



Host Community Situation Analysis

Impact of Rohingya Influx on Host Communities in Ukhia and Teknaf

PEARL UNIT

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1 GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS:

FDMN	Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals
SA	Situational Assessment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
UN	United Nations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
UPZ	Upazila (sub-district)
UP	Union Parishod
BGB	Border Guard Bangladesh
HC	Host Community
HH	Household
EPI	Exocrine pancreatic immunization
TT	Tetanus Toxoid
STW	Shallow tube-well
DTW	Deep tube-well

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1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Bangladesh became host to what is now the biggest refugee camp in the whole world. By November 2017 836,487 FDMN (Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals) fled across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border to settle here mostly in two *Upazilas*: *Ukhia* and *Teknaf* of Cox's Bazar district. By January 2018, it became clear that this would be a prolonged crisis lasting years as the Myanmar government continued dithering about taking them back, and as also the FDMN expressed their unwillingness to go back fearing persecution. As a result of this huge and sudden influx, lives and livelihoods of the host communities have been affected in many ways. Therefore, this Situational Assessment aims to assess both the visible economic and the subtle social impacts of the recent influx on the host communities. Using Oxford's integration conceptual framework, this assessment has been conducted to chalk out CARE Bangladesh's future response to the refugee crisis by involving the host communities in the process and addressing their concerns so that the tension between the two communities is defused rather than intensified.

Presence of the refugees has brought about many social and economic changes creating massive pressure on the host communities. Economic activities in the two *upazilas* have gone through transitions, leading to the emergence of a new market system and reducing employment opportunities for the host communities.

On one hand prices of essentials have shot up almost twice as much, and on the other, due to an unpredictably large number of refugees entering the local labor market wages for day laborers have gone down. Though refugees are living in highly congested camps, they are getting aid materials as well as economic opportunity in the local market. On the contrary, the host communities are finding themselves pitted against the refugees as either their work have been taken away or their earnings significantly reduced. It is true that a few locally influential people owning large tracts of land and businesses are benefitting from the availability of cheap labor, but the poor and the ultra-poor from the host communities are bearing the brunt of these changes. Access to administrative, educational and healthcare needs has diminished. Reduced access and availability of CPR-resultant scarcity of timber, bamboo for shelter, food & cooking fuel created insecurity of accessing resources. Due to security risk of woman and girls mobility has goes down, women income earning opportunity getting reduced; all of this has evidently created tension between the host and the refugee communities and within host community households. If left unaddressed, this tension is likely to rise to the extent of creating potential threats of ethnic conflicts.

In response to these findings of the situational analysis possible types of interventions could be **Gender specific livelihoods strengthening initiatives based on diversification of off/on farm activities, Transformative approach to build life free from GBV, Promoting youth leadership and** Strengthening service delivery and demand side functions through **Inclusive governance**.



Introduction

Bangladesh became host to the largest refugee camp in the world overnight, when on August 25-26, 624,000 FDMN (Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Nationals) from Myanmar fled here. By November, it was 836,487 - 55% of whom were children and 120,000 pregnant and lactating women. Those fleeing are concentrated mostly in two upazilas; Ukhia and Teknaf of Cox's bazar district. Pre-existing settlements and camps have expanded with the new influx, while new spontaneous settlements have also formed and are quickly growing. Significant numbers of new arrivals are also being absorbed into the local host community. While initial responses were based around emergency relief and life-saving measures - by January 2018, it became clear this will be a prolonged crisis lasting years. There are FDMN's spread out over much of the areas seeking for basic survival essentials. In the meantime there is widespread chaos as people fight for a place to shelter. The assumption of this Situational Assessment of Host Community study is that the FDMN's are unlikely to return with shorter time span and how to manage the long term problem is unclear. However, it is easily assumable about the massive pressure on the host communities in the Cox's Bazar Districts. Their presence may create social and economic pressure and tension in the Cox's Bazar area in the years to come. Having this background, CARE Bangladesh conducted this situation analysis to understand the extent of impact on the lives and livelihoods on the host communities due to this influx population.

2.1 OBJECTIVES

- To find out the socio-economic impact of the local communities in living with refugees since 2000's
- To analyses current situation and perceptions of the local communities regarding refugees
- To understand the stresses and opportunities created through this refugee crisis on host communities

The findings of this study will privilege CARE Bangladesh to pull up the issues lying with the host communities and have dialogue with major actors regarding way out to resolute their issues. This will also guide the future programme opportunities with the host communities and in formulating strategies for the long run to make development agenda more inclusive.

