



# HARANDE

## Integrated report<sup>1</sup>:

### **“Political Economy Analysis for food and nutrition security and community resilience, and analysis of conflicts affecting food, nutrition and income security in Harande program area”**

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<sup>1</sup> This report combines two assessments conducted through the Harande programme: “Political Economy Analysis for food and nutrition security and community resilience in Northern Mali” and “Conflict study in Harande programme area: understanding the prevalent conflicts that affect food, nutrition and income security in Mopti”.

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## Abbreviations

ACR-Caritas	Australian Catholic Relief	LOA	Agricultural Orientation Law
AJM	Association of Malian Women Lawyer	LWR	Lutheran World Relief
ANICT	Agence nationale d'investissement des Collectivités territoriales	MAA	Movement of the Azawad
ANSIPRJ	National Alliance for the Protection of the Fulani Identity and the Restoration of Justice	MCCAA	Mali Climate Change Adaptation Activity
AOPP	Association des organisations des organisations professionnelles paysannes	MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
APDF	Association for the Progress and Defense of the Rights of Malian Women	MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Hazawad
APH	Action for Human Promotion	MPD	Mouvement pour la Défense de la Patrie du Delta Central, du Hayre et du Seno
ASSN	African security sector network	MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
CBO	Community-Based Organization	NEF	Near East Foundation
CISV	Children's International Summer Village	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
COFO	Land Commissions	ODEM	Office of Livestock Development in the Mopti Region
CROCSAD	Development Action Steering, Coordination and Monitoring Committee	PAGTV	Projet d'appui à la gestion des terroirs villageois
<b>CRS</b>	Catholic Relief Service	PDESC	Economic, Social and Cultural Development Programme
CSR	Catholic Service Relief	PEA	Political economy analysis
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	PSDR	Plan stratégique de développement de la région
DED	German Development Service	RECOTRAD	Network of Traditional Communicators
DRC	Danish Refugee Council	RP-SéFA	Réseau de plaidoyer pour la sécurisation foncière agricole au Mali
FAMA	Mali Armed forces	SART	Schéma d'aménagement régional du territoire
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FGD	Focus Groups Discussions	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
FLM	Macina Liberation Front	WFP	World Food Programme
GAAS	Groupe d'Animation Action au Sahel	YAGTU	Association for the Advancement of Women (from the Dogon <i>Yam Giribolo Tumo</i> )
GATIA	Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés		
GDRN	Decentralized Management Network of Natural Resources in the 5th Region		
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit		
HCUA	High Council for the Unity of Azawad		
KFW	German Development Bank		
KII	Key Informant Interviews		

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## Executive summary:

The major findings of this twofold study firstly highlight peaceful as well as contentious coexistence between formal institutions put in place with decentralization and informal and customary institutions managing resources essential to food and nutrition security. Stemming from a centuries-old tradition based on the right of the first occupant, the paramount importance of lineage and family, strict intra-community differentiation of socio-professional categories both in the management of pastoral resources and fisheries in Delta flooded areas and farming in dry areas, these customary institutions are still greatly relevant and legitimate in the eyes of the different communities today. Conversely, these communities often find it difficult to grasp the legal principles and norms (State land domain, local communities' responsibilities, local governance, the role of deconcentrated State officials etc.) supporting local governments' role in resource management. This overlap between customary and positive laws often triggers tensions between communities and networks involved in farming, livestock breeding and fishery exploitation, tending to fuel and intensify century-old conflicts opposing the different communities in Mopti. Priority to agriculture-oriented policies at the expense of pastoralism during the decentralisation process has triggered intra- and inter-communal tensions, causing in particular the emergence of new power relations within communities involved in resource exploitation, especially within the Fulani community where domination between pastoral and farming populations has been changing. Arising from such dynamics, current conflicts in Mopti are mostly related to the technical and operational conditions of resource exploitation as well as the difficulties met in defining and delineating the agro-pastoral area. Resource conflicts impact food security as they accelerate youth migration rates and rural exodus, undermine local production capacities and cause lower yields and drop in incomes. Though traditional mechanisms are still deemed most legitimate, it appears that populations almost systematically resort to judicial institutions in settling structural resources management disputes despite the fact that they are bound to be mistrustful of the judiciary system. Moreover, the increasing concern over the expansion of the conflict that erupted in Northern Mali in 2012 is increasingly being felt in Mopti, especially in Youwarou and Tenenkou and to a slightly lesser extent, in

the district of Douentza, where the security situation is very volatile due to massive quantities of small arms in circulation and their use during intra- or inter-communal clashes, competition around food aid, movements increasingly hampered during agricultural fairs because of attacks by armed gangs or the emergence of new jihadist and politico-military groups. Consequently, the implementation of the Harande Program should be guided by the socio-cultural specificities of the target areas and should take into account the customary conflict management mechanisms as well as those promoted by civil society organizations which are the most validated by populations in the region of Mopti.

## Background and methodology

Though their region is endowed with substantial water, soil and vegetation resources, populations of Mopti are still among the poorest in Mali. Aggravated poverty in the area is due to several factors including:

- low access to basic social services such as education, extension, healthcare and potable water;
- low productivity of agricultural lands and low level of production;
- lack of equipment for producers and difficult access to agricultural inputs;
- ecosystems degradation due to anarchic deforestation, abusive tree felling, bush fires and poaching;
- poor farming and fishing practices;
- overgrazing and poor management of pastoral areas; and
- isolation of the zone due to lack of roads.

Such indicators are compounded by structural and very old conflicts related to access to and management of resources essential for food security (agricultural lands, pastures, fisheries). Combined with the impacts of the violent conflict prevailing in the northern part of the country since 2012 with increasing backlashes in the central part of the country, these factors are increasingly contributing to social disintegration and a breakdown of solidarity structures. Bearing in mind the various challenges and threats on resources and populations survival, local communities and governments assisted by partners such as the Harande Program, have engaged actions aimed at supporting people's access to resources

essential to food and nutrition security and to wealth creation opportunities in the region of Mopti.

Harande is a USAID Title II Development Food Assistance funded program aimed at improving food, nutrition, and income security to 310,855 vulnerable household members by 2020 in four districts (Cercles) of Mopti region: Youwarou, Tenenkou, Bandiagara and Douentza (region of Mopti)<sup>2</sup>. The program uses an integrated approach to deliver five inter-related purposes to holistically address the needs of target beneficiaries and their households in 290 villages (communities) from across target districts: Strengthening Human Capital (P1); Diversifying and Improving Livelihoods (P2); Climate Change Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction (P3); Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (P4); and Social Accountability and Governance (P5). To ensure a thorough understanding of what prevails in the four identified districts, the Harande program initiated the two following studies:

- Firstly, a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of food and nutrition security in the region of Mopti, expected to boost existing knowledge and learning on potential avenues and strategies for enhancing the impact of development policies (mainly food and nutrition security programming focused on building community resilience) on local and national efforts for the stabilization and pacification of northern Mali.
- Secondly, a conflict analysis providing an understanding of the prevalent conflicts that affect food, nutrition and income security in the Mopti region, both the long-standing agro-pastoral conflicts which have been a key driving factor of the recurrent conflicts in Northern Mali,

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<sup>2</sup>A 6-member consortium led by CARE International in Mali implements the programme including CARE, Save the Children (SC), Helen Keller International (HKI), YAGTU, Sahel-Eco and GRAT.

<sup>3</sup> The twin studies requiring deep familiarity with Malian local languages (both French and different vernacular languages in Mopti) as well as with local habits, customs and practices, Malian researchers with an anthropological background have closely worked with international experts both on empirical, methodological and conceptual aspects of the research.

<sup>4</sup> The hybridity concept provides a key input to understanding non-state stakeholders, non-official networks and non-codified standards, whose influence either competes with or completes the scope of intervention of state institutions and legal frameworks both in stable and conflicting environments. According to the concept of hybridity, the various dimensions of informality are not separated from formally recognised state

and the recent round of violent conflicts from the Northern part of the country since 2012.

A six-member team of consultants led by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) has developed an integrated and detailed methodology for the two studies combined<sup>3</sup>. To better understand the governance landscape as well as the conflicting dynamics and social stratification in the region (how they both impact power relation over decision making on resources critical to food, nutrition and income security for all), this methodology has focused on the complex amalgam of statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions, whose interactions in conflicting contexts have given birth to “*hybrid security orders*”<sup>4</sup>. Such an analysis of conflicts as well as of formal and informal institutions involved in food and nutrition security and community resilience in Northern Mali has drawn upon a neo-institutionalist theoretical framework, referring both to historical and sociological neo-institutionalism that defines institutions as sets of formal and informal rules, customs, habits and routines determining decision-making and power distribution in a given society<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, the analysis has focused on the continuing historical transformations of conflicts and food security and resilience in Northern Mali as well as the multiform ways in which the Malian state and informal norms, actors and networks overlap, interrelate, and interpenetrate at complex levels.

The research has aimed to provide answers to the two following questions:

- How do power relations between conventional and unconventional actors and networks interacting within formal and informal institutions influence the evolution of current

institutions, and indeed, acquire significance through their conflicting or cooperative interactions with the latter.

<sup>5</sup> Thus, formal institutions are institutions with boundaries, authority structures and ways of working mostly codified by officially recognised sets of rules, regulations and standards. They correspond to the rational Weberian ideal-type of officially and legally-established rules, norms and standards (including constitutions, laws, decrees, property rights, charters, organisational blueprints, administrative, organisational and bureaucratic structures like ministries, legislatures, rule of law institutions or political parties). Informal institutions are predominantly structured around implicit practices, rules, social understandings, and interactive networks as well as socially sanctioned norms of behaviour (attitudes, taboos, conventions, customs, traditions etc.) — relying on expected reciprocity, neither officially established nor codified, though commonly and widely accepted as legitimate.

active conflicts and resource governance in Mopti region?

- How do individuals, households and communities perceive the impact of violent conflicts and authority contestation on Northern Mali socio-political relationships as well access to critical resources?

Two desk studies were conducted to review recent literature on the on-going active conflict in Northern and Central Mali on the one hand; and on Political economy analysis for food and nutrition security on the other hand. The first section of this report presents an integrated analysis of both literature reviews with an emphasis on power relations between conventional and unconventional actors and networks interacting within formal and informal institutions that do influence current active conflicts as well as resource governance in the Mopti region. Concurrently, a preparatory workshop was held in Ségou, during which some activities were initiated: selection of target sites for the field survey, drawing-up of research questionnaires, elaboration of FGD (Focus Group Discussions) and KII (Key Informant Interviews) guides as well as the definition of processes (dates, communication protocols, composition of research teams). Security, accessibility and relevance of research sites were duly taken into account. Primary data were collected using pre-designed and validated data collection instruments<sup>6</sup> with Harande team:

- Qualitative data collection targeted key leaders in both the informal and formal governance positions in each of the sites under investigation. Semi-structured interviews with Harande staff and other development partners (such as State representatives, international partners, donors or research institutes) were carried out in Bamako. Field research was conducted in the four Harande targeted districts: Youwarou, Tenenkou, Bandiagara, and Douentza. For each target village in the Bandiagara and Douentza districts, the researchers conducted six KII and organized six FGD. Interviewees included representatives of decentralized authorities (villages, communes,

districts and region), the central administration (the Prefets and other deconcentrated State officials) as well as professional corporations. Were equally included representatives of civil society organizations (NGOs and CBOs), traditional and other customary leaders. FGD's had a mixed composition, including about 10 participants at least and 15 at most. Gender and age balance were equally taken into account. The security situation being very volatile in the Youmarou and Tenenkou districts, it was decided that no researcher would be deployed in those areas and that research would rely on Harande staff living in the villages/communes under consideration who served as the interface for a Malian researcher and collected data for him. All narratives were conducted in the local Bambara language. Providing a synthesis of individuals', households', and communities' perceptions on formal and informal resource governance institutions on the one hand and on conflicts' impacts on socio-political relationships and access to critical resources for food security on the other, the results of this field research are presented in the second and third sections of this report.

- The quantitative survey was administered by enumerators from Harande team already familiar with the villages where the program is meant to be implemented. In total, 2058 surveys were conducted, targeting youths, men and women. The investigation particularly scrutinized the various perceptions on conflicts (their nature, stakeholders involved etc.), their scope (familial, community, pastoral etc.), their frequency and intensity within each locality<sup>7</sup>, the settlement mechanisms used (customary, legal, military...); citizens perceptions on the role played by local institutions in conflict management (equity, efficiency, flexibility and durability), the impact of conflicts on safety and security of communities and families, on inter-community co-existence as well as food and nutrition security, on relations

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<sup>6</sup> The research team came up against a certain number of difficulties. These especially include short time allocated for field research (six days) and rampant insecurity that made it impossible to conduct the research in the districts of Youwarou and Tenenkou in good conditions. In addition, even if very welcome most of the time; researchers were confronted with

reluctance in some visited localities due to the climate of fear created by the present security situation.

<sup>7</sup> Recurrent conflicts such as agro-pastoral disputes and sporadic/violent conflicts were differentiated.

between neighboring communities and clans. The analysis of the survey is presented in the third section of the report.

To help the Harande program efficiently achieve its goals, recommendations are drawn-up in the fourth section of the report.

## Section 1: Power Relations, Food Security, Resources Management and Conflicts in the Region of Mopti: Literature Review

The region of Mopti encompasses two agro-ecological zones: the Inner Niger Delta around Mopti, which is an immense basin covering a flooded area (referred to as “zone inondée”) with highly prized pasture lands such as the burgu grasslands (referred to the “bourgoutières”) can be found. The Delta’s connections are extending to the following dry areas (referred to as “zones exondées”): the Bandiagara cliffs, the Gondo-Mondoro (the Hayre areas particularly), the Gourma and the plain of Bankass (Seno) along the Burkina Faso frontier. Flooded and dry areas are ecosystems that sustain production systems functioning in full interdependence, as reflected by resource exploitation methods. The most important resources critical to food and nutrition security stem from farming (lands), livestock (pastoral lands) and fishing (rivers, lakes, ponds, channels among others). The exploitation of these resources is based on the three following production systems, which do co-exist and at times overlay one another, depending on the season: a pastoralist system characterised by cattle breeding, as well as agricultural and fishing systems<sup>8</sup>. As

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<sup>8</sup>This pastoralist system is characterised by double transhumance: internal transhumance in the Delta from Diafarabé and Sofara to the pastures of Lake Débo, and larger transhumance from the Delta towards pasture on land where floods have receded (Seno, Plateau, Gourma). As regards agriculture, dry cultures such as cereals are practiced in dry areas; rice is cultivated in flooded zone whilst crops are cultivated in Bandiagara area. Fishing can be divided into three categories: 1/Fishing carried out together with farming; 2/ Full-time traditional dam fishing; 3/ specialized fishing in river ecosystems.

shown by the literature review on “Political Economy Analysis for food and nutrition security and community resilience in Northern Mali” (*see bibliographical references in Appendix 1*), resource management has gradually evolved in response to changes in social, cultural, economic or political customary systems, ranging from those based on the right of the first occupants to the sophisticated Dina system established in the 19th century. Since Mali’s democratic transition in the early 1990’s, decentralization has been employed as a critical policy to manage resources critical to food and nutrition security. Today, customary and statutory systems do co-exist and overlap, respectively legitimized by “tradition” and legislation. On the other hand, the literature review on current conflict in Northern and Central Mali has particularly focused on the following trends: an historical perspective stressing both multi-secular trajectories from the Ardos and Dina period to more recent competitions and rivalries, which have regularly degenerated into violent clashes around resource management since the independence; former and current contestation of the central government’s authority in most parts of northern Mali and current competition between main Northern Mali ethnic/community groups; composition and political claims of main armed groups as well as their relationship and kinship with different ethnic groups in Mopti region; and mechanisms set to prevent and manage inter-community conflicts (*see bibliographical references in Appendix 2*).

This dual literature review shows that management of resources essential to food security is closely linked to traditional power relations existing between actors historically interacting within the following customary institutions found in every community living in the region of Mopti<sup>9</sup>:

- villages, known as territorial units based on “first occupancy” right <sup>10</sup> and where political power is organised and built on chiefdom and religious authority;

<sup>9</sup> Community refers to people sharing a language, norms/values and a same history. The main communities that make up the Mopti region include Fulani, Bozo, Dogon, Bambara and Songhai.

<sup>10</sup> First occupancy is fundamental in understanding resource exploitation by different groups in a same area. The first occupant has a vital space limited by natural features (mountains, stony peaks, rocks, trees or tree plantations) and referred to as the first occupant’s “customary property” giving priority use to his descendance.

- « lineages » made up of family units<sup>11</sup>;
- hierarchical structures organising domination within community groups;<sup>12</sup> and
- exploitation systems which, from a spatial viewpoint, have been historically structured around the “leydi”<sup>13</sup> in the Delta region and around land units based on collective property of farms in dry areas.

It is based on the above-mentioned centuries-old institutions that customary systems were established and codified to ensure efficient exploitation of resources essential to food security for populations. Yet, for more than two decades now, they have been undergoing far-reaching changes due to the creation of legally established decentralized institutions (local governments: communes, districts and regions), ruled by decentralised actors (mayors, presidents of districts and presidents of regions respectively assisted by councils) who benefit from limited legitimacy, and as well as new exploitation norms standardized by development policies. This had led to the emergence of new power relations tending either to escalate former open or simmering conflicts or to generate new ones (land, intra- or inter-community or leadership conflicts). Moreover, since 2012, the region of Mopti has been directly affected by the severe security crisis that erupted in the three regions of Northern Mali with rebel or jihadist groups, whose influence has also contributed in changing power relations between some categories of actors involved in the management of resources essential for food security. Furthermore the region has experience several climate related crises during the same period.

<sup>11</sup> Lineage is essential in choosing those who traditionally wield political and economic power in villages. In Fulani communities, lineage is structured around the “*suudu baaba*” (the Father’s House) and refers to a group of herders with a common ancestor. The family unit is traditionally essential in choosing the village chief (Amirou) who belongs to the first occupant’s lineage and the “*Jowro*”, manager of pastoral resources. In Dogon communities, the lineage is structured around the *Ba-ulum* in the Bandiagara area. There, family organisation is articulated around the “*Ginna*” (enlarged family comprising several units claiming common ancestry).

<sup>12</sup> Relations between social groups are traditionally based on a strict hierarchy, which is still greatly relevant in today’s

## I. Customary Power Relations in the Management of Resources Essential for Food Security

In the region of Mopti, access to agricultural and fishing areas was initially subordinated to pastoral needs relating to cattle migration between the Inner Niger Delta flooded grazing lands and dry area tracks during the raining season. This old system was codified under the “*Dina*”, established in the nineteenth century by Sekou Hamadou, who provided groundwork for social organization of resource management and defined statutory and political positions within the Fulani society.

### Box 1 : The Dina

#### The Dina

Sékou Amadou - a Fulbé descent - delivered its first battle in 1818 against the Ardos, allied to the Fama (king) of Segou. Having declared the Jihad and conquered the city of Djenné, he then established a theocratic empire which he named “*dina*” (meaning “faith in Islam”), governed according to the sharia law. He divided his empire into 5 regions, each managed by a military commander and a religious council, and placed under his authority. He created the city of Hamdallaye, which became the new capital. The general states of the Dina, organized in 1821 in Hamdallaye, laid the foundations of a strong state organization and established a code of natural resource management favorable to the cohabitation between the different communities of the Delta. Sékou Amadou also imposed the settlement to the Fulani nomadic populations and built a system based on pre-existing institutions but formalised the repartition of the delta’s pastoral resources into 37 “*leydi*”. Initially focused on the management of

communities. These include 1/ dominant groups made up of nobles exercising key political (chieftaincy), religious (imams, marabouts etc.) and resource management functions. Depending on each ethnic group, nobility is dedicated either to land exploitation (farming as in the Dogon or Bambara communities) or pastoralism as in Fulani communities; 2/ castes (blacksmiths, cordonniers and griots), which are excluded from politics and agropastoral resource management and endowed with important conciliatory and advisory powers and 3/ slaves. <sup>13</sup> Each leydi (defined as socioecological and territorial entity) was under the authority of a chief known as the *Djom leydi*, whose role was to manage resources (pastoral lands, cultivable lands and water bodies) pertaining to a given space.

valuable rangeland, the system also had implications on land, water and fishery management. Its structures had a proper structuring linked to the social environment, groups organization, lineages and families.

The system instituted by the Dina historically served as benchmark to communities involved in the management of resources essential to food and nutrition security in the Delta flooded area, but also in the dry areas. However, dry zones also had their own specificities, being characterised by agricultural resources exploitation systems structured around family and/or village head lineages. Those two exploitation systems linked to different agro-ecological zones have coexisted for many centuries, with periodic conflicts.

## 1.1 in the Delta Region

Under the Dina, the Delta region was characterized by customary institutions that have kept until recently their organized forms in pasture land management at the level of the “leydi”. These were divided and administered as follows:

- Jowro (or *Dionro*), also known as ‘masters of land and pastures’, who were Fulani leaders of pasture and herdsman, from the Rimbe nobility<sup>14</sup>. Each leydi was controlled by a *Suudu baaba* lineage to which the jowro was accountable. The Jowro’s function was entrusted to the eldest member of the *Suudu baaba*. Herders belonging to clans based in the Delta could freely access to pastures, according to the principle of reciprocity<sup>15</sup>. Non-native herdsman only enjoyed access to grazing resources after resident herders and had to pay a fee (“tolo” or “connji”) to the

<sup>14</sup>In Fulani communities of the region of Mopti, there is a clear distinction between Rimbe nobility (divided into three social categories, namely the Wehebe (political elite), the Modibaabe (marabouts) and the Seedoobe (nomadic herdsman); caste people (the Waalobe comprising the Nyeenyube (lyricists and griots), the Wailube (blacksmiths) the Gargassabe (cordonniers), the Labube (the boisseliers) and finally the Rimaibe who are slave descendants and thus granted an inferior social position. Historically speaking, land owners were part of the Modibaabe clergy, whose lands used to be exploited by the Rimaibe.

<sup>15</sup> However, the Dina regulated the priority order to access pastures: usually, first came the herd of the jowro, followed by the other herds ordered according to kinship proximity to the jowro, age and social status.

<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, the jowro could restrict access for outsiders’ herds, by regulating the length of their stay in the leydi.

