GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV) LOCALIZATION: HUMANITARIAN TRANSFORMATION OR MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO?

A GLOBAL STUDY ON GBV LOCALIZATION THROUGH COUNTRY-LEVEL GBV SUB-CLUSTERS

DECEMBER 2019
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**List of Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBPF</td>
<td>Country-Based Pooled Funding</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organizations</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV AoR</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPC</td>
<td>Global Protection Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC/RC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCT</td>
<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFCB</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Fragile Context Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHF</td>
<td>Iraqi Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>Nigerian Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Items</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNGO</td>
<td>National Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoP</td>
<td>Principles of Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEA</td>
<td>Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>Strategic Advisory Group</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Humanitarian Summit</td>
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<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
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<td>WLO</td>
<td>Women-Led Organizations</td>
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<td>WoS-Turkey</td>
<td>Whole of Syria – Turkey Response Hub</td>
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Gender-based violence (GBV) is one of the most prevalent human rights violations in the world, with an estimated one in three women experiencing physical or sexual abuse in her lifetime. Although humanitarian emergencies disproportionately impact women and girls, their needs and roles within the context of emergency response interventions are underrepresented.

The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and subsequent Grand Bargain commitments have set the localization agenda with the aim of improving local capacities while also providing additional aid directly to those most in need. Evidence suggests that engaging local actors is critical to the success of humanitarian interventions, leading to a faster, more effective, and more sustainable response (International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2017; Wall & Hedlund, 2016). In many cases, these benefits can be attributed to the fact that local actors have a greater understanding of the context, can often access affected populations more easily, and can navigate complex political and social dynamics more readily. These issues are particularly true with regard to the provision of GBV prevention and response initiatives, as the inclusion of local women and women-led organizations (WLOs) is crucial to effectively addressing issues of gender inequality and harmful social norms that contribute to the occurrence of GBV (IRC, 2017). Depending on the shape that humanitarian systems take, and the degree to which they foster women’s meaningful participation, emergencies can either be a catalyst for transformational change or exacerbate existing drivers of GBV.

Despite the presence of global commitments to GBV localization, including the 2016 WHS, the Grand Bargain, and the Call to Action on Protection From GBV in Emergencies², there is little evidence to suggest that the protection of women and girls is being adequately prioritized or that women and WLOs are meaningfully integrated as change agents in response initiatives (Latimir & Mollett, 2018). The Global Protection Custer (GPC) remains significantly underfunded, with the GBV Sub-Cluster particularly underfunded when compared to other cluster areas (Fletcher-Wood and Mutandwa, 2018). Global humanitarian funding data reported to the Financial Tracking System (FTS) between 2016 and 2018 found that

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1 For more protection localization research visit Local2Global at https://www.local2global.info/research
2 Hereafter referred to as simply the Call to Action.
GBV accounted for just 0.12% of all humanitarian funding, which represented only one-third of all GBV funding requests (IRC, 2019). Localized funding across all humanitarian response remains strikingly low, with local agencies receiving just 0.4% of all humanitarian assistance funding in 2015 and 0.3% in 2016 (IRC, 2017). Currently, financial tracking mechanisms neither provide a means to report how much funding is targeted to women and girls nor how much funding is received by WLOs (Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2019).

Founded in 2006, the Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility (GBV AoR), led by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), is the global-level forum for the coordination of GBV prevention and response in humanitarian settings under the Global Protection Cluster (GPC). Seeking to meet commitments under the Grand Bargain and the Call To Action, the GBV AoR is dedicated to ensuring that GBV localization moves beyond rhetoric and is realized through global decision-making and field coordination mechanisms, while also ensuring that the needs of survivors and those at risk are prioritized. The purpose of this study is to guide the GBV AoR’s Task Team on Localization, its members, and other stakeholders within the GBV community in ways to increase the meaningful engagement of local actors in humanitarian GBV coordination, prevention, and response.

From February to March 2019, CARE USA and ActionAid International, as co-leads of the Localization Task Team of the GBV AoR, undertook a study to examine the issue of GBV localization in humanitarian contexts. Data was collected from a range of local and international actors participating in GBV coordination, including GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator(s) and representatives from WLOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), national non-governmental organizations (NNGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and other global leaders engaged in the localization debate. In line with the GBV AoR’s mandate, the primary focus of this study was on settings with internally-displaced persons (IDP). Four priority countries with active cluster systems were identified as focal contexts for this study: Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Whole of Syria-Turkey (WoS-Turkey) Hub. This study adopted a mixed methods approach, including an analysis of multiple quantitative data sources and 45 key informant interviews.

Findings from this study suggest that GBV localization overall has been minimal, with a low level of perceived localization in three of the four priority contexts. Findings further suggest that localization has not been formally operationalized at the global level, making its effectiveness – or lack thereof – highly dependent on country contexts rather than relying on recognized standards of good practice. Respondents believe that localization efforts are often donor driven and only pay lip service to the inclusion of local actors rather than engaging in meaningful change.

Findings also suggest that the larger humanitarian system remains patriarchal, with positions of power occupied predominantly by men, limiting space for women and WLOs both at the local and international level. Respondents viewed the impact of patriarchy as undermining the commitment to address GBV within the humanitarian system overall. Another key finding of this study is that WLOs are not meaningfully included in humanitarian response or given access to funding streams that could facilitate their involvement. Respondents report that the lion’s share of GBV funding is concentrated in the hands of large, male-led NNGOs. Findings also suggest the risk of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and sexual harassment in the workplace is heightened when GBV work is carried out predominantly by male-led organizations with varying levels of buy-in. Without making space for women’s meaningful participation, current localization practices undermine women’s access in humanitarian contexts and inhibit the degree to which GBV response mechanisms can become gender transformative in nature. Findings suggest that, within the humanitarian architecture as a whole, greater emphasis must be placed on combating gender inequality and supporting female leadership and activism for localization to become a reality. This includes addressing gender inequality within the sector and increasing the number of women in positions of authority.

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3 The Call to Action on Protection from Gender-Based Violence in Emergencies (Call to Action) is a multi-stakeholder initiative launched in 2013. The aim is to drive change and foster accountability so that every humanitarian effort, from the earliest stage of a crisis, includes the policies, systems, and mechanisms to mitigate GBV risks and to provide safe and comprehensive services to those affected by GBV. More at calltoactiongbv.com

4 A low level of localization is perceived in Iraq and Nigeria. A medium level of localization was perceived in South Sudan. A high level of localization is perceived only for the Whole of Syria Turkey Hub.
Another primary finding of this study is that, although respondents believe that the GBV Sub-Cluster has the potential to be a significant driver of localization, additional efforts are needed to promote the meaningful inclusion of local actors. As country-level GBV Sub-Clusters are connected to broader systemic issues, respondents emphasized that challenges related to funding and power imbalances within the humanitarian structure as a whole need to be addressed for localization initiatives to be effective. Respondents also believe that the GBV community’s focus on lifesaving work, without addressing root causes through social norms change work, drives immediate service access at the longer-term cost of replicating gender hierarchies. Findings also suggest exploitative and unequal partnerships – linked to risk aversion and technocratic definitions of capacity – are a major barrier to localization. Findings further demonstrate that the hierarchy within the humanitarian system, apparent in practices like poaching and unequal pay for local actors, inhibits meaningful localization.

In short, findings suggest that current practices are insufficient for the meaningful realization of GBV localization. Despite current international commitments to localization, considerable investment is needed – both in terms of financial resources and political will – for GBV localization to move beyond the realm of theory and into practice. Action must be based on the knowledge and capacities of local actors who should subsequently be provided with viable opportunities to lead and engage. Ultimately, concerted action must focus on equipping dedicated and well-resourced GBV Coordinators at the field level for relevant and contextualized prevention and response initiatives to be carried out in line with recognized standards of good practice. Furthermore, this study makes the case that, without an emphasis on gender transformation, localization efforts will simply maintain the status quo and reinforce systems that exclude local actors.
II. BACKGROUND

Localization at the Global Level

The current humanitarian system is often perceived as patriarchal, politically driven, and resistant to change. In many cases, funding and power are concentrated in the hands of a few large humanitarian actors located primarily in wealthy nations of the Global North and local actors face serious financial, structural, and patriarchal barriers to accessing power within the humanitarian system. As humanitarian crises become more frequent, protracted, and complex, radical shifts within the current humanitarian system are required to meet growing demands. More impactful humanitarian action requires a shift in existing power structures to allow for greater agency and involvement on the part of local and national organizations.

Evidence suggests that increasing the power and access of local actors to decision-making and funding leads to a faster, more effective, and more sustainable humanitarian response since local actors understand the context, have greater access to affected populations, and can navigate complex political and social dynamics (IRC, 2017; Wall & Hedlund, 2016). Despite this commitment at the global level, a lack of consensus remains within the humanitarian system regarding how best to shift power and resources into the hands of local actors or how to promote localization within the context of a principled response.

Localization as a concept has been used by international agencies over the past 20 years yet the term ‘localization’ came out of the 2016 WHS and subsequent Grand Bargain commitments made by governments and humanitarian agencies. Key commitments under the Grand Bargain include supporting funding tools for local and national responders, including a commitment by donors and aid organizations to provide 25% of global humanitarian funding to local and national responders by 2020. Although the Grand Bargain is recognized as a transformative agenda, gender, women’s empowerment, and protection are minimally referenced. The localization agenda seeks to increase the accountability and effectiveness of aid, but the humanitarian system has been resistant to localization efforts. Commitments made at the global level are failing to achieve significant field-level change. Despite the Grand Bargain’s slogan for localization – “As
local as possible, as international as necessary” – in reality humanitarian aid has more frequently been “as international as possible, as local as necessary.”

While there is no globally agreed upon definition of localization (Wall & Hedlund, 2016), within the context of the Grand Bargain Localization Workstream localization is understood as: “International actors’ recognition of and support for their [local and national humanitarian actors’] leadership and capacity to lead effective and accountable response” (Global Protection Cluster, 2018a, p.3).  

ActionAid expands on this definition to ensure the inclusion of women and girls and defines localization as:

“Localizing humanitarian action involves shifting financial and other resources, as well as power and agency, to local and national responders. This shift must have women and women’s organizations at its forefront, bringing their invaluable contextual knowledge, skills, resources, and experiences to emergency preparedness, response, and resilience building. This will help reduce the male-dominated and gender-biased international humanitarian system we currently have and make responses to humanitarian crises more effective and gender transformative.” (Yermo, 2017, p.2).

The humanitarian system is marked by inequality in funding and access to humanitarian donors. In 2016, an institutionalized ‘oligopoly’ including six United Nations (UN) humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and seven federations of large INGOs accounted for 80% of the humanitarian spending, with privileged access for the main humanitarian donors (Development Initiatives, 2016). Localized funding across all humanitarian response remains strikingly low, with local agencies receiving just 0.4% of all humanitarian assistance funding in 2015 and 0.3% in 2016 (IRC, 2017). This reality is far from the Grand Bargain commitment of 25% local funding by 2020.

Humanitarian emergencies disproportionately impact women and girls yet their needs and the role of WLOs are underrepresented in emergency programming. Evidence suggests that engaging local actors is critical to the success of humanitarian work, and this is especially true in providing effective GBV prevention and response programming. In particular, the inclusion of women-led local actors who are well-placed, trusted, and rooted in their communities is critical to addressing gender inequality and responding sensitively to GBV. Evidence demonstrates that the advancement of women’s rights is driven by vibrant women’s movements and that emergencies can be a catalyst for transformative change in overcoming longstanding inequality, violence, and discrimination toward women and girls. Conversely, patriarchal humanitarian systems that curtail local women’s opportunities to participate in and influence decision-making can further undermine women’s rights and drive social norms that perpetuate GBV.

Despite pressing needs, the Protection Cluster and, to an even greater extent, the GBV Cluster remain significantly underfunded (Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2018). Global humanitarian funding data reported to the Financial Tracking System (FTS) between 2016 and 2018 found that GBV accounted for just 0.12% of all humanitarian funding, representing only one-third of all GBV funding requests (IRC, 2019). Currently, financial tracking mechanisms do not provide a means to report how much funding is targeted towards woman and girls or how much funding is received by WLOs (Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2018). Despite global-level commitments like the 2016 WHS, the Grand Bargain, and the Call to Action, there is little evidence to suggest that the protection of women and girls is being prioritized and that women and WLOs are meaningfully integrated as change agents in the response.

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5 GBV AoR Task Team on Localization Workshop Report June 2018: “In Nigeria, one minister told us that while the localization slogan might be “as local as possible, as international as necessary”, in their experience practice was actually “as local as necessary, and as international as possible” with national actors only resourced when access closes or adequate funding for international agencies dries up. - UN official”

6 For more information on the Grand Bargain Localization Workstream visit http://media.ifrc.org/grand_bargain_localisation/
The Gender-Based Violence Area of Responsibility Localization Task Team

The GBV AoR,7 led by UNFPA, is the global-level forum for the coordination of GBV prevention and response in humanitarian settings under the GPC. The Localization Task Team is one of five reference groups under the GBV AoR, which are informed by field-level needs and support the implementation of the GBV AoR strategy and workplan.

The Localization Task Team grew out of a session organized by CARE at the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) conference in the spring of 2017 on the engagement of local women’s rights activists in humanitarian action. Recognizing the momentum around better understanding and supporting local actors in playing meaningful roles in humanitarian assistance and protection, the GBV AoR established the Localization Task Team at the annual meeting in June 2018. At this meeting, consultations with local partners identified research priorities and themes for the Localization Task Team moving forward.

The Localization Task Team is co-chaired by CARE USA and ActionAid International and its members are comprised of both GBV AoR members and their local CSO partners. The Task Team was developed to promote four primary objectives: (1) to share learning between AoR members on the engagement of local actors in humanitarian GBV prevention and response coordination; (2) to convene spaces to engage local actors in more systematic and meaningful ways in AoR activities at global, regional, and country levels; (3) to prioritize and facilitate inter-agency approaches between AoR members, local actors, and other stakeholders to promote effective localization;8 and (4) to leverage joint action through the Localization Task Team and AoR to influence broader processes.9

Review of the Evidence Base

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENHANCING LOCALIZATION

As a part of this study, the researcher reviewed existing literature on localization. There is a significant body of literature on localization, including primary research, theoretical pieces, and both high-level and practical guidance on localization. Localization is one form of critiquing the humanitarian system and the political economy of the relief system, which is considered by many to be both financially and politically unstable. The goal of localization, therefore, is to address systemic failures in aid effectiveness and to improve response, emphasizing a shift in power and relationships to address imbalances in the existing system. The localization debate is both political and ethical, though it lacks clarity on the definition of localization or the problems localization is intended to mitigate.

The literature reviewed for this study indicates that global commitments to localization rarely translate into effective relationships on the ground. Some evidence indicates that international agencies are rarely willing to cede power and responsibility to local organizations; in justifying their hesitation to alter existing power structures, international actors cite concerns related to time, efficiency, capacity constraints, fiduciary risk, and the ability for local actors to uphold humanitarian principles. Humanitarian agencies are structured and operate in a way that creates financial, regulatory, and cultural barriers to localization (Wall & Hedlund, 2016; ODI, 2016). The system can be averse to innovation, learning, and transformation and often works to maintain the status quo (Bennett, 2016). The evidence suggests that there is a lack of willingness and attention to translate global-level commitments into concrete action. Researchers argue that this is indicative of neocolonial attitudes toward power, leadership, and resources and emphasize that localization, above all else, will require a mental and cultural shift among humanitarian actors and institutions.

7 For more information on the GBV AoR, including history, membership, strategy, and workplan, visit gbvaor.net
8 For example, engagement of local CSOs in national-level coordination and decision-making in GBV Sub-Clusters, Humanitarian Needs Overviews, Humanitarian Response Plans, and Pooled Funds.
9 For example, Call To Action on Protection From GBV in Emergencies, Grand Bargain, and Global Protection Cluster.
In stark contrast to the attitudes of some international actors, evidence suggests that localization improves humanitarian response through improved access, stronger community acceptance, reduced costs, increased accountability, and improved links with development (IRC, 2017; Wall & Hedlund, 2016; Ayobi, Black, Kenni, Nakabea, & Sutton, 2016; Clayton & Emmens, 2017). Case studies from many contexts refute assumptions made about the difficulties of supporting local actors and provide lessons learned that can guide the way forward for localization efforts.

There is clear guidance on ways to increase localization through capacity building, increased voice for local actors, learning and collaboration, direct and transparent financing, and improvement of policies and practices that undermine localization. For example, research conducted on accelerating localization through partnership provides recommendations around building trust and respect, improving partnership agreements, increasing visibility, assessing and building capacity, and ensuring financial stability (Christian Aid, CARE, Tearfund, ActionAid, CAFOD, & Oxfam, 2019).