3 METHODOLOGY

It is worth to note that though number of protracted displacement situations is increasing, lack of rigorous impact assessments is a major gap (KNOMAD, 2017). Having limited methodological options, the study questions mostly developed following Oxford's integration conceptual framework¹.

In this situation analysis (SA) a set of qualitative tools has been applied to understand the changes that are taken place in the host communities over the last 5 years. The Situational Analysis have followed a systematic process to gather information and identify the main socio-economic and cultural impacts of Myanmar refugees on host communities over the period.

¹ Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework Alastair Ager Alison Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 21, Issue 2, 1 June 2008, Pages 166-191, Available from <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen016>



The Situation Assessment study have collected information in a systematic, strategic, integrated and coordinated manner. Community dynamics are an important part of context, a thorough situation analysis requires involving people from different social section within the community. So in the analysis not only community leaders, but also people of lower status in the community has been included. The study applied the following tools and participants to capture multiple voices in two sites:

Tools	Whom
Stakeholder consultations (2)	Local development partner (PNGOs)
Key Informant Interview (16)	UN, INGOs representatives, Government officials
Resource mapping, well-being & livelihood analysis, critical incident analysis, causal relationship diagram, power analysis, 16 seeds technique	Host Communities
Influential members' discussion	Local government representative, Journalist, religious leader, teacher
Market Analysis	Local traders

3.1 Methods & Tools:

Participants have been selected from the NGOs and individuals working with refugees and the host communities, particularly on development activities to make the community people self-reliant. In total 32 sessions have been conducted with local host communities.

Type of respondents	Number
Women	150
Men	198
Youth	100
Wider community i.e., teachers, traders, government, non- government, UN representatives, religious leaders	80

Study area: Study was conducted in two Upazilas of Cox-s-bazar district where most influx population is concentrated. These are, Ukhia and Teknaf; from each upazila one Union has been selected based on:

- concentration and duration (old/new; registered camp, makeshift) of refugee population
- Accessibility and availability of host population and
- Distance from city or growth center

The finally selected sites are:

District	Union	Community
Teknaf	Palongkhali	Jadimura, Nayapara
Ukhia	Nhilla	Balukhali, Putibonia



Gender Norms Analysis, Jamidarpara, Ukhia



4 HOST COMMUNITIES

IMPACTS ON HOST COMMUNITY

The sudden influx of such large groups of people into communities has impacted the host communities in every aspect of their lives. However, both the scope and severity of impact has differed between the two key districts of Ukhia and Teknaf.

Teknaf, at the edge of the country, has long history of communities forming from migrants of other areas. The communities are hosting Rohingya refugees from 1991 and before while a part of their community is also internally displaced persons, from Hurricane Aila, the 91' cyclone and other natural disasters.

Thus, the Teknaf communities are relatively better equipped to deal with the influx.

Ukhia communities are generational residents and decades of growth in tourism in nearby Cox's Bazar has only started to shift the communities. Communities are living mostly off natural resource extraction from nearby hills and Naf River and agrarian livelihoods through farming in the valleys.

Being at the extremities of the country, Government services and infrastructure support have always been weak

Given below are the various impacts; both economic and social and their Programmatic Implications

5 ECONOMIC IMPACTS

Combination of large influx of both people *and* money (in aid) has radically shifted the economic structure of the communities and while there are both opportunities and challenges for Host communities, due to pre-existing inequalities, the opportunities have gone to powerful few while the rest have suffered the brunt of challenges competing over limited resources and opportunities with the refugees.

5.1 MARKET SYSTEMS

Price Hike of regular foods seen as of Feb '18

- Brinjal/egg-plants per KG: BDT 5-7 last year to BDT 30-40 now
- Beef per KG: BDT 330-350 in last year to BDT 500-550 now
- Betel leaves-18piece bunch: BDT 40-50 in last year to BDT 200-250 now

Estimated \$350m in aid has entered these areas in just 6 months where combined economic value would be under \$30m annually before. This sudden **inflation of the economy by 10 times** or more have resulted in rapid economic shifts favoring those in trade.