Jowro<sup>16</sup>. With time, the Jowros saw their power growing and charged increasing royalties on foreign herds.

- Bessema (*diomsaré* or *jom sarré*), which were local farming institutions. Known as ‘masters of the land’, the *bessema* was generally a former captive of the Jowro’s family. Therefore, lands were managed and cultivated either by the Diomsare (in Rimaibe populated agricultural hamlets), or by Bambara and Marka communities through their respective heads of lineage to whom the Jowro had given the responsibility to manage plot cultivation. The Bessema’s power was quite limited.
- Baba awgal were local institutions in charge of water and fishery, managed by the *‘ji-tu’* or *‘ji-tigi’* known as the ‘masters of water’ and usually belonging to the Bozo or Somono ethnic group<sup>17</sup>. Fishing, stock breeding (both sedentary and transhumant<sup>18</sup>) and farming were regulated through a covenant between the ji-tu and the Jowro, giving authority to the first over water and the second, over livestock and farming. However, the Ji-tu was placed under the Jowro’s authority. The ‘master of water’ regulated collective use of water bodies by assigning each socio-economic group a point of access and exploitation of water resources. They were chosen by the family council made of heads of families of the same lineage, and generally headed by the oldest member administrating the fisheries on behalf of the community<sup>19</sup>.

The relationship between the masters of the land, pastures and water bodies was quite clear regarding the limits of their rights and powers and their scope (see *Appendix 3*).

<sup>17</sup>The Bozo are known to be a specific group: after having migrated to the region after the downfall of the Ghana Empire, they undertook exploitation of Niger River resources and adopted fishing as their main activity. There is another group of fishermen called « Somono » though strictly speaking, there is no Somono ethnic group as they are a mixture of Bambara, Soninke, Bobo, etc.

<sup>18</sup> It is important to make a clear distinction between dynamics linked to livestock breeding and those linked to pastoralism, both systems most frequently leading to confusion due to ignorance of transhumance peculiarities.

<sup>19</sup> The rules for clan and family management were discriminatory, priority being given to the family of the ‘master of water’, then to resident families and thereafter to foreigners.

These institutions enjoyed legitimacy through the observance of first occupancy rights, the priority and ownership to family sections for resource management. The land tenure system established by the Dina was not egalitarian as it was more favorable to Fulani herdsmen and Rimbe nobles. However, it laid groundwork for peaceful coexistence between groups with heterogeneous production and natural resource management systems.

## 1.2 In the dry areas

The system inherited from the Dina and prevalent in the Delta has been extended to the dry areas. It is based on transhumance and its complementarity with fishing and agriculture according to areas and periods of the year: during dry season, the herds would stay in the Delta from November to March before moving towards dry zones in the raining season according to norms and tracks set under the Dina<sup>20</sup>.

However, specific resource exploitation systems for food and nutrition security have existed in dry areas before the Dina and withstood crises throughout history. The migration of the Dogon dates back to the seventeenth century as they moved from the Manding Plateau and sought refuge in the Cliffs of Bandiagara to escape from Fulani invaders. Thereafter, the Dogon settled into villages of 500 to 1000 inhabitants, collectively exploiting lands parcels “*within sight*”. In such a context, the closest lands to the village reverted to the oldest members of families who would ensure property rotation upon their death<sup>21</sup>. Property rules were traditionally applied following the family system (the «*Ginna*» as previously indicated). Each family unit, the so-called “*manan*”, managed the production of grains and vegetables like shallots. They were responsible for collective cereal production as well as stock management. Cereal production was designed to feed the whole “*manan*”<sup>22</sup>, meanwhile virtually all the vegetable production was intended for commercialization and managed by individuals (with spouses and children holding individual parcels) or nuclear families<sup>23</sup>. Similarly, each Songhai farming unit developed a collective system

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<sup>20</sup> In the collective memory, the Dina applied from the Delta to eastern and western dry zones: both areas thus formed a sociohistorical space that was extended to the neighboring Burkina.

<sup>21</sup> Dogon social hierarchy is made up of “nobles who are landowners and castes people including cordoniers (*Djombé*) and blacksmiths (*Double*).

and each member (cadets, wives and sons) managed their own farm.

In Dogon and Songhai populated villages, the surrounding farms are usually part of the property of the founding family. Remote farms are therefore accessible to everybody and left fallow after a certain number of years. In this zone, farming production is achieved over two periods: dry and flooded crops are cultivated during winter season and vegetables during cold season.

Customary supra-village resource management institutions have functioned under the aegis of the land tenure institutions of the founding villages, whereby the lineage chiefs assist the customary land tenure institutions. Embedded in a structure of age groups, the former decide on the management modes by fixing the codes of conduct (social, economic and environmental) applicable to all users (autochthonous and allochthonous). Under the supervision of the village chief, the general meeting of the council of wise men proposes management rules related to farming and those related to resource conservation. Decisions are approved by the chief of cults and the village judge. Neighborhood representatives (the lineage chiefs) inform the members of their respective lineages. Under customary rules, once decisions are taken by the land tenure institutions of the village, the council of wise men designates youths for a strict application of the management rules by all users of natural resources, without distinction as to sex or ethnic group. Finally, forest areas are jointly managed by many villages.

## II. Breaks with Tradition Introduced by Decentralization and Natural Resource Law

<sup>22</sup> Millet is a basic food stuff in Dogon communities.

<sup>23</sup> However, land exploitation for vegetable cultivation by individual members of nuclear families varied from one village to another in the Plateau. In Sangha for instance, the shallot was cultivated by women on an individual basis, which was different in the Bandiagara neighborhood and the northern part of the Plateau, where women’s role was limited to transformation and commercialization.

With recent decentralization reforms<sup>24</sup> and agricultural development policies, new principles have been imposed on customary resource management and production systems, resulting in a disruption of the power relations that underpinned their functioning.

## Box 2

### Malian Decentralization Law

The decentralization process started in 1991 after the ousting of the autocratic leader Moussa Traore. Firstly, the 1992 Constitution has provided the basic tenants of decentralization (Art 97-98). Then, the newly democratically elected Government of Mali adopted a series of legal measures guiding the decentralization process:

- The decentralization law (Loi 93-008) adopted in 1993 provided a global framework by establishing regions, cercles, and communes as “local governments” (territorial units) entitled to manage their own natural resources. The law also established elected assemblies or councils to manage these “collectivités”.
- The October 1996 “Codes des Collectivités Territoriales” (Law 95-034) and the Law N° 96-050 have established the principles of constitution and management of regional authorities.
- According to the 4th November 1996 Loi N° 96-059 and the August 10<sup>th</sup> 1999 Loi N° 99-035, the process of creating communes, cercles and regions is expected to be “*progressive, consultative and participatory*”. From a practical point of view, rural communes were established in 1999-2000.
- The Loi 00-042 enabled the creation of the l’ANICT (Agence nationale d’investissement des Collectivités territoriales).
- Law 2012 – 007 (setting the code des collectivités territoriales) was adopted on February 7<sup>th</sup> 2012.
- Law N°2012 -005 modifying the Loi N° 93-008 was adopted on January 23<sup>rd</sup> 2012.
- October 14<sup>th</sup> 2014 Law N°2014-052, setting the Code des Collectivités Territoriales, was adopted on March 31<sup>st</sup> 2016 by the Malian National Assembly: it modifies the aforementioned N°2012-007 February 7<sup>th</sup> 2012 law and is meant to integrate provisions of the “Accord d’Alger” instituting temporary provisions before the elections of new councils for territorial collectivités<sup>25</sup>. The powers enjoyed by regional assemblies are now enhanced, as they have become designing and implementing bodies for economic and social development policies.
- Any decentralisation process transferring competencies to democratically elected collectivités territoriales has been coupled with a deconcentrating process, meant to ensure legality of decisions undertaken by those collectivités on behalf of the central State. In Mali, each region is administrated by a governor appointed by ministerial decree whilst the District is administered by a prefect.

## II.1 Enhanced Political Influence of villages

Strictly speaking, decentralization itself has not brought any change in local power share, as the designation of authorities has tended to legitimate the traditional political

order prevailing at the village level. Thus, the historically dominant role of village leaders has been carried on through legal recognition of traditional authorities: the village is now an administrative subdivision of the commune<sup>26</sup>, administrated by a Chief (from the French “Chef de village”) acting as a representative of the commune’s mayor in the village and assisted by a village council (“Conseil de village”)<sup>27</sup>. On the contrary, there has

<sup>24</sup> Reforms engaged during the colonial (abolition of slavery) and post-independence eras (lands nationalization) equally contributed in changing customary ways of managing natural resources, tending to modify the centuries-old established order.

<sup>25</sup> Municipal elections were held on November 20<sup>th</sup> 2016.

<sup>26</sup> The Code des Collectivités Territoriales stipulates in its first article, that the urban or rural commune is a local government

endowed with moral status and autonomy. It is in such a setting that the municipal council and traditional authorities are called upon to jointly manage the commune.

<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, chiefs of village exert a hybrid power, being at the same time the administration representatives but also traditional leaders. It is an administrative act issued by the administrative authority within the purview of the local

been no official recognition of the spatial organization of the leydis wherein farming, stock breeding and fishing were historically carried out in the Delta region.

Under the Mayor's authority, village chiefs and their councils have to ensure efficient enforcement of laws and regulations as well as decisions taken at the commune. They also play a role in the implementation of economic development measures (Art 63-73 of the Code de collectivités territoriales). Furthermore, village chiefs are vested with "powers in settling civil and commercial matters following customary rules", which strengthens their traditional prerogatives in dispute settlement. Finally, village chiefs with no prerogative in customary resource management have been granted roles in the field. Chiefs and their advisors must then be consulted on issues pertaining to the development and implementation of land use patterns and plans, environmental protection and natural resource management as well as land and property disputes.

## II.2 Overlapping Customary and Legal Rules

The decentralization process has been supported by the adoption of a certain number of texts that have deeply

affected agro-pastoral management principles, triggering social tensions among resource management players.

Today, major difficulties have arisen in the region of Mopti because of different rationales between legislation and customary principles (see Appendix 4 and table 1 in Appendix 5). In reality, the local population mostly refer to informal natural resource management agreements as well as to land rights between original claimants to a territory and newcomers that predate colonization. The establishment of rural communes in 1999-2000 has affected resource management dynamics in the region, paving the way for tensions between the newly established local authorities and customary forms of power which, in opposition to the authority of the chief of village, have not been legally recognized: tensions have particularly arisen in opposition to elected officials such as mayors representing the formal administration, and customary rulers like the jowro or the council of the wise<sup>28</sup> which, although weakened, have survived the history of legislative interventions. In his leydi for instance, the jowro still implements the calendar for pasture opening the crossing of livestock. These tensions have been all the more prevalent when locally elected officials are not considered 'autochthonous'.

### Box 3

#### Laws and decrees regulating the management of natural resources

- No. 95-031 law establishing conditions for wildlife management and habitat;
- No. 95-032 law of March 20<sup>th</sup> 1995 establishing fishery and farming management conditions;
- Under the "Code des collectivités territoriales" and the No. 96-050 law establishing constitutional and managerial principles for aforementioned regional authorities, local governments have been given control over management and protection of natural resources.
- The 1986 and 2000 Land Codes ("Code Domanial et Foncier") created through Order No. 00-27/P-RM and establishing the Code on Land and State owned Land devolve rights and authority over land to local governments. As enshrined in the Land Code, "vacant land without owners is State's property". Consequently, untitled lands are all considered State property, though most lands remain untitled and primarily governed by customary law. The Code "Domanial et Foncier" codifies the State's ownership of land, water and forests, and stipulates that customary users have usufruct rights to the land that they cultivate, as

government which legalize village chiefs after their accession to traditional authority: in its enforcement decree, Article 8 of June 28<sup>th</sup> 2006 enables the Préfets to appoint Chiefs of villages by stressing that the designation of the Chef de village, Chef de fraction or Chef de quartier is carried out in line with customs and traditions in force in each locality. From a practical point of view, one can see that the Chief of villages originates more often than not from ruling family descent. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the introduction of democracy in designating local authorities has jeopardized the historical stability achieved through lineage precedence, leading to

political tensions when it comes to choosing candidates for municipal elections. However, prejudices describing castes and slave descendants as social categories unworthy of managing affairs and resources of the community are persisting and increasingly contradict the meritocratic principles that are supposed to ground democratic choices.

<sup>28</sup>The Council of wise men is a customary institution bringing together the oldest members of lineages who can be consulted for their experience.

long as the State does not demand it. However, the law grants farmers the right to formalize their property rights. To some extent, those Codes have recognized customary land rights.

- No. 01-004 P-RM law known as the 2001 Pastoral Charter, is a piece of legislation regulating access to pastoral resources and entrusting substantial natural resource management responsibilities to communes. Law No. 01-004 of February 27<sup>th</sup> 2001 on a Pastoral Charter also creates conflict management committees. The adoption in 2006 of the enforcement decree of the Pastoral Charter has paved the way to effective implementation of the Pastoral Charter. Mobility is acknowledged (Articles 4 and 5) with respect to the agreements relating to transhumance. Livestock move on pastoral tracks. The role of local governments in pastoral tracks management, in cooperation with pastoral organizations and all the actors involved, is also recognized (article 16). There are set rules on the use of pastures (article 35). Any development project or program is called upon to take pastoral needs into consideration (article 47). Ways have been allocated on pastoral tracks to avoid destruction during transhumance (article 53).
- No. 02-006/ law of January 31<sup>st</sup> 2002 establishing the Water Code;
- N°046-40/ANRM (2006) law establishing the Agricultural Orientation Law (LOA) providing for the creation of Land Commissions (COFO). Some provisions of the LOA provide that *“the parties involved in an agricultural land case must submit the matter to the arbitration of agricultural land commissions before referral to relevant courts”* (article 79).
- Section 2 and 3 of January 19<sup>th</sup> 2009 Decree No09-011/P-RM set out attributions, composition and operating methods for these local and municipal Land Commissions (COFO), whose duties include, in addition to reconciling parties in an agricultural land dispute, playing a role in the elaboration of the inventory of land customs and traditions, contributing to the development of a local land registry, playing a role in the development and implementation of the local land management policy, and giving an opinion on any land issue brought before them. Local land commissions are familiar with land issues pertaining to a Cercle or to many communes in the same Cercle, meanwhile municipal land commissions only have competence for cases concerning one commune.
- The Malian Government put a consolidated framework in place through the February 21<sup>st</sup> 2008 decree N° 08-095/P-RM establishing regional, local and communal Development Action Steering, Coordination and Monitoring Committees (CROCSADs). This regulation seeks to encourage discussion between local development actors in the same territory.
- N° 10-028 law of July 12<sup>th</sup> 2010 determines principles for resource management in the National Forestry Domain (*gestion des ressources du domaine Forestier National*) ;
- It is also important to take into account the role of the “Chambres d’Agriculture”. The Chambre d’agriculture du Mali was created by Law N°88-56/AN-RM of April 5<sup>th</sup> 1988 and decree N°133 of May 19<sup>th</sup> 1988.
- The region of Mopti has two major strategy tools: -the Schema d’aménagement régional du territoire 2011-2025 (SART) and the Plan stratégique de développement de la région 2011-2020. Account also has to be taken of the commune social, economic and cultural development plans (PDSEC) whose implementation requires prior consultation of the Prefet at district level.
- It is also worth mentioning the Regional Conference on fodder banks (Conférence régionale des Bourgoutières), created in 1966, which is responsible for: supporting dialogue between the administration, technical services and farmers; determining the timing of transhumance; enforcing transhumance rules and preventing conflicts. The Conference meets every year to fix the transhumance calendar (dates of entry into the different leydi)<sup>29</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup>The Bourgoutiere Conference however failed to address herdsman and farmers’ grievance, since yearly meetings have serious difficulties to find binding decisions.

More generally, legitimacy of the decentralised institutions and actors involved in resource management is questioned by communities and customary stakeholders who tend to consider that customary law on resource management inherited from the Dina to be most legitimate, are more and more alienated, in particular regarding:

- Changes in land property rights based on first occupancy;
- Ambiguities often resulting in tensions over claims of property title between *jowros* or succession disputes between *jowros*;
- Partition of the jurisdiction of the *jowro* since their traditional territories (*leydis*) are now divided into different administrative structures over which they have no control;
- Disruption of traditional relationships due to State's intervention in local affairs, in particular attempts to remove a *jowro*, a position held for life and governed only by traditional customs.

The efficiency of the decentralised systems is also at stake, due in particular to:

- the deterioration of traditional methods of managing resources with an over-exploitation of pastures contrary to the traditional customs based on the complementarity between different systems of exploitation;
- poor use of transhumance routes, resulting in competition among stakeholders and
- diverging interests between customary institutions and communes which have led to the competing application of different norms on the same tracts of land.

In fact, without overlooking the role played by customary institutions in resource management, the legal frameworks resulting from the decentralization process have not taken into consideration a number of ancient principles related to tenure or complementary seasonal cycles of pastoral, farming and water resource use. This goes a long way towards explaining difficulties met in implementing some legal provisions and which have caused decentralised management of food security resources to be ineffective, if not dysfunctional. Such a context has often been referred to as an "unproductive dualism": transferring competences to local authorities (and instituting them at the expense of customary principles) has not encouraged better management of resources. Such

ambiguities have fuelled recurrent resource management conflicts. (*See Appendix 5, table 2*).

### III. Community Upheavals Provoked by Agricultural Development Policies

Customary structures in charge of food security and resource management have also undergone serious breakdowns due to the major agricultural developments that occurred with development policies. Agriculture, which was formerly regarded as a second order activity (in the Fulani community of the Delta in particular) practiced by low social categories, has gained much more importance and become lucrative. Essentially based on "food security", priority given to agriculture, this has immediately and directly led to the devotion of many grazing lands to rice cultivation. It also resulted in pastoral marginalisation, which in turn has increased land use conflicts between herders and farmers. Finally, it contributed to the inversion of historical domination in resource exploitation and access to agro-pastoral spaces.

#### III.1 Reconfiguration of Power Relations between Herdsmen and Farmers in the Various Communities

Reforms initiated with development policies have generally caused disruption between agriculture and transhumant pastoralism, as cattle rearers have frequently felt excluded in space allocation. Today, it has become easier for all communities to split back to farming thanks to increasing cultivable areas (perimeters) and the lucrative nature of the activity. Such a process hostile to the centuries-old interdependence between pastoralism, agriculture and fishing has affected pastoral incomes (which have been declining drastically) and social relations in the following way:

- o There are newly enriched farmers in the region, who have been investing in livestock breeding. As mentioned above, agriculture has always been and remains the main activity in Dogon communities. Nevertheless, the Fulani, who are traditionally invested pastoralists, have now adopted agriculture as

a second activity, pastoralism having gone through hard times in the region.

- Accordingly, some livestock breeders are now running big farms.
- Though livestock breeding is henceforth practiced in every production unit by all socio-professional categories, it mostly remains a Fulani activity as these communities still economically depend on it.
- Livestock breeders who are still active in pastoralism have been losing influence in communities. This is especially the case of the Fulani, most of whom have become mere salaried shepherds.

### III.2 Reconfiguration of Power Relations within Fulani Communities

The evolution and the fluidity between the different resource exploitation systems described above have influenced the existing social order and stability based on the traditional division of production functions, particularly within the Fulani community. Unlike some regions of southern Mali where Fulani communities have shown receptiveness to the political and economic changes that occurred with democratisation, political power in Mopti has remained the domain of the Wehebe local elite, while the Seedobe nomadic herdsmen have been resilient to certain crises such as droughts in the 70s and 80s that decimated their stocks (known as their primary source of income) and compelled many to migrate or diversify their production sources. Within Fulani communities of the region of Mopti, traditionalists who are great supporters of the established order have historically considered pastoral resource management as the right of Rimbe nobles, while the Rimaibe should be confined to the exploitation of agricultural resources for Rimbe benefit, the Diawambe to trade and the Nyeibe to ensure mediation and social cohesion. Particularly, the idea confining Rimaibe to agriculture (viewed as degrading) and presenting pastoralism as a traditionally noble activity has long been pervasive. However, the above-mentioned upheavals have brought an inversion in historical balances, which can be witnessed through:

- The downgrading of Seedobe pastoralists because of less favorable policies;
- More precarious living conditions of the Modibaabe: the evolution of agriculture has been

urging Modibaabe marabouts (who used to get their wealth and prestige from the exploitation of their lands by the Rimaibe) to reorganise themselves and find strategies to sustain their status and advantages without resorting to slavery.

- Rimaibe social and financial advancement. By selling rice, the *bessema* camp has been able to invest in livestock. It is not uncommon to find Rimaibe who have more fields and livestock than the Rimbe pastoralists. In some cases, the latter have instead become herders for the former.

Such changes in relationships within caste systems are intrinsically linked to the status of the jowros, which are traditionally originating from the Rimbe nobility. As shown above, for many centuries, the jowros have represented a powerful pastoral elite dominating land management in the Delta. However, they are gradually losing power and wealth to the benefit of previously under-privileged Rimaibe farmers, who used to be their bessemas. This shift in influence has led jowros to insist that bessemas are under their authority and are not independent land managers. This new context is resulting however in different situations:

- the Rimaibe loyal to the Rimbe elite (in particular to the *jowro*), do not own much livestock and remain as subordinate farmers,
- the rise of Rimaibe, which has over the last few decades become wealthier and more independent through the expansion of agricultural land controlled by the bessema at the expense of bourgou pastures controlled by the jowro.
- However, since the jowros still enjoy legitimacy as pastoral leaders, it is difficult to imagine a strengthening of pastoral production in the delta without passing through their authority.

These recent evolutions have caused reluctance and even bewilderment of traditionally dominant players (namely the Rimbe nobility) towards the State, whose policies are said to have destabilized historically established balances, complementarity and peaceful coexistence between agriculture and cattle breeding (*see Appendix 5, table 3*).

## IV. Climatic and demographic factors

## IV.1 Resource degradation due to climatic factors

Since the great drought of 1973, the effects of climate change have disrupted the ecological regime of the region, resulting in: lower rainfall; early recession of waters, restriction of the fodder banks that make up large pools of floodplains; consecutive redefinition of their intervention zone by each stakeholder; degradation of the traditional “*zone d’attente*”<sup>30</sup>. As a result, some parts of the Delta with floodwater traditionally used by fishermen have become too dry and are now being claimed as farm or pasture land for livestock. As waterpoints dry up, flocks tend to enter the Delta without following the traditional calendar that regulates the entry of animals in the area.

