is the single most important influence on WHERE assembly members in your district want DEVELOPMENT projects to be located?  <i>(Note: we want to know about which villages get projects, NOT the precise location in a village.)</i>	1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share 2. Rewarding political supporters 3. Trying to win over undecided voters 4. To switch the loyalty of party supporters 5. Targeting areas with the most need 6. Developing the district capital 7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied 8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied 9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
D23	<b>[If D22 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D24	What are some of the more important factors that influence where the DCE wants development projects to be located?  <i>(Select all that apply. Note: we want to know about which villages get projects, NOT the precise location in a village.)</i>	1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share 2. Rewarding political supporters 3. Trying to win over undecided voters 4. To switch the loyalty of party supporters 5. Targeting areas with the most need 6. Developing the district capital 7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied 8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
D25	<b>[If D24 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D26	What do you think is the single most important influence on WHERE the DCE wants development projects to be located?  <i>(Note: we want to know about which villages get projects, NOT the precise location in a village.)</i>	1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share 2. Rewarding political supporters 3. Trying to win over undecided voters 4. To switch the loyalty of party supporters 5. Targeting areas with the most need 6. Developing the district capital 7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied 8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied 9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
D27	<b>[If D26 is 97 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D28	Compared to Common Fund Projects, is the implementation of donor-funded projects (e.g. District Development Facility, DDF) more or less likely to stick to the Annual Plan?	1. Much more likely 2. Somewhat more likely 3. About the same 4. Somewhat less likely 5. Much less likely
D29	In your estimation, what share of Common Fund projects are abandoned during construction (i.e. never finished) four years from when they began?	0. 0/None 1. 1-10% 2. 11-20% 3. 21-30% 4. 31-40% 5. 41-50%

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		6. 51-60% 7. 61-70% 8. 71-80% 9. 81-90% 10. 91-100% 888. Don't know
D30	In your estimation, what share of donor-funded projects are abandoned during construction (i.e. never finished) four years from when they began?	0. 0/None 1. 1-10% 2. 11-20% 3. 21-30% 4. 31-40% 5. 41-50% 6. 51-60% 7. 61-70% 8. 71-80% 9. 81-90% 10. 91-100% 888. Don't know
Section E: Contracting		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
E1	When thinking of larger district capital projects in this coming year's budget, which factors do you expect will influence the selection of a contractor on these large projects?  <i>(Select all that apply.)</i>	1. Contractor's professional and technical qualifications 2. Bid's terms of payment 3. Bid's timeframe for project completion 4. Contractor's political affiliation 5. Contractor's connections with the District Chief Executive 97. Other <i>(specify)</i>
E2	<b>[If E1 is 97. 'Other']</b>  If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
E3	Which factor do you expect will be the single most important factor in the selection of a contractor on these large projects?	1. Contractor's professional and technical qualifications 2. Bid's terms of payment 3. Bid's timeframe for project completion 4. Contractor's political affiliation 5. Contractor's connections with the District Chief Executive

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
E4	<b>[If E3 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
E5	Whose approval will be necessary for these larger contracts? <i>(Select all that apply.)</i>	1. District Chief Executive 2. District Tender Review Board 3. District Assembly Internal Auditor 4. District Assembly Finance Committee 97.Other ( <i>specify</i> )
E6	<b>[If E5 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
<b>Read: When it comes to public development projects, sometimes situations arise that can affect competitive contracting. I would like to ask you how often some issues came up in contracting in your district IN THE LAST 6 MONTHS.</b>		
E8	In the last 6 months, how often did fewer than the required number of qualified contractors submit bids?	Very frequently Frequently Occasionally Rarely Never Don't know Prefer not to respond
E9	In the last 6 months, how often were projects broken into smaller parts to avoid requirements for competitive bids?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<b>Read: Now I will provide you with a list of things that people mention as a part of AWARDING A CONTRACT in some DAs. Please tell me HOW MANY of them happen REGULARLY in your DA. Please DO NOT tell me the specific answers, only how many.</b>		
Survey Experiment I (Randomize between SE2.1 AND SE2.2)		
	How many of the following happen REGULARLY in your DA? <b>[Read choices]</b>	
	Comparison of multiple competing bids	
	Potential contractors lobbying the President to get the contract.	
	The district engineer reviews the contract.	
SE2.1	Please enter the number: _____	
	How many of the following happen REGULARLY in your DA? <b>[Read choices]</b>	
	Comparison of multiple competing bids	
	Potential contractors lobbying the President to get the contract.	
	Contracts being awarded corruptly.	
	The district engineer reviews the contract.	
SE2.2	Please enter the number: _____	
Section F: Construction		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
<b>Read: When it comes to the construction of district capital projects such as government schools and clinics, some people in other districts report that sometimes issues come up. I would like to ask you about how often these issues have happened in your district IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS.</b>		
FI	How often have delays in construction happened in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		4. Rarely 5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F2	How often in THE LAST 6 MONTHS have construction costs exceeded their budgeted amount?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F3	How often in THE LAST 6 MONTHS have contractors abandoned projects for which they have received advance payment?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F4	Can you describe how the district's system for overseeing the construction of capital projects has worked in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?  <i>(What are the major features and stages?)</i>	[Text]
F5	Are there any problems with the system?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F5a	<b>[If F5 is 1. 'Yes']</b>	[Text]

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	What are the biggest problems with the system?	
F6	How many times will a typical large ONE YEAR capital project be visited by a district engineer, auditor, or other official to evaluate project progress before it is completed?	_____#
F6a	When a district engineer finds a problem with a large project, do you think they typically deal with the contractor directly or report it to the DA?  <i>(Note: Both is an option, but don't mention it in asking the question.)</i>	1. Deal with contractor directly 2. Report it to the DA 3. Both 888. Don't know
F7	In THE LAST 6 MONTHS, what is the most common reason given by contractors for running over budget?	1. Unforeseen increase in the costs of materials 2. Change in design 3. Unforeseen delays 4. Difficulty of finding qualified workers 5. Delays in receiving payment from the DA 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond  <i>(Probe and code)</i>
F8	<b>[If F7 is 97. 'Other']</b>  If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
F9	In your estimation, what percentage of major capital projects have finished on time in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%
F10	What is the most common reason given by contractors for running behind schedule in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	1. Unforeseen increase in the costs of materials 2. Change in design

Section D: Capital/Development Projects		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		3. Unforeseen delays 4. Difficulty of finding qualified workers 5. Delays in receiving payment from the DA 97. Other (specify) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond  (Probe and code)
F11	<b>[If F10 is 97. 'Other']</b>  If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
<b>SEI</b>	<b>Survey Experiment I (RANDOMIZE BETWEEN SEI.1 AND SEI.2)</b>	
SEI.1	Imagine that your district assembly received an extra 100,000 cedis from the COMMON FUND for development projects. About what percentage would you guess would be wasted or mis-spent?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%  888: Don't know  999: Prefer not to respond
SEI.1a	And what percentage of the resulting development projects do you think would be built on time?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%  888: Don't know  999: Prefer not to respond
SEI.2	Imagine that your district assembly received an extra 100,000 cedis from the DDF for development projects. About what percentage would you guess would be wasted or mis-spent?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%  888: Don't know  999: Prefer not to respond
SEI.2a	And what percentage of the resulting development projects do you think would be built on time?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%  888: Don't know  999: Prefer not to respond

<b>SECTION G: Governance and Corruption</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
G1	To what extent would you say that corruption is a problem in the PREPARATION of the Annual Action Plans?	1. Significant problem 2. Somewhat of a problem 3. Not much of a problem 4. Not at all a problem 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
G2	To what extent would you say that corruption is a problem in the EXECUTION of the Annual Action Plans?	1. Significant problem 2. Somewhat of a problem 3. Not much of a problem 4. Not at all a problem 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<b>Section H: Organizational Performance and Provision of Services</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
H1	To what extent would you agree or disagree that district capital projects are PLANNED in a transparent manner?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H2	To what extent would you agree or disagree that district capital projects are CONTRACTED in a transparent manner?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<p><b>Read:</b> There can be many obstacles to building development projects that serve the needs of district citizens. When you think about the preparation of the next Annual Action Plan, to what extent do you agree that the following are likely to represent big obstacles to building better development projects in your district?</p>		
H3	To what extent do you agree or disagree that CITIZENS' NON-PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT will represent a big obstacle to building better development projects?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree

<b>SECTION G: Governance and Corruption</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
		888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H4	To what extent do you agree or disagree that THE INFLUENCE OF THE DCE will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H5	To what extent do you agree or disagree that limited discretionary authority over DA Common Fund resources will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H6	To what extent do you agree or disagree that POLITICAL PRESSURE TO START MANY PROJECTS is an obstacle to building better development projects in your district?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H8	To what extent do you agree or disagree that INSUFFICIENT AND/OR LESS QUALIFIED STAFF TO OVERSEE PROJECTS will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree

<b>SECTION G: Governance and Corruption</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
		5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H9	To what extent do you agree that <b>CORRUPTION AMONG DISTRICT            PUBLIC OFFICIALS</b> will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in            your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H10	To what extent do you agree that <b>CORRUPTION AMONG            CONTRACTORS</b> will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in            your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H11	To what extent do you agree <b>THAT            THE NEED TO RESPOND TO THE            CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S            PRIORITIES</b> will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in            your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H12	To what extent do you agree that the <b>INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES</b> will represent a big obstacle?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree

<b>SECTION G: Governance and Corruption</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
	<i>(to building better development projects in your district)</i>	3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H13	To what extent do you agree that the INFLUENCE OF CHIEFS will represent a big obstacle?  <i>(to building better development projects in your district)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H17	Above the village level, how many important chiefs are there in this district?	_____ #
H18	Would you say that there are important, sustained conflicts among chiefs in this district?  <i>(For example, over resources or power)</i>	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<b>Read: Now I will provide you with a list of things that people mention as being a REGULAR part of their work. Please tell me HOW MANY of these you have seen REGULARLY. Please DO NOT tell me the specific answers, only how many.</b>		
<b>Survey Experiment 3 (Randomize between 3.1 and 3.2)</b>		
	SURVEXP 3.1 How many of the following things have you seen REGULARLY? <b>(Read choices)</b>	
	Citizens requesting financial assistance	
	Office supplies running short	
	Employees attending job training seminars	

<b>SECTION G: Governance and Corruption</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
H19a	Please enter the number:_____ #	
	SURVEXP 3.2 How many of the following activities have you seen REGULARLY? <b>(Read choices)</b>	
	Citizens requesting financial assistance	
	Office supplies running short	
	Government officials providing members of their political party with privileged access to public resources	
	Employees attending job training seminars	
H19b	Please enter the number:_____ #	

<b>SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
<p><b>Read: Now I will read you a list of people and agencies that your office might involve in the preparation of THIS COMING YEAR'S Annual Action Plan: The Public, NGOs, the national agency overseeing your area of work, Ministry of Local Government (MLGRD), MPs, DCE, DA, and Chiefs.</b></p> <p><b>Which is your office most responsive to? [MARK as 1]</b></p> <p><b>Which is your office second most responsive to? [Mark as 2]</b></p>		
I1	The Public	_____ #
I2	NGOs	_____ #
I3	The national agency overseeing your area of work	_____ #
I4	Ministry of Local Government (MLGRD)	_____ #
I5	MPs	_____ #
I6	DCE	_____ #
I7	Senior members of the DA	_____ #
I8	Chiefs	_____ #

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
<b>Section J: G-SAM Awareness and Influence</b>		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	Does your DA have an ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee)?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997 Not applicable
	<b>[If above is 1. 'Yes']</b> Over the LAST YEAR how much influence would you say the ARIC has had on how the district contracts and oversees projects?	1. A lot of influence 2. A little influence 3. No influence 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
	Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement: Contractors sometimes try to influence the outcome of audits	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
	Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: Sometimes one (or more) DA OFFICIAL tries to influence the outcome of audits  <i>(Note: We are not interested in if ALL DA officials, but if ANY officials try to influence.)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
	Now we would like to ask you about audits of your DA over the last 12 months. We know you are audited quarterly by the RCC, but we are only	_____# <i>(Enter 888 for Don't know)</i>

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	<p>interested in the most recent RCC audit. Including the most recent RCC audit, how many EXTERNAL audits has the DA been subject to in the last 12 months?</p> <p><i>(Note: We are NOT interested in all RCC quarterly audits; ONLY the MOST recent.)</i></p>	
<p><b>Audit History:</b> for each audit reported in the above question (up to 5 total audits), the enumerator asks for details of each audit. Items J1 through J20 are repeated for every audit up to (and including) the 5<sup>th</sup> audit. Upon completion of J20 for the final (or 5<sup>th</sup>) reported audit, the survey advances beyond the roster series. If no audits are reported or 888. 'Don't know' reported, skip J1 through J20. Note: this text box is for analyst purposes only and not included in the survey.</p>		
<p><b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 1)</b> Let's start with the most recent audit.</p> <p><b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 2)</b> Let's now discuss the SECOND most recent audit</p> <p><b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 3)</b> Let's now discuss the THIRD most recent audit</p> <p><b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 4)</b> Let's now discuss the FOURTH most recent audit</p> <p><b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 5)</b> Let's now discuss the FIFTH most recent audit</p>		
J1	When was the audit conducted?	[Select Year and Month]
J3	Who conducted the audit?	[Text]
J4	What was the focus of the audit?	1. Financial audit 2. Performance audit 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
	<p><b>[If J4 is 97. 'Other']</b></p> <p>If 'Other,' please specify.</p>	[Text]
J5	Have the results of the audit been disseminated to DA officials?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		-997. Not applicable
J5a	Were the results of the audit positive, negative, or neutral?	1. Positive 2. Negative 3. Neutral 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
J6.	<b>[If J5a is NOT 888. 'Don't know']</b> Can you summarize the main findings of the audit?	[Text]
J7	Who received/reviewed the results of the audit? <i>(Select all that apply. "Received" in a meeting, as a report, etc.)</i>	1. MMDA Internal Auditor 2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration) 4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one) 5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above) 6. Director of the Physical Planning Department 7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one) 8. District Works Engineer 9. Assistant District Engineer 10. DCE 11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly 12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee) 13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee 14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member) 16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee 17. District Procurement Officer 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know
	<b>[If J7 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
J10	Did the audit results motivate the DA to make any changes in how it is preparing THIS COMING YEAR's budget and Annual Action Plan?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997. Not applicable
J11	<b>[If J10 is 0. 'No']</b> If 'No', please explain why not.	[Text]
J11a	<b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b> If 'Yes', in what areas is the DA planning to (or has already) implement changes?	[Text]
J13	<b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b> Who was MOST important in initiating the changes in THIS COMING YEAR's budget process?	1. MMDA Internal Auditor 2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration) 4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one) 5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above) 6. Director of the Physical Planning Department 7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one) 8. District Works Engineer

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		9. Assistant District Engineer 10. DCE 11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly 12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee) 13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee 14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee 15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member) 16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee 17. District Procurement Officer 97. Other 888. Don't know
J15	<b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Did the audit encourage changes to CURRENT contracting and procurement processes?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997. Not applicable
J16	<b>[If J15 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Who was MOST important in initiating the changes in contracting and procurement processes?	1. MMDA Internal Auditor 2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration) 4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one) 5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above) 6. Director of the Physical Planning Department 7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one)

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		8. District Works Engineer 9. Assistant District Engineer 10. DCE 11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly 12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee) 13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee 14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee 15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member) 16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee 17. District Procurement Officer 97. Other 888. Don't know
J17	<b>[If J15 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Please describe the changes to contracting and procurement processes.	[Text]
J18	<b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Did the audit encourage changes to internal auditing processes?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997. Not applicable
J19	<b>[If J18 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Who was MOST important in initiating the changes to the internal auditing process?	1. MMDA Internal Auditor 2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration) 4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one)

SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
		5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above) 6. Director of the Physical Planning Department 7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one) 8. District Works Engineer 9. Assistant District Engineer 10. DCE 11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly 12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee) 13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee 14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee 15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member) 16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee 17. District Procurement Officer 888. Don't know 97. Other
J20	<b>[If J18 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Please describe the changes to the internal auditing process.	[Text]
J24	Overall, how influential do you think the audits have been in motivating change in your DA?	1. Very influential 2. A little influential 3. No change 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
J25	<b>[If number of reported audits &gt; 1]</b>  Which audit was most influential?	[Text]

<b>SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
<b>Section K: Political Involvement</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
KI	Are you affiliated with a political party?	0. No 1. Yes 999. Prefer not to respond
	<b>[If KI is 1. 'Yes']</b>  Which party?	1. NDC  2. NPP  97. Other
<b>Read: Now I will provide you with a list of activities relating to the most recent DA elections. Please tell HOW MANY of these you took part in. Please DO NOT tell me which ones, only how many.</b>		
<b>SURV EXP 4 (Randomize between SURVEXP 4.1 and SURVEXP 4.2)</b>		
	How many of the following did you take part in? <b>[Read choices]</b>	
	Informing yourself about the campaign	
	Went to Accra to gather information on candidates	
	Did NOT vote	
	Voted for the same party you usually vote for	
SURV EXP 4.1.	Please enter the number: _____	
	How many of the following did you take part in? <b>[Read choices]</b>	
	Informing yourself about the campaign	
	Went to Accra to gather information on candidates	
	Did NOT vote	
	Targeted district resources to help mobilize voters	
	Voted for the same party you usually vote for	
SURVEXP 4.2.	Please enter the number: _____	

Section L: Respondent Background		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
L1	What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group?	0. AKAN ( <i>specify</i> ) 20: GA-ADANGBE 30: EWE 40: GUAN 50: GURMA 60: MOLE-DAGBANI 70: GRUSI 80: MANDE 97: Other ( <i>specify</i> )
L1a	<b>[If L1 is 0. 'AKAN']</b> If 'Akan,' please specify.	1. Twi 2. Fante 3. Other Akan
L1o	<b>[If L1 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
L2	What is your religion, if any?	1. None 2. Christianity 3. Islam 4. Traditional/ethnic religion 5. Agnostic (do not know if there is a God) 6. Atheist (do not believe in a God) 7. Other
L3	Respondent Name (Surname, First name)	[Text] <i>(If "Prefer not to give name" enter 999.)</i>
L4	Primary e-mail of respondent.	[Text] If no email, enter 0. Explain to respondent that this is only in the event we would like

		to follow up with them. Their responses are ANONYMOUS.
L5	Does your salary at this job cover all, most, or only a small part of your typical monthly household expenses?	1. Covers all 2. Covers most 3. Covers only a small part 999. Prefer not to respond

**Read: Thank you for participating in this survey.**

**Section M: Questions for Enumerators**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
M1	Were there any other people immediately present who might be listening during the interview?	1: No one 2: Office staff 3: Other political officials 4: Other administrative officials 5: Small crowd
M2	What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?	1: All 2: Most 3: Some 4: A few 5: None
M3	What was the respondent's reaction to the interview?	1: Very positive 2: Somewhat positive 3: Neutral 4: Somewhat negative 5: Very negative

# ANNEX 4: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

Section A: Basic Information and Consent		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
A1	Date of Survey	[Date]
A2	Name of Enumerator	24. Beauty 25. Bimpor 26. Diana 27. Dzakuma 28. Baffoe 29. Joana 30. Lawrence 31. Abutima 32. Anderson 33. Dickson 34. Alhassan 35. Ama 36. Samuel Wieh 37. Owuraku 38. Eric 39. Sethina 40. Bontii 41. Christopher 42. Desmond 43. Stephen 44. Samuel Okae Ansah 45. Kpadam 46. Bernice 98. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
	<b>[If A2 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
A3	Name of Supervisor	[Text]
A4	Region	11. Ashanti 12. Brong-Ahafo 13. Greater Accra 14. Central 15. Eastern 16. Northern 17. Western 18. Upper East 19. Upper West 20. Volta
A5	District	See variable in data for complete list of districts.

## **INFORMED CONSENT**

Good morning/ good afternoon, my name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am a research assistant working with the University of Ghana, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Social Impact on a study of neighborhood relations and public services across Ghana. I would like to ask you some questions to better understand your district. Your participation is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate, our discussion will last for around 30 minutes.

Please rest assured that your answers will remain confidential. This device will help me enter your answers, but I assure you that it is not recording your voice. While your answers would help us understand important features of your district, we will not provide your name and answers to anyone. Do not feel obligated to answer any question that you are not comfortable with and do not hesitate to ask me for a clarification if you think that a question is a bit difficult or unclear. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the research manager in Ghana, Professor Peter Quartey of the University of Ghana. His contact information is 0264522350.

<b>Section A: Basic Information and Consent</b>		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
A8	Did the respondent consent?  <b>[If 1. 'Yes', go to A11]</b>  <b>[If 0. 'No', go to A9]</b>	0. No  1. Yes
A9	Can you please tell me why you have chosen not to participate?  <b>[End survey]</b>	[Text]
<b>Read aloud: Let's begin by recording a few facts about yourself.</b>		
A11	What your current position?	1. DCE 2. Presiding Member of the District Assembly 3. Chair of the Works Sub-committee 4. Chair Development Planning sub-committee 5. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member) 6. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
	<b>[If A11 is '97' Other]</b>  If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
A12	Respondent's sex	0. Male  1. Female

Section A: Basic Information and Consent		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
A13	How old are you?	_____ # of years (Age at last birthday)
A14	How many years have you lived in this district?	_____ # of years (Round to the nearest year (i.e. 5 months = 0. 1 year and 7 months = 2 ))
Section B: Education and Position		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
B1	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	1. No formal schooling 2. Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling) 3. Some basic schooling 4. Basic school completed 5. Some secondary school/high school 6. Secondary school/high school completed 7. Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college 8. Some university 9. University completed 10. Post-graduate 999. Prefer not to respond
B2	How many years have you worked in your current job?	_____ # of years (If < 6 months, enter 0; if more than 6 months, enter 1.)
B3	<b>[If A11 is NOT 1. 'DCE']</b> Were you newly elected in the most recent DA election? (i.e. is this your first term in the DA?)	0. No 1. Yes
B4	Where did you work before beginning your current job?	1. Private Business/Private Sector 2. Mass media

		3. Farmer 4. NGO 5. Same institution 6. Another institution in the public sector 7. Political party 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
B5	<b>[If B4 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
B6	In a typical week, how many hours per week do you work on district-related issues?	_____ # of hours
B7	In a TYPICAL working week, how many hours do you spend on each of the following tasks? <b>[Remind respondent of # of work hours from previous question]</b>	
	Meeting with district officials	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
	Meeting with national officials	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
	Meeting with employees	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
	Providing services/responding to citizen concerns	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
	Working with civil society or community groups	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
	Administrative tasks and documentation	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
	Training, skill-building, or workshops	_____ # of hours ( <i>Hours (NOT minutes)</i> )
B8	<b>[If A11 is NOT 1. 'DCE']</b> We are interested in how you financed your campaign for the most recent election. Can you tell me the two most	1. From my own savings 2. By my political party 3. By the District Chief Executive

	<p>important sources of financing for your campaign?</p> <p><i>(Please select the TWO MOST IMPORTANT options.)</i></p>	<p>4. Through private donations</p> <p>5. Your MP</p> <p>6. A loan</p> <p>7. Not elected</p> <p>97. Other</p> <p>971. Other (2<sup>nd</sup>)</p>
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**Section C: Recruitment, Promotions, and Transfers**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
C1	Are you affiliated with a political party?	<p>0. No</p> <p>1. Yes</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
	<p><b>[If C1 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Which political party?</p>	<p>1. NDC</p> <p>2. NPP</p> <p>97. Other</p>
C3	<p><b>[Skip to C3a if A11 is 1. 'DCE']</b></p> <p>Thinking about your electoral victory IN THE MOST RECENT ELECTION, how important would you say PARTY AFFILIATION was for your victory?</p>	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
C5	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you say MONEY/WEALTH was for your victory?	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
C6	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you say SUPPORT OF COMMUNITY	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p>