Local businesses adjacent to camps have been swamped with refugee aid secondary shops. It has created great opportunity or challenge depending on whether their products are in competition with Aid products or not. **Price of essentials** like rice, pulse, cooking oil have **fallen sharply** due to food aid entering the market and there is wider choice of food. Market access has been increased for the people of this community. The number has been increased to 15% whereas it was 5%.



Grocery and butcher stores have also boomed due to Refugees exchanging aid products for these foods - causing price hikes of 3 to 5 times which impact Host communities.



LABOR MARKET

The labor market has been most significantly impacted with wage rates halved. Roughly 50%-60% of Host Community is involved as day labor in agriculture or salt fields or other industries. As Refugees have their food and essentials covered by aid they can work for much lower wages for disposable income. Consequently, daily wage for casual/agricultural labor was **BDT 500 (low-skill) to 700 (high-skill)** that has gone down to **BDT 200 to 300 now**. Thus, refugees are replacing day-labors in host communities.

Reduced Day-labor hires due to influx

- Earth-moving work (Govt. hired): 10% HH to 3%
- Agriculture (Contract harvest): 15% to 2%
- Agriculture (day labor): 55% to 10%
- Salt Field Labor: 33% to 20%

DEFORESTATION AND FIREWOOD CRISIS

Community Forestry began in 2012 to protect the 13 hills near the host communities of Balukhali, Ukhia from excessive collection of firewood and other resources. These hills recovered, becoming the central resource for communities. **Of the 13 hills, only 2 remain with useable accessible forest resources.** With Host Community and refugees both competing for natural resources, host communities have to **buy firewood for the first time and threatened depleting groundwater** faster than it can renew. With foliage no longer holding the hills together, **land erosion and landslides** are now at high risk for both host communities and refugees during upcoming monsoon season.


Myanmar refugees (Discerned by tucked-in shirt) working alongside locals in hill-strengthening earthwork – Government Cash-for-Work program for poor people in communities.



5.2 LIVELIHOODS



Effect on employment and income



Both Teknaf and Ukhia have been identified by Government among the 10 lagging districts of Bangladesh with high rates of extreme poverty, low literacy rate and limited services. Thus, the economic patterns of the areas are limited to mostly agrarian livelihood based around natural resource extraction from hills and nearby Naf River – which is also the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar – and some border-based trading.

With limited land owned by few, **most in host community work as day-labor in various works**. Overall, Teknaf having more settlers have trended towards more off-farm retail and trade based activities than Ukhia.

With the influx the biggest livelihood impact has been on refugee population being used in various agriculture-based livelihoods due to their **wage rates being half of host community**. This resulted in significant loss of livelihood (Detailed in Annex X) for poor and

extreme poor in host community which forced them to shift towards off-farm work or migratory labor practices along with reduced expenditure patterns.

For example, fishing, one of the major livelihoods, has completely stopped since it is the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Fish traders have shifted to buying from other local markets while fishers have no income source – resorting to more dangerous alternatives like deep sea-trawler fishing. Eg: Ward containing Ukhia Host Community had 21 "jaals" (Large fishing net used for group river fishing) employing 210-252 fishermen – among whom **60-70 people from host community (~30%) are now unemployed**. Consequently, 5 fish wholesale points (macher arot) in Teknaf have closed where average monthly sale was BDT 7–10 million (~\$120,000) and thousands of families were directly engaged in trading activities now forced to look for alternatives.



Large River Fishing Boats, now idle, repurposed to transport Relief products sold by Refugees

Similarly, commercial caged poultry a thriving business due to tourism in Cox's Bazar has shrunk again since water crisis prevents keeping poultry cages clean– thus increasing chance of losing the entire stock to infection. This is what happened to one farm in Balukhali. In addition, most houses (98%) had poultry and ducks before along with cows. **Now 40% houses have poultry (gets stolen) and 10% have cows due to lack of grazing field.**

On positive note, those involved in trading have had significant increases in wealth and assets. Rohingya-origin traders – who migrated here in early 90s are taking ever-growing share of the growth. The 21,000 Rohingya families living in Nayapara Community only shop or trade with selected 17 Rohingya-origin retailers. Consequently these retailers have grown from street-side retailers selling from small



baskets (tukris) to fully built grocery shops in just 6 months. A change of this magnitude is estimated to require 40-50 fold increase business revenue – at the expense of Host Community Retailers.