## IV.2 Demographic pressure

The population’s increase associated with both high birth rate and increased immigration from the Sahel regions has aggravated competition among different stakeholders. Traditionally, migration has often been a strategy to mitigate the effects of drought, particularly during low yield periods. The Delta in particular has experienced high migration to Southern Mali (Sikasso region in particular) or to neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire). On the the other side, land-use conflicts were exacerbated by the return of Malian immigrants following the Ivorian crisis in the early 2000. Today, land pressure is exacerbated by the return of migrants challenging the traditional authority by accusing the latter of not respecting their customary succession rights after their long absence.

## V. Networks Involved in Food Security Resource Management

Apart from customary and state actors, it is important to point out some networks (traditional and informal; formally constituted; clientelistic) whose influence on the management of essential resources to food security is real, though puzzling:

- Traditional informal networks including:

- o Initiation societies and powerful groups on whom it is generally hard to get detailed information. Hunters are not only the most famous initiation group, but also the network that seems to be exerting greatest influence on natural resources essential to food security. Thus, they are regarded as first guardians of both the community and forest resources. Though secret, they have wide and influential powers on village decisions, since they often comprise chiefs who generally listen to them.
- o Age groups equally play a significant role. Female excision and male circumcision are factors that create solidarities defining age groups, each bearing a name. The council of wise men includes the oldest people of the village. Chiefs are generally very close to the members of their own age group and this is where they choose their advisors. Age groups can be associated to resource management on issues relating to land distribution for instance: circumcision solidarity allows a chief to transfer land plots to people of his generation or to let them acquire fields on their own initiative. Witchcraft groups are equally influential as a network but the issue is taboo, because their members are generally unknown. Witchcraft, occult and spiritual practices are often associated with natural resource management, environmental protection and conservation.

- Formally constituted networks also play an important role. Networks are not necessarily loose and informal. Some of them (platforms, syndicates, and federations) have been officially established to improve coordination and synergy of activities implemented by the numerous State, para-state and private organizations involved in resource management in the region of Mopti. Professional networks play a significant role in resource management, for instance : the Decentralized Management Network of Natural Resources in the 5th Region (GDRN5), the platform of 30 NGOs involved in national resource management ; the Réseau de plaidoyer pour la sécurisation foncière agricole au Mali (RP-SéFA), the Société coopérative des éleveurs (active in the four investigated districts). In Mopti, the Fédération

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<sup>30</sup>Zone d’attente are areas where livestock is used to wait and feed before entering the Delta for pasture during the dry season, thus allowing farmers harvest their crops.

régionale des exploitants du bétail et de la viande; the Association of Professional Farmers Organizations (Association des organisations des organisations professionnelles paysannes - AOPP): a private body supporting national consultation between farmers' organizations in all regions of Mali and promoting a framework for discussion and collective action; the Coopérative régionale des pêcheurs ; The Regional Water Board: a private body created in 2006 to disseminate information, raise awareness and train stakeholders in the water sector.

- Clientelistic networks are also of great importance. The new configuration of power resulting from interactions between formal/legal and informal/customary institutions has provided a fertile breeding ground for corruption practices involving:
  - o A rent seeking bureaucracy. The State's elites and bureaucrats may use their power through various forms of rent seeking to exploit institutional ambiguity between the legal and customary frameworks. To open up a new livestock corridor for instance, a jowro has to pay off a number of State technicians and administrators. More often than not, the administration benefits from the informality of jowros who today need its support to manage pastures effectively. Each year a huge amount of what the jowros gets as pasture taxes is spent in bribing State officials.
  - o The judiciary system. Millions of CFA are spent by parties involved in resource disputes, thus far to cover lawyer and court fees, as well as kickbacks to judges. The courts' decisions are often ambiguous when judges have received bribes from both parties.
  - o Greedy jowros via arbitrary collection of *tolo*<sup>31</sup> and monetization of fodder banks. The yearly entry of livestock into the Delta is a particularly lucrative business. Herders pay fees to the jowros for each animal at the various entry points. At the entry dates, key politicians and

public administrators tend to claim their shares of the income. Because of such (increasingly unaffordable) entry fees and other levies collected by jowros, there are widespread tensions between pastoralists in the Delta. As regards agriculture, farmers usually gave a small portion of the harvest (about 5 kg) to the jowro as recognition of land ownership, but today jowros' ambitions clearly seems to be oriented towards a system of share cropping, which is strongly rejected by farmers.

- o Certain jowros infringe on the traditional principle upholding that the head of the family unit, the *suudu baaba*, acts in accordance with the mandate he is given, and even collect the "tolo"<sup>32</sup>.

## VI. Impact of Recurrent Conflicts and of the Prevailing Crisis in Northern Mali on Food Security and Resilience

Ambiguities resulting from contentious coexistence between customary and legal principles, development policies favoring some systems of resources exploitation, as well as tensions generated by the behavior of some networks (namely clientelistic networks) have intensified the recurrent conflicts that have opposed coexisting groups in the region of Mopti for centuries. This structural dynamic is exacerbated by the war-related consequences of the politico-security crisis that has affected Northern Mali since 2012: the district of Tenekou is undoubtedly the most affected area, Bandiagara being the most spared so far.

### VI.1 Typology of Conflicts

Six types of conflicts can be identified in the region of Mopti, varying in intensity from simple disputes to violent and deadly clashes or even disputes likely to generate into conflicts.

then used the proceeds to bribe the judiciary in order to maintain authority on the estate. The profound bewilderment generated by his attitude compelled him to be moving with security forces favorable to his cause. So he managed the pastoral area without reporting to any family unit, in breach of customary rules.

<sup>31</sup>As explained above, the *tolo* is a grazing fee traditionally imposed by the *jowro* to foreigners willing to access its pastures.

<sup>32</sup>Boubacar Ba's book relates (see *Appendix 1*) on a jowro who used his administrative and judiciary connections to set the family unit aside and secure preeminent right of use on the agropastoral area. He used to receive ten to twenty million CFA francs tax for the exploitation of those lands and to sell some areas to immigrant farmers from Seno or Gondo villages. He

- **1/ Leadership or Legitimacy Conflicts:** They occur when positions of power or hierarchy are contested within political institutions. Disputes over chieftaincy for instance are more and more politicized and instrumentalized.

- **2/ Conflicts over Resources**

These include:

- o Conflicts opposing actors of a same system:
  - Conflicts between farmers;
  - Conflicts between stock breeders or Conflicts between pastoralists;
  - Conflicts between fishers (fisheries conflicts)
- o Conflicts opposing actors of competing systems:
  - Conflicts between livestock breeders and farmers or Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers;
  - Conflicts between farmers and fishers;
  - Conflicts between fishers and livestock breeders.

- **3/ Agro-pastoral space delineation related disputes**

These are related to territorial divisions resulting from the legal framework, diverging interpretations of customary and modern law (especially non-compliance with covenants on “primitive property”), succession and inheritance, sales of land in violation of customary law as well as non-application of the doctrine of *res judicata*. In this context, conflicts are fuelled by overlapping principles of positive and customary laws.

- **4/ Conflicts associated with inter-community tensions**

Without considering them as such, it should be stressed that they partly co-occur with resource and agro-pastoral space delineation related claims, since division of labor and task specialisation are still often related to the ethnic origins of the actors. These include in particular clashes between:

- o Fulani (predominantly specialized in pastoralism) and Bambara (specialized in agriculture).
- o Fulani and Dogon groups also specialized in agriculture.

- **5/ Intra-community conflicts opposing members within same ethnic groups**

These are:

- o Conflicts related to the exploitation of resources;
- o Conflicts opposing people of low social categories refusing to abide by the customary verdict considered to be out-dated;
- o Conflicts between families;
- o Conflicts between generations;
- o Conflicts related to money, land plots/ residential parcels.

- **6/ Conflict prone violence related to the crisis prevailing in the North since 2012 with:**

- o Armed groups with armed robbery manifested by sporadic violence.
- o new politico-military groups, some fighting against the state and others involved in jihadist movements
- o Self-defence groups.

However, groups resorting to violence are hardly ever part of structured organizations (See table 4, *Appendix 5*).

## VI.2 Causes of Conflicts

Six elements can be identified as major causes of the conflicts observed in the region of Mopti (*See Appendix 5, table 5*). These include:

### **1/ Causes associated with conflicts between customary and formal Law**

- Absence of written documentation formalizing the recognition of customary property (based on first occupancy) as well as land tenure. Non-compliance with traditional land tenure practices with regard to precedence, sharecropping, tax, etc.
- Consecutive juxtaposition of traditional practices and poorly managed modern mechanisms (misunderstanding of provisions and implications of the legal framework that came with decentralization and national resource laws; and complex legal procedures).

### **2/ Technical and operational causes**

- Competition between different types of exploitation and farming methods on the one hand

and on the other, breeding and pastoral techniques encroaching upon one other (livestock wandering in cultivated areas meanwhile tracks have been designed for transhumant pastoralism) following periods of the year (during winter season especially);

- Inadequate agricultural, pastoral and forest management plans.
- Poorly adapted development policies, mostly structured around “food security” and thus focusing almost exclusively on agriculture to the detriment of pastoralism (*see above*).
- Lack of pastures in dry zones.
- Lack of farm lands due to soil deterioration and erosion caused by torrential rains.
- Degradation of exploitable resources due to climate change.

### **3/ Societal and community-related causes:**

- Redefinition of customary social organization;
- Dislocation of large families (nuclear and extended family unit; lingering tensions between families because of previous disputes).

### **4/ Causes associated with state governance deficit**

- The State’s failure to mediate interests competition or regulate access to resources (land, pastures and fisheries).
- Absence of Government representatives beyond urban centres;
- Poor familiarity of local and government law-enforcement authorities with modern law;
- Inadequacy of the security forces’ response to the insecurity outburst following the 2012 crisis;
- Lack of arms traffic control from State authorities.

### **5/ Causes related to the politicization of local issues**

- Politization of inter-community tensions related to agro-pastoral resources;
- Instrumentalization of chieftaincy disputes increasingly used as a political tool.

### **6/ Security-related causes**

- Effects of the occupation of part the region by terrorist groups coming from the North;
- Traffic of light weapons;
- Upsurge in Islamic proselytizing; and

- Increasing tensions between local communities (especially the Fulani) and the Mali Armed forces (the FAMA).

## **VI.3 Impacts of Recurrent Conflicts on Livelihood and Food Security in Communities**

Communities are strongly affected by conflicts and rampant insecurity which have:

- caused youth migration and rural exodus, leading to loss of the labor force;
- undermined local production capacities;
- reduced resources and decreased revenues, having effects on:
  - o *Agricultural production and stock breeding*: conflicts between farmers or between farmers and stock breeders directly affect their outputs. Indeed, the destruction of crops by flocks undermines agricultural production. Similarly, conflicts between farmers cause inactivity of contentious plots (being referred to as “no go” areas).
  - o *Food security and nutrition*: farm destruction causes low agricultural production with repercussions on communities’ livelihoods as they have difficulty in building up grain banks due to insufficient resources.
  - o *Revenue*: because of exactions and violent acts locally perpetrated by armed groups, populations have considerably lowered their participation to agricultural fairs where they used to sell goats, sheep and other animals as well as cereals to secure some money. Confiscation of stock breeders’ animal reduces their livestock and impacts their incomes.

## **VI.4. The Particular Impact of the Northern Mali Security Crisis on Mopti Region**

The region of Mopti has not been spared by widespread insecurity in the North of the country since 2012. Violence has progressively moved downwards to the central part of

the country, changing the face of the older north-south conflict – from ethnic lines to religious lines and with the appearance of Islamist/traditionalist groups.

#### **VI.4.a. Aggravated Insecurity**

Since 2012, the region of Mopti has been suffering from a growing deteriorated security situation. Violence has particularly been intensified over the last quarter of 2015, including criminal acts like kidnappings, death threats, numerous attacks on administrative authorities and security forces, assassination of people identified as informants of security forces. In particular, there is widespread banditry in the Hayre and Seno areas, characterised by attacks during agro-pastoral fairs, stock theft or even score settlement. All these have killed many people, compelled administrative authorities and locally elected officials to run away or simply resign from duty. They have equally led to the suspension or stopping of certain social services and limitation of people's movements and activities. Tough insecurity affects the whole region, the districts of Tenekou, Youwarou, Douentza, Koro, Djenne and one part of Mopti have been particularly targeted by armed groups. The current insecurity situation is also fuelled by massive traffic of light weapons used during intra- and inter-community clashes (as seen in Sari for instance).

This has resulted in mistrust and hostility among the population and has intensified traditional resource conflicts within and between communities. Moreover, the security crisis influences flock's routes and transhumance calendars, as transhumant pastoralists are compelled to change both the duration of their stay and their track in the flooded zone for fear of abduction and robbery.

#### **VI.4.b. Influence of Northern Armed Groups in the Region**

The region of Mopti was caught up in the spiral of the Northern Mali conflict when Tuareg MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and MUJAO jihadists occupied the district of Douentza<sup>33</sup>. The region is still suffering the consequences of that occupation today.

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<sup>33</sup> So far, this invasion has insufficiently been evoked. Two hypotheses have been put forward to explain why it has not gained much attention from the state, media and civil society organisations: either they had no exact information on what was really happening there, or the government –in an attempt to safeguard state sovereignty and honour, willingly decided to

The MUJAO initially carried out concrete actions with the view of reducing insecurity as they overpowered the most dangerous robbers of the region in order to relieve the population from theft and banditry. In remotest localities, MUJAO leaders distributed their contacts to people for any security need. This is how accepting the MUJAO was regarded by Gourma and Hayre pastoralists who regularly benefited from the movement's support as a way to protect themselves against thieves and robbers. To most people in Douentza therefore, the MUJAO was initially regarded as a movement that brought more security than violence.

Fulani pastoralists (whose livestock used to be stolen along Niger's border region in Gourma) were the very first people who joined the jihadist movement to secure weapons and training in its camps; the movement was rather joined by members of rigorous religious confessions in Songhai and Dogon communities from Douentza district.

It is in late August 2012 that the MUJAO started applying Sharia by imposing restrictive principles on populations of the Cercle<sup>34</sup>. This resulted in hostility from most sedentary population who found the principles imposed on them extremely stringent. Nevertheless, many nomadic populations considered those laws as appropriate and prescribed by the Islamic doctrine.

After Operation Serval's forces had stamped the armed groups occupying Douentza out, conflicts arose between those who had remained faithful to Mali government and those who had rallied the armed groups. These were manifested through denunciations on the basis of pre-existing tensions and accusations on certain ethnical groups, especially the Fulani.

In fact, the occupation of Douentza briefly outlined a reconfiguration of power relations within the Fulani community:

- Nomadic herdsmen whose prestige was declining over the recent decades because of the previously described pastoralist crisis and who predominantly

keep it secret to avoid bringing to four over eight the number zones held by rebels.

<sup>34</sup>These include women's obligation to wear a veil, the banning of music during celebrations like baptism and marriages, prohibition of alcohol and alcohol sale, closing of women hair salons etc.

rallied the MUJAO movement found their status enhanced. This is how shepherds for instance became special representatives of the MUJAO with key political responsibilities entrusted on them.

- To some people, many young Fulani living in Gourma joined the MUJAO –whose first jihadist members were mostly Fulani from Banibangou and Aballa councils in Niger- out of intra-community solidarity between Fulani groups (the Seedobe and the Toleebe<sup>35</sup> for instance).

Different armed groups from the North equally affected other communities. Many Tuaregs living in the region of Gourma decided to join the GATIA (Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et allies). Many of them are accused to have carried out attacks and confiscated Fulani stocks in large numbers. For instance, in the city of Serna, Tamasheq representatives are assimilated to the MNLA, which paves the way to violent clashes with other communities exacerbated by flock theft and banditry.

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<sup>35</sup> Toleebe Fulani are those coming from Niger.

#### VI.4.c. Frustrations associated with the Arrival of Refugees and Displaced People

Since the crisis broke out in 2012, frustration has been felt with the arrival of refugees and displaced people, blamed – especially in the Douentza area, to be playing a role in exactions and human rights violations perpetrated by armed groups. They are also said to have priority access to humanitarian aid designed for all communities affected by conflict or violence. When the Hayre locality fell in the hands of MNLA rebels, people of Douenza spent almost three months without support from the state or any humanitarian actor. At the same time, humanitarian aid passed through the Cercle to populations of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, giving the impression that there was no populations in need in Douentza<sup>36</sup>.

#### VI.4.d. Emerging Armed Groups

Since 2015, new-armed groups have appeared in the region of Mopti. These may include jihadist groups, politico-military militia and self-defence groups. But such a distinction has proven to be insufficient in making out the exact nature, the hybrid set of interest (economic, religious and ethnic) and even the actual existence of such movements due to their high versatility and flexibility, characteristics that tend to cast doubts over current classifications of jihadist, identity, self-defence and even civil society movements. Furthermore, the configuration of armed groups sometimes tends to transcend ethnic lines though they are claiming their allegiance to a specific ethnic group.

Groups engaged in the jihadist fight include the Katiba<sup>37</sup> Ansar Dine Macina and/or the Macina Liberation Front. The Katiba Ansar Dine Macina that appeared in early 2015, precisely in the central part of Mali and in the region

<sup>36</sup> Humanitarian aid now plays a major role in achieving food and nutrition security. To mitigate such negative perceptions, UNHCR current assistance policy aims at working alongside with public authorities to reach at least 20% of the local communities among the target communities.

<sup>37</sup> A Katiba refers to a Jihadist fighting unit.

<sup>38</sup> Kouffa calls for a state model similar to that of the theocratic Macina Empire under Cheikou Amadou. He used to work closely with Iyad Ag Ghali whom he met as both were Dawa supporters.

<sup>39</sup> The prevailing situation in Boni illustrates the ways jihadists have been trying to overthrow traditional social relations. In the region of Douentza, there is a centuries-old hierarchy disputes (nobility rivalry) between Boni and Djonna families. Pastoralists of the region are under the protection of Boni's chieftaincy, held by the Dicko family. In an attempt to change social relations in

of Mopti, has reportedly recruited most of its members within the Fulani community. It predominantly comprises ex-members of the MUJAO and former followers of Amadou Koufa, a radical local preacher suspected to lead the movement<sup>38</sup>. Kouffa's hot speeches denouncing customary land tenure rights enjoyed by great marabouts families (especially the Modibaabe clergy holding land use rights as described earlier) have found a favorable echo with underprivileged social classes<sup>39</sup>. In addition to repeated attacks against the FAMA (Mali Armed forces) and the MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) or even civilians considered to collaborate with those actors, Katiba Ansar Dine Macina has claimed participation to Sevare and Bamako attacks that were respectively carried out in August and November 2015<sup>40</sup>. Observers however consider that there are two movements and that Katiba Ansar Dine is likely to be wrongly assimilated to another active group known as the Macina Liberation Front (FLM)<sup>41</sup>. To them, both groups operate in the same localities of the central Mali, but pursue different objectives. The FLM is supposedly politically motivated and led by Hamadou Founè. It is said to be predominantly made up of Fulani herdsmen revolting against theft of their livestock and several abuses of administrative authorities and traditional leaders<sup>42</sup>.

Furthermore, politico-military militia have appeared in a post crisis context i.e. after the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement reached through the Algiers Process signed on May 15<sup>th</sup> and June 20<sup>th</sup> 2015 between parties of the Northern Mali conflict. The following can be relatively clearly identified:

- The National Alliance for the Protection of the Fulani Identity and the Restoration of Justice (ANSIPRJ) supposedly led by a young Fulani named

2012, the MUJAO created an alliance with Fulani people dominated by the Dicko family. The rationale behind this was to make those people attack the Dickos and claim their rights, especially on spaces. In February 2016, the son of the Boni Chief was assassinated. A September 2016 attack, which led to the abduction of the Deputy-Mayor who is equally from the Dicko family is also reported to be an attempt to demystify this chieftaincy.

<sup>40</sup> Though Al Mourabitoune (who later claim the attack) was the main suspect.

<sup>41</sup> The origin of that name is still unclear, but it reportedly refers to an attempt to free the zone (traditionally regarded as a pastoral area) from numerous looters and robbers.

<sup>42</sup> The mapping of the attacks comforts the existence of two distinct groups operating in the same geographical area with sometimes convergent interests.

Oumar Al-Djana. ANSIPRJ's modus operandi is based on armed struggle. The group (similar to other terrorist groups like Ansar Dine), has claimed responsibility for the deadly attacks carried out against a military camp in Nampala on July 19<sup>th</sup> 2016.

- The Mouvement pour la Défense de la Patrie du Delta Central, du Hayre et du Seno (MPD), which is said to have been created in 2012 as an expression of Fulani bewilderment. Since June 2016 however, the group has been member of the "Platform" in order to be associated with the peace and reconciliation process in Mali<sup>43</sup>.
- The Dewral Pulaaku group reportedly created in 2014. The group's positioning remains unclear and this shows the hybrid nature of the movements spreading throughout the region. Dewral Pulaaku was thus initiated by nomadic pastoralists of Hayre and Seno. It is formally motivated by defence of Fulani interests and prevention of inter-community conflicts. However, Dewral Pulaaku seems to be engaged in double-dealing as its leaders present themselves in a dual identity. Sometimes, members describe it as an armed movement aimed at taking advantage of peace dividends through the DDR process. But most often, they describe it as a civil society organization by presenting themselves as an association<sup>44</sup>. Finally, others consider Dewral Pulaaku as part of the full constellation of self-defence groups.
- Finally, many self-defence groups are created today, especially within Fulani communities.

It is still difficult to carry out a sociological description of followers of these different armed movements. However, observers are unanimous that most of them have been dominated or victims of violence in the past and are now ready to seek revenge. Fulani nobles who deem that current development policies tend to question their ancestral power are rather sensitive to the Islamist rationale. Additional effort is necessary to make out the

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<sup>43</sup>This is viewed by some observers as a strategic action to enter the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. By so doing, the three hundred active followers, predominantly Fulani and claimed by the MPD, will be able to reap the benefits of the DDR process.