**CHALLENGES SPECIFIC TO LOCALIZATION FOR GENDER, GBV, AND WLOs**

While barriers to localization exist generally in the humanitarian sector, there are specific challenges in attempting to enhance localization related to gender, GBV, and support of WLOs. There is no evidence of improvement in the funding of localized protection funding for women and girls, including funding specifically for GBV (IRC, 2019; Mollett, 2016; Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2018). Funding for the protection sector as a whole has decreased, with limited funding for GBV response, while a lack of human resources for protection work also constrains GBV response capacity (Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2018). Fewer than five large donors provide sustained funding for GBV programming in emergencies (Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2018). The humanitarian community demonstrates a bias toward gender-related work, viewing it as the purview of the development sector, which undermines GBV in emergencies work. Global-level financial tracking systems do not disaggregate data on funding for women and girls’ protection or WLO funding, which makes it challenging to hold donors accountable.

Although they are uniquely placed to respond to GBV in emergencies and have often been working for decades to meet the needs of women and girls, WLOs are frequently excluded from funding opportunities and humanitarian response work. The humanitarian system tends to ignore existing grassroots social networks and WLOs specifically face barriers in accessing funding, building capacity, and forming partnerships with INGOs. The literature describes some of the systemic challenges facing WLOs, including short-term funding, one-off and ineffective capacity building methods, and funding that excludes operational support (GBV AoR, 2018b; Fletcher-Wood & Mutandwa, 2018).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that localized funding goes primarily to large, male-led NNGOs that rarely operate in a gender sensitive manner (GBV AoR, 2018b). However, the evidence base asserts that empowering women and girls as change agents and leaders will help reduce the male-dominated and gender-biased international humanitarian system that currently exists, ultimately making response more effective and gender transformative.

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10 These case studies come from such varied contexts as: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Gaza, Myanmar, the Philippines, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe (see https://startnetwork.org/start-engage/shifting-the-power and https://www.local2global.info/research). Other authors have written on experiences from the Pacific region (Ayobi et al., 2016) and the Ebola response (Wall & Hedlund, 2016).
Study Rationale

This study builds on existing localization research conducted by the Child Protection AoR (CP AoR) and the wider GPC (Nolan & Dozin, 2019; Nolan, n.d.). This research contains rich information on challenges and best practices for protection localization but is not specifically focused on localization for GBV prevention and response. This study seeks to fill that gap, exploring the experience of actors engaged in humanitarian GBV coordination through country-level GBV Sub-Clusters, including GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators, WLOs, CSOs, NNGOs, INGOs, and global leaders in the localization debate. In line with the GBV AoR’s mandate, the primary focus of this study is IDP contexts in four priority countries (Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, and the WoS-Turkey Hub).

This study seeks to build the evidence base surrounding the inclusion of WLOs and the empowerment of local women in coordination and the provision of service delivery through the GBV Sub-Cluster. The purpose of this study is to guide the Localization Task Team of the GBV AoR, its members, and other stakeholders in the GBV community of practice in methods for enhancing the meaningful engagement of local actors in humanitarian GBV coordination while promoting principled and effective humanitarian GBV prevention and response.

Study Process

Agencies have been criticized for conducting humanitarian localization research without sufficient involvement of local organizations, focusing on local actors as objects of research rather than agents of change. This study seeks to deviate from this trend by involving WLOs and female activists and leaders engaged in humanitarian GBV programming and coordination throughout the study process, from formulation of thematic areas through validation. This study employs feminist approaches to focus on the unique impact of GBV localization on effective GBV prevention and response programming and the specific challenges faced by female humanitarian actors and WLOs.

This study defines ‘local organizations’ as those located in the same country of operation, including CSOs, NNGOs, NNGO consortiums, and local women’s networks. Within the context of this study, national or local host government bodies or affiliate offices of international organizations are not considered ‘local organizations.’ Within this report, the term ‘local organization’ refers to both CSOs and NNGOS as respondents used the terms CSO and NNGO interchangeably.

Examining the experiences of GBV Sub-Cluster members allowed the researcher to identify overarching drivers and barriers to localization, as well as the least and most conductive practices for localization in functional areas: participation and decision-making of local actors in GBV Sub-Cluster processes, inclusion and input in the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) processes, and access to funding, including Country-Based Pooled Funding (CBPF) mechanisms. A global-level workshop was held in March 2019, and three regional workshops will be held in 2019 to further explore and contextualize issues related to GBV localization, bringing together local and global actors to catalyze outreach and commitment.

11 Through interviews conducted for this study it became clear that terminology at the field level, including the definition of CSO and NNGO, remains unclear and varies across contexts. Data from the Coordinator Baseline Study utilized in this study indicated that three of four priority contexts (Iraq, Nigeria, and the WoS-Turkey Hub, see Table 6) had no reported CSO members within the GBV Sub-Cluster. Despite this, many respondents from these contexts utilized the term CSO in the interview process. Several Coordinators also noted that the terms CSO and NGO are used interchangeably due to the flexible and changing nature of local organizations or that CSOs as understood by the global definition do not exist in their context. For these reasons, the terms CSO and NNGO are used interchangeably within this report, with the two categories based on self-reporting and not globally agreed upon definitions. The number of WLOs was not collected by the Coordinator Baseline Study as this would result in double counting; therefore, every place where a WLO is discussed it has likely been self-reported as an NNGO in the Coordinator Baseline Survey.
III. METHODOLOGY

Study Design

From February to March 2019, the Localization Task Team of the GBV AoR undertook a study to explore the experiences of GBV localization with local and international actors participating in humanitarian GBV coordination through county-level GBV Sub-Clusters. This study used a mixed-methods approach, employing both qualitative and quantitative methods (see Annex 1). Four priority IDP contexts (Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, and the WoS-Turkey Hub) were identified by the Localization Task Team; selection was based on geographical coverage to ensure a diversity in response type and respondent experiences within the coordination mechanism. Information about these four contexts is included in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>CLUSTER SYSTEM ACTIVATED</th>
<th>HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR (HC)</th>
<th>RESPONSE CONTEXT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed (migrant, refugee, IDP)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>WoS-Turkey Hub</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IDP (remote management)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

Quantitative data was collected from three sources to assess localization across all contexts where GBV Sub-Clusters are active. These three modalities are summarized in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2: QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION MODALITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INQUIRY</th>
<th>DATA TYPE / TOOL</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>COLLECTED BY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF INQUIRY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GBV placement in cluster system</td>
<td>Publicly available HNO/HRPs</td>
<td>Global (18 HNOs and 18 HRPs)</td>
<td>GBV AoR</td>
<td>Assessment of GBV Sub-Clusters power and representation within country-level cluster systems and representation of localization within protection systems across HNOs and HRPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level GBV Sub-Cluster structure</td>
<td>Survey tool via email</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>GBV AoR</td>
<td>Baseline survey conducted to assess coordination structure, leadership, and membership of country-level GBV Sub-Clusters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context-specific GBV Sub-Cluster localization</td>
<td>Question list via email</td>
<td>Priority context</td>
<td>Lead researcher</td>
<td>Data on WLO membership, HRP project submission and approval by local organizations, and CBPF funding received by local organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

Qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews with 45 key informants. Priority themes for exploration were identified at the inaugural GBV AoR Localization Task Team meeting held with GBV AoR members and local organizations in June 2018. The interview guide, which can be found in Annex 1, was generated through an analysis of these themes and a review of the evidence base surrounding localization of protection. The interview guide explored challenges and barriers to localization and functional processes that were identified as means for localization through GBV Sub-Clusters:

■ Identified good practices in GBV localization of wider relevance
 ■ Priority challenges surrounding GBV localization and suggestions on how to navigate
 ■ Participation of local organizations in country-level GBV Sub-Clusters
 ■ Engagement of local organizations in leadership roles and decision-making in country-level GBV Sub-Clusters
 ■ Role of partnerships and identifying key risks surrounding GBV localization and modalities for the GBV Sub-Cluster to address
 ■ Engagement of local organizations in country-level HNO and HRP processes
 ■ Engagement of local organizations with the CBPF mechanisms for GBV prevention and response funding and other funding modalities
 ■ Identifying practices and priorities for engaging WLOs in country-level GBV Sub-Cluster processes

12 Thirty-nine interviews were conducted as several interviews had two or three respondents involved.
Key informants were both purposefully selected and identified via snowball sampling. Global leaders in GBV localization and GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators in the four priority contexts were interviewed for this study. Snowball sampling was utilized to identify additional CSO, NNGO, and INGO stakeholders in the priority contexts. Interviews were conducted via Skype by the lead researcher with one interview was conducted via email. The aim was to interview a minimum of five respondents per priority country: the GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator, two local organizations, and two country-level INGOs. The researcher obtained verbal consent from respondents to record interviews and use quotations within this report. All personal identifying information has been removed. In total, 39 semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted with 45 key informants.

Data Analysis

QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
Quantitate data was analyzed across the three separate modalities to draw conclusions at the global and priority context levels. Analysis of 18 global-level HNOs and HRPs from 2018 was conducted through simple tabulation via Excel prior to this study by the GBV AoR (FVH), and comparisons were made to 2016 and 2017 HNOs and HRPs conducted by UNFPA’s Humanitarian and Fragile Context Branch (HFCB). The GBV AoR coordination baseline study (with results from 27 countries) was also analyzed by the GBV AoR through Excel tabulation. Priority context GBV Sub-Cluster localization data was the only primary data collected and analyzed for this study and was assessed through simple tabulation in Excel.

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
An inductive approach was applied to the qualitative data, with interview transcripts analyzed using Iterative Grounded Theory. After reading through a sample of the transcripts, the lead researcher developed a coding frame. The transcripts were then read three additional times with new emerging themes added to the coding frame. As a result, the transcripts were read four times in total to identify themes emerging from the data, with general theory emerging from these themes. Codes were grouped and analyzed based on respondent category (local organization, country-level INGO, GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator, and global actor) to assess differences. The coding process focused on the overall drivers and barriers to localization, which were used to develop sub-categories and were conceptualized into overarching themes that underpin the general theory of localization within GBV Sub-Clusters. Key themes identified include: the patriarchy, the humanitarian system, responsibilities and dynamics within the GBV Sub-Cluster, and country context.

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13 GBV AoR staff member Fray van Herk
Quantitative Findings

INCLUSION OF GBV AND GBV LOCALIZATION IN HNOS AND HRPS

Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) are intended to reflect the priorities of humanitarian response. Therefore, if GBV and GBV localization are priorities within the context of humanitarian response, one would assume that these topics would be explicitly and comprehensively addressed in HNOs and HRPs.

INCLUSION OF GBV IN GLOBAL-LEVEL HNOS AND HRPS

In 2018, 16 global-level HNOs and HRPs were assessed for GBV inclusion and compared to trends from 2016 and 2017. Although GBV inclusion and representation within the cluster system is improving, representation in the HNOs and HRPs is limited and inclusion is not always meaningful.

As reflected in Table 3, between 2016 and 2018 there has been minimal improvement in the inclusion of GBV in HNOs through paragraphs reflecting specific GBV needs and the average number of times GBV was mentioned within the document. Overall, there is relatively little information on GBV services coverage, availability, and accessibility included in the HNOs despite the fact that data should be available through regular coordination activities and tools such as the 3/4/5W.14

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14 The 3/4/5W (Who, What, When, Where, Whom) is a service mapping tool utilized by the cluster system. All GBV Sub-Cluster members are requested to complete the 3/4/5W.
Between 2016 and 2018 there was slight improvement in the inclusion of GBV in HRPs through stand-alone GBV paragraphs and dedicated operation plans, as reflected in Table 4 below. In 2018, only half of all HNOs included a separate GBV section, either as a whole section or a sub-title under protection. Of these eight HRPs, two—Bangladesh and Nigeria—explicitly mention GBV in overall funding requirements. Although there has been slight improvement in the inclusion of GBV in HRPs, inclusion remains limited and inconsistent and meaningful representation, including GBV mainstreaming across sectors, remains minimal.

**TABLE 3: ANALYSIS OF GBV INCLUSION IN GLOBAL-LEVEL HNOS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2016 (N=24)</th>
<th>2017-2018 (N=16) *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph on GBV Included in HNO</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times GBV is Mentioned within HNO</td>
<td>Average 12</td>
<td>Average 12.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2017 HNOs were published between late 2017 and early 2018*

Between 2016 and 2018 there was slight improvement in the inclusion of GBV in HRPs through stand-alone GBV paragraphs and dedicated operation plans, as reflected in Table 4 below. In 2018, only half of all HNOs included a separate GBV section, either as a whole section or a sub-title under protection. Of these eight HRPs, two—Bangladesh and Nigeria—explicitly mention GBV in overall funding requirements. Although there has been slight improvement in the inclusion of GBV in HRPs, inclusion remains limited and inconsistent and meaningful representation, including GBV mainstreaming across sectors, remains minimal.

**TABLE 4: ANALYSIS OF GBV INCLUSION IN GLOBAL-LEVEL HRPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2016 (N=28)</th>
<th>2017 (N=21)</th>
<th>2018 (N=16)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standalone GBV Paragraph within HRP</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated Operation Plan or Section in HRP</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>19%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Niger was the only HRP with a GBV-specific operation plan included in the overall HRP (p. 8); two countries, Cameroon (p. 24) and Nigeria (p. 26) had stand-alone GBV operation plans within the Protection Cluster (p. 8).*

**INCLUSION OF GBV LOCALIZATION IN GLOBAL-LEVEL HNO AND HRPS**

GBV localization is poorly represented within 2018 HNOs and HRPs. Of eight 2018 HNOs that had standalone GBV sections, none discussed localization. One HNO—Niger—generally discussed community protection strategies.\(^{15}\)

Within 2018 HRPs, inclusion of GBV localization was higher. Among the eight 2018 HRPs that had standalone GBV sections, two—Nigeria\(^{16}\) and Yemen\(^{17}\)—discussed localization directly. Nigeria and Yemen’s HRPs discussed capacity building for local actors while Yemen’s also included the critical need to fund NNGOs along with a robust capacity building strategy. One HRP—Cameroon\(^{18}\)—discussed community protection strategies.

These findings align with research conducted by the Child Protection AoR regarding the inclusion of localization across all HNOs and HRPs released in 2018. Only two (8%) HNOs explicitly referenced localization in the Needs Overview, while

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15 Text: ‘le renforcement des strategies de protection communautaire’
16 Text: ‘Prevention and reduction of immediate threats of violence, including sexual violence and SEA, through initiatives that promote community resilience and empower key community stakeholders with a focus on young women and adolescent girls. Strengthening of the capacity of service providers, including community capacity’
17 Text: ‘With increased targets in 2018, a scale up is required and planned, particularly in the field hubs of Ibb, Hudaydah, and Sa’ada, in addition to a modest increase in the number of international NGOs and more sustained funding for national NGOs to program for year-long activities. Meanwhile, a robust capacity-building strategy, involving coaching and placement of specialists in local partners, is planned for 2018’
18 Text: ‘nécéssite de mener des activités de protection spécifique pour favoriser leur réintégration de manière durable dans la communauté, en lien avec le gouvernement et les acteurs de développement’
five (21%) refer to localization-related terms (e.g. Grand Bargain, Principles of Partnership (PoP)). Within HRPs, this was slightly higher, with ten (43%) HRPs explicitly referencing localization and thirteen (57%) referencing localization-related terms. Three (13%) HNOs and six (26%) protection chapters within HRPs explicitly mention partnership modalities between local and national actors, though HNOs do not specify local partners within coverage maps and HRPs do not denote the proportion of the response that will be undertaken by local actors. No HNOs disaggregate funding trends by type of partner and no HRPs differentiate funding requirements by local and international actors. Four (17%) HRP protection chapters reference the importance of institutional strengthening of local actors and one (4%) explicitly references strategies to achieve this (Nigeria); no protection chapters of HNOs mention institutional capacity building of local actors. Overall, these results reflect minimal inclusion of GBV localization within both HNOs and HRPs, with little progress evidenced in recent years.

INCLUSION OF CSOS AND NNGOS IN GBV SUB-CLUSTERS

The GBV AoR Coordination Baseline Survey provides important data on the inclusion of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and National Non-Governmental Organizations (NNGOs) in GBV Sub-Clusters. The baseline survey demonstrated that local organizations represent 51% of total GBV Sub-Cluster membership, yet two (10%) national GBV Sub-Clusters have no NNGO members and 13 (54%) have no CSO members. As CSO membership is limited, localization within GBV Sub-Clusters is defined by NNGOs. In a few cases, however, local membership is much higher, with some national GBV Sub-Clusters comprised of nearly all local organizations, including the WoS-Turkey Response Hub (91%), Yemen (88%), Somalia (79%), and CAR (67%). Table 5, below, provides additional numbers on local representation in GBV Sub-Clusters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5: GLOBAL GBV SUB-CLUSTER MEMBERSHIP (N=27)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GBV Sub-Cluster members (N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,014 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average: 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO members (N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58% no CSO members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNGO members (N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>473 NNGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% no NNGO members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local members (CSO + NNGO, N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522 CSOs and NNGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51% Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-National coordination groups (N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58% &lt;1 Sub-National coordination groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 The GBV AoR Coordination Baseline Survey was collected from 27 GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators. The survey included 1,014 individuals (GBV Sub-Cluster members, including national and sub-national level members) across all GBV Sub-Clusters for an average of 42 members per country-level Sub-Cluster. This included 473 NNGO members (for an average of 20 NNGO members per country level Sub-Cluster) and 49 CSO members (for an average of two CSO members per country-level Sub-Cluster). Countries with the most NNGOs included: Turkey (60), the Central African Republic (CAR) (57), Iraq (51), South Sudan (37), Somalia (30), and Mali (32). While the countries with the most CSOs included Indonesia (10), the occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) (10), and Chad (6).