(Left) A Rohingya-origin owned grocery shop that only 4 months ago looked similar to shop on the right

COPING STRATEGY – OCCUPATIONAL SHIFT

Unskilled labor, driven out of market by cheaper Rohingya labor, have resorted to migratory labor practices, with men moving either out to sea for deep-sea trawler fishing or to brick fields and rice fields in other districts. Most alarming is 31% households now engage their children in work with some youth working in hotels as waiters, cook assistants and assistant retailer to support their family – at expense of their childhood and education. There is also shift towards off-farm skilled work like rental drivers of Rickshaw, Tom-Tom and CNG.

On the positive side, communities can purchase relief materials of food, quilt and others at a much lower cost, reducing living expense. Retail shops have increased in numbers, creating employment opportunities and better choices– although benefits remain largely under control of influential people in the host community. Other coping strategies are seen in reducing food portions and frequency, negating purchase of clothes, family outings and visits and other incidental non-essential costs which further builds on growing frustrations within families, weakening family and community bonds.

5.2 ACCESS TO SERVICES

With the number of people inflating by many times, all public services are naturally overburdened and combined with utilities and infrastructure being highly overtaxed has led to host communities being consistently marginalized in favor of Refugee first.

EDUCATION

Across different stakeholder groups from host community to local influential stakeholders to local NGOs, impact on education of young boys and girls have been the top concern after livelihoods. With education rate in both Upazilas at 40%, about half of national average, low literacy is a pre-existing condition exacerbated by the influx. In each communities, children have access to government primary schools but, secondary school facilities are far away. Only 10%-15% girls and 20%-30% boys go to college.



School attendance rate has mainly dropped due to shortage of teachers since they have shifted to teaching jobs inside Myanmar refugee camps with three time's higher pay.

Child labor increased in different sectors with 20-25% child got engaged in work dropping out of school. Incidences were found of class 8-12 children (especially girls) getting engaged in NGO activities as volunteers due to negligent recruitment practices.



Children in Host Community work instead of school

Refugees traveling within host community, has reduced mobility of women and girls as host communities are very conservative by nature. In youth group consultation with girls, they shared harassments while commuting to school and college. Lastly, transportation to secondary school

and college is difficult. Public transport now used by refugee response people (NGOs, government and Security authorities) means fares have increased from half-price for students to double normal fare (meaning 4 fold increase), road checks by security slows traffic and crowded transport leads to insecurity among female students. Ukhia host communities share nearly 30% of their girls have stopped going to school. Also, with decreasing income and rising school fees (teachers are more expensive) more families cannot afford secondary or education. Overall, about 25-30% of the youth are in stage of school drop-out.

WATER AND SANITATION

As open spaces have become highly congested, sanitation and human garbage is becoming a threat for the environment – host communities report higher incidences of diarrhea. For one host community in Ukhia (Jomidar Para), human waste from latrines in the camp overflow or dumped into adjacent river, which flowed into host community's paddy field – damaging crop and cannot harvest due to health risks. On the positive side, aid support has led to number of latrines and deep tubewells within camps and in communities. Host Community and government officials shared concern of new deep tube-wells (DTWs) may cause depletion as well as contamination of ground water. Host communities are worried that their short tube-wells (STWs) may not work in near future.

MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION

Aforementioned weak infrastructure meant the road networks are wholly unprepared to handle the sudden increase of road traffic volume and type of vehicles. A large number of trucks for carrying aid items and other vehicles for UN agencies, NGOs, government, foreign visitors, etc. have caused substantial wear and tear on the local roads, disrupting local road networks as the traffic increased by 10 fold – delaying all public and private services to host community. Consequently, fares of public and mass transport (bus, tom-toms etc) have increased. Road checks by camp guards and regular movement of national and international leaders disrupts traffic.

HEALTHCARE

The two sub-districts have only 15-33 Health Assistants in total meaning Patient-to-Health Assistant ratio is a staggering 135:1. The consequences are:



- Long queues prioritizing refugees – host communities forced to pretend to be Rohingyas to get service
- Fall of medicine supplies from 2-3 times/month to once now
- Immunization schedule (EPI and TT) has collapsed for host communities
- Upazilla Government Officials validated they cannot serve their constituents due to volume and immediacy of Rohingya response who outnumber host communities 4:1 or more
- Shortage of medicines have led to 10%-15% increase in prices at local pharmacies
- Pregnant women's health needs are under served as they are overburdened with the response.