<sup>44</sup> The group comprises members (like the current president) who took arms in 2012 and received training in jihadists camps in Gao, in MUJAO's camps in particular. This has led some observers to consider it as an association aimed at clearing

social or generational categories supporters of the currently emerging groups belong to:

- It would be interesting for instance, to pay attention to positions within families and find out how young people who feel excluded or dominated in the resource management process – as they belong to the disadvantaged categories in the succession order - can be receptive to armed groups messages;
- It would equally be interesting to pay attention to whether or not free slaves are receptive to those movements preaching social equality and advocating power redistribution.

#### **VI.4.e. Tensions between Rebel Movements and the FAMA forces**

Current tensions and clashes place armed groups and communities in opposition to the Mali defence and security forces<sup>45</sup>. FAMA's interventions have prompted much criticism because of the repressive measures specifically taken against the Fulani living in the Mopti zone, which they reproach to have supported the MUJAO during the deadly Konna attack carried out against them. Tensions between Fulani communities and armed forces have a negative impact on the pastoral activities.

More generally, the almost total absence of defence and security forces in remote localities tragically jeopardizes resource exploitation through lack of state security measures to protect communities from the attacks they are currently experiencing.

## **VII. Conflict Management Mechanisms**

Nowadays, three kinds of mechanisms are often used to address recurrent conflicts in Mopti and those associated to the northern insecurity crisis (*See Appendix 5, table 6*).

- Traditional and religious mechanisms. These are mostly designed for intra- or inter-community

jihadists, as it was the case with the Arab Movement of the Azawad (MAA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), two movements created after 2013 with former MUJAO, AQMI and Ansar Dine rebels.

<sup>45</sup> The aforementioned July 19<sup>th</sup> 2016 attack of the Nampala military camp killed 17 soldiers. Furthermore, the Mali security forces were ambushed at Boni on September 9<sup>th</sup> 2016.

conflicts relating to resource management. Social mediation is frequently meant for residual conflicts. During intra- and inter-community disputes, mediators are chosen among supposedly neutral people and those playing key functions within the society. They generally include religious leaders (marabouts, Imams cadis, etc.), griots or notables. Conflict management mechanisms in the region of Mopti include the “Sinangouya” (pleasant/joking cousinship or cathartic alliance), which is still frequently invoked<sup>46</sup>; the “jurer sous le figuier sacré” used in Koro or Kiri; mutual support mechanisms like the “*pari*” or the “*ton*”; initiation society mechanisms; the Togouna or Palava in Dogon communities; procedures initiated by Marabouts with Cadis referring to the Quran and the Hadith; the Mandé or Kurukan Fuga Charter which, though not legally recognized, is usually evoked by the Mandingo and Voltaic communities (Bambaras, Dogons, Malinke and Bozos). Meanwhile this is not claimed as cultural property by Arabic and nomadic groups like the Fulani, Arabs, Tuaregs etc. Caste systems also play a key role in dispute settlement and decision-making advice. These include the Dogon « *Djambé* » and « *Doube* », the Bambara *Niamakala* (including blacksmiths, Jéli/griots and the *finah*), the Fulani *Mabo* and the Songhai *Bara koy*, who through their sacred function (sacrificateur), play a paramount role in social regulation. These caste people (custodians of the community’s secrets and history) can traditionally draw the Chief’s attention on the population’s general mood, their grievances as well as worries. In recent year they have officially gathered into the Network of Traditional Communicators (RECOTRAD).

- Modern legal mechanisms. Most used mechanisms include mediation by locally elected authorities like the Mayor who can act as judiciary police officer and who is competent for intra- and intercommunity conflict management; Land Commissions (COFOs)

established by the Agriculture Orientation Law, dealing with land disputes and promoting access of disadvantaged groups (women, young people, poor people etc.) to lands. These commissions are chaired by the Prefet at the level of a district or the Sous-prefet at the level of communes. They are made up of Mayors, representatives of technical State services but also traditional leaders and finally modern justice with very poor reputations with the communities who end up referring to it when they feel dissatisfied by decisions rendered by traditional mechanisms or when it comes to issues or abuses associated with the politico-military crisis (see below).

- Mechanisms initiated by civil society organizations, playing a major role in peace seeking. In the region at stake, these include mechanisms mobilized by associations such as Tabital Pulaaku, an international association aimed at promoting the Fulani culture and defending Fulani interests; Ginna Dogon, an association promoting Dogon culture, and playing a role in intra- and inter-community disputes settlement<sup>47</sup>; the Deental association and its Douenza-based Crisis management Committee<sup>48</sup>; and to a lesser extent Dewral Pulaaku, whose ambiguous role has been previously described. It is also important to point out actions initiated by the Eveil association that has set up a committee to prevent and mediate conflicts with the assistance of a paralegals network in Kounari (Mopti)<sup>49</sup>.

Both in the Delta and in dry areas, mechanisms such as pleasant/joking cousinship, cathartic alliance, mediation of caste people as well of the civil society organizations aforementioned have withstood a series of ethnic and political crises and may provide potential opportunities for enhancing local solutions to crises affecting natural resources critical to food and nutrition security.

<sup>46</sup> The “Bankass Initiative” is based on sinangouya and ambitions to codify the customs and norms, for the development of conventions between customary and modern institutions, and to work out the legal status of administrative entities (villages, communities, cercles, and regions).

<sup>47</sup> For instance, talks are on-going between Tabital Pulaaku and Ginna Dogon with the aim of settling the deadly conflict that erupted at Sari (Koro district), as the Dogons formed a coalition to fight against the Fulani. Talks are currently taking place between both associations to prevent community crisis.

<sup>48</sup> This association was created by Douentza natives living in Mali or abroad

<sup>49</sup>This initiative was initially meant to strengthen customary and traditional governance systems of land management. The consultative committee was set up to gather the representatives of each concerned group, *Jowro* for the herders, *Bessema* for the farmers and *Baaba angal* for fishers. The idea was to clarify the right timing to let the herds access the ‘bourgoutières’, the definition and respect of passing routes as well as alternative resolution mechanisms.

## Section 2: a Field Research Synthesis on Formal and Informal Resource Management Institutions in Bandiagara, Douentza, Tenenkou and Youwarou:

(points II and III respectively). The findings discussed in this section are based on interviewees' perceptions.

This part of the report discusses the field research by three Malian researchers in Bandiagara, Douentza, Tenenkou and Youwarou districts<sup>50</sup>. In accordance with the method presented in the introduction, the research was based on focus group discussions and key informant interviews in the following villages:

- In Bandiagara district, the research was conducted in Pah and Kilempo (Pignari commune), Konsogoudo and Korou (Dourou commune), as well as Sincarma and Golgou (Dandoli commune).
- In Douentza district, it was conducted in Koumbena (Douentza urban commune) ; Orodou and Mougui II (Koubewel-Koundia commune) ; Niogolon, Gnimignama and N'doukoye (Dangol-Boré commune) ;
- In the districts of Tenenkou, the investigation was conducted in Konna-Mali, Konna-Fabé and Seinde-Sallah (Sougoulbe commune); Tenenkou-Binta (Tenenkou commune) as well as in the village of Diafarabe. Interviews were also carried out in the towns of Mopti and Sévaré. In the district of Youwarou, the research targeted Gounouma, Dimakoko, Youwarou-Ouro, Ferobe, Hombolore and Sobe villages.

Interviews focused on the role of formal and informal institutions in the management of natural resources essential to food and nutrition security and the impact of recurrent conflicts and violence on those resources. This section presents these two mentioned aspects separately

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<sup>50</sup> It is important to mention that field research was conducted in very peculiar conditions in the districts of Tenenkou and Youwarou. Due to prevailing insecurity in these areas and CARE's security policy, the researcher in charge of qualitative investigation could not be deployed. Therefore, the findings are based on handwritten transcripts by persons identified by

CARE among its partners. At Sévaré and Mopti, the researcher carried out direct or telephone interviews, which enabled him to bring in some additional elements of analysis. For those reasons, information analyzed in the paragraph dealing with Youwarou and Tenekou Cercles should be considered with great care.

## I. The District of Bandiagara

Bandiagara's economy essentially depends on agriculture based on the following products: millet, sorghum, rice, groundnuts, wandzou, fonio, sesame and shallots as the most cultivated vegetable. Traditional and extensive livestock raising is practiced in some pockets of the Cercle. Dogons and other minority groups sharing the same culture with them (namely the Dafing, the Mossi and the Samogo) predominantly populate the district. These populations predominantly live from agricultural crops and vegetables while raising livestock. Bandiagara district equally includes Fulani pastoralist communities<sup>51</sup>. Therefore, there are many communes and small hamlets inhabited by Fulani pastoralists within the Cercle. They are gathered in the communes and villages of Timiniri, Bassara, Lowel-Gueou, Pignari-Bana, Borko, Sanga, Dourou and Wadouba. Living in a sedentary lifestyle and holding agricultural spaces, those Fulani pastoralist communities move to the Delta from November to April and stay in dry areas in the remaining periods.

### I.1 Changes in Current Exploitation of Natural Spaces

Exchanges with the various stakeholders reveal that food security is threatened by actual constraints altering or thwarting collaborative and customary management of resources and pastoralist tracks in the Dogon plateau area. Natural resources (land-water-vegetation) remain basic factors of development and the cornerstone of local economies playing an essential role in achieving food security. The interviewees have stressed the following bottlenecks showing that barriers are less and less rigid between the existing exploitation modes:

- Agriculture (cereals and vegetable cultivation) is predominant in plains and shallows. Due to limited spaces, it has been competing with other production systems like pastoralism and fishing. Agricultural space is characterised by human and demographic pressure, non-compliance with customary resource management practices, and the spread of land conflicts between users. In spite of strengths and opportunities characterising agriculture and the presence of partners deploying considerable efforts

and political will to boost the sector, food security is far from being attained in Bandiagara. This is due to lack of equipment and poor organization of farmers, insufficient grain banks, low agricultural production (on a downward trend for more than ten years now), land scarcity and poor soil conditions<sup>52</sup> as well as weak and poor timing of water availability.

- Cultivated lands have been extended beyond their normal limits, yet production levels barely cover annual food needs. This is manifested by temporarily abandoning the practice of allowing old lands to lie fallow. The situation varies from one area to the other in accordance with links existing between alliances and families.
- Livestock breeding systems are characterised by more or less contradictory but complex factors:
  - i) rich farmers who add to their savings by amassing wealth in stockbreeding.
  - ii) breeders with larger and larger amounts of production in agriculture;
- Pastoralism is ailing. Human pressure has severely reduced pastoral tracks and confined them to specific portions of the area, since agriculture henceforth dominates the space. Transhumance routes comprising animal tracks are obstructed, locked or simply no longer existing and many Fulani have become salaried shepherds in localities of the zone.
- There are on-going tensions between users of original village territories and those of hamlets resulting from those same villages. Original villages are referred to as "historical settlements". These tensions have ramifications on hamlets that progressively extend, trying to become autonomous villages independent from original villages. This triggers disputes when it comes to choosing leaders of the newly created villages.
- The natural environment suffers increasing degradation. Agricultural space is impacted by climate change. Forests (in particular Pah in the Pignari commune and the remaining forest cover in the commune of Dourou) and fauna are being destroyed. This is essentially associated with water and wind erosion as well as human activity.

<sup>51</sup> As well as Soninke, Toucouleur, Bambara and Bobo natives.

<sup>52</sup> In Bandiagara, only 10% of the land can be used for agricultural purposes.

## I.2 Importance of Land Acquisition and Disposal Methods

As explained by the people interviewed, it is important to take heed of the fact that historical changes have exerted significant pressure on lands and overlapping spaces in Bandiagara. The history of the Bandiagara population is structured around founding lineages and land masters as well as the way people spread on the territory. According to interviewees, customary rights of the first occupant are fundamental in understanding the ways resource are exploited in the same area by different groups throughout the year. To sustain the first occupancy principle, the comonest modes of acquisition include:

- acquisition by alliance (through marriage, friendship, or ancestorship) ;
- acquisition by religion (animism in a near past) ;
- acquisition by transfer (long term lease involving a covenant and witnesses) ;
- acquisition as a compensation (after a conflict or a harmful act) ;
- acquisition after disastrous circumstances (such as droughts, war, debt, etc.) and
- acquisition through inheritance (from father to son based on elder son's precedence).

Land transfer is based on male lineage, i.e. from father to eldest son, or from elder to younger brother. Land is generally only transferred to married men. Young people have access to land and make up the group working and contributing to fulfilment of the family unit. They work in their elders' farms and benefit from their care, but only marriage makes them possible heirs of lands. As such, exclusion from land inheritance can be temporary, but appears as a means of pushing young men to early marriage. Women have access to land for farming purposes (cereals and vegetables cultivation) and married women cannot be transferred land. The women interviewed during this study feel "excluded" from the process because of social roles and land ownership division. They can only access small plots (farms and gardens) and exploit them as a precarious usufruct with agreement of their husbands. They deplore such social discrimination in the access to production means.

Even if most interviewees tend to value the principles aforementioned, FGD as well as KII have shown that social exclusion and discrimination are obvious in land access.

## I.3 Importance of Customary Ceremonials in Exploiting Resources

Interviews have highlighted the importance of certain practices in managing natural resources. These include:

1. Animist rituals such as the Lebe (worshiped spirit incarnating respect of community principles and values), the Binou and the Pegou (totems commonly worshiped by populations). They are based on an oath (the French "*serment désiçoire*") whereby two parties in a dispute agree to share a poisoned chicken, given that the party in the wrong will die thereafter;
2. Bans on use imposed through the laying or hanging of objects on plants, representing the hanging of sacred objects on a tree to prevent theft;
3. Openned/closed periods for hunting, gathering or wood cutting and;
4. Importance of "bois sacré".

## I.4 The various Perceptions of the Natural Resource Legal Frameworks

According to the respondents, the practical implementation of legal and regulatory frameworks to manage resources essential to food security is going through difficulties. To them, this is due to:

- The complexity of legal documents ;
- A very large number of texts and their inadequacy based on local people's expectations and customary practices ;
- Dependence on external funding;
- Lack of community participation in the policy-making process with the exclusion of regional and local actors.

On the relevance of the reforms, most interviewees approve the government's and Mayors' initiative to create consultation frameworks. However, they deplore the lack of exact information on approaches, methods and strategies to be adopted for their implementation. They feel dissatisfied by explanations and reports provided by Chiefs and locally elected authorities.

Nevertheless, village leaders and wise men have expressed receptiveness to legal innovations in local governance and

community conflict management. In particular, they are very often favorable to Local Land Commissions (COFO) as well as the conflict prevention and management commissions currently put in place by NGOs like APH and Yagtu. They however think that initiating concertation and dialogue processes around Local Land Commissions will take time before being practically effective. Others even feel satisfied by the frameworks set for the development of local conventions on natural resources joint management including simplified land use plans, nursery management protocols, learning centres, coordination commissions and enforcement brigades. Such instruments are vital in their view for a new community approach.

As far as family agriculture enhancement is concerned, interviewed women have expressed their wish to take advantage of the current language in the organic Agriculture law to secure equal participation in village, inter-village and municipal decision-making bodies.

Finally, it is important to underline that the interviewees are less informed on pastoralism-related legal texts, such as the 2001 Pastoral Charter and its 2006 implementation, formalizing transhumance as a rational natural resource management system.

## 1.5 Non-Governmental Players Involved in Resource Management

Of all development actors, NGOs are seen by interviewees as those playing the most important role in

the institutional, social and organizational development of resource management. Some of those most repeatedly cited for their relevance and efficiency include YAGTU, APH, Moliberno, NEF and Gaas Mali (See Appendix 5, table 7).

## II. The District of Douentza

Agriculture is the main activity in the district of Douentza. The Dogons are the major ethnic group in the zone<sup>53</sup>, predominantly living from agriculture. Breeding is the second most practiced activity in the district, drawing its importance from the fact that the area welcomes transhumant pastoralists in during the winter season and concentrates them in the best rangelands and the most important saline lands in the eastern side of the Delta. Stock breeding is practised in every community in the district. In the southern part of the district, the Fulani<sup>54</sup> are the group mostly living from cattle rearing, with agriculture as second activity. Reknown for their nomadic life, Fulani living in the district own no land, except those in the town of Douentza. Moreover, the Fulani, depending on whether the community is nomadic or sedentary, practices agriculture in varying ways. They cultivate farms on leased plots. When rains come, they spread through the neighboring Sahelian areas. Finally, equally known as “*Songhai of the Yaire*”, Songhai communities of Douentza<sup>55</sup> live in the villages perched on cliffs with the vast majority practicing farming<sup>56</sup> in addition to livestock, although they equally practice fishing. Apart from those three dominant ethnic groups, other communities are present in the district including the Sarakole, the Bambara<sup>57</sup>, the Moors and the Bellas<sup>58</sup> who are also Douentza natives.

<sup>53</sup> Dogons are not a monolithic entity in this area. Several different dialects are spoken in Douentza, mainly including Tomoso (in communes like Koubewel Koudia and Douentza), Nadjamba (in councils like Koubewel Koudia and Douentza), Pingui (in Koubewel Koudia, Dangol Boré and Douentza), Nangasso and the Benni (in the commune of Douentza).

<sup>54</sup> Fulani is the most spoken language in the area (as it is used by all ethnic groups), while the Yaire is commonly used.

<sup>55</sup> The Songhais living in the district originate from Hombori, a great province of the former Songhai Empire due to its strategic position on the border with Mossi country and at the junction with the Macina theocratic empire.

<sup>56</sup> In Songhai and Dogon communities, rudimentary but adapted techniques are used to fix the soil, based on local know-how in water and soil conservation in farming especially soil transportation, stone walls, protection and monitoring, production of organic fertilisers.

<sup>57</sup> Bambara were assimilated to Fulani in some villages. This is the case in Gnimignama and Niogolon villages in the Dangol-Bore rural commune, a Fulani village with Fulfulbe as the spoken language. Some inhabitants however (the chief's family in particular) have kept their Bambara family names like Traore, Diarra or even Coulibaly. These population have acknowledged their Bambara origins.

<sup>58</sup> Two categories of Bellas coexist in some of the investigated localities (N'dounkoye especially): emancipated Bellas and “sherif Bellas”, with the second remaining under the domination of an Ouramango or Moor-Bore (white-skinned Arab Moors claiming to be of Muhammad descent and bearing the name of “Haidara-chérif”). It was even explained by some interviewees that Bellas' property does not revert to their families after their death, but to their masters.

## II.1 Resource Exploitation in the District of Douentza

In the district of Douentza, resource management is practiced differently depending on the geophysical characteristics of the space. It varies as we move from the Plateau to the plains. Most of our respondents are aware of the limited availability of resources in the district, which justifies the measures taken by communities to protect or prevent their overuse.

Interviewees all wished to own a herd. This is regarded by all tribes as a sign of power. The Fulani are generally known to possess more herds than the Dogon and the Songhai, whose herds they protect and use. Cattle, sheep and goats are raised for their milk that can be consumed or sold to address family or personal needs (by acquiring grains and clothes or financing marriage). Horses and camels are herded for riding and equipment or water transportation purposes<sup>59</sup>. As far as transhumant livestock breeding is concerned, interviewees stressed the need to make a distinction between:

- Douentza native pastoralists, whose animals stay in the region during the winter season before going down to the Bourgou at the end of harvesting. So they swing between flooded pastures of the Niger Delta basin. They also move northwards to reach the Drougama saline soils. That movement is particularly observed among Gandamia and Hombori herdsmen.
- Delta native pastoralists move to the zone with the first rains (i.e. in May and June) before getting back to the Delta in September and October, depending on the harvesting season. The greatest majority of those herders originate from the district of Mopti.

Our interviewees equally explained that fishing is practiced in ponds and lakes as floods recede, as fish concentrate in the stagnant water points of the Yaire River. This is an activity practiced as one of the income generating activities. It is mostly annual and helps improve on households' food quality and generate individual incomes in rural areas. Most of the times, it is carried out as collective fishing organized by the landowners of the village who generally invite the neighboring villages.

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<sup>59</sup> Animals belonging to members of a same production unit are generally placed under control of the head of the production

Water bodies are put under various defences and then exploited in efforts involving the whole community. Fishing equipment entails two-hand and triangular nets, as well as creels. In the visited localities, fishers can be grouped into two classes:

- Native fisher farmers of the neighboring villages who use rudimentary equipment like traps, and
- Non-native migrant fishers like the Bozos and Somonos from Mopti and Konna who are more professional and use equipment that is more sophisticated. They are generally not integrated in the localities they visit.

## II.2 Description of Local Practices in Natural Resource Management

In the visited villages, resource access and use are guided by customary rules and thus subject to specific procedures. Arable lands plots are only leased with prior consent of the estate manager, and commitments are made not to plant trees and to remain within the established plot limits. Access to other wood or herbaceous species, to crop residues for gathering purposes or pastures is free regardless of the users' origins. One of the most frequent arrangements was the regulation of access and use of forest resources by village organizations. The resources concerned included firewood, green wood used for construction, coal, wood for tools manufacturing, lands, gathering forage as well as feed used for local and transhumant stock breeding. Access to resources is generally reserved for community members. Firewood collection for example is usually free for everyone, whereas the collection of green wood requires prior consent of village authorities, namely the chief. The collection of wood is authorized to natives for domestic use. For non-natives, it is authorized for the realization of collective works. Wood collection for trade purposes is prohibited.

Forests, pastures and water points are managed as collective resources, whereas arable lands belong to the communities in charge of their management. Usually, such arrangements are made locally, simply and clearly so as to enable easy understanding for internal and external users of resources. Most ownership systems are defined at the village level, except that of transhumance tracks dating back to the period of Sekou Amadou. Most of those tracks

unit. Nevertheless, he cannot sell, nor give or even use them without owners' consent.

still exist today and the interviewed farmers recognize them.

In Gnimignama for instance, fishing is strictly forbidden without prior agreement of the water masters called the Diallos. In the Horoudou village, a traditional method - consisting in building small dykes to protect crops from water streams - has been developed to fix the soil under pressure of rainwater in order to fight against erosion.

Furthermore, collecting certain wood species like the Balazan and the baobab is forbidden in the Dogon community of Mougui II, as they are reputed for their role in soil regeneration. It is the Chief's prime responsibility to ensure observance of that principle.