	SOCIAL GROUPS was for your victory?	3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C8	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you say POLITICAL CONNECTIONS WITH THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT were for your victory?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C9	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you say NON-POLITICAL CONNECTIONS INCLUDING FAMILY, FRIENDS, and RELIGIOUS CONNECTIONS were for your victory?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C10	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you say PARTY ACTIVISM was for your victory?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C11	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you say TRIBE/ETHNICITY was for your victory?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C12	(Thinking about your electoral victory...) How important would you	1. Very important

	say PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE AS AN ELECTED OFFICIAL was for your victory?	<p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p> <p>-997 Not applicable</p>
C3a	<p><b>[Skip to prompt immediately after C12a if A11 is NOT I. 'DCE']</b></p> <p>Thinking about your appointment how important would you say PARTY AFFILIATION was for your appointment?</p>	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
C5a	<p>(Thinking about your appointment...)</p> <p>How important would you say MONEY/WEALTH was for your appointment?</p>	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
C6a	<p>(Thinking about your appointment...)</p> <p>How important would you say SUPPORT OF COMMUNITY SOCIAL GROUPS was for your appointment?</p>	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
C8a	<p>(Thinking about your appointment...)</p> <p>How important would you say POLITICAL CONNECTIONS WITH THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT were for your appointment?</p>	<p>1. Very important</p> <p>2. Somewhat important</p> <p>3. A little bit important</p> <p>4. Not at all important</p> <p>888. Don't know</p>

		999. Prefer not to respond
C9a	(Thinking about your appointment...) How important would you say NON-POLITICAL CONNECTIONS INCLUDING FAMILY, FRIENDS, and RELIGIOUS CONNECTIONS were for your appointment?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
CI0a	(Thinking about your appointment...) How important would you say PARTY ACTIVISM was for your appointment?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
CI1a	(Thinking about your appointment...) How important would you say TRIBE/ETHNICITY was for your appointment?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
CI2a	(Thinking about your appointment...) how important would you say PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE AS AN ELECTED OFFICIAL was for your appointment?	1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. A little bit important 4. Not at all important 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond -997. Not applicable
<b>Read: Within a district, different people are elected for different reasons. We're interested in learning about these general trends. Please think about the representatives in your district.</b>		
CI3	Of those representatives elected in the most recent DA election, what would	1. Party affiliation

	<p>you say were the particularly IMPORTANT factors that determined THEIR electoral success?</p> <p><i>(Probe for response and check all that apply.)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Political connections</li> <li>3. Grassroots mobilization</li> <li>4. Personal wealth</li> <li>5. Ideas for improving district</li> <li>6. Tribe/ethnicity</li> <li>7. Support of Chiefs</li> <li>8. Support of the DCE</li> <li>9. Spending money on voters during the campaign</li> <li>97. Other(s) <i>(specify)</i></li> <li>888. Don't know</li> <li>999. Prefer not to respond</li> </ul>
C13o	<p><b>[If C13 is 97. 'Other(s)']</b></p> <p>If "Other(s)," please specify.</p>	[Text]
C14	<p>And if you had to say, which would you say was the single most important factor that contributed to their electoral success?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Party affiliation</li> <li>2. Political connections</li> <li>3. Grassroots mobilization</li> <li>4. Personal wealth</li> <li>5. Ideas for improving district</li> <li>6. Tribe/ethnicity</li> <li>7. Support of Chiefs</li> <li>8. Support of the DCE</li> <li>9. Spending money on voters during the campaign</li> <li>97. Other <i>(specify)</i></li> <li>888. Don't know</li> <li>999. Prefer not to respond</li> </ul>
C14o	<p><b>[If C14 is 97. 'Other']</b></p> <p>If "Other," please specify.</p>	[Text]

C18c	Which do you think is the MOST effective way of winning the support of voters: promising PRIVATE BENEFITS to them/their family OR promising DEVELOPMENT benefits to their community?	1. Private benefits 2. Development benefits 3. Neither are effective 4. Both are equally effective 888: Don't know 999: Prefer not to respond
<b>Read: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.</b>		
C20	Voters can easily vote out elected District Assembly members who are not responsive to their needs.	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C21	District politicians win votes by starting development projects in an area, even if the projects don't get completed.	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
C22	Chances for reelection depend more on job performance than political affiliation.	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

C23	To be professionally successful, elected officials need to be more responsive to party positions than citizen opinions.	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<b>Read: Please rank the factors below according to the influence each has on people LOSING reelection. Please rank with “1” the factor that has the most influence. Please rank with “2” the factor that has the second most influence.</b>		
C24a	Lack of responsiveness to district citizens	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24b	Unethical behavior	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24c	Perceived corruption	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24d	Insubordination within the party	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24e	Party loses popularity	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24f	Opposition from DCE	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24g	Opposition from Chiefs	Rank _____# <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24h	Influence of the national governing party	Rank _____#

		<i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C24o	Other	Rank _____#  <i>(Please enter 1 for first priority, 2 for second priority, 0 for all others.)</i>
C25	<b>[If C24o &gt; 0]</b>  If "Other," please specify.	[Text]
<b>Section D: Capital/Development Projects</b>		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
D1	Has the district government produced a draft budget (i.e. a DRAFT ANNUAL ACTION PLAN) for this coming fiscal year?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know
D2a.	<b>[Skip to D8 if D1 is 0. 'No' OR 888. 'Don't know']</b>  Who produced the first draft?  <i>(Select all that apply)</i>	1. DCE  2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council  3. District Tender Board  4. District Coordinating Director  5. District Finance Officer  6. District Budget Officer  7. Finance Subcommittee  8. District Planning Coordinating Unit  9. Presiding member of the DA  10. Physical Planning/Works Department  11. Town/Area Councils  12. Social Services Subcommittee  13. Works Subcommittee  14. Health Department  15. Education Department  16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department  17. Ministry of Local Government

		18. National Development Planning Commission 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D3a.	<b>[If D2a is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D4a	If you had to choose, who would you say had the MOST influence in producing the first draft?	1. DCE 2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Tender Board 4. District Coordinating Director 5. District Finance Officer 6. District Budget Officer 7. Finance Subcommittee 8. District Planning Coordinating Unit 9. Presiding member of the DA 10. Physical Planning/Works Department 11. Town/Area Councils 12. Social Services Subcommittee 13. Works Subcommittee 14. Health Department 15. Education Department 16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department 17. Ministry of Local Government 18. National Development Planning Commission 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D5a	<b>[If D4a is 97. 'Other']</b>	[Text]

	If 'Other', please specify.	
D8	<p><b>[Skip to D14 if D1 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Who do you EXPECT to prepare the first draft?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DCE</li> <li>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</li> <li>3. District Tender Board</li> <li>4. District Coordinating Director</li> <li>5. District Finance Officer</li> <li>6. District Budget Officer</li> <li>7. Finance Subcommittee</li> <li>8. District Planning Coordinating Unit</li> <li>9. Presiding member of the DA</li> <li>10. Physical Planning/Works Department</li> <li>11. Town/Area Councils</li> <li>12. Social Services Subcommittee</li> <li>13. Works Subcommittee</li> <li>14. Health Department</li> <li>15. Education Department</li> <li>16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department</li> <li>17. Ministry of Local Government</li> <li>18. National Development Planning Commission</li> <li>97. Other <i>(specify)</i></li> <li>888. Don't know</li> <li>999. Prefer not to respond</li> </ol>
D9	<p><b>[If D8 is 97. 'Other']</b></p> <p>If 'Other,' please specify.</p>	[Text]
D10	If you had to choose, who would you expect to have the SINGLE most influence in producing the first draft?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DCE</li> <li>2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council</li> <li>3. District Tender Board</li> <li>4. District Coordinating Director</li> </ol>