"Go to the back of the line, you're not Rohingya – they said. Why am I treated last in my own country?"

~Woman in Gender Norms Group

6 SOCIAL IMPACT

Despite geographic proximity, the host community and Rohingya are very different– from language to norms and culture. With such large influx, social impacts are not visible like economic ones; but much more deep-seeded and likely to be underlying causes of challenges in the future. The key point is these locations are not well-settled and number of people here is low. Thus, the influx has led to the local host communities becoming minorities. Added to that the international and national focus on refugees mean the locals feel marginalized, fearful and resentment towards them.

"In Palongkhaly Union, there's about 44,000 people whereas nearly 200,000 Rohingyas (both old and new) are living here. We are the minority here"

~Union Chairman

6.1 INTERNAL POWER DYNAMICS

"All the powerful people are also businessmen with steady supply of Rohingya Aid selling to our markets at normal prices – making profits at both ends – constantly growing in money and influence. The Army stops general people from joining, protecting their business"
~ Community member (On condition of anonymity), in Gomtoli, Teknaf

As the distorted economic patterns reveal, internal power dynamics are centered on few individuals forming a nexus of social, political and economic power in the community. Power shifts are minimal, with most communities having the same leader and group for over a decade. These powered individuals have some common characteristics:

- Strong connections with current ruling party government
- Membership in Hill Ownership Committee
- Main source of firewood and other livelihoods for the community.
- Largest arable land ownership and access to river and hill resources (licensed)
- Owns major grocery shops and livelihood sources in the community
- Has place as judge in village justice system (Shalish)
- Unofficial control over government land (*khas* land)

6.2 SOCIAL COHESION AND NORMS



Host Communities in Teknaf revealed extensive inter-marriage between locals and Rohingyas since '91. Members claim *Rohingya* families aim to marry their daughters into Bengali families – sure path to Bangladesh citizen ID – and then bring over other family members from Myanmar. On the other hand, Bengali grooms can shift away from shrinking agro-based livelihoods and move into border trade (smuggling) which is booming. Marrying a *Rohingya* means access to her family on Myanmar side, making a stable supply chain for their retail trade.

Water collection points are few, becoming meeting points for Rohingya women and Bengali women – resulting in relatively better understanding between women of the two communities. Adolescent boys of both play together while adolescent clubs were previously key interaction point between adolescent girls of both communities - but it shut down as project and staff shifted to camps.



Boys in Host Community playing football with Rohingya Boys



ILLICIT TRADES

Influential stakeholders reveal whether unfairly blamed or not, there are common complaints that refugees have caused drug addiction (Yaba), theft, prostitution, drug trade, etc to rise. Gender norms analysis show known cases of drug addicts have increased from 5 HHs to 15 HHs (out of 120-200 HHs). Thus, although it is a small percentage, tripling in 6 months is cause for concern. Consequently, widespread prostitution and drug use is creating distrust and discord within their family to the point that men and boys must return home before 7pm (When camps close off) or are automatically assumed to have visited for solicitations. Adolescent girls expressed growing discord and growing distance from their fathers.

It is interesting to note that while host communities, especially women, spoke strongly about this – the influential people downplayed their impact during group consultation and sidestepped attempts at deeper understanding despite repeated probing.

6.3 IMPACT ON WOMEN AND GIRLS

WOMEN'S LIVELIHOODS

1. 50% women were involved in natural resource extraction like wood cutting, firewood collection, agricultural labor, producing watermelon, radish, chili, betel leaf, okra and other vegetable cultivation round the year on hill slope which now has stopped because of women's reduced mobility and destruction of hill forestry.
2. Consequently, 85% of HH has reduced income, only 10-15% households have had large increase in income due to control over secondary aid trade and refugee response.
3. Women from PEP Households also worked as housekeeping staff (maid) at richer community member's houses for secondary income. That is now replaced by Rohingya women who charge half-wage or work for free in return for staying with the respective households.
4. Host communities could sustainably use forest land, hills, rivers which are either taken by refugee or blocked by camp guards. Reduced access results in scarcity of timber, bamboo for shelter, food & cooking fuel.