The jowro managerial system is effective in grazing areas and the use of pastures is regulated according to seasons. During dry seasons, they are available in forest and farms, but cannot be used without farmers' agreement. During winter seasons, access to agricultural zones is not allowed for herds and cultivation in the pastoral area reverts to farmers. At that time, animals only have access to defined water points.

In agricultural zones, local associations known as the Kelka and Walde Kelka have been established for environmental protection and management. Their supervisory bodies include a general assembly, a steering committee and a monitoring committee. Decisions related to resource management regulation are taken at the general assembly after consultation of socio-professional groups. The adopted rules focus on environmental protection measures: ban on tree cutting and mutilation (especially for protected species), unripe fruits collection or animals straying. Any deforestation requires an authorisation from the village chief, which is only provided along with a commitment to spare protected species. Clearing is forbidden in traditionally defined grazing areas, though pastoralists often feel aggrieved because of unprecise limits. Observance of those rules is ensured by local volunteers permanently patrolling the territory during dry season, before being relayed by the whole community during winter season. During this period, monitoring is so easy that farmers spend most of their time in their farms. Non-compliance with those rules entails a fine determined according to the seriousness of

the damage and the offender's good faith. Otherwise, the association shall call upon Water and Forests Department services to impose sanctions to the offender or simply ban them from accessing resources.

The interviewees pointed out that some of these customary or *ad hoc* practices have failed to comply with relevant formal regulations. Elder people remember that a couple of years ago, the government extended its powers in renewable resources management<sup>60</sup>. The newly adopted measures imposed restrictions of tree cutting in state forests and protected areas. Some provisions of the code authorized the Water and Forest Department's agents to regulate the various species growing on farmers' lands. This excluded local communities from resource management, and tree cutting required a permit issued by the Water and Forest Department. The new system made wood exploitation excessively costly for local people and forest companies abiding by the law could then cut anywhere, even in community-protected and planted areas. Violators of the new forest code were fined or jailed. Local authorities who attempted to settle resource disputes based on customary law were equally fined. This overwhelming presence of the state in resource management paved the way for several conflicts between local land users and state officials in charge of law enforcement. The respondents equally said that customary practices that had proven to be efficient were set aside and this led to resource degradation and widespread conflicts against users. With the decentralisation process, local resource management initiatives have flourished, boosted by supporting measures from the government, international and local actors whose actions are satisfactory according to the people we interviewed.

### II.3 Traditional Land Acquisition Modes

Like in the district of Bandiagara, the people we interviewed stressed the need to come back to traditional modes of acquiring lands, of which three have been identified in our search area:

- *Ancestral property*: it is the very first and most ancient type of property, based on first occupancy or ancestorship. The lands received were not sold and today are not subject to compensation.
- *Family property*: it concerns lands owned by founding or resident families involved in farming in the village

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<sup>60</sup> In fact, the state monopoly on resource management is guaranteed by the January 30<sup>th</sup> 1986 Forest Code (law 86-43).

fields. Their specificity stems from the fact that they remain a family property that can neither be sold nor transferred. Thus, they are only inherited. However, they can be subject to a short-term lease without any authorization to plant trees or to carry out a long-term investment. Family lands are managed by the eldest members of the lineages to whom they belong, and family chiefs ensure their access to all members.

- *Collective property*: in addition to the plots or farms demarcating lands in each village, communities equally own ponds exclusively recognized as their property. Ponds belong to a given village and they are considered as a collective property. Often exploited by the only village owning them, they can also be used for yearly collective fishing taking place at a date well defined by the owner village.

## II.4 Non-Government Actors Involved in Resource Management

Interviewees showed respect and trust for the NGOs involved in resource management in Douentza (*See Appendix 5, table 8*).

## III. The Districts of Tenenkou and Youwarou

According to the actors interviewed in the Districts of Tenenkou and Youwarou, resource management rules are primarily set by local customary institutions that should be consulted before designing any community-oriented policies. The interviews in the Youwarou district highlighted the persistence of the key role played by the master of the land (the jowro) and the master of the waters (the ji-tu) in the current context. In all the villages making up the Deboye commune, the jowro even has authority to appoint the chief of the village. The land master does not set himself up as a chief of the village, but entrusts the chiefdom to the person who follows him within the lineage. The village chief manages public affairs and reports to the jowro. If he violates that covenant, he is removed from this position to the benefit of someone else chosen by the jowro and related to him by blood or marriage. The jowro even has power to decide to exclude all of the descendants of the dethroned chief from chieftaincy. This way of appointing leaders is viewed as normal by our respondents who even deplore the public

administration's interference in the appointment of village chiefs nowadays. The interviews conducted in this area clearly show that more than a mere individual, the jowro in an institution in resource management and conflict settlement. Interviewees explained that the jowro authority in fact belongs to a family whose patriarch holds the reins of power. A panel made up of family members and enforced by the person acting as the jowro takes resource-related decisions. The interviewees expressed their attachment to the following principles:

- The land granted by the jowro for livestock or agricultural purposes can be passed from father to son for generations.
- A land parcel received from the jowro is not subject to retrocession or use rights transfer without prior consent of the jowro, from whom the land has been received.

The village of Seinde Sallah has a characteristic distinguishing it from other villages of the district: the Chief and his advisors are the actors involved in natural resource management according to an age-old custom.

The interviewees of Konna-Mali in the commune of Sougoulbe deem that coexistence of agricultural, fishing and breeding systems creates no major problem, as actors observe the rules set by customary authorities. Most of them think that decentralisation has brought no change in resource management.

On the contrary, interviews in Konna-Fabé highlighted that decentralization has brought several changes including less farmland with the current administrative division of communes. However, on a more positive note, it has increased cooperation between populations and local governments and has resulted in more community participation in natural resource management.

Respondents in Tenenkou-Binta regard decentralisation as a serious obstacle for access to land and the cause of land-related disputes in the commune, especially in the village of Tenenkou. To them, decentralization has equally favoured the emergence of land speculation, which was absent in the village before.

In the village of Diafarabe, some people think that decentralization has paved the way to corruption. Traditionally, access to farmland was unconditionally allowed by the chief, as a simple application was the only

thing required. Today, astronomical sums must be laid out to secure farmland. Moreover, mayors of the region are said to have secured the finest plots that they sell back to government officials, at a minimum of 25,000 CFA Francs each.

More generally, it has been found that most of the actors interviewed within localities of the zone are not even aware of the COFO. Some say they know about their creation, but have no information about their implementation.

Interviewees still find it necessary for development actors to consult customary authorities before implementing projects, so as to ensure the legitimacy of their actions. In their views, talking directly to the local administrations, without taking heed of customary procedures pushes the projects straight to failure. So, informing the Mayor is not enough to secure a projects' legitimacy. Some of them reported on cases where livestock breeders purposely allowed animals to wander through defined farm land areas cultivated with international funding. NGOs had not informed the jowro about the development projects at stake. Project efficiency can be undermined if such precautions are not taken into account. Some actors bear in mind the fear that involving the administration only is likely to result in written provisions that can make them lose their customary rights.

Finally, interviews conducted in Mopti and Sévaré have highlighted disappointed expectations from the Annual Conference on Fodder Banks, a meeting that has seemingly lost sight of its initially set objectives (*see above*).

Though actors are almost unanimous on the significance of such a framework, they deplore weaknesses that have arisen in its operational implementation: conferences are not really organized and the body is a mere exchange forum, whose decisions are not implemented. The respondents deplore that situation, thinking that the Conference could have been an important tool promoting concerted management of issues pertaining to transhumance between the Delta and the dry zone. Also, it could have been an important tool in preventing conflicts arising from damage caused on farms and management of the bourgoutieres. Nonetheless, the results of that activity are hardly perceptible in the reality, in spite of considerable funds (21 – 22 millions CFA Francs) raised through its organization.

## Section 3: A Field Research Synthesis on Conflicts in the Districts of Bandiagara, Douentza, Tenenkou and Youwarou

As indicated earlier, Focus groups and KII were organised in the villages enumerated in the introductory part of the second section of this report. These focused on actors' opinions on the role played by formal and informal institutions involved in food security resource management. Interviews conducted in that context equally focused on conflicts and conflict management mechanisms likely to impact food security. Therefore, this section of the study focuses on this aspect, enabling us to make a distinction between different forms of violence and their intensity, and how they negatively impact resource management and food security in the districts of Bandiagara, Douentza, Youwarou and Tenenkou. In addition, the views of some international actors involved in the region of Mopti are also presented.

### **I. Conflicts in the District of Bandiagara**

#### **I.1 Security Situation in the District**

Unlike Douentza, Bankass and Koro (three neighboring districts), Bandiagara has recorded fewer security incidents related to the crisis prevailing in the North since 2012. Most interviewees say they only hear about terrorist and jihadist groups fighting in areas adjoining the district of Bandiagara, over radio and public discussions. Moreover, many local actors have expressed assurance on the peaceful presence of talibe (in particularly large numbers in September and October) in the town of Bandiagara, stressing the importance of Muslim religion as a rallying factor in the district communities. However, according to interviewees, mass fear was intensified in some localities

of the district as the conflict moved to the central part of the country – especially in other districts of Mopti.

Though not directly affected, the district indirectly suffers the consequences of this crisis via:

- lower tax revenues in collectivities.
- withdrawal of state officials like the sous-prefets and technical agents, even in municipalities we visited (namely Dourou and Pignari).
- depletion of tourism-related resources with serious consequences such as lower purchasing power and an increase in the price of basic products.
- youth migration.
- Proliferation of light weapons and an upsurge in banditry, in Pignari commune's neighbouring areas especially<sup>61</sup>.

## 1.2 Recurrent Conflicts in Localities of the Bandiagara District

Conflicts in Bandiagara are mostly related to local disputes with varying violence and intensity. The structural conflicts prevailing in the investigated communes can be grouped into three major types (*See Appendix 5; table 9*):

- **Leadership conflicts over chieftaincy** (as seen in Dabolo village).
- **Conflicts related to the agropastoral space:** these occur as customary property rights are often subject to contestation between villages (populations of Pah in the commune of Pignari) against those of Diallo (in the commune of Bara Sara); or between families (as shown by current tensions in Balaguine in the Baboye hamlet) on a customary property right opposing Birago and Karembe families). Similarly, in Dandoli, a customary property dispute is currently opposing Nantoume families.
- **Conflicts over resources**, which are sometimes related to agro-pastoral space. They mainly occur between farmers and cattlebreeders, or between farmers and nomadic herdsmen. This is the case in the deadly conflict between Degoga and Karembe families in the Koko village, the deadly conflict equally between populations of Dourou (district of

Bandiagara) and those of Koporopen (district of Koro), the deadly conflict between the Ourou (commune of Dourou) and the Tereli (commune of Sangha); the conflict between the Dioudiourou (commune of Dourou) and the Wol (commune of Koporona in Koro), the conflict between the villages of Tegu and Tama over access to farmlands, the conflict between the village of Sikolo (commune of Dandoli) and a group of villages of the same commune (Sibi Sibi, Kolontanga), and the village of Diombololey (commune of Docoumbo).

There are also minor conflicts with lesser impact, which should also be mentioned. These include conflicts associated with water management and/or water point exploitation, firewood or timber exploitation, hay collection in forests, animal theft, corruption and some behaviors of interest groups leaders with personal motivations.

The above-mentioned types of conflicts can trigger more or less violent incidents, tending to fuel community tensions. However, this detailed presentation of the conflicts occurring in some localities shows that the identified cases are generally disputes and not conflicts strictly speaking, except for the ongoing deadly conflicts in Dourou (*See tables 9.a. and 9.b. in Appendix 5*).

## 1.3 Causes of Conflicts and Violence

The conflict dynamics identified through interviews and focus groups can be summarized as follows:

- Failure to follow traditional principles has sparked off several chieftaincy disputes in the Dogon plateau. These are usually exacerbated by protests over legitimacy and decried interference of the administration in the choice of village chiefs.
- On conflicts' peculiarities in the district of Bandiagara, a member of the wise council from a blacksmith's family at Golgou (in the commune of Dourou) explains: "intra-community conflicts are the most recurrent in villages and relate to practical challenges over the rights enjoyed by first occupants who controlled the land. More often, we face conflicts

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<sup>61</sup> In particular, some interviewed observers like members of the Dogon hunters' brotherhood explained that the traffic of small

and light weapons has exponentially increased since 2012, leading to many community incidents relating to land.

over customary rights interpretation between traditionalists and moderns.”

- Recurrence of conflicts between breeders and farmers often stem from contradictions in their activities, as grass cut by farmers is part of what breeders need to feed animals. This natural contradiction is at the heart of several disputes. Conflicts related to animal free grazing are numerous and frequent. In search of pastures, conflicts often occur between breeders and farmers whose crops are destroyed by flocks. Respondents have however explained that disputes are settled through transactions between parties and hardly go beyond the local scope.
- disputes among breeders.
- latent resentment within families.
- availability of light weapons.
- Banditry (armed-attacks, highway-robbery etc.)
- Absence of the state’s mediation, as illustrated by the violent conflict between Tentari (Council of Timiniri in Bandiagara) and Niondoli (Council of Timissa in Tominian) over pastoral resources and easement boundaries; the conflict between Dourou (district of Bandiagara) and Koporopen (district of Koro) over land use.

#### I.4 Consequences of Conflicts and Violence

With regard to the variety and intensity of conflicts (the recurrent conflicts in the investigated villages or violence and insecurity resulting from the northern Mali crisis), discussions and focus groups have pointed out the following consequences:

- Loss of manpower during bloody and deadly clashes;
- Inaccessible agricultural spaces due to their declaration as “no go” areas during legal proceedings, and the inoperable nature of customary mediation mechanisms;
- Constraints relating to the withdrawal of projects and NGOs following social and community tensions caused by persisting conflicts;
- Social and community disintegration between households, families, villages and communes touched by relentless conflicts.

#### I.5 Presentation of Customary Dispute Management Institutions in the District of Bandiagara

From the interviews conducted throughout the district of Bandiagara, various informal resource management actors were identified alongside with dispute settlement mechanisms. These include:

- **Families:** they refer to the basic family unit (called “Ginna” as explained above) active in the management of farmland conflicts involving members of the family.
- **Villages:** important actors at this level include the chief who is generally from the ruling lineage and his advisors (village council) playing a dual role by serving as the traditional conflict management authority and taking over the administration as explained above.
- **Councils of wise men:** made up of village notables (eldest men most of the time), their members are designated by families. They regulate and find remedy on land and social matters settlement.
- **Men of casts, particularly Bandiagara blacksmiths:** they are from families particularly specialized in conflict resolution at a social and community level. They play a role in enhancing social relations between the various social categories;
- **The Hogon:** regarded as the highest spiritual authority among the Dogon, he is responsible for peace and social cohesion and represents the Lebe spirit (*see above*). The Hogon is present in some localities and hamlets of the zone (Hogon of Arou, Hogon of Nombori).
- **Hunters’ brotherhoods:** they ensure social stability and wildlife protection as well as the protection of the community. They equally act as a defence force with the village chief’s endorsement. It is interesting to recall how these actors declared that Bandiagara needs no army, expressing their commitment to ensure security within the community when jihadist groups invaded the North of Mali in 2012.
- **Masks brotherhoods, also called the “Ogouloubendje” or “Adakaye”.** Located in the Plateau, their role is to conserve masks and protect the community’s traditional and customary inheritance. They are guardians of traditional values and ensure strict compliance with customs.
- **Secret societies, also called “Allamondjou or Allamoudiou” or “Ogokama”.** They are local

environmental institutions in the Dogon area, located in the Bandiagara cliff are local environmental institutions in the Dogon area<sup>62</sup>.

- **Religious leaders (imam)**, who serve as resource for populations before the village chiefs and equally play a role within Muslim representative institutions.

Dispute settlement at a local level (between actors of a same village or between two villages) is the prerogative of local institutions (Chief, council of wise men, customary legitimacies). These customary institutions mostly resort to mediation, negotiation or conciliation. Of the just-enumerated mechanisms, the Council of wise men and the Chief determine the most suitable resolutions<sup>63</sup>.

Other local remedies include:

- The palava tree or the Toguna, which is a location designated for notables' to sit together and resolve conflicts.
- Pleasant/joking cousinship, largely used among communities, including actions such as:
  - o Pleasant cousinship with the same ethnic entity (son and aunt, daughter and uncle, the Djibguiba and the Banou, the Kanambaye and the Telly, natives of precised territories, the Kah and the Boumbou etc.);
  - o Pleasant cousinship between different ethnic entities: the Dogon and the Bozo, the Songhai and the Dogon, the Fulani and the Bomou.

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<sup>62</sup>Known as the most ancient associations in Dogon populated areas, the Alamoudiou are traditional structures in charge of conflict resolution and environmental protection. They comprise men and women with great moral and social personality, who cannot be influenced by social pressures and who enjoy unbridled freedom of speech thanks to their functions. Referred to as the "nasty people" of society, they are mostly found in communities in the district of Bandiagara (council of Dourou). They were formerly in charge of protecting fruit trees in the village. Offenders had to pay a symbolic fine in kind (grains and some money). What was actually important was the moral lesson for the convicted person, and not the fine paid. The Alamoudiou equally took part in mediations within a family, a village or between two communities when actions carried out by family or village authorities were unfruitful. In the performance of their duty, Alamoudiou were supported by the various social classes, which made them tremendously notorious. Names of such structures vary from one area to the other, but they all play the same roles. The Ogo-kama for instance, were similarly active in environmental protection within the district of Koro. These organizations survived from

- The RECOTRAD network bringing together different categories of castes men as described previously.

## 1.6 Perceptions on Formal and Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

According to respondents, local customary institutions, though their interest is declining, still have much to say in the resolution of conflict matters. However, they need to adapt to the current context in order to be gradually integrated in decentralization structures and land management bodies. To them, local customary institutions have been weakened and eroded throughout the years, since they have no legal basis. The main concern today is the interpretation of those customs, hence the need to record them. Griots are no longer fit to maintain information about the large number of customs associated with their culture, and this has pointed to the necessity to keep written records. So though their legitimacy is still recognized today, traditional dispute settlement mechanisms seem to be less reliable in the current context which can be explained as follows:

- In most villages, customary mechanisms have appeared to be strictly limited to the management of diverging interests among families and clans, from which the representatives of those local dispute institutions originate<sup>64</sup>.

colonization and the arrival of the state when environmental protection was entrusted to the Department of Water and Forests. Their enhancement was initiated by SOS Sahel, a British NGO, through community development projects in partnership with PAGTV –FENU, a rural land use support project that carried out actions for their revitalization for about ten years (from 1993 to 2003). Throughout the 1990s, the Ogo-kama received organizational and equal backup from CARE International, aimed at promoting environmental protection in partnership with the Department of Water and Forests under the state's authority.

<sup>63</sup> According to local customs and practices, women and young people are not involved in dispute settlement. To respondents, youth exclusion has led to failures in inter-generational communication in recent times.

<sup>64</sup>For instance, dating back from the 1980s, the conflict among Nantoume families in the village of Golgou is frequently reinitiated due to difficulty in interpretations of customary rights resulting in violent clashes.

- Moreover, the exclusion of certain social categories (women and youth) in conflict resolution mechanisms has been decried.
- Many respondents also believe that customary conflict management institutions have entered into competition with the administration and modern law. In fact, people do not really accept the verdict of customary institutions when there is latent or simmering conflict. Failing to obtain a successful outcome from traditional mechanisms, they generally refer to the mayor, the administration and even justice to have matters settled<sup>65</sup>. This is reportedly because populations increasingly prefer legal proceedings.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming influence of the administration and justice in dispute settlement is not free from criticism: people generally have a bad opinion of the justice system in the investigated areas. Indeed, in rural areas, the impartiality of administration and justice officials is questionable: they allegedly behave like “predators” and conceive of conflict as a lucrative activity consisting in taking advantage of the opportunities offered by proceedings. Some judges are stigmatized as they settle land disputes without regard to formal law. Another explanation evoked during discussions is related to corruption, which is rooted in many communities. Bribery has become an efficient mean to win disputes. Finally, respondents criticized constraints linked to the legal processes associated with disputes, pointing to:

- Inadequate legal decisions that ignore the reality of the environment where disputes and related conflicts take place;
- Rejection and non-compliance with legal decisions by conflicting parties;
- The presence and persistence of pressure groups as the new “brokers” exploiting and living from the material and financial rents earned during proceedings;
- The influence of politicians and administrative officials in decision-making.

Throughout the investigation, the “*necessity to reconstruct coherence between customs and modernity*” has been proposed repeatedly.

<sup>65</sup> Eleven conflict situations figure in the table 9.b., nine of which were settled by courts and only two by chiefs and notables.

Finally, the positive and important role of associations such as Ginna Dogon and Tabital Pulakuu has often been mentioned by the interviewees (*see Table 10, Appendix 5*).

## II. The District of Douentza

### II.1 Impacts of the 2012 Security Crisis

The security crisis that erupted in the North in 2012 has affected the district of Douentza in a more serious way than the district of Bandiagara. Today, two categories of armed groups can be identified:

- The jihadist groups, in particular the organization created by Amadou Kouffa (*see above*). Characterised by extreme mobility, jihadist troops usually move on bikes in groups of two. Sometimes, they simultaneously operate in small groups of three to six bikes. They mainly target members of the Mali armed forces as well as every person suspected to cooperate with them. Respondents explained that those groups operate through surprise attacks out in the open, or targeted assassinations within the town of Douentza. Deeply infiltrated, jihadist elements are reported to be relayed almost everywhere in Douentza<sup>66</sup>, so that people have become reluctant to visit one another.
- Self-defence groups and Fulani militia: mostly confined in Mondoro, Gbuiye, Djonna, Kagnoume, Douma, Tabako and Ngouma, these groups have refused to be assimilated with jihadists and even declare themselves opposed to their actions. Their objective is to defend the rights of Mopti communities, particularly the Fulani who according to them are victims of attacks and reprisals by the national army that tends to equate them with a terrorist group like Amadou Kouffa. Several sources believe that non-Fulani populations have been victims of attacks carried out by these militia and self-defence groups.

In addition to those two categories, there are gangs involved in criminal activities. Information collected in investigated villages reveal that they frequently carry out armed attacks during agropastoral fairs, stripping farmers and herders of their possessions. By the way, many people met in Gnimignama, Orodou, N’doukoye, Koumbena,

<sup>66</sup> These elements are responsible of the September 2<sup>nd</sup> 2016 attack on a column of the National Guard in Boni, which killed 2 soldiers.