20 Two GBV Sub-Clusters with no NNGO members: Fiji (pacific sub-region), Panama (R4V - Venezuela Regional Response Platform)

21 Thirteen GBV Sub-Clusters with no CSO members: Afghanistan, Burundi, CAR, Colombia, Fiji (pacific sub-region), Iraq, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Panama (R4V - Venezuela Regional Response Platform), Somalia, Sudan, WoS-Turkey Hub

22 The Coordination Baseline Study did not capture number of WLOs. In 3/4 contexts, no CSOs self-reported; therefore, we assume all WLOs self-identify as NNGOs in Iraq, Nigeria, and the WoS-Turkey Hub. See Table 6.
Membership of local organizations in the GBV Sub-Cluster does not directly translate into leadership. All national GBV Sub-Clusters were led by UNFPA, with nine (36%) GBV Sub-Clusters co-led by INGOs and only one (4%) co-led by a NNGO (Noha Yehya of Yemen Women Union). Ten (37%) GBV Sub-Clusters are co-led by the national government, which aligns with the goal of the Call to Action to reach 50% national leadership or co-leadership of GBV Sub-Clusters by 2020\(^23\) (if governments are considered national actors). However, the localization agenda does not tend to see governments as local actors so if national government is excluded this then means that this commitment is not being met.

In terms of decentralization, there are a total of 60 Sub-National coordination groups (an average of three per country). However, the majority of GBV Sub-Clusters (58%) have fewer than one\(^24\) Sub-National coordination group. The most decentralized GBV Sub-Clusters include South Sudan (14), Iraq (8), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (7).

Between 2018 and 2019, the number of GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators who said they were dedicated to GBV coordination increased slightly, from six (22%) in 2018 to eight (30%) in 2019.\(^25\) The remaining 70% of Coordinators are ‘double’ or ‘triple-hatting,’ meaning that they have additional work-loads beyond coordination, including GBV programming and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA). Of the six Coordinators who were dedicated to GBV coordination in 2018, five (18%) were on long-term contracts (two fixed-term; three temporary appointments), undermining the stability of GBV coordination and response mechanisms.

**COUNTRY-SPECIFIC GBV SUB-CLUSTER DATA FROM FOUR PRIORITY CONTEXTS**

GBV Sub-Cluster membership from the four priority countries (Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, and the WoS-Turkey Response Hub) are similar to findings from the GBV AoR Coordination Baseline Survey. Priority context countries have, at minimum, 46% local organizational membership and, at maximum, over 90%. However, three of the four priority contexts have no CSO membership. Compared to the global figures included in the Baseline Survey, priority contexts are more decentralized, with five of fourteen (36%) Sub-National coordination groups led by NNGOs in South Sudan and two of eight (25%) Sub-National coordination groups led by NNGOs in Iraq. Further figures on GBV Sub-Cluster Membership in the priority contexts can be found in Table 6.

**TABLE 6: PRIORITY CONTEXT GBV SUB-CLUSTER MEMBERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL MEMBERS</th>
<th># CSO</th>
<th># NNGO</th>
<th>% LOCAL (NNGO + CSO)</th>
<th># SUB-NATL COORD GROUPS</th>
<th># SUB-NATL COORD GROUPS LED BY NNGO</th>
<th>% SUB-NATL COORD GROUPS LED BY NNGO</th>
<th>NNGO SAG MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2 (1 WLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2 (2 WLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3 (1 WLO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoS-Turkey Hub</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{23}\) **Outcome 2**, Indicator 2c: % of countries with a Humanitarian Coordinator that have a national-level humanitarian GBV coordination co-led/led by a national actor. Milestone 30% by 2018, 50% by 2020

\(^{24}\) 7 (29%) no Sub-National coordination groups, 7 (29%) 1 Sub-National coordination group

\(^{25}\) Noting the sample is 27 across both years, yet respondents are not matched, therefore this data is not directly comparable as samples are two different country sets. For matched data 7% are double hatting in both 2018 and 2019.
Coordinators in the four priority contexts were also asked about other indicators of localization. Local membership translated into decision-making power for some organizations as all priority contexts with Sub-Cluster Strategic Advisory Groups (SAGs) included more than two local organizations, with WLOs well-represented. The approval of NGO HRP projects and Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) allocations varied across contexts, with the lowest level of local access in Iraq (38% of NGO HRP projects approved, 20% NGO allocation of CBPF) and the highest level of local access in the WoS-Turkey Hub (80% of NGO HRP projects approved, 84% NGO allocation of CBPF).

CBPF funding levels in three of four contexts are in line with Grand Bargain commitments of channeling 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national actors, although in several contexts this is still a fairly small amount of funding. Funding was given directly from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to NGOs in Nigeria, South Sudan, and the WoS-Turkey Hub; in Iraq, NGOs were not funded directly as funding was received through INGO consortiums. These findings demonstrate a range of moderate- to high-level localization within the priority contexts, which is expected as contexts were selected either for gaining momentum on localization efforts or for showing interest and reflection on localized protection. Table 7 contains additional data on these priority contexts HRPs and funding access.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL HRP–GBV PROJECTS SUBMITTED</th>
<th>NGO HRP–GBV PROJECTS SUBMITTED</th>
<th>NGO HRP–GBV PROJECTS APPROVED</th>
<th>% NGO HRP–GBV PROJECTS OF TOTAL HRP</th>
<th>% NGO HRP–GBV PROJECTS APPROVED</th>
<th>TOTAL CBPF GBV FUNDING ENVELOPE</th>
<th>Nngo CBPF GBV ALLOCATION</th>
<th>% Nngo CBPF GBV ALLOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>$1,600,000</td>
<td>$314,442*</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>$2,100,000</td>
<td>$462,322</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$1,750,000</td>
<td>$760,000</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoS-Turkey</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>$1,601,553</td>
<td>$1,347,796</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Iraq: NGOs did not receive standalone funding; funding was channeled through INGO consortiums

**No CSO-submitted HRP projects (3/4 contexts have no CSO members)**

Compared to the global sample, more priority context GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators are dedicated (50%). The remaining 50% are double- and triple-hatting. All Coordinators are on long-term contracts. All GBV Sub-Clusters are co-led by INgos and in one context (Nigeria) the government is an additional co-lead of the GBV Sub-Cluster. Details on the leadership for each of the priority context GBV Sub-Clusters can be found in Table 8, below.
TABLE 8: PRIORITY COUNTRY SUB-CLUSTER COORDINATION LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>No (Triple-hat)</td>
<td>FHI360</td>
<td>No (Double-hat)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoS Turkey Hub</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>No (Double-hat)</td>
<td>Global Communities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Qualitative Findings

Qualitative data was collected through 39 interviews conducted with 45 key informants. Twenty-two (49%) respondents represented local organizations, 16 (36%) represented country-level INGOs, six (13%) were GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators, and one (2%) came from another area. Overall, thirteen (29%) respondents represented WLOs. Forty (89%) respondents were female and five (11%) were male. Table 9 contains further information on the types of key informants included in these interviews.

TABLE 9: KEY INFORMANT TYPE BY CONTEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMANT TYPE</th>
<th>PRIORITY CONTEXTS</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL CONTEXTS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>SYRIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV SC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local organization (CSO/NNGO)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the qualitative data obtained through these interviews, three strands of analysis were explored: (A) perceived localization by country context; (B) drivers and barriers to GBV localization; and (C) the most and least conductive practices for GBV localization within functional processes.
(A) PERCEIVED LOCALIZATION BY COUNTRY CONTEXT

Overall, the perceived level of localization is highly context dependent. Perceptions emerging from key informant interviews align with the quantitative data for each context indicating the level of localization through membership, HRP inclusion, and CBPF funding access, with Iraq having the lowest level of perceived localization and the WoS-Turkey Hub having the highest level of perceived localization.

Perceptions of localization are driven by perceived levels of ‘intent.’ Intent is indicated by concrete actions taken to localize the GBV Sub-Cluster as well as the broader humanitarian system in-country. In GBV Sub-Clusters with ‘high intent’ meaningful actions have been taken to include local respondents as equals and local respondents feel that the cluster believes in the value and need for localization. In GBV Sub-Clusters with ‘low intent’ meaningful actions to include local respondents as equals has not occurred, thereby signaling to local respondents that the Sub-Cluster and the broader humanitarian system do not believe in the value and need of localization. Perceived level of intent is highly dependent on the country context and operating environment, which can serve as a barrier to or a driver for localization. Localization is supported in contexts where local organizations have improved access over international organizations, the response is decentralized, and civil society and existing local capacity are strong. Localization is hindered in contexts where international organizations have greater access, the response is centralized, and civil society is weak.

Perceived level of intent is directly associated with the perceived level of localization in three contexts: Iraq, Nigeria, and South Sudan. In the contexts where participation is high yet meaningful engagement and access to decision-making is low (low levels of intent), participation and inclusion are seen as ‘checkboxes’ required by donors. The WoS-Turkey Hub is the outlier, with low perceived intent and high localization; as there was no access for INGOs the environment required localization as a means to provide services. Though perceived intent is low in the WoS-Turkey Hub, respondents feel meaningfully included as equal partners, indicating that in environments where meaningful localization is high, perceived intent ceases to be a key factor for localization. The relationship between localization and perceived intent for the four priority contexts is summarized in Figure 1, below.

FIGURE 1: PERCEIVED LEVEL OF LOCALIZATION WITHIN PRIORITY CONTEXTS
(B) DRIVERS FOR AND BARRIERS TO GBV LOCALIZATION

Through analysis of the key informant interviews, themes around drivers for and barriers to GBV localization emerged. It is important to note that respondents described barriers and drivers differently: while barriers were challenges to GBV localization that respondents have actually experienced and witnessed at work within the global humanitarian system and at the country level, drivers reflect both respondents’ actual experiences and their aspirations for how the system could and ought to advance GBV localization. This difference is indicative of the relatively low levels of GBV localization operating in these priority contexts.

The primary themes that emerged from this analysis of drivers and barriers include: patriarchy and other aspects of the humanitarian system, responsibilities and dynamics within the GBV Sub-Cluster, and country context. While patriarchy and the structure of the humanitarian system were described only as barriers to GBV localization, respondents described elements of responsibilities and dynamics and the country context as both drivers and barriers. Figure 2, below, reflects the sub-themes identified as drivers for and barriers to GBV localization. These sub-themes are described in greater detail below.

FIGURE 2: DRIVERS FOR AND BARRIERS TO GBV LOCALIZATION

Respondents described nearly twice as many barriers to GBV localization as they did drivers of localization. All respondent groups (INGO, global, and local respondents) except GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators were twice as likely to report a barrier as a driver. Local respondents reported the most barriers, indicating that local respondents tend to be more pessimistic than other respondents. INGO respondents reported the largest number of drivers – twice that of local respondents. Global respondents were least likely to report perceived drivers of localization. Based on these frequencies, it appears that local and global respondents tend to be most pessimistic with regard to GBV localization, while INGO respondents and GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators tend to be more optimistic and also report more mixed barriers and drivers. The frequency of reported drivers and barriers by respondent group is detailed in Figure 3, below.
### FIGURE 3: DRIVERS AND BARRIERS BY RESPONDENT GROUP: SUMMATION OF QUALITATIVE CODES

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>PATRIARCHY</th>
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<th>PROGRAMMING/ GBV COMMUNITY</th>
<th>HIERARCHY: UNEQUAL POWER, ACCESS &amp; CONTROL</th>
<th>INFLEXIBLE ARCHITECTURE</th>
<th>ROLES &amp; RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
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*Between and within SC members, interpersonal, and community
B.1 BARRIER: PATRIARCHY

Respondents in all groups view patriarchy within the humanitarian system and at the country level as a serious barrier to GBV localization. Respondents view patriarchal systems as limiting the space for women and WLOs in the response and concentrating the lion’s share of GBV funding with male-led organizations. Respondents stressed that GBV is often viewed as the least important sector within the cluster system and is the least funded. Gender transformative work is not taking place within the broader humanitarian system, the country-level cluster system, or the GBV Sub-Cluster. The only driver of GBV localization identified under this theme is the inclusion of WLO leadership in the cluster system, which is helping to shift power away from the patriarchal tendencies of the system.

PATRIARCHY WITHIN THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

Respondents discussed a humanitarian system that is rigid, patriarchal, and male-dominated. Despite global-level commitments to localization, actors within the humanitarian system maintain the status quo. A local respondent stated, “Risk [of localization] is exaggerated because of fear. Organizations are scared of change. They want to keep the status quo.” An international respondent explained, “Organizations sign up for these initiatives but what happens is replication of white supremacy and patriarchy, the axis of oppression. There is no social norms change, so organizations go along and support this axis of oppression.” The impacts of systemic patriarchy are visible in a number of ways within the work of the humanitarian system.

LACK OF EMPHASIS ON GENDER TRANSFORMATIVE WORK

Respondents discussed the impact of a patriarchal and rigid humanitarian system, which translates to in-country realities where gender and GBV work is neglected and underfunded. Across all respondent groups GBV was discussed as one of the lowest priority sectors, receiving limited funding and attention from donors. An INGO respondent stated, “GBV will always be marginal. It is not seen as big or important as WASH or shelter sectors. Many groups start to do GBV because donors told them to do it.”

All respondent groups emphasized the fact that patriarchy impacts the positioning of GBV work and women and girls’ voices within response programming. Respondents view male-led systems as contributing to a lack of gender transformative and social norms change work within the sector, undermining both GBV work and GBV localization. An international respondent expressed her concern, stating, “I am concerned GBV is seen as a niche ‘women’s issue.’” When GBV is not a central part of humanitarian response, prioritization for its funding and localization remains minimal. An INGO respondent explained, “Women’s issues are not taken into account in the response; they are just seen as ‘symptoms.’” A local respondent stated, “We need to mainstream GBV across sectors...We need to discuss prevention and awareness raising and root causes... Cluster and INGOs need to push; they need to have a role to set the agenda for inclusion.”

An international respondent explained, “Humanitarian systems lack of willingness to address structural inequalities is the issue. The bigger question is how to convince the humanitarian industry to be transformative. Localization without transformative work reinforces patriarchy and white supremacy.” As this quote illustrates, without gender transformative work, localization will continue to reinforce and replicate patriarchal systems that exclude local actors. A local respondent explained, “Ninety-five percent of local NGOs are pretty much run by men. There is no room for being progressive and no prevention or root causes work...They [INGOs and UN] never say, ‘Ok let’s do something to tackle gender stereotypes and root causes.’ They will not ask unless pushed.”

In the wake of a crisis, this lack of commitment to supporting WLOs and movements can even erode progress made on women’s rights issues in the past. An INGO respondent explained, “Women’s rights organizations, their capacity and role is not taken seriously by the international community...Women’s issues are not taken into account in the response; they are just seen as ‘symptoms.’ Previous women’s rights work and development work has been affected, all of that money moved to emergency activities. They feel they are going backwards from the work, blowing away all their achievements.
in changing laws and advancing rights.” An overreliance on male-led organizations is seen by some as limiting more progressive and gender transformative work as one local respondent explained, “The GBV Sub-Cluster never talks about LGBTQ issues; changing gender norms or gender stereotypes – there is a very limited space for this...Male-led NGOs are very conservative.”

### BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP

There is a significant gender gap for women working in GBV and humanitarian response, especially apparent at leadership levels. An international respondent explained, “...in meeting[s] all local actors are women but when you go higher up within the humanitarian cluster system those in power are men. The GBV coordinator may be a woman but the protection cluster coordinator and UN leads, they all are men.” Respondents believe it is essential to address gender inequality within the sector and increase the number of women in positions of authority. A local respondent explained, “Even UNFPA, they do a great job, but they do not have a female leader.”

### PATRIARCHY AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

#### BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S INVOLVEMENT, LEADERSHIP, AND FUNDING IN GBV RESPONSE

All respondent groups discussed the impact of a patriarchal humanitarian system as supporting and replicating patriarchy at the country level. Respondents viewed this adherence to patriarchal structures as undermining the commitment to address GBV within the humanitarian system, eroding the building of women’s movements, and undermining future improvements in women’s rights and access in humanitarian causes. An international respondent explained, “This speaks to why GBV is sidelined—patriarchy and a lack of political will to address. Patriarchy is in all global contexts.” A local respondent stated, “Organizations would rather stay safe and not blame the government, keep the patriarchal system and society going. Right now, men lead all positions; the INGO/UN system gives more space to male-led organizations because they are linked to government...This is corruption; this is about power. This repeats the stereotype: men sit to represent women, which means that we need them to speak for us, that we cannot speak for ourselves.” Another local respondent said, “Nigeria is a patriarchal country—women are seen not heard...Space is a challenge for WLOs. Organizations are mainly male-led...I have expressed concern Borno state crisis is a women and children’s crisis, yet we see men speak for them; this would not have as much impact as women talking for themselves.”