		5. District Finance Officer 6. District Budget Officer 7. Finance Subcommittee 8. District Planning Coordinating Unit 9. Presiding member of the DA 10. Physical Planning/Works Department 11. Town/Area Councils 12. Social Services Subcommittee 13. Works Subcommittee 14. Health Department 15. Education Department 16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department 17. Ministry of Local Government 18. National Development Planning Commission 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D11	<b>[If D10 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
D14	How many important changes do you expect to be made to the initial draft budget for this coming year?	1. A lot of changes 2. Some changes 3. A few changes 4. No changes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D15	<b>[Skip to D20 if D14 is 4. 'No changes' OR 888. 'Don't know' OR 999. 'Prefer not to respond'.]</b> What do you expect to be the most important sources of those changes?	1. DCE 2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Tender Board

	(Select all that apply)	4. District Coordinating Director 5. District Finance Officer 6. District Budget Officer 7. Finance Subcommittee 8. District Planning Coordinating Unit 9. Presiding member of the DA 10. Physical Planning/Works Department 11. Town/Area Councils 12. Social Services Subcommittee 13. Works Subcommittee 14. Health Department 15. Education Department 16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department 17. Ministry of Local Government 18. National Development Planning Commission 97. Other (specify) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
D18	<b>[If D15 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other', please specify.	[Text]
D19	Which of these do you think is likely to be the single most important source of change?  (This choice should have been mentioned by respondent in previous question)	1. DCE 2. District Planning Officer/Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Tender Board 4. District Coordinating Director 5. District Finance Officer 6. District Budget Officer 7. Finance Subcommittee 8. District Planning Coordinating Unit

		<p>9. Presiding member of the DA</p> <p>10. Physical Planning/Works Department</p> <p>11. Town/Area Councils</p> <p>12. Social Services Subcommittee</p> <p>13. Works Subcommittee</p> <p>14. Health Department</p> <p>15. Education Department</p> <p>16. Social Welfare and Community Development Department</p> <p>17. Ministry of Local Government</p> <p>18. National Development Planning Commission</p> <p>97. Other</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
D20	Do you expect the PREPARATION of THIS COMING YEAR'S Annual Action Plan to proceed in about the same manner as in previous years?	<p>0. No</p> <p>1. Yes</p> <p>-997. Not applicable (new in position/do not know past practices)</p>
D21	<b>[If D20 is 0. 'No']</b>  If 'No,' how do you expect it to be different?	[Text]
D22	Did both the District Assembly and District Chief Executive approve the MOST RECENT Annual Action Plan (i.e. the current, ongoing budget)?	<p>4. No, only the DA approved the AAP</p> <p>5. No, only the DCE approved the AAP</p> <p>6. Yes the AAP was approved by both the DA and DCE</p> <p>889. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
D22b	Is the EXECUTION of the CURRENT/ONGOING Annual Action Plan proceeding in about the same way as it has in previous years?	<p>0. No</p> <p>1. Yes</p> <p>-997. Not applicable (new in position/do not know past practices)</p>
D23	<b>[If D22b is 0. 'No']</b>	[Text]

	If 'No,' what have been the important differences?	
D24	In your district, how much discretion does the District Chief Executive have over which development projects are built AFTER the Annual Action Plan is approved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. A lot</li> <li>6. Some</li> <li>7. A little</li> <li>8. None</li> <li>889. Don't know</li> <li>999. Prefer not to respond</li> </ul>
D25	In a typical year, about how many important changes are made to the AAP after it is approved by the General Assembly?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. A lot of changes</li> <li>6. Some changes</li> <li>7. A few changes</li> <li>8. No changes</li> <li>889. Don't know</li> <li>999. Prefer not to respond</li> </ul>
D26	<p>What are some of the more important factors that influence where YOU want development projects to be located in the district?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply. Note: we want to know about which villages get projects, NOT the precise location in a village.)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share</li> <li>2. Rewarding political supporters</li> <li>3. Trying to win over undecided voters</li> <li>4. Potential to switch the loyalty of party supporters</li> <li>5. Targeting areas with the most need</li> <li>6. Developing the district capital</li> <li>7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied</li> <li>8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied</li> <li>9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied</li> </ul> <p>97. Other(s) <i>(specify)</i></p>
D27	<p><b>[If D26 is 97. 'Other(s)']</b></p> <p>If "Other(s)," please specify.</p>	[Text]
D28	<p>What is the SINGLE most important influence on where YOU want development projects to be located?</p> <p><i>(Note: we want to know about which villages get projects, NOT the precise location in a village.)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share</li> <li>2. Rewarding political supporters</li> <li>3. Trying to win over undecided voters</li> <li>4. Potential to switch the loyalty of party supporters</li> <li>5. Targeting areas with the most need</li> <li>6. Developing the district capital</li> <li>7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied</li> <li>8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied</li> <li>9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied</li> </ul> <p>97. Other(s) <i>(specify)</i></p>
D29	<b>[If D28 is 97. 'Other(s)']</b>	[Text]

	If "Other(s)," please specify.	
D30	<p><b>[If All is NOT I. 'DCE']</b></p> <p>What do you think are some of the more important factors that influence where the DCE wants development projects to be located?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share</li> <li>2. Rewarding political supporters</li> <li>3. Trying to win over undecided voters</li> <li>4. Potential to switch the loyalty of party supporters</li> <li>5. Targeting areas with the most need</li> <li>6. Developing the district capital</li> <li>7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied</li> <li>8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied</li> <li>9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied</li> <li>97. Other(s) (specify)</li> </ol>
D31	<p><b>[If D30 is 97. 'Other(s)']</b></p> <p>If "Other(s)," please specify.</p>	[Text]
D32	<p><b>[If All is NOT I. 'DCE']</b></p> <p>What do you think is the SINGLE most important influence on where the DCE wants development projects to be located?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Making sure everyone gets an equal share</li> <li>2. Rewarding political supporters</li> <li>3. Trying to win over undecided voters</li> <li>4. Potential to switch the loyalty of party supporters</li> <li>5. Targeting areas with the most need</li> <li>6. Developing the district capital</li> <li>7. Keeping the DCE's ethnic group(s) satisfied</li> <li>8. Keeping influential/well-organized/lobbying communities satisfied</li> <li>9. Keeping Chiefs satisfied</li> <li>97. Others(s) (specify)</li> </ol>
D33	<p><b>[If D33 is 97. 'Other(s)']</b></p> <p>If "Others," please specify.</p>	[Text]

D34	Compared to Common Fund Projects, is the implementation of donor-funded projects (e.g. District Development Facility, DDF) more or less likely to stick to the Annual Plan?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Much more likely</li> <li>2. Somewhat more likely</li> <li>3. About the same</li> <li>4. Somewhat less likely</li> <li>5. Much less likely</li> </ol>
D35	In your estimation, what percentage of Common Fund projects are abandoned during construction (i.e. never finished) four years from when they began?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0. 0/None</li> <li>1. 1-10%</li> <li>2. 11-20%</li> <li>3. 21-30%</li> <li>4. 31-40%</li> <li>5. 41-50%</li> <li>6. 51-60%</li> <li>7. 61-70%</li> <li>8. 71-80%</li> <li>9. 81-90%</li> <li>10. 91-100%</li> <li>888. Don't know</li> </ol>
D36	In your estimation, what percentage of donor-funded projects are abandoned during construction (i.e. never finished) four years from when they began?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0. 0/None</li> <li>1. 1-10%</li> <li>2. 11-20%</li> <li>3. 21-30%</li> <li>4. 31-40%</li> <li>5. 41-50%</li> <li>6. 51-60%</li> <li>7. 61-70%</li> <li>8. 71-80%</li> <li>9. 81-90%</li> <li>10. 91-100%</li> <li>888. Don't know</li> </ol>