WOMEN'S MOBILITY

Conservatives by nature, mobility of women were restricted from before – only grown worse now. While GO and NGO response has opened new job opportunities for educated women and girls, new barriers have been raised. Refugee numbers greatly outnumber host community raising concerns on social security. Women and girls of host community report feeling harassed by Myanmar refugee men and boys as they move within their community. Activities like household shopping are now done by men only. Jam packed buses, longer commute due to traffic congestion and increased bus fares mean using the bus is no longer a viable option. Due to security risk of woman

***"AMRA EKHON KHACHAR BHITOREY".** Balukhali, Ukhia ('we are in a cage now') She explains west side of the community is blocked off by the refugee camps settled over hills where they used to collect natural resources, on the east is the Naf river-where fishing is banned by both border guards. On the north is Balukhali bazar-now taken over by secondary aid trade and the south is blocked off by Border Guard (BGB) camp with restricted access. The community is stuck in the middle.*



and girls, mobility has goes down from 60% to 20%. This particularly impacts travels to schools, colleges and health service in all 4 host communities.

EARLY MARRIAGE:

A pre-existing condition, 80% of 15-16 year olds are married. As per mothers, school dropouts, premarital relationships and low dowry claims are primary drivers of child marriage. It is socially acceptable practice and 90% of girls choose to get married by their own choice (Youth group discussion). While concerns of eloping with Rohingya boys have been stated by some women, increased school dropout due to reduced attendance has a stronger impact behind increasing early marriage rates in the host community.

PROGRAMME SUMMARY – OUR RESPONSE

Impact Groups/Sub-groups	Poor and extreme poor of host communities that depend on informal wage and the extraction of natural resources including female headed households, adolescents girls who are at risk of early marriage			
Impact vision	Promoting inclusive development for resilient livelihood of Host communities			
Thematic Programme Niche	Livelihoods Strengthening	Life free from GBV	Promoting youth leadership	Inclusive governance
Major areas of interventions	<p>Developed diversified income generating options through reducing dependence on natural resource extraction based livelihoods</p> <p>Create off-farm/value enhancing economic activities</p> <p>Promoting positive coping strategies</p>	<p>Challenge social norms relating to IPV</p> <p>Building women solidarity group to make their voice heard at multiple level to claim their rights</p> <p>Men and boys engagement for promoting gender redistributive practices</p>	<p>Building leadership skills to bring about positive social change and creating alternative opportunities</p> <p>Facilitating youth's engagement in non-traditional roles and activities (life skills, ICT, sports)</p> <p>Youth circle for peer to peer reflection and learning</p>	<p>Strengthening service delivery and demand side governance</p> <p>Develop alternative leadership, citizen solidarity groups, network and alliances</p> <p>Creating social spaces for community dialogue and capacity building of UP to promoting pro-poor inclusive governance and gender inequalities</p>



Conclusion

The economic impacts of the FDMN influx have indeed affected the host communities, especially the poor and the ultra-poor families whose livelihood depends on informal wage labor and extraction of natural resources. They are finding themselves more poorly guarded than before as they are having to compete with the FDMN population both for a manual labor job or resource extraction. The social impacts, too, have put them at the receiving end of the changes that have taken place.

All in all, those from the lowest social tiers of the host communities are in immediate need of social and economic protection from both government and non-government organizations. In the absence of such protective measures, the tension that is brewing between the two communities may escalate. As immediate interventions, more viable and diversified employment opportunities should be created for the host communities and steps should also be taken to restore the stability of the market system and exercise some form of control over arbitrary price hikes of commodities.

Women's solidarity groups should be created so that they can voice their demands and seek counseling from the group to support each other. More group activities, social dialogue and mass communication activities can be organized to engage men and boys in gender discussions and encourage them to take part beyond traditional gender roles. This can go a long way toward maintaining stability and resilient in family and community spheres to address the inequity and gender based inequality.

Youth leadership should be promoted to ensure that the youth engage more with community people to bring about positive social results in the face of a social and economic crisis of this magnitude. To restring integrity community cohesion, spaces and opportunity should be opened up to create collective youth leadership and platform for productive discussions about addressing their needs and enhancing alternative pathways for their future.

Most importantly, both the government and the non-government organizations including community leaders and locally influential people must be involved in the dialogues to put in place an inclusive development model that stands by the FDMN while also paying adequate attention to the host communities and addressing their concerns. Overemphasizing the needs of the refugees may serve to widen the existing distrust between the two communities. In addition, government and non-government organizations must adopt more pro-poor policies for the host communities in terms of good governance and delivery of necessary services, such as healthcare and administrative services.