At the country level, as within the global humanitarian system, positions of leadership are often reserved for men. An international respondent said, “The vast majority of GBV Sub-Cluster members are women, technical roles mainly women, yet the supervisors and the leads of organizations are mainly men. Many NGOs the bulk of their work is not in GBV and led by men.” Another local respondent stated, “Most organizations are managed by men. There are few strong WLOs; there is no space for them. This is a challenge because of patriarchal systems.” Another local respondent explained, “Many organizations get funding for ‘women’s issues’ but they are led by men.”

Findings demonstrate that few donors directly fund WLOs and that international organizations are reticent to partner with and fund WLOs as well. As an INGO respondent succinctly put it, “The space for WLOs is very limited.” A local respondent explained, “Donors don’t think it is important to support feminist WLOs.” An international respondent stated, “WLOs are more grassroots, less ‘NGO-ized.’ Groups that are less ‘NGO-ized’ do not get money and are less likely to be at the table.” A local respondent explained, “The reason why funding goes to male-led NGOs is because WLOs are not in the space. Barriers and criteria is too high so WLOs are often dropped. Then male NGOs get the contracts and they sub-grant the same WLOs as their foot soldiers.” WLOs are, therefore, not meaningfully included in the response, with the lion’s share of GBV funding concentrated in the hands of large, male-led NNGOs. Respondents see this as detrimental to the effectiveness of the overall response. A local respondent emphasized that this gap is due not to the absence of WLOs but to a lack of commitment to funding and supporting their work, stating, “There are many WLOs. The biggest issue for them is funding.”
SENSITIVITY OF GBV RESPONSE

Respondents discussed patriarchal country contexts in which cultures of stigma and fear surround GBV. Barriers to comprehensive local response to GBV include conservatism, GBV sensitivity, and a lack of understanding of GBV from the local population. A local respondent shared, “Even GBV victims exposed to GBV don’t know this is GBV; if they are beaten by their husband or forced to have sex, they may think this is normal. This is a conservative religious and cultural society. NGOs need capacity to educate the community to fight the ‘GBV is a ‘Western women’s idea’ that is invading our community.’” A local respondent from Nigeria explained that, though culture often pushes women to remain silent, these same women are a powerful force that could be tapped into to tackle GBV issues, stating, “Women in the north are silent due to barriers from traditional and religious practices. Still many [women] know and understand. We are just not engaging them. They can be very powerful.”

Local respondents discussed severe threats of violence for advancing women’s rights and access. A local respondent explained, “South Sudan is a very difficult context. There is no space for civil society; this is even worse for women. National security threatens women leaders and they leave the country. Women are taking a back seat due to fear – ‘you will disappear’. The GBV Sub-Cluster needs to be advocating for women and needs to position women to make sure they are involved in the new constitution.” Despite risks, all respondents agreed that GBV sensitivity is not an excuse for inaction. An INGO respondent stated, “GBV is sensitive but this cannot be an excuse...[We] need to be mindful [that] GBV is sensitive and of risks but this is not an excuse.”

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, ABUSE, AND HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE

Respondents discussed sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual harassment in the workplace as risks posed when GBV work is carried out predominantly by male-led organizations with varying levels of buy-in. One local respondent said, “A male CSO colleague who works in protection coordination, he talks the talk but then I heard from people that he says sexist jokes in front of colleagues and treats the female staff badly.” An international respondent explained, “They
[local NGO] had never had a PSEA [protection against sexual exploitation and abuse] training and didn’t want one. It was an all-male staff plus one gender advisor who was the only woman – she would change every three months because the person would quit. The environment was one of poor behavior and sexual harassment.” Another international respondent explained more explicitly, “[We knew that the] humanitarian system for years were using local actors who were perpetrating SEA when distributing food. Sexual abuse while distributing food aid was seen as the cost of doing business; women’s lives and bodies are the price you pay for getting food into the country.” Respondents see localization without gender transformative work as increasing the risk of SEA in programming. An international respondent phrased this a bit more hopefully, stating, “The humanitarian system has a way to go even internally on uptake of gender equality and GBV. This will in turn translate back to willingness for GBV and gender advocacy work, a willingness to talk about the issues.”

B.2 BARRIER: HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

When considering localization within the GBV Sub-Cluster, it is essential to place this within the broader context of localization in the humanitarian system. All respondent groups viewed the humanitarian system as a barrier to localization. Respondents described a humanitarian system marked by hierarchies, inequalities, and inflexible architectures. All respondent groups identified unfair treatment and unequal access in partnerships and access to funding. Respondents noted that, in the wake of a crisis, the emphasis is placed on lifesaving work and shifted away from addressing gender and root causes. Respondents noted that localization discussions within the humanitarian system tend to be top down, lacking clear, operationalized definitions of or goals for localization. Despite these challenges, local respondents identified several drivers of localization within the broader humanitarian system: inclusion, visibility and access to global platforms, and access to funding and equitable partnerships.

HIERARCHY: UNEQUAL POWER, ACCESS, AND CONTROL

Respondents from all groups described the hierarchical nature of the humanitarian system that is donor driven and allows for extremely limited power and access by local actors. Limited access to funding, which remains projectized and short-term and a lack of transparency in donor relations are just two of the symptoms of this hierarchy. A local respondent explained, “Funding is not transparent; it is always given to the same organizations. UNFPA Is funding the same organizations for five years. They should issue a transparent call and have a transparent process.” Another local actor explained additional barriers to local acquisition of funding, stating, “[Donors] expect we can do lengthy online application process. This is very difficult...With tight timelines local organizations are marginalized.” An INGO respondent explained that what progress has been seen in extending funding to local actors has been insufficient to date: “There has been increased access to pooled funds for local actors, but the funding is not proportionate; only three to four percent goes to local actors. Donor restrictions and requirements are a huge challenge.” Respondents acknowledged that the GBV Sub-Cluster has limited power and control to confront challenges within the broader humanitarian system without support from other players in the humanitarian field. A local respondent said, “Overall the GBV Sub-Cluster has been supportive. They have put priority number one as CSOs. The issue is the decisions and control are coming from above the GBV Sub-Cluster.”

UNEQUAL AND EXPLOITATIVE PARTNERSHIPS

Respondents see exploitative and unequal partnership agreements as a major barrier to localization. Respondents stressed that local actors are generally not provided overhead funding, are rarely consulted in proposal development processes, and are often pushed to work at low costs. Global respondents and Coordinators discussed exploitative arrangements that pushed risk down; in some cases, this was linked to risk aversion. For example, a local respondent explained, “The main challenge is survival instincts. Even if INGOs want to partner, they need to survive so they tend to transfer all risk to national partners.”
In other cases, these imbalanced partnerships are the result of technocratic definitions of capacity linked to English-language skills and the production of project cycle management documents, creating a funding-capacity cycle that keeps local actors dependent on external support. A local respondent stated, “The perception that local organizations have no capacity is ironic as they implement the intervention.” Another emphasized how the international standard for capacity negates local knowledge and expertise that are essential to implementation, stating, “We’re tired of hearing we have no capacity...WE know the culture and the society. How can you say we have no capacity?”. An International respondent added, “INGOs have huge technical capacity gaps also. We don’t focus on that.”

The technocratic and exclusionary definition of capacity used by the humanitarian system serves as a barrier to funding for local organizations and actors. A local respondent explained, “There is no funding for capacity so the NGO cannot grow; overhead costs do not go to us...There is no overhead for internet or telephones...The money for air tickets is given to them [INGOs] not us. On a monthly basis they want a hardcopy of the report, but how can we give it? We have no money for printing.” An international respondent echoed these concerns, explaining, “If they [local organizations] include money for administration in their proposal, donors will say they are technically strong, but organization is not strong enough, there is not enough capacity.” Another international respondent concluded, “This creates a vicious cycle—they cannot get capacity without funding and cannot get funding without capacity.”

Overall, respondents expressed concerns that there were few fair partnerships and a lack of accountability and that the inclusion of local actors is often inauthentic, ‘check-box’ engagement. An international respondent stated, “Partnerships are not meaningful as they [local actors] are not involved in program design....They are only called upon when there is no access or it is cheaper to use CSOs.” A local respondent explained, “NGOs feel the work they do, UN agencies take credit for; now some don’t want to share data for this reason. They [NGOs] say they [UN agencies] put them down and take data from them for the report—they do the work but don’t get the credit.”

■ UNEQUAL PAY FOR LOCAL PARTNERS

Respondents see practices such as unequal pay for local partners as a demonstration of the hierarchy within the humanitarian system and as factors that inhibit meaningful localization. A local respondent illustrated this point, explaining, “It is unfair the difference in salary between internationals and a local person. For the exact same job and title the international staff makes twice as much...I feel like my organization is a factory for training staff; we bring up their skills and then they leave for an INGO. Donors give very little funding to NGOs and expect them to do the same work as INGOs.” Another local respondent said, “We created a class system, white and regional expats then local staff; a racial hierarchy is created. If organizations are not prepared to pay the same amount for people based on education and expertise, then they are not prepared as an organization to get into equal partnerships.” One local respondent explained how the hierarchies that have been fostered within the humanitarian system can extend to putting local actors at greater physical risk; “People are regularly ambushed and killed on this road, but they expect us [local actors] to go...I was ambushed by armed men on the way to a meeting; my money and cellphone were stolen. In the end, when we met the donor and the INGO there was no action, no report taken.”

■ LIMITED DEFINITION OF AND COMMITMENT TO LOCALIZATION

Respondents in all groups described how the lack of a globally agreed-upon definition of localization, limited access to information, tokenization, and low levels of intent to localize from international actors shaped experiences on the ground. Many local actors feel that they do not receive adequate information in a timely manner, which constrains their ability to engage meaningful in discourse around localization. A local respondent said, “[The] issue is many local NGOs say they don’t hear about things like [the] Grand Bargain until way later. We need to know so we can hold organizations accountable and use [it] for advocacy and leverage.” Another local respondent echoed this sentiment, stating, “Even conversations about the Grand Bargain and localization we are not involved.”
The lack of engagement of local actors in discourse and dialogue around localization is directly linked to the low levels of intent among international actors to promote localization. A local respondent explained, “There is a lack of genuine intention to promote local NGOs in the humanitarian system. For example, I met DFID today and asked if they are going to look at strengthening local NGOs and they said no. It was clear they hadn’t even considered it. They are only paying lip service [to localization].” An international respondent said, “Localization is an add on with no resources put into it.” The low levels of commitment to localization may be one reason why the international community has failed to operationalize a definition of localization, thereby setting standards for progress and measurement. An international respondent stated, “Localization is a contested area the same way ‘resilience’ was a buzzword years ago but has fallen out of favor. There is no tangible definition of localization. Every organization defines localization its own way.”

**HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP**

Local respondents and GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators identified the leadership of those such as the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) members, and UN OCHA as a driver of localization while INGO respondents saw this as a mixed driver and barrier of localization. An international respondent stated, “The UN OCHA lead and UN Resident Coordinator were big champions of localization. This made a huge difference. They asked for planning and approaches for inclusion, were proactive, ensured the Iraqi Humanitarian Fund (IHF) interfaced with local coordination systems. The issue is when people leave things are not systematized, things fall apart. There is no systemic change.” An international respondent noted, “A road map for localization is needed from the global AoR as right now actions are ad hoc.”
INFLEXIBLE ARCHITECTURE

All respondent groups described barriers to localization related to the humanitarian system’s inflexible architecture, the focus on speed, and the general complexity of the system. An international respondent explained, “Looking broadly at the humanitarian system, there are very few localization efforts. There is no bad intention, but the international community is like a steam roller. GBV and gender folks come in later trying to undo these first impacts and expectations, but the power imbalance is real…[it is] almost impossible to undo. Local capacity has already been tossed aside. Another international respondent stated, “We do not build in enough time. We have unrealistic goals and objectives and indicators. We cannot decrease GBV in six months. We know capacity is low and the environment is difficulty; it is not realistic.”

All respondent groups discussed additional barriers built into the humanitarian architecture, including the rigidity of the cluster system, bureaucracy, and prioritizing purely humanitarian organizations (organizations fit for purpose). These barriers had the greatest impact on WLOs. For example, an international respondent explained, “WLOs are more grassroots, less ‘NGO-ized.’ Groups that are less ‘NGO-ized’ do not get money and are less likely to be at the table. An INGO respondent stated, “GBV programming can be restrictive and reductive…we need to think largely. Women rights, WLOs, grassroots organizations don’t define themselves as GBV specialists or humanitarians.” Similarly, an international respondent said, “They [WLOs] are not framed as NGOs, more as activists and advocacy groups, not humanitarian response NGOs.” An INGO respondent explained some of the challenges related to the rigidity of the cluster system, stating, “The system is not optimized. It made sense when [the] cluster system was designed, but it is so structured. Putting organizations into specific sectors within the humanitarian structures is not part of their nature – they are more holistic. There are natural spaces of CSOs in many spaces.”
**RISK AVERSION**

All respondent groups discussed risk aversion within the humanitarian system with international humanitarian actors particularly sensitive to financial risks, especially fraud, and risks related to maintenance of humanitarian principles. An INGO respondent said, “The international communities’ perception right now is the risk of fraud is too high and that groups cannot execute with humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, so they do not want to work with local organizations. But communities do not perceive INGOs and the UN as impartial or neutral; they are seen by the population as being biased. In our experience working closely with organizations, we can provide checks and balances to ensure humanitarian principles are followed and we have seen good practices. They [local organizations] are able to show a high level of neutrality in a very complex environment.”

Respondents specifically discussed challenges related to weak financial systems within local organizations and systems, which is used as a justification for limited localization. An INGO respondent provided an example from the humanitarian response in Iraq: "NGOs were not assessed on their financial systems. In 2014, after the liberation/re-taking of Iraq, most of the funding was done through local organizations because they had access and it was hard for INGOs to go in. Later, they [local organizations] were charged with corruption and fraud, but they were not given any support or guidance by INGOs and the UN. They were not assessed on their capacity to absorb the funds and handle the risky operating environment. There is no banking system in Mosul or Tikrit; they have to handle cash. This is a big risk, but there was no training or preparation. The INGO audited them and said it was corruption and fraud and they blacklisted them. We need to do our homework and evaluate them and evaluate the risk and share with the donor form the beginning; we need to provide support and that is not happening now. We say localization is not happening because NGOs are corrupt. Fraud means they don’t want to take on a level of risk...We need to support them [local actors], not abandon them.”

Respondents also discussed challenges related to the perceived inability of local actors to provide quality services aligned with humanitarian principles. An international respondent explained, “The conversation around risk is just so much more complex...For example, in Iraq we say that [local actors] can’t uphold humanitarian principles. They are not impartial, so it is too much risk, but access means risk in these areas and they have to work with political groups and negotiate with armed groups. This is their contribution and an asset: How else would we get to hard-to-reach groups like ISIS sex slaves? Success is reducing risk...It is beyond simple black and white.”

**THE ‘NEXUS’**

Although all respondent groups described the ‘nexus’ as a potential in-road and comparative advantage for local organizations, there was neither clarity in how the nexus is defined nor guidance on how nexus work should be executed in reality. An INGO respondent stated, “Issue of the nexus, what does this mean? This terminology is another top-down word. The academic construct of ‘nexus’ and how this is understood at the field level and recognizing the link between humanitarian and development work broadly is a gap. In practice, again, this is us bringing our language. We bring this to local organizations and expect them to follow course.” Local respondents saw the shift away from development to purely humanitarian work as a mixed driver and barrier for localization. A local respondent said, “There is a huge impact on local organizations who were running development programs as now [the] focus is only on humanitarian work. They ignore development. NGOs will change mandates from development to humanitarian, but the funds are not divided; they only go to humanitarian organizations like the UN only.”

**GBV PROGRAMMING AND THE GBV COMMUNITY**

All respondent groups were critical of the GBV community and the current culture around GBV programming. Local respondents were the most critical while GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators were the least critical. Respondent groups at the country level had specific critiques around GBV programming whereas global-level respondents tended to have more systemic critiques of the GBV community and how these serve as barriers to localization.
INGO and global respondents described systemic challenges as barriers to localization, including a lack of cohesion in GBV work, the complexity surrounding multiple systems of work, and One international respondent explained, “There is muddiness everywhere. There is a lack of clarity around who we are and what we want to do.” International respondents also emphasized insufficient accountability related to global-level standards guiding GBV work. Another international respondent stated, “We do not monitor [the GBV] guidelines and hold people accountable. We have to go to the field level...having standards in place only matters if people are held accountable to those standards.”