Mougui II and Niogolon said they have been victims of criminal actions and armed robbery by those gangs.

## II.2. Disputes Situation in Douentza Villages

Two major types of conflicts have been identified in the investigated communes (See Appendix 5, table 11):

- Disputes over chieftaincy that have created divisions in villages of the Dagnol Bore rural commune, between supporters of inherited chieftaincy and those who uphold that chieftaincy is rather based on individual capacities:
  - o three communities co-exist in the village of Gnimignama (the Fulani, the Dogon and the Bambara). However, protests have erupted over the ruling capacities of the successor of the Traore –a Bambara family that has ruled the village for more than 80 years ;
  - o At N’doukoye, a dispute opposes the only son of the deceased Chief and his cousin, eldest son of the deceased’s junior sister.
- Disputes over natural resources, which only partially cover inter-community distinctions. Indeed, disputes have intensified between communities that are still strongly specialized in the exploitation of different resources. However, disputes between identical socio-professional categories occur in other communities. It is therefore possible to make a clear-cut between:
  - o Conflicts between farmers and breeders, frequent in rural communes of Douentza. Such conflicts also have an inter-community dimension, between Dogon and Bambara farmers and Fulani transhumant pastoralists, whose herds often destroy farmers’ crops during the winter and growing seasons. Such clashes occur on a daily basis in localities where Fulani and Bambara co-exist. That violence was aggravated with public mediation as administrative officials were accused –whether rightly or wrongly- to favour the Bambara farmers.
  - o Conflicts opposing farmers over rural land. Some farmers migrate towards areas with large arable lands in the neighboring villages. This mass migration has led to disorderly occupation and overuse of lands, thus fuelling tensions and land disputes.
  - o Conflicts opposing pastoralists. Though the Pastoral Charter (see above) is meant to regulate transhumance, pastoralists have remained attached

to customary practices dating back from the Dina system. However, those ancestral practices have been strained by rampant insecurity, drying up of rivers and new resource management schemes under decentralization. Related difficulties have revived tensions and triggered open conflicts between Fulani pastoralist communities and other nomadic groups migrating between dry and flooded areas over the distribution of pastures. In the district of Douentza, pastoral conflicts are very frequent at Koumbena, Niogolon, Gnimignama and N’doukoye.

- o Conflicts opposing fishers, particularly acute in the village of Gnimignama where there is simmering tension between populations and Bozo fishers from neighboring or distant localities, who have modern equipment and fish in Gnimignama ponds without consulting the Chief or the local population, but exercising an authorization from the Mayor of Dagnol Bore.

## II.3 Impact of Violence on Communities

To most respondents, intra-community and inter-community conflicts strongly affect community life:

- Chieftaincy disputes have seriously disrupted social links in some villages (Gnimignama and N’doukoye), leading not only to divisions (between supporters of customs for power succession and those who uphold individual qualities as the main criteria), but also to the breakdown and the questioning of family and clan solidarities as well as intercommunity marriages. To some people, “mysterious” deaths observed in some villages are closely related to chieftaincy disputes. At N’doukoye, a dispute over chieftaincy halted the construction of a grain bank by a cooperative, which had to go through lean periods and a food crisis due to low agricultural production associated with lack of rain.
- In predominantly Dogon villages like Mougui II, Koumbena and Orodou, insecurity, land conflicts and soil deterioration have provoked massive youth migration (most of them were shepherds) and exodus from rural areas to Bamako (especially women who take up activities like domestic help), as well as to Algeria or Lybia in an attempt to enter Europe. This has affected agricultural yields due to insufficient manpower in farm cultivation.

- Conflicts aggravate poverty in communities by affecting agricultural production and income generating activities. This impact is felt at three levels:
  - o *On agricultural production and livestock.* Conflicts against farmers or those between them to livestock breeders have an impact on productivity through destruction of crops associated with free grazing. Similarly, conflicts among farmers always lead the contentious plots to be declared “no go” areas.
  - o *On food and nutrition security.* Communities currently have difficulties in consistently being able to building grain banks enabling them to face lean periods.
  - o *On revenue.* The criminal acts mentioned earlier have dramatically impeded people from attending fairs where they usually sell cereals and cattle to earn some money. This naturally impacts incomes and food security. Theft of cattle reduces breeders’ flocks, also leading to a decline in their income.
- Lineage is regarded as a factor of social cohesion. Indeed, marriage between cousins in a same tribe fosters linkages and lowers potential conflicts between groups of a same lineage<sup>68</sup> ;
- Pleasant/joking cousinship. In the district of Douentza, cousinage exists both between different communities (between the Dogon and the Fulani, the Dogon and Songhai, the Fulani and the Sonrhai<sup>69</sup>) and within communities between social categories (between Fulani blacksmiths especially). Respondents believe that cousinship still plays a significant role in mediation and even attach a mystical value that centuries-old practice.
- The Imam, who equally plays both the role of mediator and conciliator. In particular circumstances (succession or demarcation of lands), he is the judge and his decisions cannot be challenged like those rendered by other customary bodies, since they are based on religious beliefs (the Quran) and doctrines.

## II.4 Conflict Management Mechanisms

Several actors and mechanisms are involved in dispute prevention and management in the villages investigated within the district of Douentza:

- Mediation is ensured by chiefs and notables; Settling conflicts between breeders and farmers entails mechanisms varying from one village to another, but is generally based on exchange: in Fulani communities for instance, milk is given in exchange for grains<sup>67</sup> ;
- Natives who have succeeded financially or those who are former civil servants often serve as fund providers or consultants in conflict management processes;

<sup>67</sup>Farmers and breeder associations are almost non-existent in the zone. The few operational ones find no need to invest in conflict management, focusing more on production and specific activities such as livestock vaccination, microcredits or grain banks building.

<sup>68</sup> Bonds of marriage between the Fulani and the Songhai especially, can be efficient in preventing conflicts. Likewise, marriage with the Fulani is meant to end disputes in Dogon communities.

## II.5 Perceptions of Formal and Informal Conflict Management Mechanisms

Investigated communities have expressed a preference for traditional dispute settlement structures as opposed to state authorities (mayors, sous-prefets, judge or the gendarmerie in case of crime), which they suspect to be partial and corrupt. Nonetheless, certain distrust has been expressed towards traditional rulers, whose legitimacy is no longer as strong as in earlier days due to the decline in influence of traditional values and their inability to govern economic issues and achieve survival for the populations. This is the reason why administrative authorities are always solicited when traditional ways of solving conflicts appear to be ineffective<sup>70</sup>. Respondents have equally express distrust towards government representatives who use tribal disputes as a tool to secure electoral votes, depending on their political objectives and the influence of some members of the local elite, especially in Gnimignama and N’dounkoye. Some state officials are

<sup>69</sup> No matter the intensity of a conflict opposing Fulani members in a community, mediation by a Dogon brings the conflict to an end and without contest. This equally applies to the Songhai.

<sup>70</sup> Mayors and Prefets are often called upon to settle disputes with an intervention of security forces if there are clashes between communities. Similarly, justice is solicited when traditional means have failed in settling disputes.

also accused of being corrupt: mayors especially are often said to give priority to their political accomplices when distributing grains, or even worse, to misappropriate tons of grain for resale on the community markets. In a final analysis and as suggested above, Fulani communities feel that government authorities always favor Bambara farmers in disputes against Fulani breeders, as they mostly originate from the South<sup>71</sup>.

## II.6 Resilience of Communities to Conflicts Impacts

To overcome the shortcomings of public authorities in the six villages investigated in Douentza (especially the absence of Gendarmerie or Garde Nationale's patrols), "*local brigades for security and nature protection*" have been informally established both to prevent attacks by armed groups and to protect natural resources. Those structures are made up of young people and are meant to play a dual role:

- Protecting farms, forests and grazing areas (by watching night movements of herds from other communities) and;
- Watching population inflows and outflows. Any unknown person seen around during the night is immediately arrested and interrogated on the reasons for his presence. In the event of a reply deemed unsatisfactory, he is brought to the Chief of village before being conducted to the commune or to the Gendarmerie.

Furthermore, local conflict management committees like the Djanguini Igodoye (equivalent to the Ginna Dogon) have been created with the support of NGOs' (ACR-Caritas for instance). They organize public hearings as well as workshops on the conflict cycle and peaceful conflict management tools. Women's integration in such committees is one of the greatest achievements in conflict prevention and management.

## II.7 Non-government Actors Involved in Conflict Management

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<sup>71</sup> Respondents have presented this as the main reason behind the spread of Fulani self-defence militia throughout the region of Mopti.

Non-government actors involved in conflicts management also include NGOs like ACR-Caritas, NEF and Catholic Relief Service (CRS). These organizations are related to local resource management and their role in conflict management is complex. On the one hand, they initiate information and education activities in communities to prevent conflicts between farmers and herders (on the demarcation of pastoral areas and tracks as well as the importance of planting hedges to protect farm areas). On the other hand, some of the activities they support (agricultural development) are likely to trigger conflicts.

## III. The Districts of Tenenkou and Youwarou<sup>72</sup>

### III.1 Impacts of the 2012 Security Crisis

In Youwarou and Tenenkou, the security context related to the 2012 crisis is strongly marked by the presence of armed groups ready to fight with defence and security forces, as well as any entity representing the central state and local governments.

The following dynamics have been pointed out during interviews:

- The emerging banditry due to small groups collaborating with MUJAO and Ancar Dine since 2012;
- The prevalence of four or five Katibas in the zone. Due to poverty, certain younger talibés have joined those radical groups. Interviews have revealed that those fighting in the bush earn 300,000 CFA francs per month, against 150,000 CFA francs for those collecting information in villages;
- The appearance of self-defence groups;
- The uncontrolled traffic and the proliferation of weapons, reported to be easily accessible.

Sometimes, these tendencies seem to interrelate. Interviewees have stressed the fact that both members of jihadist movements and those of self-defence militia are often involved in criminal activities and are all natives of

<sup>72</sup>Part two introductory remarks on the shortcomings of Tenenkou and Youwarou investigations equally apply to this section.

Tenenkou or Youwarou (referred to as the “milieu”). This makes them extremely swift and able to easily blend in among the population once they have committed a crime.

State and decentralized authorities in charge of public affairs are also accused of responsibility for current insecurity. Respondents consider that armed groups are often supported or instigated by members of the intellectual or political elite who use militants or natives as tools for violence or protest movements. They also consider that religious leaders take advantage from inter-community disputes, as well as social and judiciary injustice as they have been instrumentalizing the talibes.

The attractiveness of jihadist and armed movements has been explained at two main levels: their supporters are former victims of domination or violence and consider the current context as a revenge opportunity. Also, youths are living in absolute poverty and this makes them ready to do everything to change their condition. Therefore, idleness among young people is seen by interviewees as a fertile ground for their recruitment in jihadist movements or criminal groups.

### III.2 Recurrent Disputes

The types of conflicts identified in the two districts include:

- Family disputes;
- Disputes occurring as consequence of the decentralization process;
- Disputes opposing the administration to the people;
- Succession disputes: as seen in the district of Youwarou, a number of problems occur when the patriarch dies. Heirs often fail to abide by customary succession rules and end up resorting to courts;
- Disputes over natural resources, which have alarmingly spread in the region:
  - o Disputes between farmers and livestock breeders are the most recurrent. Both systems operate in an extensive way. Most farmers are not landowners and this makes power relations and coexistence more complex, as breeders and fishers set the applicable standards. Therefore, disputes between farmers and breeders are

unfolding in the commune of Sougoulbe Tenenkou, at the village of Seinde Sallah, in the Tenenkou Binta quarter as well as the villages of Konna Fabe and Konna-Mali villages. In Youwarou, most recurrent disputes oppose farmers and breeders equally over the bourgoutières. Respondents say farmers are regarded as invaders. Local conventions exist, though they are either unknown or not recognized by actors nor respected. Pastoral tracks are covered by farms, which pose acute problems of coexistence between livestock breeders and farmers in the communities.

- o Women’s disputes over the market garden in Konna Mali are specific. They originate from a lack of water in the garden (during the dry season) and free grazing.
- o Tenenkou and Youwarou’s specificity lies in the conflicts against fishers, especially in the village of Ouro-Boubou. Moreover, there are persisting conflicts related to incompatibility between customary practices and formal law, as well as the regulatory role of the state with respect to fisheries. Some conflicts opposing fishers are also related to claims to fishing zones and priority in collective fishing<sup>73</sup>. Another type of conflict within the fishing system is associated with fisheries agreements established and enforced in the region. According to respondents, these agreements should be applied down to districts, communes and villages, which is not yet the case. Moreover, they unanimously foster a lack of coherence between current fishing conventions and customary practices whose spirit is violated, yet fishers feel that it should take precedence. Some local ponds were customarily managed and rules were never violated. Today, written authorizations have been delivered to some users and this has disrupted the initial stability. Deep distrust has also been expressed towards the interference of justice in fisheries disputes. *“There was no dispute in fishing, until customs come to be breached. Disputes are not settled by courts: they are settled in accordance with customs”*, a fisher stated. Finally, modern agricultural techniques have

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<sup>73</sup> Following this customary principle, natives enjoy priority access to the fishing zone. Customary managers generally manage the fishing zone and carry out sacrifice rituals. Violent

conflicts erupt when a non-native fisherman happens to access the zone in priority.

brought about two categories of fishers, between whom tensions have started emerging: native farmer-fishers who use traditional equipment like nets, and nomadic non-native fishers who are strangers and operate with very sophisticated equipment. Actors of this last category are not usually integrated in communities where they operate. Furthermore, a particular type of conflict currently concerns fishing actors, relating to the use of a non-compliant equipment: a type of net locally known as “*sawasekou*”.

As seen in the other Districts, the above-mentioned disputes are both intra-community (increasingly recurrent, especially in rural areas) and inter-community conflicts (*see Appendix 5, tables 12 and 13 for recurrent conflicts in Tenenkou and Youwarou respectively*).

### III.3 Origins of Resource Conflicts

The factors presented in Tenenkou and Youwarou districts that cause recurrent conflicts around natural resources can be synthesized as follows:

1. Causes associated with state governance failures. Whether at the Mopti regional capital or in villages, actors have different descriptions of the on-going conflicts: those met at Sévaré and Mopti have been more critical of the state than those in villages;
2. Causes associated with poor legal decisions and corruption of judges. Information collected in villages has shown deep resentment towards judiciary authorities;
3. Historical causes highlighting features of great pre-colonial empires. Actors are unanimous on the positive impacts of reforms carried out by Sekou Amadou on land tenure and social relations (during the Dina system). They also unanimously agree that colonization led to disruption of traditional mechanisms;
4. Causes associated with the coexistence of competing natural resource exploitation systems; and
5. Effects caused by politicization and instrumentalization of conflicts.

### III.4 Manifestations and Consequences of Conflicts for Populations

The most recurrently evoked impacts of conflict and insecurity include low production, low household income and rural exodus of young people in search of a better future. Moreover, the following have been particularly emphasized:

- The withdrawal of several development projects from villages: project like GRAT, DEBOALAFIA, NRC, WOLRD VISION and AMPRODE /SAHEL all went back to Tenenkou, as movement became impossible for field agents in villages. To overcome this situation, development programs that still operate in rural areas now carry out their activities through native agents of the targeted localities. Respondents explain that the withdrawal of such projects has increased poverty;
- Most locally elected officials (including mayors) have left; and
- Decentralized (the Prefets and Sous-prefets) and technical state service officials equally suffer the consequences of such a precarious security context. A huge number of teachers transferred to Sévaré have also fled.

### III.5 Conflict Management Modes and Community Resilience

In all the villages targeted by this research, chiefs and notables play a central role in conflict management. However, some still present peculiarities:

- Traditional Chiefdom (the chief along with his advisors) is the only dispute settlement structure at Konna-Mali. Mediation is unanimously deemed sustainable here, since complaints end with resolutions. Amicable settlement is therefore preferred and no dispute has been above the competence of traditional rulers and thus do not necessitate administrative intervention. The Chief and his Council have created a farm oversight committee with powers to bring errant cattle back to the chiefdom, where herders are imposed substantial fines. These committees equally carry out periodic oversight to prevent free grazing and make sure that animals move in tracks and prevent

them from destroying rare plant species. The so-called “Kaoural Association” can also intervene in mitigating conflicts. Women are excluded from both resource and conflict management.

- At Ouro Boubou, a management committee has been created for amicable management wherein the different ethnic groups in the village are all represented.
- In Diafarabe and Ouro-Boubou, there is an informal mechanism (a committee) in charge of amicable management of conflicts and the ethnic groups of the village are all represented. The fishing council and the farmers and foresters association are both involved as informal authorities. Conflicts under the Committee’s authority are settled in the “Guabakoro”, a great hall designed for that purpose.
- In the Tenenkou-Binta quarter, inhabitants have entire trust in the decisions rendered by traditional authorities and sometimes express reluctance towards administrative authorities, though they may solicit them as last resort in case social mediation fails. To them, modern justice is characterised by the law of the strongest with a highly corrupt judiciary system. However, some disputes are regularly referred to justice and the gendarmerie, as they appear to be above the competence of customary mechanisms.
- Some actors find that decentralization is an opportunity for a more broadly accepted management of land conflicts. To them, *“the transfer of competence to local authorities is profitable because settling disputes at a local level entails less time and expenditure than in court”*.
- Among the villages investigated throughout the district of Youwarou, Ferobe and N’gounouma seemingly appear to be stable: very few cases of violent disputes and referral to modern justice have been recorded so far. Most disputes are settled locally in accordance with customary principles. *“For a very long time now, we no longer go to justice, as it entails too much expenditure”*, a member of the wise men’s council said.

### III.6 Lack of capacity of Justice Officials

Frequently criticized for inefficiency, arbitrary decisions and corruption, justice officials are equally characterised

by acute lack of competence. The scale of this phenomenon can only be understood in light of the following story, reported during interviews held in Sévaré. During the Annual conference on the bourgoutières that was held in Mopti in 2015, a judge presenting on “Disputes over the management of the bourgoutières in Mopti” referred to the 1986 land tenure code (Code domanial), a text that was abrogated in 2002 by the 2000 land tenure law (Code domanial et foncier) and its ratification and amendment acts. The official was equally ignorant of the Pastoral Charter, of the Agriculture Orientation Law as well as many other texts dealing with natural resource management.

## IV. International Actors’ Perceptions

This paragraph focuses on the main remarks from investigations conducted among NGOs and international humanitarian organizations operating in the region of Mopti, and more particularly in districts targeted by the Harande Project. Five major conclusions can be drawn:

- Most stakeholders invariably have emphasized the precarious conditions in the four districts, where populations increasingly have difficulties in accessing their livelihood. Lack of agricultural inputs in predominantly agricultural communities are a direct consequence of the deteriorating security situation since the beginning of the 2012 crisis. In addition, humanitarian and development actors have difficult access to their target communities. Security has become a major challenge for humanitarian operations and development actions in the region of Mopti and most stakeholders note that the violence that erupted in the North in 2012 is gradually extending to the central part of the country, especially in Tenenkou and Youwarou. For instance, World Vision considers that the degrading security situation in Tenenkou and Youwarou is one of the biggest challenges it faces in implementing its emergency programs. Such a situation is not favourable to direct operations such as food distributions or cash transfers. United Nations actors such as the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are supported by local and international partners carrying out activities on their behalf in areas like Tenenkou and Youwarou.

- Managing evolving security demands in Mopti region entails different priorities according to international partners: organizations of the United Nations system have more restrictive security instructions than those applied by most of international NGOs that seemingly operate more freely. Interviews have revealed that strictness of security instructions and degree of restrictions significantly determines actors' depth of knowledge regarding the conflict and its context.
- International actors have a sound knowledge of Mali's institutional context and conflict dynamics, but seem to lack the means to make them compatible with their programs. Most respondents have measured the direct impact of natural resource conflicts and violence on food security and livelihoods in communities affected. However, actors still fail to base their activities on the link between conflict, violence and food security. Moreover, it is difficult for actors to implement actions addressing the root causes of conflicts. However, FAO respondents pointed out an ongoing global analysis of the Malian conflict, followed at the micro level through studies carried out by their Food Security Cluster.
- Some international NGOs are attentive to specific conflict dynamics emerging in the Mopti region. In Douentza localities for instance, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) has been implementing food security projects (in Boni, Mondoro and Hombori) coupled with social cohesion actions. Given that disputes between breeders and farmers over natural resources weaken livestock breeders' purchasing power and undermine farmers' grain banks, DRC has been implementing food security projects including the development of community bodies wherein the various social classes are all represented. DRC has equally initiated a land conflict management-training project for state and customary authorities in Mopti. The project is also aimed at providing legal assistance and disseminating national land law to both public and customary authorities. However, inter-community tensions and difficult access to legal documents and land titles at the level of central and local institutions are bottlenecks hampering the implementation process of the project.
- Finally, none of the partners met during the study seems to have indicators that can help take into consideration communities' distrust towards Mali's

public (the judiciary system) and customary institutions.

## V. Discussion of Quantitative Survey Results

The quantitative part of the research was carried out with the support of a quantitative survey conceived by CARE. The survey encompassed several topics: the first topic has to do with the relationship between current conflicts in the four districts and their impact on livelihoods. Secondly, the survey investigated the nature and behaviors of formal and informal social networks during recurrent and violent conflicts. The survey then examined the major resolution mechanisms, their legitimacy as well as their accessibility for the population. The last part of the survey pays attention to governance systems in general. The present section provides an analysis of data collected in the field. The section follows the structure of the survey. The first two parts study the impact periodic and violent conflicts have on food security and household income, while the next two focus on conflict management and systems of governance. Major findings of the analysis are highlighted with regards to this structure. More specifically, we will see that there are no relevant differences in the way individuals and communities view recurrent or violent conflicts; involved networks and actors; etc. Furthermore, an analysis of collected data reveals that traditional authorities maintain legitimacy and authority in the communities of the four investigated districts: they are trusted as leaders and mediators to whom people refer matters. In the final analysis, the survey shows that State authority has been plummeting, humanitarian and development agencies and community-based organizations are being regarded as actors that ensure access to food security and livelihoods in the targeted zones. Details of the quantitative survey can be here: <http://www.harandemaligis.org>

### V.1 Conflicts and livelihood

According to the results of the survey, there seems to be a relationship between the individual and household livelihood, and the conflicts that they witness and experience. This chapter explores this relationship,

concerning violent conflicts and those occurring during specific periods and cycles.