**Section E: Contracting**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
E1	<p>When thinking of larger district capital projects in this coming year’s budget, which factors do you expect will influence the selection of a contractor on these large projects?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply.)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Contractor's professional and technical qualifications</li> <li>2. Bid's terms of payment</li> <li>3. Bid’s timeframe for project completion</li> <li>4. Contractor's political affiliation</li> <li>5. Contractor's connections with the District Chief Executive</li> <li>97. Other <i>(specify)</i></li> </ol>
E2	<p><b>[If E1 is 97. ‘Other’]</b></p> <p>If ‘Other,’ please specify.</p>	[Text]
E3	<p>Which factor do you expect will be the single most important factor in the selection of a contractor on these large projects?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Contractor's professional and technical qualifications</li> <li>2. Bid's terms of payment</li> <li>3. Bid’s timeframe for project completion</li> <li>4. Contractor's political affiliation</li> <li>5. Contractor's connections with the District Chief Executive</li> <li>97. Other</li> </ol>
E4	<p>Whose approval will be necessary for these larger contracts?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply.)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. District Chief Executive</li> <li>2. District Tender Review Board</li> <li>3. District Assembly Internal Auditor</li> <li>4. District Assembly Finance Committee</li> <li>97. Other <i>(specify)</i></li> </ol>
E5	<p><b>[If E4 is 97. ‘Other’]</b></p> <p>If ‘Other,’ please specify.</p>	[Text]
<p><b>Read: When it comes to public development projects, sometimes situations arise that can affect competitive contracting. I would like to ask you how often some issues came up in contracting in your district in THE LAST 6 MONTHS.</b></p>		

<b>Section E: Contracting</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
E6	In THE LAST 6 MONTHS, has your DA been involved in contracting for an infrastructure project?	0. No 1. Yes
E7	<b>[If E6 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  In THE LAST 6 MONTHS, how often did fewer than the required number of qualified contractors submit bids?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never  888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
E8	<b>[If E6 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  In THE LAST 6 MONTHS, how often were projects broken into smaller parts to avoid requirements for competitive bids?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never  888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<b>Read: Now I will provide you with a list of things that people mention as a part of AWARDING A CONTRACT in some DAs. Please tell me HOW MANY of them happen REGULARLY in your DA. Please DO NOT tell me the specific answers, only how many.</b>		
<b>Survey Experiment 1 (Randomize between SE2.1 AND SE2.2)</b>		
<b>How many of the following happen REGULARLY in your DA?</b>  <i>(Read choices aloud)</i>		
Comparison of multiple competing bids		
Potential contractors lobbying the President to get the contract		
The district engineer reviews the contract.		
<b>SE2.1</b>	<b>Please enter the number: _____</b>	

Section E: Contracting		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
<p><b>How many of the following happen REGULARLY in your DA?</b></p> <p><i>(Read choices aloud)</i></p>		
Comparison of multiple competing bids		
Potential contractors lobbying the President to get the contract		
Contracts being awarded corruptly		
The district engineer reviews the contract.		
SE2.2	Please enter the number: _____	
Section F: Construction		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
<p><b>Read: When it comes to the construction of district capital projects such as government schools and clinics, some people in other districts report that sometimes issues come up. I would like to ask you about how often these issues have happened in your district in THE LAST 6 MONTHS.</b></p>		
F1	How often have delays in construction happened in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F2	How often in THE LAST 6 MONTHS have construction costs exceeded their budgeted amount?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

**Section E: Contracting**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
F3	How often in THE LAST 6 MONTHS have contractors abandoned projects for which they have received advance payment?	1. Very frequently 2. Frequently 3. Occasionally 4. Rarely 5. Never 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F4	Can you describe how the district's system for overseeing the construction of capital projects has worked in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?  <i>(What are the major features and stages?)</i>	[Text]
F5	Are there any problems with the system?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
F6	<b>[If F5 is 1. 'Yes']</b>  What are the biggest problems with the system?	[Text]
F7	How many times will a typical large ONE YEAR capital project be visited by a district engineer, auditor, or other official to evaluate project progress before it is completed?	_____#
F8	When a district engineer finds a problem with a large project, do you think they typically deal with the contractor directly or report it to the DA?  <i>(Note: Both is an option, but don't mention it in asking the question.)</i>	1. Deal with contractor directly 2. Report it to the DA 3. Both 888. Don't know

**Section E: Contracting**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
F9	In THE LAST 6 MONTHS, what is the most common reason given by contractors for running over budget?	1. Unforeseen increase in the costs of materials 2. Change in design 3. Unforeseen delays 4. Difficulty of finding qualified workers 5. Delays in receiving payment from the DA 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond  ( <i>Probe and code</i> )
F10	<b>[If F9 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
F11	In your estimation, what percentage of major capital projects have finished on time in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%
F12	What is the most common reason given by contractors for running behind schedule in THE LAST 6 MONTHS?	1. Unforeseen increase in the costs of materials 2. Change in design 3. Unforeseen delays 4. Difficulty of finding qualified workers 5. Delays in receiving payment from the DA 97. Other ( <i>specify</i> ) 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond  ( <i>Probe and code</i> )
F13	<b>[If F12 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]

<b>Section G: Governance and Corruption</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
G1	To what extent would you say that corruption is a problem in the PREPARATION of the Annual Action Plans?	1. Significant problem 2. Somewhat of a problem 3. Not much of a problem 4. Not at all a problem 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
G2	To what extent would you say that corruption is a problem in the EXECUTION of the Annual Action Plans?	1. Significant problem 2. Somewhat of a problem 3. Not much of a problem 4. Not at all a problem 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
<b>SEI</b>	<b>Survey Experiment I (RANDOMIZE BETWEEN SEI.1 AND SEI.2)</b>	
SEI.1	Imagine that your district assembly received an extra 100,000 cedis from the COMMON FUND for development projects. About what percentage would you guess would be wasted or mis-spent?	<i>Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%</i> 888: Don't know 999: Prefer not to respond
SEI.1a	And what percentage of the resulting development projects do you think would be built on time?	<i>Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%</i> 888: Don't know 999: Prefer not to respond
SEI.2	Imagine that your district assembly received an extra 100,000 cedis from the DDF for development projects. About what percentage would you guess would be wasted or mis-spent?	<i>Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%</i> 888: Don't know 999: Prefer not to respond

SEI.2a	And what percentage of the resulting development projects do you think would be built on time?	Please enter % (0 to 100) _____%  888: Don't know  999: Prefer not to respond
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**Section H: Organizational Performance and Provision of Services**

H1	To what extent would you agree or disagree that district capital projects are <b>PLANNED</b> in a transparent manner?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H2	To what extent would you agree or disagree that district capital projects are <b>CONTRACTED</b> in a transparent manner?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

**Read: There can be many obstacles to building development projects that serve the needs of district citizens. When you think about the preparation of the next Annual Action Plan to what extent do you agree that the following are likely to represent big obstacles to building better development projects in your district.**

H7	To what extent do you agree or disagree that <b>CITIZENS' NON-PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT</b> will represent a big obstacle to building better development projects?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H8	To what extent do you agree or disagree that <b>THE INFLUENCE OF THE</b>	1. Strongly agree

	DCE will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i>	2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H9	To what extent do you agree or disagree that LIMITED DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY OVER DA COMMON FUND resources will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H10	To what extent do you agree or disagree that POLITICAL PRESSURE TO START MANY PROJECTS is an obstacle to building better development projects in your district? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H11	To what extent do you agree or disagree that INSUFFICIENT AND/OR LESS QUALIFIED STAFF TO OVERSEE PROJECTS will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

<p>H12</p>	<p>To what extent do you agree or disagree that <b>CORRUPTION AMONG DISTRICT PUBLIC OFFICIALS</b> will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i></p>	<p>1. Strongly agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree  5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to respond</p>
<p>H13</p>	<p>To what extent do you agree or disagree that <b>CORRUPTION AMONG CONTRACTORS</b> will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i></p>	<p>1. Strongly agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree  5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to respond</p>
<p>H14</p>	<p>To what extent do you agree or disagree that <b>THE NEED TO RESPOND TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITIES</b> will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i></p>	<p>1. Strongly agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree  5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to respond</p>
<p>H15</p>	<p>To what extent do you agree or disagree that the <b>INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES</b> will represent a big obstacle? <i>(to building better development projects in your district.)</i></p>	<p>1. Strongly agree  2. Agree  3. Neutral  4. Disagree  5. Strongly disagree  888. Don't know  999. Prefer not to respond</p>
<p>H16</p>	<p>To what extent do you agree or disagree that the <b>INFLUENCE OF</b></p>	<p>1. Strongly agree</p>