Local respondents discussed a lack of clarity around the specific skill set and programming defined as GBV work. A local respondent explained how the lack of clarity within this system can be unfairly applied to local organizations: “There is concern over CSOs not having the right definition of GBV or how to do GBV [work], but, for example, [at] SRHR ... we don’t have a global definition. We don’t even have a global set of what GBV interventions are. There are so many standards and practices. We expect a woman in a rural area to know some weird definition.”

Many respondents also discussed the Call To Action as creating greater complexity and not fully including local actors. An international respondent explained, “The issue is that the Call to Action and the cluster system can seem like two separate, parallel systems. It is so complex and doesn’t speak to CSOs. The Call to Action Roadmap workshop experience was full of UN jargon, held in English, and many CSOs were lost. We need to accompany and prepare local organizations. There is still a culture clash and so much is unclear.” A local respondent also said, “At the most recent Call to Action Roadmap meeting in New York, inclusion of local groups was raised as an issue, but someone said local advocacy at the UN level is too complex and not needed [for local actors. I don’t agree; people need to learn and have exposure.”

As noted above, respondents also described the hierarchy and a culture of exclusion between international humanitarian actors, including those working in GBV, and local actors. An international respondent explained, “We disparage local efforts that they are not good enough, don’t know standards....There is this ‘mean girls’ sub-culture. We pat them on the back and say good job but then send them to do a demeaning basic training.” A local respondent shared, “There are these ‘small gangs’ at the beginning of the emergency, as many humanitarians know people from before. Not on purpose, but they have this club we are not a part of. There is this air of ‘we know better.’” Another local respondent said, “INGOs only want ‘pure’ GBV programing. We need livelihoods for survivors or programming will not work. Survivors maybe in other contexts can leave [the] abuser, but without livelihoods they will not be able to. [They] will have to go back.”

Local respondents noted a critical shortage of GBV specialists in some contexts. A local respondent said, “I am frustrated with the idea of technical capacity for NGOs. We work with UNHCR and they have staff that don’t know the GBV guidelines and are not GBV technical people...This is the same problem with UNFPA, UNHCR, and all UN agencies; they don’t have GBV specialists and they don’t listen.” Several respondents were critical of UNFPA’s role as the lead agency of the GBV AoR in providing dedicated coordination and advancing women’s rights. A local respondent stated, “Even UNFPA, they do a great job, but they do not have a female leader. They do not work with the media or on TV. There is no female personality fighting for women’s issues.” An INGO respondent said, “UNFPA needs to ensure this is a permanent role [the GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator]...Capacity building lags because we need assessment and a plan in place, but we cannot do this without a Coordinator. So many organizations do GBV, but we have not assessed their capacity to ensure they are doing the right thing. They need coaching and mentoring; they need leadership.”

THE LIFESAVING FOCUS OF HUMANITARIAN WORK

Respondents also discussed the focus on lifesaving work within the GBV sector as driving service access at the cost of replicating gender hierarchies and as a barrier to localization and quality GBV programming. Respondents stressed the need to address root causes of GBV through social norms change. An international respondent explained, “In the past fifteen years the lifesaving focus has moved us towards sexual violence and specifically sexual violence in conflict. We have moved away from root causes. Lifesaving only means no focus on social norms change.” An INGO respondent stated, “[I] would like to see not just more WLOs but more discussions around gender, not just service provision. We need
prevention and root causes work. There is no willingness from INGOs and the UN with GBV and protection programming... We’re not in an acute emergency now—why aren’t they working on gender? They say culture is too conservative; the clusters need to be more active to combat this.” The lifesaving focus and the rigidity of the humanitarian system may limit natural spaces for local actors.

Local respondents were the only group to discuss how insufficient localization drives poor GBV programming methods and undermines accountability to survivors and communities. Local respondents described a lack of accountability as a challenge; a local respondent said, “The GBV Sub-Cluster is not accountable enough to civilians.” Local respondents also discussed a lack of programming and guidance around safe houses/shelters, access to justice mechanisms, and economic empowerment opportunities. A local respondent, speaking about Iraq, explained, “[In] the women’s shelters there are no standards. They are like prisons. The GBV Sub-Cluster needs to come up with guidance.” Another local respondent stated, “Right now if I talk to a survivor…I have nothing to give them. I bring the case to the cluster, but nothing is being done, no help. If they would fund local organizations and place their confidence in us, then we can support survivors. We know what they need, but with INGOs nothing is being done about it.”

Local respondents described how insufficient services serve to weaken overall GBV response. A local respondent said, “We are trying to create a culture for people to speak out. If they do and their needs are not met, why speak out?” and another local respondent explained, “[T]he challenge for GBV survivors is getting access to justice...Not many people report; there are not many services and not much confidence. So it is not worth it to speak out. With no access to justice, will they get service?”

Local respondents also talked about the negative impact of short-term programming. A local respondent explained, “The real risk is not sustainability of change. INGOs leave and what impact have you made? [T]he first principle is ‘do no harm.’ Unintentionally, these INGOs cause harm. They bring services then take them away. This is the hardest on GBV survivors. It is the responsibility of service providers to build structures and ensure change is a sustainable thinking.”
THE CALL TO ACTION

Respondents described the Call to Action as an opportunity to access global advocacy platforms, engage stakeholders, and access donors. An international respondent stated, “The Call to Action is the first global platform to proactively look at local actors.” A local respondent shared, “[The Call to Action] can be a space for local actors, international, and donor come together as an advocacy platform. I feel for local actors. It is about voice, a space to make voices heard. If it is left to us and available spaces to advocate, we can use the Call to Action platform to advocate [and] engage INGOs, the UN, and donors collectively.”

Several respondents described localization efforts that were responsible for specialized GBV services. A local respondent said, “In 2016 to 2017, before the training initiative and before the revolution, there were no protection services in Syria. No one had any idea about these services. GBV services are new services to the Syrian people. After the Syrian revolution there was a big need for services. People had no clue about humanitarian response. We started from a basic level up and now we are providing specialized psychosocial services and working on referral systems.

B.3 MIXED DRIVER AND BARRIER: RESPONSIBILITIES AND DYNAMICS

Respondent groups did not agree on responsibilities and dynamics of various actors working in this space, with some describing barriers to localization in terms of roles and responsibilities and others describing these issues as drivers of localization. Respondents described perceived roles, responsibilities, and dynamics of local actors, international actors, the global-level humanitarian system, and the cluster system, specifically the GBV Sub-Cluster. They also discussed dynamics between these actors and the beneficiaries whom they seek to serve.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The way in which respondents understood their role vis-à-vis the GBV Sub-Cluster was largely shaped by their sense of responsibility to other participating organizations.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL ACTORS

Local respondents tended to feel responsible to the wider community, to the wider community as well as to other women and survivors. For example, a local respondent explained, “Localization is about communities. Operationalizing localization beyond INGOS down to NGOs...local communities are not being taken along.” Another said, “The international community will not be there forever. We need to build capacity of the people.” Another local respondent explained, “There is no space for women. We need to join hands for things to change.”

Some local respondents also felt a sense of responsibility to push forward the women’s rights agenda as a whole. A local respondent stated, “How can we change society and mindsets? With feminism we need to fight; without this there will be no change in parliament.”

International respondents recognized the role of local actors in accessing communities and understanding the needs of women and girls, which are drivers of localization. An international respondent explained, “We are in a circle: They [local actors] are the part that know the voice of women and girls and can reflect their needs. As the GBV Sub-Cluster we cannot reflect women’s needs. We cannot reach our target women and girls without them [local actors]. Then we involve them more in the GBV Sub-Cluster to reduce service duplication and ensure they respect confidentiality and [the] survivor-centered approach. It’s a circle; we complement each other. We cannot work without them and, at the same time, they need the GBV Sub-Cluster.”

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND GBV SUB-CLUSTER COORDINATORS

International respondents, GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators, and INGO respondents tended to feel responsible to advocate for the inclusion of local actors as well as to address the needs of survivors. An international respondent explained, “The GBV Sub-Cluster put criteria to accept new membership. They have to have clear GBV programs that serve women directly. If they [local actors] are active in GBV but low capacity, our role is to give them support and train them.”

Respondents also expressed their belief that international actors must take responsibility and be held accountable for localization and changing mindsets. An INGO respondent stated, “We need to operate in a space of personal responsibility – not explain, to stop and listen, stop talking only from our position. We need to switch the system so we really need to listen and understand and take CSOs into account.” Another INGO respondent said, “[At the] beginning of the emergencies, internationals are showing off. This is part of the humanitarian culture. If we want to meaningfully talk about localization, we need to change the way we see things, change power dynamics. Mindsets need to change.”

Participants described that GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators see their role as gatekeepers, maintaining and expanding membership within the cluster while ensuring services provided to survivors align with international standards. GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators discussed the challenge of balancing timely, quality services while ensuring inclusion of local actors and building their capacity. An international respondent explained, “We did a lot of advocacy with the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (NHF) to ensure local organizations were prioritized, to decrease technicalities so they have access. Then the situation with displacement needed us to respond and we needed an agency with capacity to respond quickly. Yet local organizations need to increase capacity. Balancing the two is a challenge. NHF funds are for immediate need; they do not favor local organizations.” Another international respondent discussed a similar issue in Iraq, stating, “The biggest barrier is technical GBV capacity, institutional capacity as well. Most GBV staff in Iraq are not specialized and trained. The work is not in line with international standards; people do work for salary and source of livelihood. Quality is a big challenge – ensuring staff are trained in GBV. Confidentiality is a big issue.”

Coordinators also discussed the limited power and control of the cluster and challenge of managing expectations. International respondents saw the concept of ‘gatekeeping’ as a mixed driver and barrier to localization. An international respondent said, “There are expectations of funding; many expect to get money through the sector. When they do not see [it], they get frustrated. It is hard to manage expectations.” Another international respondent said, “Expectations of
[the] GBV Sub-Cluster are huge. For example, recently a local partner explained to me that INGOs were taking her staff. She expected me to do something. I had to explain that her staff can move.”

It was the sense among participants that local respondents felt that GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators were responsible for reaching local actors, while acknowledging their shared responsibility in engagement. As stated by a local actor, “The [GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators] need to reach more local NGOs that are active on the ground. They [local actors] are not able to participate as there are no English speakers, many have no public relations or emails so cannot be reached. The GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator needs to reach out to them.” Global respondents saw the fact that local actors had not been shown the relevance of the cluster system as a barrier, while mixed drivers and barriers included setting realistic expectations of the cluster and the role of UNFPA in supporting the AoR. An international respondent explained, “Not only do they [local actors] need to understand how the system works, but to understand how they benefit from involvement, how benefit goes both ways. The cluster coordination system needs to show relevance.” Another international respondent stated, “The system is not functioning. Even with the best intentions, the GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator does not have the time to do it [localization].”

■ RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL ACTORS: ADVOCACY

All respondent groups described advocacy as a driver of localization and the dimensions in which they were responsible for advocating localization. All respondents see advocacy as a driver and a responsibility of all stakeholders.

Local respondents discussed their role in demanding localization, power, respect, and representation and the role of international actors as advocating alongside them. A local respondent stated, “We lead community-based programming, changing negative social norms to positive around women and girls. We work with community discussion groups to look at norms and how they can address issues. We are big in awareness raising. The program entrusts us to increase our responsibility and advocate with the Sub-Cluster.” Another local respondent said, “Advocacy is not one person – just the coordinator or cluster or OCHA’s job alone. We should all advocate – all parties involved in GBV in the field – in order to get what we are working towards.” Another said, “We need more advocacy and coordination with other sectors. They don’t see GBV as a priority. We need more work to increase referral systems for survivors, show the GBV Sub-Cluster is an important sector.”

GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators saw their roles around advocacy as both inclusion and empowerment of women. INGO respondents discussed advocacy in terms of humanitarian leadership, ensuring PoP, and ensuring that local actors receive institutional, not just technical, skill building. Global respondents also discussed movement building, intersectionality, and the role of global platforms. An INGO respondent explained, “It is the role of the GBV Sub-Cluster to promote the Principles of Partnership both within and between group members.” An international respondent said, “We need to have NGO members in the HCT, built advocacy and power – advocacy so they [have] access to donors and decision-making power.” An INGO respondent stated, “We are supporting women’s leadership training and professional development and advocating for opportunities for CSO leadership in this space.”

■ ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GBV SUB-CLUSTER

Building Capacity

All respondent groups noted that building capacity was a key responsibility and function of the GBV Sub-Cluster. An INGO respondent stated, “Iraq has a long way to go. [We] need to invest in capacity to strengthen local organizations, then providing resources and finances beyond training towards stable funding.” A local respondent said, “We know we need capacity to be build but no one is working to do it. How do we operationalize the Grand Bargain?” An international respondent explained, “We prioritize based on the needs and capacities of local NGOs. Sometimes you need to take a step back, not a step forward, need to go slow at the beginning and lower your ambitions and expectations, need to bring local NGOs to a certain level before you can engage. This is slower than with INGOs but there are big opportunities
for them. There will be long-term results that local NGOs can take in the long term in terms of resilience and moving to development. This is a big added value in an emergency situation.”

Respondents described the need to move beyond inefficient one-off trainings and towards meaningful, long-term capacity building strategies. A local respondent said, “They [local actors] are highly dependent on GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators…They need the capacity to assume critical services and sensitive case management. They cannot do this without on-job support and mentoring.” An international respondent shared a positive example of such mentorship: “In hard-to-reach areas, sub-national GBV Sub-Cluster coordination is led by local partners. We supported them for two to three years of mentorship, until they could take over on their own.”

**Systems Building and Strengthening**

All respondents saw systems building and strengthening as the role of the GBV Sub-Cluster and a driver for localization. This role involves including local organizations specifically in referral pathways, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and strategic planning processes. For example, an international respondent stated, “Within state-level SOPs and referral pathways, we ensure they [local actors] are part of it.” Respondents also noted that mapping of local actors is needed, with a local respondent explaining, “[The] biggest challenge is [that] local organizations are not mapped out. We need to see strengths and contributions of local service providers and how they can contribute to the GBV Sub-Cluster. There is no funding, but many have strengths. The cluster needs to play a lead role in linking to donors.” An INGO respondent noted the importance of evaluating local actors and associated risks, explaining, “We need to do our homework and evaluate them and evaluate the risk and share with the donor from the beginning…We allow local actors to showcase approaches and achievements through presentations at the GBV Sub-Cluster meeting and give constructive feedback.”
INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS

All respondent groups noted interpersonal dynamics as a barrier within the GBV Sub-Cluster, with power imbalances and inequitable systems put in place by the larger humanitarian system. Among participants, the GBV Sub-Cluster was seen as a space where pre-existing hierarchies are both replicated and challenged.

THE ‘BLESSED FEW’ PHENOMENON

All respondents discussed the ‘blessed few’ phenomenon, in which a small number of local organizations have access to the majority of funding and opportunities. An international respondent stated, “[There are a] blessed few set of the same NGO actors who always get access. This process is replicated from donors who have favorite INGOs – donor darlings. They then replicate this down to favored NNGOs, same power dynamics replicated.” Another international respondent explained, “The [‘blessed few’] agencies we fund mirror wider issues in the humanitarian system.” A local respondent expressed how frustrating this phenomenon can be: “I am frustrated as it seems the same organizations get UN funding. I understand they did a good job, but it’s the same faces over and over. It’s because of resources and connections. There are other organizations who need the opportunity more as it is a big opportunity to get UN funding.” Respondents noted that this occurs in all contexts and is a major barrier to localization.

Respondents believed that the ‘blessed few’ phenomenon leads to a low quality response and undermines the potential for other organizations to increase service quality and coverage. An international respondent said, “INGOs select the same one or two organizations for everything. They are overrun and overwhelmed. They do all projects and don’t build capacity of other organizations…They provide services of lower quality to be able to manage all the work. [We] need [an] approach to build mutual trust both ways.” A local respondent stated, “We are not existing. We are tired because we are
the main local association providing the services to the violated women. Many CBOs [community-based organizations] but they are not specialized in providing the service. [We] would love to help other CBOs to raise their capacities.”

Another local respondent said, “Some people get grants, some do not...This does not send a good signal. Next crisis, only a few will respond.” There was no agreement as to how the ‘blessed few’ dynamic can be confronted or which parties are most responsible.

Most critically, the favoritism of a small number of organizations, coupled with the centralized power structure of the humanitarian system and exclusion of WLOs, seems to erode the building of women’s movements. An INGO respondent explained, “There is definitely a trend of preferring a few of the bigger, more well-resourced CSOs above others, which has the effect of eroding movement building.”

LACK OF MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE GBV SUB-CLUSTER

Another barrier discussed by all respondent groups was tokenistic or forced participation in the GBV Sub-Cluster. Respondents saw this as a lack of meaningful participation and decision-making and the resistance of the cluster system to give up power. An international respondent explained, “Local organizations still feel very strongly that clusters are highly centralized and monopolized. International actors monopolize decision-making...Voices of local actors not heard even if they are greatly contributing.” An international respondent said, “Sixty plus people sitting in a room not contributing or being part of technical working groups? This is useless.”