### Recurrent conflict

The four districts are theaters of various recurrent conflicts mainly among farmers and pastoralists, ethnic groups and neighbouring communities. However, the distribution of these conflicts varies slightly from one district to the other. Findings make it obvious that the recurrent cyclical conflicts observed in the four districts are between farmers and pastoralists (See Appendix 6, Fig.1). The frequency of these conflicts is virtually the same in the four districts with a slightly higher incidence in Youwarou. This type conflict has the most severe impact on the means of production and accessibility of food products, which are essential elements in achieving food security. The list of recurrent conflicts in the area is not exhaustive. Still in Youwarou, the survey recorded a relatively high frequency of conflicts between neighboring communities or different ethnic groups, which are less present in the three other districts. Finally, violence of armed groups has been reported in Tenenkou much more than elsewhere. Respondents said these conflicts are much more recurrent during the raining season (hevernage), and that they do affect mostly agricultural production inputs such as seeds and other farming tools. In Youwarou, a huge majority of respondents also indicated that these conflicts also affect the size of their herds. Such dynamics equally impact available productive resources in the four districts: most of them depend on land cultivation, and a few on cattle rearing. Therefore, farmers and pastoralists are the most affected social groups in the four districts. Respondents have also noted that these conflicts have an impact on fishers, mostly in the districts of Tenenkou and Youwarou.

### Violent conflicts

As far as violent conflicts are concerned, respondents have expressed different opinions from one district to another.

On the actors involved in violent conflicts, respondents in Tenenkou and Youwarou find that State and customary authorities are the most involved. In Youwarou, the violent conflicts disturbing coexistence in communities occur between neighbors. In Tenenkou though, respondents affirmed that violence of armed groups is the

most destructive form of violence in the zone. In the two other districts of Douentza and Bandiagara, opinions vary more. To respondents, these conflicts have an equally negative impact on security, on the household and individual means of production as well as access to services essentials to food security in the targeted districts. As seen during recurrent conflicts, the means of production for farmers and herders are deeply affected by violent conflicts. Again, violent conflicts in Youwarou affect pastoralists' means of production much more than in the other three districts. In conclusion, data collected through the survey reveal a direct correlation between conflicts - be it recurrent or violent - and means of production. The nature of the conflicts in the four districts changes considerably. In the districts of Douentza and Bandiagara we have enumerated a variety of conflicts, ranging from ethnic-driven to conflicts between neighbors. In Tenenkou and Youwarou, farmer-herder conflicts are those with the most severe impact on household livelihoods. Furthermore, conflicts jeopardize access to and availability of seeds, land, and tools for agriculture. At the same time, they cause a decrease in livelihood opportunities for pastoralist groups. Responses show that there is no significant variation in the consequences of conflicts, whether recurrent or violent.

## V.2 Conflicts and networks

This chapter explores the nature and roles played by social networks in the target districts during recurrent and violent conflicts. This part of the research stems from the assumption that social networks are a powerful tool that can ensure long-term resilience in case of shocks related to food security.

### The role of networks in recurrent conflicts

According to respondents, the major networks involved in recurrent conflict are professional associations and community-based organizations. Both have the same relevance, except in the district of Bandiagara, where community-based organizations are far more important than professional networks. However, the type of relationship that binds individuals within these networks varies from one district to another. In Youwarou and Tenenkou, respondents claim that these networks are designed to protect *professional and economic interests*. In Douentza and Bandiagara, the perception is quite

different: respondents say that the interest behind the existence of these organizations is also of ethnic nature, despite acknowledging also an economic and professional reason (*See Appendix 6, Fig. 2*). Needless to say, these relationships are quite strong and mutually reinforce themselves in the presence of recurrent conflicts, thus perpetuating a dynamic based on either professional and economic interests or ethnic links. In such dynamics, each actor plays a role by influencing decision-making over the recurrent conflicts experienced by the community. Information shows an overwhelming influence of *customary leaders* as they wield most of the power within formal and conventional networks as well as in informal and unconventional networks. However, in Tenenkou and Youwarou, the perception of respondents is that *locally elected officials are even more powerful than traditional leaders*. Finally, a marginal role is played by religious or opinion leaders in the four districts. However, the landscape changes when it comes to analysing informal conventional networks. In Bandiagara and Youwarou, most respondents report that traditional leaders are much more influential than any other actors. According to these results, there seems to be a correlation between the nature of the networks - formal or informal - and the relatively influential role played by traditional/customary leaders and stakeholders.

In the case of formal networks, locally elected leaders can make the difference in settling recurrent conflicts, whereas traditional authorities are much more listened to in matters involving informal networks. However, on the nature of the relationship between these networks and the conflicts that affect food security, most respondents in the four districts associate it with family or ethnic ties. A possible interpretation of this discrepancy is that when food security and livelihood are at stake, communities tend to draw their strength from those networks representing traditional ties and values.

#### *The role of networks in violent conflicts*

The survey also looked at the role of actors and networks in influencing violent conflicts. The results show that similar dynamics come into play when it comes to violent conflicts. Socio-professional networks and grassroots associations are the most affected by violent conflicts in the four districts. However, respondents indicated that the types of relationships that are the most affected by violent conflicts are those relationships that ensure access to

means of production, and are mostly ethnic or family ties. The uniformity of responses among the four districts illustrate that there is little or no difference between the social dynamics of formal and informal networks, or the actors that play a decisive role within them. Both recurrent and violent conflicts have the same negative role in affecting social and professional networks. In addition, the results show that the key actors in influencing both recurrent and violent conflicts are either traditional leaders or locally elected officials, with the caveat and differences that have been already laid out in this chapter.

### V.3 Conflict management

Any society has its own ways of handling community conflicts. This chapter examines the main conflict-generating factors as well as the resolution mechanisms that have been put in place in the four target districts, and their legitimacy and efficiency. As usual, a distinction has been made between recurrent and violent conflicts.

#### *Conflict management in recurrent conflicts*

As previously pointed out, the main conflicts in the four districts are between farmers and herders. Consequently, respondents blame this either on the early return of cattle to farming zones, or on the occupation by the herders of arable lands beyond established periods. These elements result in crop destruction, equally seen as the main cause of recurrent conflicts. This holds true in the four districts where the survey was administered. According to respondents, these triggers are much more important than others, such as occupation of protected spaces or absence of delimitation of transhumance corridors. However, it is necessary to mention at this point that a possible bias might have occurred in the responses: the survey was administered in villages, and might have failed to capture the views of herders, who are nomads and as such, difficult to reach.

As far as resolution mechanisms are concerned, people firstly resort to amicable means to settle disputes: these may include compensation for the casualties to farmers for instance. In case a solution cannot be arrived at, cases are referred to a traditional authority in the village. The village chief, for instance, will try to reconcile the parties by finding a solution that is satisfactory to both parties.

Failing this, the parties can either address their concerns to a superior traditional authority, or bring the case to a state authority, such as the *Gendarmerie* or a courthouse. It was discovered that another traditional dispute settlement mechanism is in place, commonly known as *parenté à plaisanterie*. Therefore, actors involved in conflict resolution are traditional rulers, local administrative officials and other State authorities such as judges (See Appendix 6, Fig.3). According to respondents, these mechanisms are easily accessible to everyone, and are reliable. They are acknowledged almost unanimously by respondents, and are deeply entrenched in tradition. They enjoy undoubted legitimacy. The data showed no major discrepancy in responses among the different districts, which leads us to believe that these mechanisms are widely diffused in Malian society, with no major differences in their accessibility or legitimacy.

#### Conflict management in violent conflicts

Conflict resolution mechanisms remain largely unchanged for violent conflicts, just like the actors involved. We observe, however, a slightly higher relevance of religious leaders, as actors involved in the resolution of violent conflicts. This is possibly due to religion being a common ground for most social or ethnic groups in the districts where the research has been conducted. Two main findings can be highlighted. The first is that conflict resolution mechanisms do not vary considerably according to the type of conflict. Communities in the four districts have faith in the same interventions and the same actors for different conflicts - recurrent or violent. Secondly, traditional leaders still wield authority in mediating and resolving conflicts within their constituencies. In the four districts, people still deem customary authority reliable and accessible.

## V.4 Governance

The survey equally explored people's perceptions on governance systems affecting food security. Data collected lead to pessimistic conclusions. First, when asked about formal food security governance institutions active in their area, most respondents immediately thought of "Projects and Program". This shows that the main actors intervening in food security are international development and humanitarian agencies. State structures

play a much less important role, although they are still somewhat relevant to respondents in Youwarou and Bandiagara. Development actors also play a paramount role in ensuring security and access to livelihoods in the four districts. However, when asked about informal actors that ensure access to resources for food security, respondents identified community-based organizations as main actors (See Appendix 6, Fig. 4). These findings thus lead us to the conclusion that in the four districts, external actors such as aid or development agencies, and community-based organizations are the most reliable institutions in the eyes of people when it comes to interventions/services aimed at enhancing food and nutrition security, as well as community resilience to crises affecting food and nutrition security.

The survey also inquired about inclusion or participation of citizens at the local level. Findings show that external actors running projects and programs in the four districts are the main formal actors guaranteeing inclusive participation, while community-based organizations are the informal actor likely to grant inclusive participation (including participation of women) at a village level. This result is spread across most districts, except in Youwarou, where civil society organizations play a leading role.

At the end of the survey, an overall uniform dynamic of formal and informal mechanisms can be suggested to ensure efficient governance of resources. Results also suggest that there is no particular difference with regard to the causes, triggers, and consequences of conflicts, whether recurrent or violent. More specifically, the actors that influence decisions are the same, regardless of the nature of the conflict. Within this framework, traditional leaders are regarded as legitimate and trustworthy authorities in the four districts. In identifying food security actors, the research findings show that State authorities are losing ground: external actors as well as community-based and civil society organizations are gaining momentum and State authority is being put into question. According to respondents, food security and livelihoods are best kept safe if other actors rather than the State are trusted.

## **Section 4 Finding Implications on Harande Programming –**

# Implications and Recommendations

Based on the analysis provided in the four previous sections, this last one is meant to draw operational recommendations on potential avenues and strategies to enhance the impact of the Harande program on food and nutrition security programming focused on building community resilience. The following recommendations are expected to support the adaptation of Harande theory of change, strategies and work plans.

## I. **Recommendations from the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) for food and nutrition security and community resilience in Northern Mali**

1. **The Harande Project should be guided by local specificities of the target areas.** In applying the agro-ecological approach to the Mopti area – two districts in the flooded zone and two districts in the dry zone - the project must take into account the peculiarities of resource use systems pertaining to each zone, especially the persisting prevalence of the customary Dina system, whose implications, though closely linked, are different in both areas. It is also important to take into consideration the central role of pastoralism. It appears that the choice of field survey areas did not take heed of the specificities of the various production systems in the zone. The initially targeted zones were essentially populated by farmers raising limited herds of small or large ruminants. The choice did not focus on areas with predominantly pastoral villages that do exist in the investigated municipalities<sup>74</sup>. Therefore, **the Harande Program should be focused on the integrated development of all local production systems. This is to avoid falling into the traps of development projects focusing on a sole production system.**
2. **Before engaging in a project in a community, Harande should contact and inform the state’s representatives (deconcentrated and technical services), as well as locally elected officials and customary rulers.** Most often, excluding traditional authorities (Chiefs, Jowros, Jitu, etc.) has led to project failure or inefficiency.
3. Though local informal institutions managing natural resources and associated conflicts (land, social and community resources) are subject to mistrust and some of their basic principles (discrimination based on birth, inheritance, generation, gender etc.) are contested, they are still an essential benchmark in the zone. Moreover, many resource conflicts occur because of agro-pastoral area demarcation: overlapping of customary and formal legal principles has triggered numerous disputes often causing violent clashes. **The Harande Program or other similar activity could therefore work towards creating a commission of paralegals (or community mediators) who would serve as legal advisors among chiefs, wise men and forest oversight committees on the one hand and community support networks on the other.** To successfully fulfil this mission, paralegals should achieve proficiency in French and law, in order to master fundamental legal texts and support local and customary institutions in issuing legal acts meant to facilitate their validation and approval by justice. Useful lessons should be learned from experiences of actors such as Eveil in the district of Mopti and community legal clinics (Demeso, the Association of Malian Women Lawyers (AJM), Association for the Progress and Defense of the Rights of Malian Women (APDF) in terms of local community support).
4. Since some local administrative and law officials misunderstand or simply ignore the state of the legislation they are called upon to enforce, the Harande Program or other similar activity could also contribute to bridging of knowledge gap in text and legal provisions in force. Findings of the field research have revealed a need for capacity

<sup>74</sup> After visiting the sites and discussing with target groups, one of the researchers identified this gap and informed CARE of the

need for rectification measures in the choice of additional villages to be investigated.

building of formal resource and conflict management stakeholders who have little or no mastery of applicable political, institutional and legal frameworks. **The Harande program or similar activity could therefore support capacity building of administrative and legal officials by having manuals drafted in local languages, identifying existing legislation and public policies and ensuring their annual updates.** Such actions should mainly target technical services and judiciary institutions.

5. The program should also be guided by documents like the Economic, Social and Cultural Development Programme (PDESC) as well as two other strategy instruments (the Schéma d'aménagement régional du territoire 2011-2025 (SRAT) and the Plan stratégique de développement de la région 2011-2020 (PSDR). These two instruments are designed to ensure coherence between the region' PDESC and those implemented in its districts and councils. **It is equally paramount for the Harande Program to take account of the SRAT and PSDR implementation processes as well as the economic and social objectives coherently defined within the PDESCs.**
6. **It equally seems relevant to help with upgrading the Regional Conference on fodder banks (Conférence régionale des Bourgoutières), a consultation forum that currently lacks influence in the field due to lack of structure.**
7. Chambers of Agriculture should be involved in mobilizing rural stakeholders around organizational issues. Though there has been little reference to them so far during field research, these structures need capacity building for a deeper mastery of issues relating to natural resource management and associated conflicts. **Supporting Chambers of Agriculture at a local level would be particularly efficient.**
8. **A research study carried out within a short timeframe cannot address all problems and issues. Nevertheless, a research study falling within a wider process as envisaged by the Harande project, can initiate a thinking process encompassing further studies. Therefore, the following three aspects can**

**tremendously supplement the present two studies:**

- **The importance of pastoral potential in achieving individual, household and community food security.** This research would consider the strengths, weaknesses and possible potential of pastoral production systems achieving a populations' food security, so as to contribute to the development of Mopti. **A forest, wildlife and soil inventory of the Mopti region.** The rationale behind this is to better identify forest potential such as traditional plants in the communes of Pignari, Dourou, Wadouba, Sangha, Lowel Gueou, Kendie and Doucombo. As previously underscored, the Harande program predominantly focuses on cereals and vegetable cultivation. It is important to consider other sectors such wood energy and wood services, as well as gathering of forest that contribute in a more or less direct way to food security. **Learning from projects carried out by other NGOs operating throughout the different districts.** This may provide an understanding of the rewarding experiences from NGOs actions in Harande's targeted communes, with the view of finding synergies with their varied approaches on participatory management of natural resources and local community trainings. **Comparing different experiences is meant to prevent unnecessary duplications and could help enhance the program's innovations with existing experiences.**

## **II. Recommendations from the analysis of prevalent conflicts that affect food, nutrition and income security in Mopti**

1. Though conditions in the investigated areas did not help obtain a significant amount of reliable

data, the situation in the districts of Youwarou and Tenenkou seems to be extremely insecure and will prevent Harande's smooth and efficient implementation in those areas. Therefore, it might be valuable to move the program to Mopti region areas less affected by insecurity.

2. **Advocacy campaigns should be organized, calling for administration's presence in the field.** Evolving insecurity in the largest areas of Mopti region requires measures to prevent it from spreading widely throughout the whole region. Without the rapid return of the state to the area to reassure the various stakeholders (populations, local governments, NGOs and fields partners), the threat is likely to make community resilience increasingly difficult to achieve. **Consequently, the Harande Program should actively raise the government's awareness on the necessity to fill the prevailing administrative and security vacuum in the region of Mopti.**
3. In areas targeted by the program, conflict settlement mechanisms are mainly focused on interventions of informal institutions and endogenous mechanisms. Those mechanisms are centered on dialogue between conflicting actors and elders' testimonies with the conciliation of notables, village chiefs and patriarchs. However, this approach has failed in addressing the complex conflicts associated not only with the interpretation of customary land law, but also with the absence of written documentation on land acquisition and transfer. **The use of alternative instruments such as the recently established Land Commissions (COFOs) following the Agricultural Orientation Law (LOA), involving local administrations, municipalities, village chiefs as well as community delegates should be scrutinized.**
4. **The Harande program should refer to lessons drawn from the Réseau de plaidoyer pour la sécurisation foncière agricole au Mali (RP-SéFA), whose action is aimed at reinforcing NGOs' roles in negotiating with and influencing family farms as part of security programs.**
5. As mentioned previously, **paralegals (community mediators) should equally**

**address the need to keep dispute records in all their forms, to establish a directory of records and publish it thereafter.** The main objective is to move out of the informal era where only charismatic figures can access the intricacies of family and community claims, as they are knowledgeable of settlement processes and family histories. **Henceforth, records should be kept on each conflict according to the various typologies (family, social, village or inter-village and community) that should appear throughout the settlement and land occupation process (in relation to first occupancy frequently pointed out by respondents).** For instance, documentation will be supported by information provided by the "masters the words" (griots), known as community libraries.

6. **The Harande Program should give more importance to intra-community tensions and conflicts.** While usually minimized, intra-community conflicts and tensions have historically played a key role in the region of Mopti and seem to be exacerbated by the current context. Both intra-community and intercommunity conflicts can seriously affect Harande's activities.
7. Tensions between local populations and refugees or displaced people can become new sources of conflicts. **The Harande program should therefore ensure that its actions benefit to all populations in areas affected by violence or conflict, including refugees or displaced people, without discrimination.**
8. **Communications should be established with the RECOTRAD in order to appraise the most validated conflict management mechanisms in the region of Mopti, while making sure that the extent of customary procedures is not idealized.**
9. **Justice actors should be involved in the development and implementation of projects focusing on reconciliation and conflict management.**
10. **The program should also involve civil society actors that have contributed remarkably to achieving peace. These include Tabital Pulaaku, Ginna Dogon and Deental associations.**

11. **The Harande program could more significantly support the establishment of a conflict and territory observatory at the Conseil Régional.**
12. **Finally, the Harande program or a similar activity could conduct a sociological study of recruitment into armed groups, especially jihadist movements. This might require an understanding of the link between receptiveness to salafism and wahabism on the one hand, and the fall of formerly dominant social categories or the role played by these new members within the brotherhoods (with respect to the socio-economic perspective of youth).**

## **Section 5: Conclusion**

The PEA study was meant to achieve a better understanding of the governance landscape in the region of Mopti. More particularly, it aimed at analysing the region's social and spatial stratification, as well as the governance impact on the formal and informal management practices and power relations over the food, nutrition and income security resource decision making process. Throughout this study, a particular emphasis was placed on customary pre-colonial conceptions of resource management, the role of state decentralized institutions involved in resource governance (region, cercle, district, commune, villages) in the decision-making processes, local informal rules – especially norms relating to resource management and conflict prevention/mediation mechanisms - that influence local governance of resources critical to food and nutrition security, the interactions between formal and informal practices and attitudes determining the ways citizens access and use resources.

The conflict study was intended to leverage existing analyses of the recent round of conflicts in the region, and carry out an appraisal of the implications of both recurrent conflicts and ongoing unrest in the North on livelihoods in general, as well as on local coping strategies to shield against the negative effects such factors have on social relations. This study particularly focused on the following trends: historical perspective stressing both multi-secular trajectories to more recent competitions and rivalries, which have regularly degenerated into violent clashes; current competition between main ethnic/communal

groups; composition and political claims/interests of main armed groups as well as their relationship and kinship with different ethnic groups in Mopti region; conflicts between agricultural farmers and pastoralists but also fishers living along the banks and islands of the Niger River ; analysis of existing ethnic group-based mechanisms and inter-community mechanisms to prevent and manage conflicts including local norms and customs which encourage peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

This two-fold analysis of recurrent and violent crises as well as overlapping and competing customary and legal institutions involved in the management of resources critical to food security shows the need to better ground Harande activities in the socio-cultural context of the Mopti region. This can be achieved by:

- seriously taking into account the role of customary institutions, which are still playing a key role in resource management;
- working with state and informal institutions to help clarify agro-pastoral demarcations;
- supporting capacity building of administrative and legal officials;
- resorting to instruments such as Land Commissions (COFOs) and involving local administrations, municipalities, village chiefs as well as community delegates;
- ensuring that actions benefit to all populations in conflict-stricken-areas;
- resorting to the most validated conflict management mechanisms in communities;
- involving civil society actors that have remarkably contributed in achieving peace.