	CHIEFS will represent a big obstacle? (to building better development projects in your district.)	2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
H17	Above the village level, how many important chiefs are there in this district?	_____#
H18	Would you say that there are important, sustained conflicts among chiefs in this district? (For example, over resources or power)	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

**SECTION I: ACCOUNTABILITY**

#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
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**Read: Now I will read you a list of people and agencies that your office might involve in the preparation of THIS COMING YEAR'S Annual Action Plan: The Public, NGOs, the national agency overseeing your area of work, Ministry of Local Government (MLGRD), MPs, DCE, DA, and Chiefs.**

**Which is your office most responsive to? [MARK as 1]**

**Which is your office second most responsive to? [Mark as 2]**

I7	The Public	_____#
I8	NGOs	_____#
I9	The national agencies involved in service delivery	_____#
I10	Ministry of Local Government (MLGRD)	_____#
I11	MPs	_____#
I12	DCE	_____#
I13	Senior members of the DA	_____#

114	Chiefs	_____ #
115	Does the District Assembly have a Public Relations and Complaints Committee?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know
116	<b>[Skip to 118 if 115 is NOT 1. 'Yes']</b> Is the DA Public Relations Complaints committee active?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know
117	How responsive do you think the PR Committee is to citizen complaints?	1. Not at all responsive 2. A little bit responsive 3. Responsive 4. Very responsive 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond

**Read: Now I will provide you with a list of things that people mention as being A REGULAR part of their work. Please tell me HOW MANY of these you have seen REGULARLY. Please DO NOT tell me the specific answers, only how many.**

**Survey Experiment 3 (Randomize between 118a and 118b)**

How many of the following things have you seen REGULARLY?

**(Read choices)**

- Citizens requesting financial assistance
- Office supplies running short
- Employees attending job training seminars

118a

Please enter the number: \_\_\_\_\_ #

How many of the following activities have you seen REGULARLY?

**(Read choices)**

- Citizens requesting financial assistance
- Office supplies running short
- Government officials providing members of their political party with privileged access to public resources
- Employees attending job training seminars

118b	Please enter the number: _____ #	
<b>Section J: G-SAM Awareness and Influence</b>		
#	QUESTION	RESPONSE CODES
	Does your DA have an ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee)?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997 Not applicable
	Over the LAST YEAR how much influence would you say the ARIC has had on how the district contracts and oversees projects?	1. A lot of influence 2. A little influence 3. No influence 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
	Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement: Contractors sometimes try to influence the outcome of audits	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
	Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: Sometimes one (or more) DA OFFICIAL tries to influence the outcome of audits  <i>(Note: We are not interested in if ALL DA officials, but if ANY officials try to influence.)</i>	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neutral 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree 888. Don't know 999. Prefer not to respond
	Now we would like to ask you about audits of your DA over the last 12 months. We know you are audited quarterly by the RCC, but we are only interested in the most recent RCC	_____ # <i>(Enter 888 for Don't know)</i>

	audit. INCLUDING the most recent RCC audit, how many EXTERNAL audits has the DA been subject to over the last 12 months?  (Note: We are NOT interested in all RCC quarterly audits; ONLY the MOST recent.)	
<p><b>Audit History:</b> for each audit reported in the above question (up to 5 total audits), the enumerator asks for details of each audit. Items J1 through J20 are repeated for every audit up to (and including) the 5<sup>th</sup> audit. Upon completion of J20 for the final (or 5<sup>th</sup>) reported audit, the survey advances beyond the roster series. If no audits are reported or 888. 'Don't know' is reported, skip J1 through J20. Note: this text box is for analyst purposes only and not included in the survey.</p>		
<p><b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 1)</b> Let's start with the most recent audit.  <b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 2)</b> Let's now discuss the SECOND most recent audit  <b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 3)</b> Let's now discuss the THIRD most recent audit  <b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 4)</b> Let's now discuss the FOURTH most recent audit  <b>(Read aloud immediately before J1 of Audit 5)</b> Let's now discuss the FIFTH most recent audit</p>		
J1	When was the audit conducted?	[Select Year and Month]
J3	Who conducted the audit?	[Text]
J4	What was the focus of the audit?	1. Financial audit 2. Performance audit 97. Other (specify)
	<b>[If J4 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
J5	Have the results of the audit been disseminated to DA officials?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997. Not applicable
J5a	Were the results of the audit positive, negative, or neutral?	1. Positive 2. Negative

		<p>3. Neutral</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
J6.	<p><b>[If J5a is NOT 888. 'Don't know']</b></p> <p>Can you summarize the main findings of the audit?</p>	[Text]
J7	<p>Who received/reviewed the results of the audit?</p> <p><i>(Select all that apply. "Received" in a meeting, as a report, etc.)</i></p>	<p>1. MMDA Internal Auditor</p> <p>2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council</p> <p>3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration)</p> <p>4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one)</p> <p>5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above)</p> <p>6. Director of the Physical Planning Department</p> <p>7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one)</p> <p>8. District Works Engineer</p> <p>9. Assistant District Engineer</p> <p>10. DCE</p> <p>11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly</p> <p>12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee)</p> <p>13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee</p> <p>14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee</p> <p>15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member)</p> <p>16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee</p> <p>17. District Procurement Officer</p> <p>888. Don't know</p>

		97. Other ( <i>specify</i> )
	<b>[If J7 is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
J10	Did the audit results motivate the DA to make any changes in how it is preparing THIS COMING YEAR's budget and Annual Action Plan?	0. No 1. Yes 888. Don't know -997. Not applicable
J11	<b>[If J10 is 0. 'No']</b> If 'No', please explain why not.	[Text]
J11a	<b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b> If 'Yes', in what areas is the DA planning to (or has already) implement changes?	[Text]
J13	<b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b> Who was MOST important in initiating the changes in THIS COMING YEAR's budget process?	1. MMDA Internal Auditor 2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council 3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration) 4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one) 5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above) 6. Director of the Physical Planning Department 7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one) 8. District Works Engineer 9. Assistant District Engineer 10. DCE 11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly 12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee) 13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee

		<p>14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee</p> <p>15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member)</p> <p>16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee</p> <p>17. District Procurement Officer</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>97. Other</p>
J15	<p><b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Did the audit encourage changes to CURRENT contracting and procurement processes?</p>	<p>0. No</p> <p>1. Yes</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>-997. Not applicable</p>
J16	<p><b>[If J15 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Who was MOST important in initiating the changes in contracting and procurement processes?</p>	<p>1. MMDA Internal Auditor</p> <p>2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council</p> <p>3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration)</p> <p>4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one)</p> <p>5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above)</p> <p>6. Director of the Physical Planning Department</p> <p>7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one)</p> <p>8. District Works Engineer</p> <p>9. Assistant District Engineer</p> <p>10. DCE</p> <p>11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly</p> <p>12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee)</p> <p>13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee</p>

		<p>14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee</p> <p>15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member)</p> <p>16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee</p> <p>17. District Procurement Officer</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>97. Other</p>
J17	<p><b>[If J15 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Please describe the changes to contracting and procurement processes.</p>	[Text]
J18	<p><b>[If J10 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Did the audit encourage changes to internal auditing processes?</p>	<p>0. No</p> <p>1. Yes</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>-997. Not applicable</p>
J19	<p><b>[If J18 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Who was MOST important in initiating the changes to the internal auditing process?</p>	<p>1. MMDA Internal Auditor</p> <p>2. District Budget Analyst/Budget Officer Development Planning Coordinating Council</p> <p>3. District Coordinating Director (i.e. the head of the DA administration)</p> <p>4. Chair of District Tender Board (note that this is usually the DCE. If it is the DCE, s/he should be given the POL survey, not this one)</p> <p>5. Comptroller and/or District Finance Officer (if different from above)</p> <p>6. Director of the Physical Planning Department</p> <p>7. MMDA Planning Officer (if there is one)</p> <p>8. District Works Engineer</p> <p>9. Assistant District Engineer</p> <p>10. DCE</p> <p>11. Presiding Member of the District Assembly</p>