Local respondents discussed local actors who attended meetings due to IP and CBPF requirements and did not understand the value or purpose of the GBV Sub-Cluster, although they also noted some encouraging steps toward encouraging fuller participation. A local respondent stated, “In the beginning, it was a checkbox. UNICEF funded us and asked us to attend the meetings, so we went, but for one and a half years I didn’t say a word. It took one and a half years to get the courage to speak up. This was with a lot of support from the Coordinator to get me to participate.”

POWER IMBALANCES WITHIN THE GBV SUB-CLUSTER

All respondents discussed a lack of trust and an imbalance of power as a barrier to localization, leading to unwelcome dynamics within the Sub-Cluster. Participation in the Sub-Cluster can be intimidating for local actors. One local respondent said, “It is not a friendly space. There is a lot of intimidation – not on purpose, just as a local expert not an international expert you don’t feel you can discuss and make change...You feel like an outside...On a subconscious level people do this to make you feel uncomfortable. I am an English-speaking expat also. Imagine how rural local woman feels.” Another said, “The technical language goes beyond NGO capacity to understand jargon. They have a weak role and low participation.”

Local respondents discussed feeling excluded and mistrusted and participating in a Sub-Cluster that did not hear their voice or meet their needs. One local respondent said, “We attend meetings and INGOs say the work they are doing...There is no attention given to NGOs. They underestimate our efforts. UN gives more attention and power to local NGOs that are providing services.” Another local respondent said, “I feel we do not have space, we do not have a voice.” Another explained, “I am the director and I cannot attend biweekly meetings. It’s too much...It’s all about ‘their plan’ like the 16 days of activism. They just want to share the plan. [It is] not about us and what we need. [It is] about putting us in ‘their plan.’”

However, there are occasionally hopeful signs that the GBV Sub-Cluster is taking steps to be more inclusive. A local respondent shared, “Now the GBV Sub-Cluster meetings are in Arabic. They used to be in English. Big humanitarian meetings were in English so it was clear they did not want to have NGOs there. They were invited only; they did not translate. Now they have translation services for big meetings. NGOs have big capacity; the issue is language. Things are better now. People are more active.”
OTHER HARMFUL DYNAMICS WITHIN THE GBV SUB-CLUSTER

Local respondents were the only group to discuss other negative unintended consequences arising from GBV Sub-Cluster dynamics. For example, competition within the Sub-Cluster was seen as limiting the impact that organizations can have. One local respondent explained, “This is unhealthy competition but we can have healthy competition. [We] need to share information without fear and work with them and make an impact together. Right now, I am worried if I say what I am doing, they will take my issues. Thousands of people are suffering. If I am doing work in location A, why come to location A and do work? Go to location B; there is no one providing any services in location B. Why do you come to where I am? So many places are underserved.”

Respondents also mentioned friction created between government and civil society. A local respondent shared, “The INGOs and UN community cuts civil society out. They will meet with government without them or not invite them; they are cut out. Civil society needs to be given an invite and a seat. The INGOs and UN need to be a bridge to support civil society.” Another local respondent said, “UNFPA thinks they are smart by having meetings at [the government counterpart] because this is the government office. But this is not smart. Local organizations can’t talk about the government there.”

Finally, respondents described how difficult it can be for some local actors to participate in the GBV Sub-Cluster when it requires pulling their limited staff from implementation work. A local respondent said, “Many WLOs are small and it is the director who goes to the Sub-Cluster meetings or maybe one person pulled from the field to attend national meetings. It can be too much running around.” Another local respondent said, “You see actors at the meeting but they are not in the field. We are not increasing capacity to respond. There are 30 to 50 local actors at meetings, but a huge gap as there are few on the ground.”

INTENT OF NEW ENTRANTS TO THE GBV SUB-CLUSTER

The intent – or motivation – of those organizations newly entering into the GBV Sub-Cluster was viewed by local respondents as a barrier to localization and by global and GBV Sub-Cluster respondents as a mixed barrier and driver. Respondents pointed to powerful, male-led NNGOs entering the space who are perceived to be driven only by funding opportunities and not by mandate or a desire to make meaningful impact. An international respondent explained, “They are based on ‘super market’ only, donor mentality. They have no real concept of gender sensitivity and gender issues.” Another international respondent said, “There are now 16,000 organizations in Yemen, a huge number. Many came because of the conflict. They think they can get rich.” Another said, “GBV SC has been turned into money machines. They are seen more as money machines than coordination mechanisms. This is a perception issue. Once you set an expectation you cannot bring that expectation back down.” A local respondent added, “There is a big market; there is money and they are entering not because they have good intentions. There is a lack of genuine intentions to contribute to humanitarian work.”

ENVIRONMENTS OF TRUST, INCLUSION, AND SUPPORT

All respondent groups identified an environment of inclusion, trust and support within the GBV Sub-Cluster as a driver of localization. A local respondent said, “The Syrian GBV specialists feel as a family with all GBV Sub-Cluster members.” An international respondent stated, “The task team [on localization] is a great step. I am convinced NGOs add value to the cluster.”

Respondents highlighted ways in which the GBV Sub-Cluster either is currently or could be supportive of empowerment, shared learning, coaching, and mentoring. An international respondent noted, “[The] GBV Sub-Cluster empowers local organizations more than any other sector.” Another international respondent said, “It is about hand holding, building capacity and confidence, lowering barriers for competition.” Some of these drivers were more potential than reality, with respondents sharing ideas for how to make the GBV Sub-Cluster more supportive. An INGO respondent, for example, said, “We need to benefit from a harmonized Sub-Cluster. We don’t have control over organizations. Instead of training
we need more coaching and mentoring.” A local respondent stated, “INGOs need to build capacity. If there are capacity gaps, then let’s assess them and improve on them.”

Local respondents expected the principles of trust and inclusion to extend to the communities with whom they work. They view these communities as change agents capable and emphasize the need to consult with the communities in order to drive change. A local respondent explained, “Our project is for the people. The people are always thirsty for knowledge and to improve. We are there with them. They become aware and become agents of change. They then spread the awareness to other communities.” Another local respondent said, “You need to sit down with women in their homes, face-to-face. It is disrespectful – how can you speak about this if you have not actually spoken to the person who is affected by this? How can I represent them if I don’t speak to them?”

LEADERSHIP, DECISION-MAKING, AND VISIBILITY

All actors discussed promising practices in localization within the Sub-Cluster, including concrete and meaningful actions that were taking place in priority contexts. One such action is the inclusion of local actors in leadership and decision-making through the SAG, thematic groups, and sub-national Sub-Clusters. A local respondent said, “[My organization] now leads the sub-national GBV working group. We co-lead with the Ministry of Child Welfare. We gained knowledge from the leadership training. Now our NGO and the government can lead. Leading the GBV working group they rely on us. Localization paved the way for us.” An international respondent said, “The SAG members are local organizations, including one umbrella organization of 16 traditional WLOs. I am proud of what they have done.”

In some cases local actors have had opportunities to participate in broader leadership, such as the HCT. A local respondent shared, “I sat for four years as representative of the humanitarian NGO forum on the HCT and on the advisory board of [the CBPF]. This access and exposure to international and national platforms let me know how to deal with them and understand how to encourage them and get buy-in.” As this quote illustrates, engagement of local actors in leadership and decision-making positions can have meaningful impacts beyond representation on these bodies.
Local respondents and GBV Sub-Cluster respondents saw representation for local actors as a critical driver of localization and described ways in which the GBV Sub-Cluster can, and is responsible for, increasing the voice and visibility of local actors. An international respondent stated, “When the HRP launched and we asked a WLO engaged in the GBV Sub-Cluster to lead a presentation for the civil society side on the HRP. If we want to redefine how we talk about conflict and GBV, this cannot be a man. It is about opportunities like this, availing the platform.” A local respondent said, “UN OCHA got the report from the GBV Sub-Cluster and they saw [our organization] was co-leading the Sub-Cluster. This is great visibility. They then selected us as a deep field coordination body. This build huge trust.”

B.4 DRIVER: COUNTRY CONTEXT
All respondent groups saw the country context overall as a driver of localization. Respondents specifically described how local actors’ geographical access, familiarity with the operating environment, and knowledge of country-level systems serve as drivers of localization.

GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESS AND OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
All respondent groups see local actors’ access to affected populations as their comparative advantage in humanitarian response. In contexts where access to the affected populations is limited for INGOs and the UN, localization is greater and local actors have greater power in the system. All respondent groups discussed geographic access and deep field access, or access to hard-to-reach, remote, and rural communities and the ability to decentralize the response.

Access to urban and marginalized populations was also identified as a comparative advantage. An international respondent stated, “Access to marginalized populations, like LGBTQ – local organizations are best placed to reach these populations. They have expertise and it is safer for them to access.”

While geographical access and access to vulnerable populations were seen as drivers to localization, respondents also noted that this might push local actors to take on a disproportionate share of risk. A local respondent said, “Willingness is not the same as being able to navigate safety risks in a confident manner. We know how things work and have better
access than a foreigner...But we do not have the logistics and security teams; we have limited funding and security equipment.” An international respondent explained, “CSOs take more risks so they can prove they are different. Access and ability to take on safety risks is their comparative advantage. I think this is a big issue though for CSOs. They don’t realize they are accepting more and more risk as systems push them to the maximum because the system does not incentivize risk sharing.”

Although localization is greater in contexts where access is restricted for international actors, when contexts change and access is improved for INGOs and the UN, local actors lose this advantage and lose ground once again to international actors. An international respondent stated, “At the height of the conflict, when access was limited in Mosul and Kirkuk, programming was led by CSOs. But once they were liberated from ISIS, the INGOs took back the space. The power and influence of CSOs diminished over time and they had less access to funding. They were very frustrated.” Another international respondent explained that “partnership is not meaningful. CSOs are only called upon when there is no access or it is cheaper to use them.” This is illustrative of the fact that localization is being used as a short-term, context-driven solution rather than being meaningfully institutionalized.

Promising practices in localization, such as those reported from the WoS-Turkey Hub and South Sudan, were driven by the necessity of the context and not intentional localization. Nonetheless, practices emerging from these contexts can be used elsewhere to improve localization. An international respondent explained, “The Turkey hub is a great example of GBV Sub-Cluster localization due to the forced environment. Many INGOs were forced to leave due to Turkish government restrictions two to three years ago. So they closed down and the GBV Sub-Cluster onward has been predominately made up of Syrian NGOs with a minor presence of INGOs mainly based in Amman. We are close to 100% local NGOs. This shift caused big changes in how GBV Sub-Cluster was run and what was prioritized. This changed the strategy and workplan of the Sub-Cluster. [The] main two focuses became 1) ensuring quality services and 2) capacity building to ensure number one.”

COUNTRY-LEVEL SYSTEMS

All respondent groups saw strong civil society—robust women’s movements, viable WLO/CSO consortia, and feminist networks and organizations—as a driver for localization. An INGO respondent stated, “Civil society in Nigeria is very strong. They come to coordination meetings, yet, because of the leadership issue, we are not using their strength. Using them is much better, faster, effective...We need to engage them.”

All respondent groups saw local actors’ access and relationships with country-level systems—including the media and police—and resulting ability to sensitize and improve GBV service provision as a driver of localization. An international respondent explained, “We have a good relationship with the government and actors that work in GBV. We have a strong relation with police. They can protect women from honor killing. We have an agreement with police; if they [women] are at [a] safe house, we say they can come and speak but they cannot take them if they did nothing wrong.”

Linkages with and level of participation of the government in the response were seen as mixed drivers and barriers by all groups of respondents. In contexts with high accountability and trust in government, actors’ linkages, or perceived linkages, with government counterparts was a driver of localization whereas, in contexts where trust and accountability were low, linkages or perceived linkages of local actors to government was a barrier. This also held true for linkages with other groups including police and armed groups.

The presence or absence of female lawyers also emerged as a mixed sub-theme, while INGOS noted strong government ministries and buy-in as a driver. An INGO respondent stated, “Nigeria’s big strength is its ministries, government bodies have energy and fill roles and responsibilities. The Ministry of Gender is very active in the GBV Sub-Cluster.” Similarly, GBV Sub-Cluster coordinators and INGOs saw weak or absent GBV systems as a barrier to localization, undermining local actors’ power and access. An international respondent stated, “INGOs need to be strengthening priority institutions, need to get engaged in the policy aspect as GBV systems are not in place.”
All groups discussed the politicization of aid and the complexities of political engagement as a challenge. This is crucially linked to risk aversion that exists within the humanitarian system, described earlier. An INGO respondent stated, “In South Sudan aid can also be very politicized and ethnicized. International partners are very sensitive to this around principles of neutrality and impartiality. It is harder for NGOs as they may pay allegiance to armed groups to get the activity done yet there are ramifications. This prevents partnerships later and poses huge risks.” As localization has not been formally operationalized at the global level, localization remains highly dependent on country contexts, with greater localization largely driven by necessity and ad hoc initiatives.

**(C) MOST AND LEAST CONDUCTIVE PRACTICES FOR GBV LOCALIZATION WITHIN FUNCTIONAL AREAS**

Respondents discussed challenges and promising practices around functional processes identified as key aspects of localization through GBV Sub-Clusters: participation and decision-making; WLO engagement and access; access to equitable partnerships; HNO/HRP inclusion; and access to CBPF and external funding sources.

Many of these practices are not being observed in the priority contexts included in this study. Participation of local actors was described as meaningful or somewhat meaningful in three of the contexts, while localized decision-making was only reported in two contexts, access to equitable partnerships in one, and meaningful engagement or access for WLOs in none of these contexts. In just two of the contexts, local respondents felt meaningfully included in the HNOs though respondents in all contexts felt included in the HRPs, though only the ‘blessed few’ had meaningful access in three of four contexts. In three of the priority contexts, local respondents had no direct access to CBPF and in just one context local respondents had access to direct funding sources other than CBPF.

**TABLE 10: PERCEIVED LEVEL OF LOCALIZATION IN FUNCTIONAL PROCESSES BY CONTEXT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>PARTICIPATION</th>
<th>DECISION-MAKING</th>
<th>WLO ENGAGEMENT/ACCESS</th>
<th>PARTNERSHIP</th>
<th>HNO INCLUSION</th>
<th>HRP INCLUSION</th>
<th>CBPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Not meaningful</td>
<td>No – Blessed Few</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Limited access, IP only</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>‘Blessed Few’</td>
<td>No direct funding (consortium only), limited access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Not / somewhat meaningful</td>
<td>No – Blessed Few</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>IP only</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>‘Blessed Few’</td>
<td>‘Blessed Few’ Limited funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Meaningful</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>IP only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>‘Blessed Few’</td>
<td>Local org dedicated, Limited funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoS Turkey Hub</td>
<td>Meaningful</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Equal partnerships</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Local org dedicated, Direct funding outside CBPF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the analysis of the perceived level of localization in functional processes across each priority context, the overall perceived level of GBV localization was assessed as low to medium in three of four priority contexts. In two of these contexts (Iraq and Nigeria) GBV localization was perceived as very low. The WoS-Turkey hub was the only context with a high level of perceived localization. As discussed earlier in this report, perceptions around localization are driven by perceived levels of ‘intent’ – concrete actions taken to localize the humanitarian system by leadership combined with the realities of the country context and the operating environment. In contexts where local organizations have improved access over international organizations, the response tends to be decentralized and civil society and existing local capacity tends to be strong. Localization is hindered in contexts where international organizations have access, the response is centralized, and civil society is weak.

In Iraq, localization was poorly perceived both due to a perceived low level of intent to localize by humanitarian leadership and a constrained operating environment. Although the response is decentralized in Iraq, access has improved for international actors, which, when coupled with low intent, has led to diminished space for local actors. Adverse impacts of early localization, including the blacklisting of local organizations, has also negatively impacted perceptions of localization. In Nigeria, localization is also poorly perceived, with a perceived medium level of intent to localize by humanitarian leadership coupled with context constraints including a centralized response and limited presence of civil society actors in northeastern Nigeria. Strong women-led civil society networks and fora exist in the capital and across the country, yet these groups are not substantially linked with the response. In South Sudan, localization is perceived to be stronger due to both perceived intent and a supportive environment. The perceived level of intent to localize by humanitarian leadership is moderate and the decentralization of the response coupled with restrained access for international actors is supportive of localization. Local respondents in South Sudan were clear that GBV localization has been driven by proactive actions taken by the GBV Sub-Cluster. The WoS-Turkey Hub was the only context where perceived localization was high and the actions of the GBV Sub-Cluster can be considered best practices in GBV localization. Even in this context, though, localization is driven purely by context as there was limited access for international actors both in Syria and Turkey, demonstrating that this model is not replicable across contexts. Although local respondents described actions of the GBV Sub-Cluster intended to meaningfully implement localization, perceived localization within the general humanitarian system was poorly perceived in three of four contexts. In all contexts, local respondents reported facing systemic barriers in the cluster and humanitarian system.

These findings are summarized in the section below.

PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTRY-LEVEL GBV SUB-CLUSTERS

All respondent groups noted that representation of local organizations has improved, with most GBV Sub-Cluster membership comprised of half local actors. A local respondent said, “Local NGOs are included in everything, including decision-making, not just Cluster Coordinators leading everything. Participation is very meaningful, driven by both the context but also by individuals.”

As discussed above, however, meaningful participation of local actors is still lacking. In some contexts, participation is seen as forced, as it is simply a requirement for IPs and for access to CBPF. A local respondent explained, “The Sub-Cluster is 40% local NGOs, but INGOs make the decisions. They [NGOs] don’t have a role in the cluster system; they just come to mark attendance and leverage networks...The challenge is there is no knowledge of the cluster system. They [NGOs] are required by INGOs if they receive funding to participate, but it is not explained to them why it is beneficial.”
**ENGAGEMENT OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LEADERSHIP ROLES AND DECISION-MAKING IN COUNTRY-LEVEL GBV SUB-CLUSTERS**

All respondent groups noted that leadership and decision-making has improved. Global respondents noted the goal under Call to Action to reach 50% national leadership or co-leadership of the GBV Sub-Cluster by 2020.26

Unfortunately, many times these leadership and decision-making positions are only available to the ‘blessed few.’ Local respondents noted that this practice overwhelms these few organizations, pushing them to provide services of lesser quality to meet demand, and erodes greater movement building. A local respondent said, “Decisions are based on who has what [resources] at the GBV Sub-Cluster and SAG level. The one with the resources is recognized the most. Less money, less power. SAG seats opened at the national level does not mean our voice is heard.”

**ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS AND IDENTIFYING KEY RISKS SURROUNDING GBV LOCALIZATION AND MODALITIES FOR THE GBV SUB-CLUSTER TO ADDRESS**

26 Outcome 2, Indicator 2c: % of countries with a Humanitarian Coordinator that have a national-level humanitarian GBV coordination co-led/led by a national actor.

27 Currently the global GBV AoR does not have a SAG but instead has core members. At the national level, some country-level GBV Sub-Clusters have SAGs although this is not required. Three of four priority contexts had SAGs (Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan), while the Whole of Syria Turkey Hub did not have a SAG.

28 ‘Blessed few’ is a term utilized by respondents and within the broader localization debate to indicate the trend of a few well-connected or well-resourced local organizations being selected for all partnerships and opportunities, while the majority of local organizations are left out.

29 The term “double-hatting” within the context of this report refers to GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators who are filling that role along with having another job with an NGO and so are forced to share their responsibilities across these positions rather than being able to dedicate 100% of their time to GBV Sub-Cluster coordination.
All respondent groups discussed partnerships and access to funding as the main path for localization, yet respondents in three of four contexts felt that partnerships remain largely exploitative and unequal. Respondents discussed unequal partnerships as leading to poorly designed programming that places local actors at risk and causes unintended consequences. A local actor said, “INGOs don’t have the idea of partnership. They only use local partners because donors say they are required to have local partners.” Another local respondent said, “It is a ‘sexy’ element to include in proposals—the inclusion of a local actor. This is only to get funding. Donors like this and will give more money.”

### ENGAGEMENT OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN COUNTRY-LEVEL HNO AND HRP PROCESSES

Engagement of local respondents with the HNO and HRP process was mixed. In some contexts, local respondents reported being completely excluded from the process and, therefore, having little access to funding linked to the HRP process. One local respondent explained, “The UN and INGOs go on a mission to communities without us. We are not aware. This affects the credibility of assessments as they have no local actors.” Another local respondent said, “To give inputs for 2019 HRP, all members [of the GBV Sub-Cluster] were invited, but, for me, localization is beyond attendance at meetings, about seeing you are valued, your contributions are valued, that you can develop joint programming.”

Even in contexts where local actors reported improved access to funding, many reported a scarcity of resources and requirements, which placed an undue burden on local actors. Said one international respondent, “[Local actors] are only included in data collection for the HNO, not for analysis. The GPC tried to include local actors in the HNO and HRP workshops, but it is ad hoc, not systematic. Again, the larger issue is that local partners are not aware of the HNO and HRP are.” Another international respondent said, “Local actors are seen only as implementers. They collect the data and that is it. They are not included in the greater analysis or strategic process. There is little room to be part of the HNO and HRP.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOST CONDUCTIVE PRACTICES FOR LOCALIZATION</th>
<th>LEAST CONDUCTIVE PRACTICES FOR LOCALIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building initiatives, including individual organization assessments and capacity building plans (WoS-Turkey Hub)</td>
<td>Partnerships that do not cover operating costs (all contexts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV Sub-Cluster advocacy for improved partnership agreements based on equality and trust (INGOs)</td>
<td>No duty of care: Partnerships that do not include training or funding for security management (all contexts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero cash policy to avoid risk, perception, or charges of fraud (South Sudan)</td>
<td>Partnerships that push risk down onto local partners (all contexts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including local organizations in both data collection and analysis (WoS Turkey Hub)</td>
<td>Using local organizations only as data collectors, excluding them from analysis, or including them only for validation workshops (Iraq, Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV-dedicated publications covering needs, such as “Voices: Assessment findings of the Humanitarian Needs Overview - 2018” (WoS Turkey Hub)</td>
<td>HRPs requiring consortia that do not allow time for real partnerships, leading to coercion (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open desk space and coaching/mentorship on the HNO and HRP process (South Sudan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENGAGEMENT OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH THE CBPF MECHANISMS FOR GBV PREVENTION
AND RESPONSE FUNDING AND OTHER FUNDING MODALITIES

All respondent groups reported that CBPF are the main source of funding for local actor and that local actors have very limited access to other funding streams. A local respondent said, “NGOs have many strengths, but it is so difficult to apply [to CBPF]. The application is huge. They need to make it more flexible – due process and due diligence is a huge task.” An international respondent stated, “The biggest issue is within the field there is still little transparency around funding. [It is] hard to know how much people are getting through pooled funds and partnerships or other sources. Overall, CSOs have very little access to big donors. Very little progress has been made on this.” Another international respondent explained how the Sub-Cluster attempts to support local actors in seeking funding but still comes up against constraints: “We support them [local actors] always by sharing when we see opportunities and reviewing proposals, but the issue is the money is small. [The] issue is for funding from UNICEF, UNHCR, [and] UNFPA, the Sub-Cluster does not have much influence on who they select. They have their own partnership processes and criteria.”

In some contexts, access to funding has improved, allowing local actors to receive funding that includes operational costs to strengthen internal systems though there is still room for improvement. A local respondent shared, “People now appreciate the role of local actors and give resources directly. In the past, INGOs would partner but not give fair money, all was in kind. Now they give a budget directly, but we still are under the remote control of international actors.”
IDENTIFYING PRACTICES AND PRIORITIES FOR ENGAGING WLOS IN COUNTRY-LEVEL GBV SUB-CLUSTER PROCESSES

All respondent groups noted that WLOs are not engaged in any meaningful way and that no good practices are currently being utilized. An international respondent stated, “They [WLOs] use existing structures like schools. They do what they can to meet women. They are truly community-based. Most WLOs are registered and meet criteria. They just need support as they do not have specialized programs.” An INGO respondent explained, “The GBV Sub-Cluster has advocated to include WLOs, but the issue is there are few activities and it’s hard for them to participate…WLOs are rarely able to access HRP and cluster funding due to a lack of capacity and other funding. There is limited space for decision-making at the GBV Sub-Cluster and few actively participate.” Local respondents noted that WLOs that are engaged are the ‘blessed few’ that had access and strong capacity before the emergency.
V. DISCUSSION

The Status of GBV Localization

Respondents in this study defined ‘localization’ as a sense of responsibility towards their communities. Findings also suggest, however, that there is considerable frustration among local actors who perceive existing localization efforts as primarily donor-driver and inauthentic. In many cases, respondents described initiatives to promote localization as largely tokenistic rather than leading towards meaningful change. What is ultimately needed, according to this research, is for local actors to have access to funding along with relevant training and capacity-building opportunities as well as to be given a seat at the table when it comes to decision-making around GBV prevention, response, and coordination activities in humanitarian contexts. Engaging local actors in this way is particularly crucial not only in the short-term, but as a way to promote sustainable action long after international organizations have departed.

Overall the perceived level of GBV localization was low in three of four priority contexts. In two contexts, GBV localization was perceived as very low (Iraq, Nigeria). In the two contexts where GBV localization is more positively perceived (WoS-Turkey Hub (high localization) and South Sudan (medium localization)) local respondents still face systemic barriers within the cluster system and the broader humanitarian system. This is underpinned by the hierarchical and patriarchal nature of the humanitarian system, limiting the power of the GBV Sub-Cluster within the cluster system and placing little importance on GBV programming. Even in contexts where local respondents are satisfied with the inclusiveness and efforts of the GBV Sub-Cluster to meaningfully implement localization, perceived localization within the humanitarian system still appears low.

Patriarchy and Efforts to Localize GBV Work

Findings suggest that localization efforts in the GBV sector have primarily benefited men, driven by a humanitarian system that remains patriarchal and resists gender transformative work. Patriarchy also constrains donor commitment
and limits the power of the GBV Sub-Cluster within the cluster system. GBV work is neglected and underfunded by donors and the GBV Sub-Cluster is often seen as the least important sector within the cluster system. Findings also demonstrate that donors rarely fund WLOs and international organizations are reluctant to work with WLOs; instead male-led INGOs and NNGOs receive the majority of funding to support GBV programming. Patriarchy within the humanitarian system is replicated at the country level where women are excluded and cultures of impunity, stigma, and fear limit access to GBV services. Local actors still face severe threats of violence for advancing women’s rights and access and report incidents of SEA within organizations funded to lead GBV programming. Patriarchy within the humanitarian system and at the country level contributes to a lack of gender transformative and social norms change work, which undermines both GBV response and GBV localization.

Although inclusion and representation of GBV within the cluster system is improving globally, representation in the HNOs and HRPs is limited and inclusion is not always meaningful. GBV localization was poorly represented in 2018 HNOs and HRPs. In all contexts, meaningful inclusion of WLOs was limited and respondents were unable to provide best practices for engagement. All respondents saw this as a major gap, with WLO access not seen as a priority concern for international actors. Local respondents said that, although there are typically women attending most GBV Sub-Cluster meetings, representatives from local organizations might be the only women on their organizations’ staff. Although GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators and membership of Sub-Clusters are predominantly women, leadership of key INGOS and UN organizations and humanitarian leadership positions remain male dominated. This translates to limited space for women in response as well as limited opportunities for WLOs and female leadership in both local and international structures. Demands for local actors that can respond quickly and have strong financial systems means that male-led NNGOs, which are better connected and well-resourced, take up the space and are awarded contracts while WLOs are left out.

Concerns regarding motivation or purity of ‘intent’—specifically for these newly entering into GBV work—was a major finding of this study. All respondents discussed concerns that male-led NNGOs entering the GBV space are primarily driven by funding; respondents described this as being ‘business minded’ or having a ‘supermarket mentality’ rather than organizational mandates or ‘positive intent’ to work on women’s health and rights issues. All respondents were concerned about the safety of survivors and the quality of programming. Local respondents discussed the selection of male-led organizations and exclusion of WLOs as reinforcing the limited space for women in-country and reinforcing negative stereotypes that women cannot speak for themselves. Respondents also made allegations of sexual harassment and toxic work environments for gender/GBV staff within some of these male-led organizations, another indication that these organizations may be driven more by financial incentives than by positive intent.

WLOs tend to be the smallest, most grassroots, and least ‘NGO-ized’ organizations, which means that they are the least able to compete and are regularly excluded from participation and funding because of barriers like language, transport, and access to information. In contexts where the ‘blessed few’ are WLOs, this is not due to initiatives to engage and build WLO capacity, but instead reflects the fact that these WLOs and their female leaders were already extremely strong actors within the country before the emergency. These WLOs are therefore stronger competitors than others. Gender transformative work is not taking place within the broader humanitarian system, country-level cluster system, or the GBV Sub-Cluster.
Costs of Limited Localization

Respondents feel that limited localization undermines sustainability and erodes the power and ability to build movements. Local respondents in Iraq and Nigeria discussed how the switch from development to emergency funding without the inclusion of local actors erodes the strength of local organizations and movement building overall. Local respondents also discussed other unintended consequences driven by bad practices around localization including competition between government and local actors for the same funding, which can be corrosive and undermine cohesion. Respondents were concerned that the humanitarian system would leave the country, leaving systems and civil society weaker and with reduced capacity to respond to future emergencies and with local organizations who would be unable to continue GBV programming.

All respondent groups described how the lifesaving focus of humanitarian work can serve as a barrier to localizations and to delivering quality GBV programming. Linked to the patriarchy imbedded within the humanitarian system, this exclusive focus on lifesaving elements of humanitarian work contributes to a loss of emphasis on gender and a shift away from prevention, root causes, and social norms work. Respondents also discussed how culture is often blamed for limited localization and focus on GBV work and how male-led local organizations block progressive GBV work and services for marginalized populations at the country level. This is of grave concern as this study suggests that male-led NGOs receive the majority of funding to support GBV programming in humanitarian settings. All of these examples point to a GBV community and country-level GBV Sub-Clusters imbedded within and driven by patriarchy, which often emphasizes immediate access and short-term needs while replicating gender hierarchies in the long-term. The GBV community needs to further explore the trend of localization efforts that primarily benefit male-led organizations at the expense of women and WLOs.

Overall Perceptions of the Humanitarian System and the GBV Sub-Cluster

Perceptions of GBV localization are intertwined with perceptions of the entire humanitarian system and GBV programs. Respondents described a humanitarian system marked by hierarchies, inequalities, and inflexible architectures. Hierarchy and inequality are reflected in unequal pay and the creation of racial hierarchies. The localization agenda remains largely top-down. There is a lack of clarity in defining and operationalizing localization, which respondents believe signals inauthentic intent from the humanitarian system. Local respondents who perceived a highly localized humanitarian system perceived a highly localized GBV Sub-Cluster whereas local respondents who perceived a poorly localized humanitarian system perceived a poorly localized GBV Sub-Cluster. The GBV Sub-Cluster is not seen as a neutral or stand-alone body, but rather part and parcel of the humanitarian system. As localization has not been operationalized at the global level and remains ad hoc and driven by individuals, the responsibility to participate is largely pushed down on local actors.

The GBV Sub-Cluster was seen as a space of greater localization than the humanitarian system as a whole. Looking at all GBV Sub-Clusters globally, membership was comprised of half or more than half local actors, though membership did not translate into equal leadership and decision-making power. All national GBV Sub-Clusters were led by UNFPA, with 36% co-led by INGOs and only one (4%) co-led by a NNGO. Local respondents in three contexts asserted that even though half the GBV Sub-Cluster was composed of local actors they did not have equal voice or equal power in decision-making.

Although they noted issues that were unfair and unequal, local respondents also perceive inter-personal dynamics within the Sub-Cluster as supportive. Local respondents feel that international actors do not promote inequalities through ill will or on purpose, but that the dynamics in the GBV Sub-Cluster are a replication of power imbalances and hierarchies seen in the broader humanitarian system. Dynamics within Sub-Clusters, even those that have taken steps to improve the power and access of local organizations through actions like simultaneous translation and SAG membership, are still marked by hierarchies and unequal power dynamics. The ‘blessed few’ tend to be organizations that have IP agreements...
with UNFPA or other large INGOs and UN agencies. These actors seem to have more access, voice, and space within the Sub-Cluster. Many respondents were leads of these organizations and they noted the damaging effects. There was significant frustration with UNFPA for what was perceived as a lack of transparent selection of IPs and favoritism and this reflected poorly on the perception of the GBV Sub-Cluster as a whole.

**Partnerships, Funding, and Capacity-Building**

Partnerships and CBPF are perceived as the main roads to localization yet they are frequently exploitative and unfair. The main way for local actors to gain power and access within the humanitarian system is by securing partnerships and funding through CBPF mechanisms. Respondents feel that CBPF is unfair since it has stringent access requirements for local organizations making it very difficult for local actors with limited capacity and resources to access funding. Local respondents note that, in many contexts, only the ‘blessed few’ have access to CBPF because of these requirements. Risk aversion around fraud and the perceived inability of local actors to provide quality services aligned with humanitarian principles serve as roadblocks to localization and allow the system to maintain the status quo. Even in contexts where local organizations are prioritized, the funding set aside for GBV is minimal; meaning that overall funding for these organizations is limited. Despite this, access to CBPF in several contexts has improved for local actors, providing critical funding for operational costs. Without support from OCHA, the GBV Sub-Cluster cannot address systemic barriers to access and provide operational support to actors.

Although equal partnerships are seen as possible with some INGOs, the vast majority of respondents stated that partnerships remain unfair, unequal, and exploitative even in contexts with high localization. Local actors are excluded from the planning and development of projects and seen ‘only as IPs.’ This leads to lower quality programming, which can put IPs at risk. Local partners are often required to attend the GBV Sub-Cluster as part of IP agreements and participation is required to access CBPF in most cases, which can be an unwelcome burden for local actors. Respondents reported feeling trapped in a negative capacity-funding loop in which an organization needs capacity to get funding, but also cannot build capacity without funding. Local respondents were highly frustrated by the concept of capacity, which seemed arbitrary, with no clear definition or clear mechanism to determine whether or not an organization has been capacitated. Respondents reported that local actors are often accused of having no capacity yet are required to compete at the same level as international organizations for funding and then asked to deliver the same quality programming with less funding. Local respondents consider this damaging, unfair, and deeply frustrating. Many local respondents stated that they felt that international agencies wanted to keep local actors ‘in a low level’ to keep them from competing and taking up space.

Respondents also discussed inefficient capacity building models that focus on technical ‘one-offs’ and do not meaningfully build capacity. All respondents noted that, for capacity building to be effective, it must include supervision, coaching, and mentorship yet only a small number of respondents reported seeing INGOs execute such training models. Respondents who had found capacity building beneficial said that there was support provided beyond training, including funding and continued learning opportunities. The WoS-Turkey Hub was the only example of effective training that included a well-financed three-year capacity building initiative led by the Sub-Cluster. As decisions made by OCHA and partnership management between INGOs and local actors are outside the control of the GBV Sub-Cluster, it is difficult to manage expectations. The lack of transformative work, and the unfair treatment of local actors in pay, exploitative partnerships, and unequal access to funding demonstrate to respondents that the humanitarian system is not taking meaningful steps toward localization.

**Roles and Responsibilities**

GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators and local respondents both feel a responsibility to survivors and to providing quality
services. Local respondents view their roles broadly, assuming responsibility to communities and to long-term improvement of women's place in society. GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators on the other hand view their role more narrowly as gatekeepers, ensuring that quality services are provided to survivors in line with best practices. There was significant variation across respondents and contexts as to the perceived scope of the role of the Coordinator and of whether or not coordination includes program support and to what extent. One local actor stated, “Coordination is programming”; members of the WoS-Turkey Hub described the main focus of the Coordinator as supporting local actors to provide quality services. Local respondents described as a best practice a Coordinator who connects with local actors on a daily basis, providing guidance and workshopping difficult cases.

Differences in the perception of roles and responsibilities can cause friction. Local respondents view the aim of localization as fostering sustainable services that can operate without external support after the humanitarian system moves on; therefore, they see coordination as inextricably linked to capacity building and service provision. GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators see capacity building as their responsibility, but also believe that meaningful localization must be driven by all stakeholders, including INGOs, the UN, and donors. Coordinators discussed the difficulty in managing expectations, balancing service provision, with inclusion and initiatives that expand access and build the capacity of local actors, with the limited power of the Sub-Cluster. Local respondents also noted the limited power and control of the GBV Sub-Cluster within the system, though they still see GBV localization as the ultimate responsibility of Coordinators.

Although the Coordinator is seen as a major driver for localization, current contracting modalities limit the extent to which they can drive this agenda. Coordination work is incredibly time consuming and demanding yet 70% of Coordinators are double- or triple-hatting and only 18% of Coordinators are dedicated and on long-term contracts. One global actor described localization as an add-on with no support, meaning that these tasks are often added to the Coordinator’s already exhaustive list of responsibilities. In reality, Coordinators have little time and support to drive localization. The demands of a quick response stands in stark contrast to the time required to build local capacity; as one coordinator stated, you need to “take a step back...go slow....and lower your ambitions and expectations.” For GBV localization to be meaningfully realized, UNFPA must ensure that Coordinators are dedicated, on stable long-term contracts, and have enough time and support to meet the needs of all members.
Contextually-Driven Localization

As localization has not been formally operationalized at the global level, localization remains highly dependent on country contexts, with good practices largely driven by individuals, necessity, and ad hoc initiatives. Yemen, which remains the only GBV Sub-Cluster co-led by a national actor (excluding governments), was one of two HRPs in 2018 that mentioned localization. This demonstrates the role of leadership as a main driver for localization. Individuals drive localization by setting the culture of the response, including the HC/RC, head of OCHA, and the GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator. Many respondents emphasized the importance of a supportive HC who took meaningful steps toward localization by creating a culture in which local actors were given a seat at the table. Similarly, HCs who do not value localization can be a barrier to localization. All GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinators appear to be very supportive or somewhat supportive of localization efforts, though there were varying reports of the scope of their role and their responsibility to advocate for local actors.

Respondent experiences demonstrated that localization is typically driven by necessity, not buy-in surrounding the localization agenda and real meaningful change towards local partnership and leadership.

Country contexts most conducive to localization include environments where access is only possible for local actors, and where INGOs and the UN have limited ability to operate, such as in the WoS-Turkey Hub. In these contexts, local actors have greater power in the system. This is not intentional; this power is immediately lost when access conditions change. Iraq provides an example where access was limited and response was handled largely by local actors in areas such as Mosul and Tikrit. After liberation when access was improved, local actors lost this space to international actors and many were later blacklisted.

An operating environment that is large and both requires and allows decentralization is also ripe for localization, as seen in South Sudan. Environments where INGOs and the UN have access and where the response is more centralized in one area are less localized, as seen in Nigeria. Respondents see the comparative advantage of local actors as their access to affected populations and their ability to face higher security risks. Best practices in localization, such as those seen in the WoS-Turkey Hub, were driven by the necessity of the context and not by intentional localization. Nonetheless, best practices – such as the capacity building initiative in the WoS-Turkey Hub and the decentralization and locally led sub-national GBV Sub-Clusters in South Sudan – can be applied in other contexts to improve localization. Decentralization is not possible in all contexts, though and even where decentralization is relatively high, such as in Iraq, this does not always lead to increase localization.

Opportunities

Despite barriers to localization, local respondents advocated for inclusion and access. Local respondents in all contexts discussed the added benefits of local actors participating in the cluster system beyond improved programming. Local respondents in the WoS-Turkey Hub talked about mainstreaming across clusters, as their organizations are members of multiple clusters (WASH, non-food items (NFI), etc.). They have been the only actors advocating for GBV who have seen meaningful impact. In South Sudan, respondents discussed civil society building as an added benefit; women leaders who had their capacity built through the Sub-Cluster were able to secure leadership opportunities in their respective civil society and NNGO forums.

Generally, all respondent groups noted similar challenges and changes needed to improve localization; however, accountability for these changes is lacking. Local respondents described greater urgency for global- and country-level commitment as they see the impact of poor GBV localization in harmful, unsustainable programming and the erosion of women’s movement building. It is clear that localization must be operationalized at the global level and concrete actions are needed at the field level. Currently, the ad hoc and context-driven nature of localization is not successfully achieving meaningful change, but is instead maintaining the status quo.

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30 The other context to mention localization in the 2018 HRP was Nigeria
VI. LIMITATIONS

One potential limitation of this study was the framing of the research question as priorities and ways forward for GBV localization through cluster-coordination structures, specifically the country-level GBV Sub-Cluster. Although this was necessary since the Localization Task Team of the GBV AoR conducted the study, this research question in essence provides a solution for GBV localization without allowing for alternative solutions outside of the cluster system. This limits critiques of the humanitarian system’s ability to serve as a vehicle for localization. This is particularly concerning, as the localization agenda and subsequent debate has been perceived as a top-down endeavor driven at the global level by the humanitarian system with limited input and control from local actors, a sentiment that was shared by some of the respondents in this study.

Another potential limitation was the small sample size and the sampling methods for this study. Findings were also limited since no field visits—and therefore observation of GBV Sub-Cluster dynamics—were possible. It is important to note that local organizations are not homogenous; a limited number of local organizations with diverse structures and mandates were included in this study and are by no means representative of the views of the local community or the entirety of local organizations within each country context. The lead researcher for this study was a white woman who did not represent a local organization. Steps taken to mitigate the potential impact of this on the validity of the findings included a sampling methodology focusing on local organizations and WLOs, the use of Iterative Grounded Theory, and an analysis of overall barriers and drivers to localization beyond functional processes.
VII. CONCLUSION

Findings from this study suggest that GBV localization is limited within GBV Sub-Clusters at both the global and country level. Although good practices exist, GBV localization remains largely context-driven and ad hoc. Although there is a global commitment to localization, local respondents described these commitments as largely inauthentic and donor driven, demonstrating that current practices are insufficient to meaningfully realize GBV localization. There was a great deal of agreement on barriers to GBV localization across respondent groups, demonstrating that all actors know what needs to change. Localization must be operationalized to ensure that localization moves beyond theory and is executed in practice across all contexts. This requires meaningful commitment and buy-in at the global level. A shift in mentality is needed to ensure that all actors within the humanitarian system view localization as their responsibility and take meaningful actions to promote localization.

The GBV AoR cannot work in isolation, as localization within country-level GBV Sub-Clusters is tied to broader systemic localization and to the overall challenges of limited funding, power, and inclusion of GBV and gender dynamics within the humanitarian system. The exclusion and de-prioritization of gender and GBV work within the humanitarian system fundamentally undermines GBV localization. Therefore, increasing the space and funding for GBV within the system will go hand-in-hand with increasing meaningful GBV localization.

The GBV community needs to further explore and combat the risk posed by current localization trends that benefit mostly male-led organizations, limiting the space for women and WLOs in the response. These practices erode the building of women's movements, undermining efforts to enhance protection of women's rights and access in humanitarian contexts and supporting the root causes of GBV. The patriarchal, rigid, and politically driven nature of the humanitarian system coupled with the current GBV community’s focus on lifesaving response translates into a lack of gender transformative work. Without gender transformative work, localization will continue to reinforce and replicate patriarchal systems that exclude local actors.
Recommendations

Recommendations for all stakeholders focus on operationalizing GBV localization, moving localization from theory to practice by ensuring meaningful actions are mandatory and not optional. These steps, if undertaken in a meaningful way, will increase the likelihood of GBV localization across all contexts, not only those where it is driven by the operating environment or supportive leadership.

**LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND PLATFORMS**

- Continue to advocate for GBV localization by reminding international actors of their commitments and holding organizations accountable
- Utilize free online resources to educate staff around GBV programming and the functions of the humanitarian cluster system
- Support the building and strengthening of NNGO/CSO consortia and women’s networks and develop common key messages and a joint influencing plan
- Identify organizational strengths and capacity building needs and proactively discuss with partners
- Ensure local representatives attending and inputting into global fora have a space to consult widely with relevant local stakeholders before events and provide feedback on return

**GBV AoR**

- Ensure meaningful representation and inclusion of WLOs in its core membership
- Address political and logistical barriers that prevent active engagement including travel
- Continue to provide a global platform for local Core Members, including WLOs, especially through the Call to Action, by budgeting for inclusion in global-level events
- Ensure clear and timely communication of global-level initiatives and meetings are communicated to the field level and reach local actors
- Advocate and support the GBV Guidelines group for further field-level roll-out and monitoring of GBV guidelines
- Advocate at headquarters-level to ensure job descriptions, including GBV Sub-Cluster coordinators, include tasks to enhance localization
- Advocate with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the global level to ensure dedicated space for GBV within HNOs and HRPs and the inclusion of local actors; engage with country level sub-clusters to employ local specialists to support the process
- Include WLOs in the rollout of the newly released GBV AoR Handbook for Coordinating GBV Interventions in Emergencies at the country level
- Ensure the Call to Action target of 50% led/co-led GBV sub-clusters by 2020 through mentorship, capacity building models, and adequate funding; define targets and set a roadmap for WLO co-leadership
- Advocate for a mechanism within Call to Action to create a pooled fund available to WLOs, stating that donors can contribute as part of their Call to Action commitments
### Localization Task Team

- Promote regional discussions and explore funding opportunities for:
  - Regional capacity building strategies, including field-level pilots
  - Regional WLO humanitarian leadership strategies, including field-level pilots
- Propose criteria for WLO selection and a mechanism for including WLO into the Core Membership at the annual GBV AoR Core Member meeting
- Conduct further research on WLO funding and the impact of localization benefiting male-led organizations in conjunction with the Call to Action

### Country Level GBV Sub-Clusters

- Reach out to local actors, specifically WLOs, for membership in the Sub-Cluster and remove barriers to participation including practical, physical, security, and resource-related barriers
- Ensure inclusive practices: translation of key documents, comfortable meeting spaces, open-door policy for members, and support for local actors to present and take leadership roles (and to discuss when funding limits this possibility)
- Hold yearly or quarterly sessions for new members including information on humanitarian architecture, the principles of partnership, and the two-way benefits of participation in the cluster system
- Fundraise and launch capacity building initiatives through the Cluster for both GBV technical skills and operational support
- Utilize mentorship and capacity building to move towards local co-leadership
- Include local actors, especially WLOs and consortiums, in the SAG
- Include language around GBV localization in HNO and HRP documents and ensure a meaningful role for local actors in the HNO and HRP process
  - Ensure local actors and WLOs are included in data collection and analysis for the HNO and are given due credit
  - Support local actors in the submission of HRP projects
- Provide coaching to support proposal development, submission of the 3/4/5Ws, and participation in the HNO/HRP processes
- Hold frank discussions around leadership, decision-making, and funding
- Advocate at the country-level for GBV localization, specifically WLO inclusion, gender transformative work, and prevention/root causes work

### UNFPA

- Institutionalize the GBV Sub-Cluster coordinator role, ensuring that coordinators are dedicated and on long-term stable contracts
- Encourage Country Offices to provide greater education and outreach around new country strategies and provide transparent and open information around local partnership selection
### WIDER INTERNATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY-LEVEL SUB-CLUSTERS (UN & INGO)

- Prioritize funding for local organizations, specifically targeting WLOs
- Lead and support WLO humanitarian leadership trainings
- Move beyond IP agreements; revise partnership agreements to include operational support and capacity building
- Move beyond one-off capacity building towards capacity assessments and capacity building plans, including mentorship and secondment arrangements
- Engage grassroots women leaders and groups in data collection, project planning, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
- Ensure job descriptions include tasks to push forward localization
- Endorse the Charter for Change

### UN OCHA

- Create financial mechanisms to enable a more flexible pooled fund to be available to WLOs and CSOs
- Support meaningful inclusion of GBV actors in the HNO and HRP processes; ensure GBV is mainstreamed throughout the HNOs and HRPs
- Ensure women leaders and WLOs are meaningfully included in data analysis and decision-making across all stages of the program cycle
- Revise policies and procedures, with the input of local actors, to be less restrictive and more supportive of local actors, specifically through the HRP project submission and CBPF application processes

### DONORS

- Create financial mechanisms to prioritize funding for female activists and WLOs, including removing barriers to direct financing of local organizations
- Move towards flexible multi-year funding, building on examples of pilots undertaken by the sector
- Adhere to commitments under the Call to Action
- Adhere to Grand Bargain commitments; prioritize direct financial support to local actors with the inclusion of operational support and capacity building
- Require local capacity building, including capacity assessments and capacity building plans, in funding arrangements
- Adapt funding mechanisms and policies to encourage INGOs to partner with or directly fund WLOs
- Revise policies and procedures to be less restrictive and more supportive of local actors, specifically through proposals and grant monitoring procedures
- Invest in financial tracking mechanisms to disaggregate funding specifically going to women and girls and funding received by local organizations and WLOs
- Meet directly with local sub-grantees
REFERENCES


42. IRC. (2019). Where’s the money? How the Humanitarian System is Failing to Fund an End of Violence Against Women and Girls.
Annex 1: Abridged Key Informant Interview Guide

1. At the country level, the GBV Sub-Clusters supports various activities including needs assessments, response planning and funding priorities, developing Standard Operating Procedures and Referral Pathways for GBV efforts, and capacity-building you’re your experience, reflecting across these different areas, have you seen meaningful participation of local organizations in GBV Sub-Clusters?

2. When you reflect on those priority areas for the GBV Sub-Cluster (needs assessments, planning, Standard Operating Procedures, Referral Pathways, capacity-building) – where you have seen significant challenges or gaps in current approaches to this?

3. One key function of the GBV Sub-Cluster is to inform the priorities for a coordinated humanitarian response in each country through the HNO and HRP processes, which then determine what gets funded. What has been your experience?

4. One key function of the GBV Sub-Cluster is to inform funding priorities such as through UN Pooled Funds, and support Sub-Cluster members to access other types of funding. Have you seen any good practices of engaging local organizations to support their access to funding?

5. Although we know local women-led organizations and women activists are best placed to respond to GBV in emergencies, it has emerged in consultations under the Localization Task Team that the mainstream humanitarian system is not currently engaging effectively. Have you seen any examples of good or bad practice in engaging women-led organizations and women activists through the GBV Sub-Cluster?

6. In consultations under the Task Team so far, local organizations have noted that they are often working on GBV in those most insecure areas, and yet have the least support on safety and security management. Have you seen this in you work?

7. Reflecting on our discussion – to improve GBV localization specifically through the Sub-Cluster coordination mechanism what do you think is the most important action for the global GBV AoR and for country-level Sub-Clusters?

8. Are there any other challenges or good practices in localization on GBV coordination that we have not raised?