		<p>12. ARIC (Audit Report Implementation Committee)</p> <p>13. Chair of the Works Sub-committee</p> <p>14. Chair of the Development Planning sub-committee</p> <p>15. Chair of the District Executive Committee (if different from DCE or Presiding Member)</p> <p>16. Chair of the Social Services Sub-committee</p> <p>17. District Procurement Officer</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>97. Other</p>
J20	<p><b>[If J18 is 1. 'Yes']</b></p> <p>Please describe the changes to the internal auditing process.</p>	[Text]
	<p>Overall, how influential do you think the audits have been in motivating change in your DA?</p>	<p>1. Very influential</p> <p>2. A little influential</p> <p>3. No change</p> <p>888. Don't know</p> <p>999. Prefer not to respond</p>
	<p><b>[If number of reported audits &gt; 1]</b></p> <p>Which audit was most influential?</p>	[Text]

<b>Section L: Respondent Background</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
LI	<p>What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group?</p>	<p>0. AKAN (<i>specify</i>)</p> <p>20: GA-ADANGBE</p> <p>30: EWE</p> <p>40: GUAN</p> <p>50: GURMA</p> <p>60: MOLE-DAGBANI</p> <p>70: GRUSI</p>

		80: MANDE 97: Other ( <i>specify</i> )
L1a	<b>[If LI is 0. 'AKAN']</b> If 'Akan,' please specify.	1. Twi 2. Fante 3. Other Akan
L1o	<b>[If LI is 97. 'Other']</b> If 'Other,' please specify.	[Text]
L2	What is your religion, if any?	1. None 2. Christianity 3. Islam 4. Traditional/ethnic religion 5. Agnostic (do not know if there is a God) 6. Atheist (do not believe in a God) 7. Other
L10	Respondent Name (Surname, First name)	[Text] <i>(If "Prefer not to give name" enter 999.)</i>
L13	Primary E-mail	[Text] <i>(If no email, enter 0. Explain to respondent that this is only in the event we would like to follow up with them. Their responses are ANONYMOUS.)</i>
<b>Read: Thank you for participating in this survey.</b>		

<b>Section M: Questions for Enumerators</b>		
<b>#</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>RESPONSE CODES</b>
M1	Were there any other people immediately present who might be listening during the interview?	1: No one 2: Office staff 3: Other political officials 4: Other administrative officials 5: Small crowd
M2	What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?	1: All 2: Most 3: Some 4: A few 5: None
M3	What was the respondent's reaction to the interview?	1: Very positive 2: Somewhat positive 3: Neutral 4: Somewhat negative 5: Very negative

# ANNEX 5: BALANCE

## METHODS FOR ASSESSING BALANCE

This report uses two approaches to gauge balance between the treatment and control groups on a variety of factors. The first is a linear regression model, using district level clustered standard errors. This allows us to test whether or not treatment status alone "predicts" a difference between the treatment and control groups for a given outcome. With a well-balanced sample, we expect there to be no statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups. In this ideal scenario, we expect that treatment status is not a good predictor of outcomes. While this is a well-used method of testing balance, many dataset properties, such as sample size, may affect significance (Imai et al. 2008). The second way we test balance is by taking the standardized difference in means for each variable, and reporting the standardized percent bias (Austin 2009). Under this approach, variables with an absolute percent bias less than 25 percent are considered balanced (Stuart 2010). Typically, in this context, a statistically significant regression estimate, but a low percent bias indicates a low response rate or very uniform response, where unique responses tend to be in one group. At the baseline, these two measures are sufficient to show that the control group can act as an accurate counterfactual to the treatment group for the endline analyses.

We conduct balance tests for 72 baseline indicators from the Administrator survey. Table 5.1 below provides a sample of the indicators tests. The first column of Table 5.1 indicates the variable of interest. The Treatment column gives us the estimated effect of being in the treatment group on the variable of interest. The Constant column estimates the average value, regardless of treatment status. The Clustered S.E. (Standard Error) columns give the average difference between the observations, and the estimate, adjusting for within district correlations. Finally, the % Bias column gives the standardized difference in means between the two groups, as detailed above.

The indicators cover a range of topics, including respondent characteristics, contracting, service delivery, DA governance, corruption, etc. All variables are reported at the respondent level. Most variables are either reported as binary responses, or on a scale. With binary variables, a 0 is "No" and 1 is "Yes," for variables measured on a scale, lower values are generally more "positive" responses (e.g., "Strongly Agree" or "Very Good"), and higher values are more "negative" (e.g., "Strongly Disagree" or "Very Bad").

## TREATMENT AND CONTROL

Table V.1 shows very few variables with imbalance issues that indicate a significant regression coefficient and % Biases greater than 25 percent. For many of those with a significant statistical difference in the regression models, we see that % Biases remain under 25 percent. For respondent characteristics, we see that Administrators in the control versus audit districts generally look the same. The main exception is that respondents in the control group are a couple years older – on average – than those in the treatment group.

Table 5.1: Sample of Balance Results – Administrators Survey

	Treatment	Cluster S.E.	Constant	Cluster S.E.	N	% Bias
<b>Respondent Characteristics</b>						
Respondent Age	1.94**	0.77	40.0***	.47	519	20.5%
Respondent Yrs in the District	.47	.39	3.24***	.23	530	12.2%
Education	-.06	.06	2.19***	.04	531	9.3%
Respondent Yrs in the Public Sector	2.45***	.81	11.98***	.53	530	25%
Job satisfaction	-.07	0.09	2.2***	.07	528	6.8%
Job training	-.511	1.58	10.52***	1.17	516	3%
Hours – Work Week	.81	.73	41.16***	.52	530	1%
<b>Merit based hiring</b>						
Merit based civil servant hire	3.98*	2.27	73.89***	1.47	408	15.5%
Importance of past work experience	-.0002	.05	1.39***	.03	529	0%
Know supervisor	-.03	.12	2.92***	.08	515	2.3%
Political party connections	-.04	.13	2.23***	.09	510	3.2%
Frequency of performance review	.09	.09	1.84***	.07	530	10.6%
<b>AAP Development Process</b>						
Changes following DA discussion	.09	.06	2.82***	.05	454	6.9%
Changes following public discussion	-.01	.07	3.26***	.05	459	5.5%
Updates made following approval	-.01	.07	2.95***	.06	354	11.8
Town/area council involvement	.05	.097	1.39***	.06	483	9.9%
MLGRD involvement	.03	.09	1.59***	.07	486	3.9%
Spending follows plan	.08	.08	1.57***	.05	479	5.8%
DCE discretion	.12	.11	2.47***	.07	474	.7%
Presence of public debates	-.02	.05	.80***	.03	460	16%
Influence of public feedback	.02	.10	2.03***	.06	483	6.7%
DAPR responsiveness	-.001	.06	3.67***	.04	421	-.3%
Influence of community needs	.02	.05	1.24***	.03	528	5.2%
Influence of DCE personal preferences	.10	.11	2.44***	.08	515	10%
<b>Construction</b>						
Frequency of delays	.07	.12	2.32***	.09	514	6.6%
Inferior materials	.06	.12	3.88***	.08	469	5%
Over budget	-.03	.12	3.78***	.09	462	2.3

Projects abandoned	.14	.11	4.08***	.08	488	13%
<b>Corruption</b>						
Problem in ADP development	-.08	.10	3.35***	.06	493	7.6%
Problem in ADP execution	-.04	.09	3.20***	.06	489	3.8%
Frequently reported in infrastructure	-.12	.13	3.93***	.09	418	9.4%
Cap project plans are transparent	.04	.05	1.50***	.04	528	7.7%
Influence of political parties	.02	.12	3.50***	.09	522	1.5%
Influence of DCE	.20	.13	2.86***	.10	516	15%

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