These will be the conditions for the Harande program to gain legitimacy – and thus to achieve better impact – among local communities, and thus successfully contribute in building sustainable development activities and resilience to conflicts by mitigating their severity.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Bibliography on “Political Economy Analysis for food and nutrition security and community resilience in northern Mali”

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
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### Appendix 3: Traditional structures diagram in the delta region

(By Boubacar Ba)



## Appendix 4: Power relations in the decentralization system : an organized co-management

**(By Boubacar Ba)**

### MANAGEMENT ACTORS

Master of pasture lands

Master of waters

Chief of lineage


Chief of exploitation unit

Chief / Council of village

Rural commune

Cercle

Region



## Appendix 5: TABLES

Table 1: Overview of Institutions and Actors Involved in the Management of Food Security Resources in the Region of Mopti

	<b>Managing Institutions</b>	<b>Managing actors representing the institution</b>	<b>Resources</b>	<b>Areas</b>
<b>CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS</b>	Master of pastures (Jowro)	Descendant of the first occupant in the Fulani tradition (Suudu Baaba)	zones encompassing grazing areas, lodges and tracks according to the Leydis, (socio-ecological entity comprising a major group of cattle rearers with allies, and space subjected to land-use regulations)	Discontinuous areas with characteristics of respective agro-ecological areas (Delta-non-flooded area). A space created with the agro-pastoral codification resulting from the Dina of Sékou Amadou.
	Master of the Land (Bessema)	Chosen by the Jowro	Agricultural area linked to the authority of the Jowro	Agricultural land
	Master of the Waters (Baba awgal/ji-tu)	Chosen by the Bozo fishermen	Fishing area linked to the Jowro's authority	Fishery
	Ginna (Dogon extended family)	Head of family or lineage	Agricultural area linked to first occupancy of the land	Agricultural land
	(Alamoudio, Ogokama, Bara Hogon)	Dozo supervisor of the bush	Forest area jointly managed by many Dogon villages	Environment
	<b>Political/Moral Authority</b>	<b>Players acting as political or moral authority</b>	<b>Role</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
	Village leader	Designated by the first occupant lineage and recognized by administrative authorities	Traditional authority (generally of founding family's descent. This can change as the society changes or according citizen's choices).	Relaying the administration in charge of conciliation
	Council of Wise Men	Group of most elderly people	Customary authority (designated according to customary rules)	interpretation of customs, for mediation or conciliation
	Hogon	Oldest man of the lineage	The Patriarch (a specific institution in the Dogon country)	Moral recourse for conflict settlement
	Hunters Brotherhood;	Members designated according to initiation and secret rites	Forest resource management	

	Brotherhood of Masks	Members designated according to initiation and secret rites		conflicts
<b>LEGAL INSTITUTIONS</b>	<b>Local collectivity</b>	<b>Actors representing the institution</b>	<b>Jurisdiction</b>	<b>Community organization</b>
	Council	Mayor and Communal Council	may receive an estate from the government – possible articulation with customary estates of natural resource	Made up of villages
	District	President of the Cercle and his Council	(may receive an estate from the State- Possible articulation with council estate)	Made up of councils
	Région	Président et conseil régional	(may have access to a domain retroceded by the State. Possibility to have interaction with other district)	Inter cercles

Table 2: Legal and customary frameworks of resource management

Customary framework			Legal framework		
Actors	Principles of resources management	Perceptions by communities	Actors	Principles of resources management	Perceptions by communities
In Delta region: - Jowro (master of the lands and pastures) - Ji-tu (master of waters) - Bessema.	community's or lineage's rights to land (premier occupant)	Most of the local population are still referring to informal natural resource management agreements as well as to land rights between original claimants to a territory and newcomers which predate colonization	Communes made of villages Cercles Region	Decentralisation has established regions, cercles, and communes as "collectivités locales" (territorial units), entitled to manage their own natural resources.	decentralization rules and principles are often unknown by traditional leaders and population at large, resulting in a lack of mobilization and adhesion.
	recognition of prohibition and restrictive rules related to periods, days and times of grazing/fishing, zones			The decentralisation has resulted in a significant empowerment of the village organizations which are officially recognized.	
	capture of certain species during certain periods and admission of animals prior to withdrawal of water or crops			Customary organizations in pastoral and fishing territories such as jowro, ji-tu and bessemas do not have <i>dejure</i> recognition.	
	Mobility of animals according to a principle of livestock management inherited from the Dina and customarily accepted due to natural resource constraints and the need to preserve social			However, the law requires that traditional managers must be consulted by the communal council prior to decision making.	

	<p>peace in the Delta</p> <p>Reciprocity of the movement between the Delta and the dry areas, based on the mutual interdependence of resources</p>			<p>Locally elected officials are necessarily involved in farming organization, equipment installation and management, development and implementation of land use plans, environment protection and land conflict arbitration.</p>	
	<p>Interdependence and integration of space and activities. The end of an activity results in the suspension of power over the resources and the beginning of another</p>			<p>Natural resource management is conceived on a single scope, which is the locality made up of villages and councils. This corresponds to farming and stockbreeding activities, but also to transhumant pastoralism and fishing, which may entail larger physical space.</p>	
<p>Dry area : village institution and ancestry as central elements of Dogon and Songhai land policies</p>	<p>According to the right of first occupancy, property rotation within the family with privileged access to land for the elder of the lineage and village founder (the Ginna in Dogon's communities</p>			<p>According to the Land Code, "vacant land without owners is the property of the State".</p>	
	<p>Manan (unité familiale) : gestion de la</p>			<p>Consultation of the Prefet (at the level of the</p>	

	production céréalière à usage de consommation			Cercle) prior to the implementation of the PDESC	
	Vegetable production for commercial purpose, carried out by individuals or nuclear families.			The 2001 Pastoral Charter, is a piece of legislation regulating access to pastoral resources and entrusting substantial natural resource management responsibilities to communes.	
	Remote farm lying fallow and accessible to everybody.			Parties of a land conflict must submit their claims to the COFO's arbitration before referral to relevant courts	
	Winter season is appropriate for dry and flooded cultivation, while cold dry season is best for vegetables.				
	Under the supervision of the village chief, the general meeting of the council of wise men proposes the management rules related to agricultural production and to resource conservation.				
	the council of wise men designates the youths of the village for the firm application of the				

	management rules to all users of natural resources				
	The neighborhood representatives (the lineage chiefs) inform the members of their respective lineages.				
	The rituals characterising agriculture in the Dogon territory include the Lebe, a worshiped spirit incarnating respect of principles and values in a given society, the Binou and the Pegou known as totems.				

Table 1 : Summary Table of Changes Introduced by Agricultural Policies

<b>Social and Economic Impact of Agriculture-Targeted Policies</b>			
Agriculture	Stockbreeding	Pastoralism	Fishing
Extension of agricultural spaces	Farmers' involvement in stockbreeding	impoverishment of pastoral communities	Impact on fishermen's living because of agricultural policies
Every community is now involved in agriculture which has always been Dogon and Songhai's main activity and has now become a second activity for the Fulani	Some traditional stockbreeders are now running big farm estates	Overturn in Fulani power relations, since former Rimaibe slaves who used to cultivate lands owned by Rimbe nobles (especially the Modibaabe) are now getting wealthy, as agriculture has become increasingly lucrative.	Reconversion of many fishermen into farmers
Farmers enrichment	Cattle rearing is now practiced in all production units by all social categories	Consequently, the functions of the Jowro (traditionally incumbent to the Rimbe nobility) tend to be outweighed by that of the Bessema (traditionally incumbent to the Rimaibe).	Tensions between anglers wishing to sustain their activity in this sector, due to competition between traditional and older fishing methods.
	Reconversion of stockbreeders either into salaried shepherds or into farmers cultivating borrowed land plots.		

Table 4: Conflict Typology in the Mopti region

	<u>Conflicts of leadership</u>	<u>Conflicts related to resource exploitation</u>	<u>Conflicts linked to the definition of agro-pastoral space</u>	<u>Conflicts linked to intra-community tensions</u>	<u>Conflicts linked to intra-community tensions</u>	<u>Potentially belligerent violence linked to the impact of the crisis triggered by the North crisis in 2012</u>
Manifestations	Demonstrations of positions of power and hierarchies within political institutions, especially chieftains' conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conflicts between the actors of the same system of exploitation (between farmers, between breeders, between pastors, between fishermen)</li> <li>- Conflicts between the actors of two competing operating systems (Conflicts between breeders and farmers or between pastoralists and farmers, Conflicts between farmers and fishermen, Conflicts between fishermen-breeders)</li> </ul>	Conflicts related to the non-acceptance of administrative divisions; Conflicts of succession and inheritance; Conflicts over land sales in violation of customary rules; Conflicts related to the refusal of the application of res judicata	Conflicts between Peulhs, Dogon, Songhai, Bambara	Conflict between social categories (casted and not casted); Between families; Between generations; Rights-related conflicts	Attacks by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Armed Bands</li> <li>- Political-Military Groups (jihadists or challenging the state)</li> <li>- Self-Defense Groups</li> </ul>
Impact on the management of resources essential to food and	Breakdown of social and community links	Rural exodus Reduction of production capacity	Rural exodus Reduction of production capacity	Rural exodus Reduction of	Rural exodus Reduction of	Reduced participation in fairgrounds

nutrition security		Decrease in revenues Reduction of agricultural yields and thus of consumable goods Lower incomes	Decrease in revenues Reduction of agricultural yields and thus of consumable goods Lower incomes	production capacity Decrease in revenues Reduction of agricultural yields and thus of consumable goods Lower incomes	production capacity Decrease in revenues Reduction of agricultural yields and thus of consumable goods Lower incomes	Use of light weapons in in-community clashes
Intensity	Limited	High	High	High	High	Potentially high

Table 5: Causes of Conflict in the Mopti Region

Normative Causes	Technical-Operational Causes	Societal Causes	Local Causes	Political Causes	Causes of State Governance Deficit	Security Causes
Absence of writings and formalization of "customary properties", modes of bequest or land lending;	Competition between different types of exploitation	Challenging the traditional order of social organization;	Political instrumentalisation of competition in the exploitation of resources and disputes related to the agro-pastoral area		Inadequate or disproportionate response of the security forces to the growing insecurity resulting from the crisis born in 2012	Sequelles left by the occupation of Part of the region by terrorist groups from the North
Failure to respect traditional land-yielding practices (precedence, sharecropping, royalty ...)	Inadequate national forest management schemes	Dislocation of large complex family (restricted and extended family units, rancor between families due to past conflicts).	Political instrumentalisation of chieftainship conflicts		Incapacity of the State to mediate competition or to regulate access to resources (land, pasture and community security)	Circulation of small arms
juxtaposition of traditional practices and new uncontrolled legal mechanisms	Inadequate development policies centered on Agriculture to the detriment of pastoralism				Low familiarity of the local administrative and judicial authorities with the laws that they are in charge to enforce	Islamic radical proselytism
	Lack of pasture space in these dry zones				Absence of any representative of the State in Outside of urban communes	Increasing tensions between local communities, especially the rural community, and the Armed Forces (FAMA)
	Lack of agricultural land				Notorious lack of control of state representatives on arms circulation	
	Degradation of exploitable resources due to				Demolition of state authority marked by the passivity of the administration	

	climate change			in the face of exacerbated conflicts	
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Table 6: Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Mopti Region

<b>Management Mechanisms and Conflict Resolution</b>			
	<i>Traditional Mechanisms</i>	<i>State Mechanisms</i>	<i>Mechanisms Involved in Civil Society</i>
<u>Conflict of Leadership (or Legitimacy)</u>	Council of the Wise Religious leaders Griots; Blacksmiths Tree of palaver	Mediation of locally elected representatives Justice	Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association. Deental Association
<u>Conflicts related to the exploitation of resources</u>	Village chief and his council Council of the Wise Eating the ground Swearing under the fig tree Tone	Land commissions (COFO) Police / gendarmerie Justice	Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association. Deental Association Eveil Association
<u>Conflicts linked to the definition of the agro-pastoral space</u>	Griots	Land commissions (COFO) Police / gendarmerie Justice	Awake Association
<u>Conflicts linked to inter-community tensions</u>	Sinagouya (pleasant cousinship); Mandé Charter in certain communities (Bambaras, Dogons, Malinkés, bozos)	Institutional justice	RECOTRAD, Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association Deental Association
<u>Conflicts related to intra-community tensions;</u>	Sinangouya (pleasant cousinship) Initiatory societies		RECOTRAD, Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association Deental Association
<u>Violence potentially belligerous linked</u>		Armed Forces	

<u>to the impact of the crisis triggered in the North in 2012</u>			
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Table 7: NGOs active in the management of natural resources and food security in Bandiagara district

Structures	Area of Intervention	Financial partners	Observations
YAGTU	- Restoration of the environment - Promoting food diversification - Market perimeter	Canadian Embassy Care International LWR Switzerland	YAGTU has been working for the last ten years in most of the communes of the Bandiagara circle
Human Action Promotion (APH)	Conflict prevention and management	Caritas Christian Aid	APH has been working for a decade In the communes of Dandoli, Kendié, Bara Sara, Doucoumbo, Soroly and Pignari in the strengthening of COFO in relation to justice, administration and communes
Molibemo	- Support to food security - Support to organizational development and micro-credit With the village self-management funds- Support for vegetable crops and sustainable agriculture	Oxfam UK Bread for the world FAO	Molibemo has been active in the majority of the communes of the Bandiagara circle for several years.
The Irrigation Proximity Project in the Dogon Country and in Bêlédougou (IPRO-DB)	- Construction and rehabilitation of dams; - Construction of access roads to villages and markets; - Valorisation of the infrastructures carried out (support to agricultural sectors) - Reinforcement of the management capacities of farmers' organizations	KFW DED	The project intervenes in most of the communes of Bandiagara
GAAS Mali	- Protection of the environment and management of natural resources - Food security	Care International Belgium DED GIZ	The project has been in place for almost 20 years in most of the communes of the Bandiagara
Near East Foundation (NEF)	Food security and population resilience to climate and social crises	Royal Netherlands Embassy	The project has been operating since 2015 in 05 communes of the Circle (Kendié, Diamnate, Borko, Dagani, Pelou) as part of the development of the Touperé forest.
Mali Climate Change Adaptation Project (MCCAA)	Resilience of local communities to climate change Project actions identified in connection	USAID	Project under way in the municipalities of Dandoli and Dourou

	with the social and economic development projects of the communes (PDSEC)		
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Table 8: NGOs operating in the Douentza Circle

Structures	Area of intervention	Structures
<b>AL COP/</b> Poverty Reduction Support Project	Hydro agricultural development - Development of the village terroir - Fight against poverty - Conservation of natural resources - Environmental education in schools - Creation of Arboretum - Protection of endangered species - Support for women, microcredit	<b>Canada</b>
<b>CSR/</b> Catholic Service Relief	- Social Cohesion - Conflict management - Perimeter maraicher - Then at large diameters	<b>USAID/USA</b>
<b>Islamic Relief</b>	Islamic Relief - Gifts and distribution of cereals - Large diameter wells	<b>UK</b>
<b>Sahel eco</b>	Climate change - Nutrition - Natural Resources Protection	<b>USAID/CARE</b>
<b>CSIV</b>	- Training, market gardening, health, seed, - Rehabilitation and development - Financial, material and technical support - Wells with large diameters - Vaccination - Nutrition - market gardening perimeter	<b>CNR/Denmark</b>
<b>NEF</b> (Near East Foundation)	- Conflict prevention and management - Council to municipalities - Exploitation and management of rural timber markets - Agricultural Extension - Involvement of elected representatives and actors in the protection and management of conflicts - Environmental Protection - Support to economic recovery and resilience of populations to climate change	<b>Netherland Royal Embassy</b>

Table 9: Conflict situations in Bandiagara District

Table 9.a. : Conflict situation in the councils of Pignari, Dourou and Dandoli

District of Bandiagra and Communes	Conflicting Parties	Matter	Evolution of the conflict/ settlement methods
<b>Pignari</b>	1. Populations of the village of Pah (council of Pignari) and those of Diallo (Bara Sara) who settled on their lands.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Customary property on a space occupied by the Diallo since 1976</li> <li>- Difficult access to the Dialo market</li> <li>- diverging interests since 1982.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Resolution attempt by local institutions (village chiefs, councils of wise men), municipal authorities (Mayors) and referral to justice;</li> <li>- Dispute over the territorial space between councils of Pignari and Bara Sara.</li> <li>- Re-emerging conflicts resulting in community tensions</li> <li>- On-going proceedings.</li> </ul>
	2. Conflict between Birago and Karembe families (in a Baboye Hamlet) over customary property right.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- claim to precedence by the Karembe in 2008,</li> <li>- The Biragos solicited an area for residential parcels where the family would settle and expand.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>conciliation attempt by local institutions and municipal authorities</b></li> <li>- <b>re-emerging conflict</b></li> <li>- Referral to justice and on-going proceedings</li> </ul>
	3.. Conflict in the village of Koko, between Degoga and Karembe families over land use.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Claim of property right</li> <li>- Conflict relating to residential land solicitation in 2012</li> </ul>	Amicable resolution of the conflict by the wise wen and the Mayor.
<b>Dourou</b>	1. Conflict opposing populations of Duru (Bandiagara district) to those of Koporopen (District of Koro) over land use.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Claim of land use right</li> <li>- Old conflict revived in 2010</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Resolution attempt by the wise, village chiefs, mayors and the prefets.</li> <li>- Referral to justice</li> <li>- deadly clash with about ten killed and burnt settlements</li> <li>- violent conflict</li> </ul>
	2. Conflict opposing Ourou (council of Dourou) and Tereli (council of Sangha) villages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conflict relating to a claim of customary property right</li> <li>- Resolution attempt by village chiefs, councils of wise men, mayors of two councils and leaders of the Ginna Dogon association.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-, Resolution attempt</li> <li>- Violent and deadly conflict with more than five killed</li> <li>- conflict re-emerging for many years</li> <li>- Declaration as « no go » area contentious plot declared a defence land</li> <li>- Violent conflict</li> </ul>

	3. Land use conflict between the villages of Dioundourou (council of Dourou in Bandiagara) and Wol (council of Koporona in the district of Koro)	-; Conflict related to space delimitation - Dispute between various family units	- Conciliation attempt by family units, chiefs, locally elected and state officials - re-emerging conflict - area declared a defence land - Resort to the Binu (the <i>serment derisoire</i> ) to decide between both parties
	4. Conflict opposing the villages of Tegu and Tama over farmlands.	- Conflict around customary property right	- Reconciliation attempt by local institutions and the Mayor -; Clash threat
	5. Dispute over chieftaincy in Dabolo village	n Succession dispute	-, Reconciliation attempt by local institutions -, clash threat - Referral to justice
<b>Dandoli</b>	1. Conflict in Golgou between Nantoume families over customary property right	- Conflict between two families and resulting in division	c Conciliation attempt by customary institutions - Recurrent tensions and clashes in the village - Referral to justice -. Area declared a defence land
	2. Conflict opposing the village of sokolo (council of Dandoli) to a group of villages belonging to a same council (Sibi Sibi, Kolongtanga) and the village of Diombololey (council of Docoumbo) over rights to a land site.	, conflict opposing three protagonists with different allied within family units of the village - Conflict over customary property right	- Customary resolution attempt by village chiefs and locally elected officials of Dandoli and Docoumbo - Referral to justice - Site declared a defence land

**Table 9.b.: General Table of conflicts recorded across the District of Bandiagara**

*The information in the table below shows the situation of conflicts at the level of the Bandiagara circle (and not in the villages visited). From the cross-checking of administrative, judicial and NGO sources to which the researcher has been able to access in the Bandiagara circle.*

Typologies	Localities	Actors	Management mode	Impacts on NRM and local communities and conflicts
	<b>Wadouba Commune</b>			

Land Disputes	Domo Village	Farmers, Agropastors (among families of the village in 2015)	Traditional mode (attempted management by the village chief, notables, sages)  Failed conciliation with the involvement of the town hall  Seizure of justice by one of the parties; Judicial proceedings in progress	Degradation of the social fabric at the village level + economic burden
	Tabitongo Village	Farmers (conflict between two families in the same village in 2016)	Traditional mode (attempted management by the village chief, notables, sages) Resolution in progress	Deterioration of social bond
	Dianou / Gagnaga Villages	Farmers (conflict between a family of the village of Dianou and the community of the village of Gagnaga in 2015)	Traditional fashion (management attempt by the village chief, notables, Failure to reconcile with the involvement of the town hall Seizure of justice by one of the parties; Judicial proceedings at the first instance (Bandiagara and Courts of Appeal (Mopti)	Deterioration of social ties
	<b>Kendié / Kendé communes</b>			
	Kendé / Diannati villages (hamlet of Endèguèm, Kendié commune)	Farmers, agropastors conflict between two families at the beginning then became a conflict between Kendé and the hamlet Diannati and the village of Endèguèm Commune of Kendié in 2015	Traditional mode (attempt of management by village chiefs, notables, sages)  Failed conciliation with the involvement of the town hall Justice by one of the parties  Judicial proceedings pending at first instance in Bandiagara	Deterioration of social ties
	<b>Kendé Commune</b>			
Kendé / Bondi villages (hamlet of the same village)	Farmers, agropastors (conflict between the village of Kendé	Traditional fashion (attempted management by village chiefs, notables, sages) Failed	Deterioration of social ties	

		opposite the hamlet of Bondi from the village of Kendé in 2015	conciliation with the involvement of the council  Seizure of justice by one of the parties; Judicial proceedings pending at first instance in Bandiagara	Returning of exploitation lands
<b>Borko Commune</b>				
Dempari /Kiro villages	Farmers, agro pastors: former rebellion conflicts between the community of Dempari village of Bandiagara and that of the village Of Kiro circle of Douentza.	Traditional mode (attempted management by village chiefs, notables, sages)  Failure to reconcile with the involvement of the town hall  Seizure of justice by one of the parties; Judicial proceedings pending at first instance in Bandiagara		Deterioration of social ties Armed conflicts and injuries Violent Conflict
<b>Ségué-Iré Commune</b>				
Ningari Sectors (12 villages)	Farmers, agro pastoralists: Yalcouyé communities in the area against the Kansaye in the village of Donnou. Conflict born about 10 years ago	Traditional mode (attempted management by village chiefs, notables, sages)  Failure of conciliation with the involvement of the council  Failure of conciliation between the governor of Mopti and the Minister of the Interior in his time  Seizure of justice by one of the parties; Judicial proceedings at first instance(Bandiagara and Courts of Appeal (Mopti)		Tears in social relations + economic charges + mistrust of the interveners, cases of death of aman, damage in the fields of Kansaye, intervention of security forces and security with imprisonment Of the people of Nangaladoumbo  Violent Conflict
Nangaladoumbo	Farmers, agro pastors: family of the chief opposed to a part of the population of the village	Traditional mode (attempt of management by the village chiefs, The notables, the sages)  Failure to reconcile with the involvement of the council		

		Conflict linked to that of Donnou came up about 6 years ago	Seizure of justice by one of the parties Judicial proceedings at the first instance Bandiagara	
<i>Dandoli Commune</i>				
	Sibi-Sibi / Sokolo Villages	Farmers, agro pastors: Community of the village of Sibi-Sibi and that of the village of Sokolo Conflict born about 10 years ago	Traditional mode (attempted management by village chiefs, notables, sages)  Failure to reconcile with the involvement of The town hall  Seizure of justice by one of the parties; Judicial proceedings at the first instance Bandiagara	Deterioration of social ties
<i>Bandiagara / Koro Districts</i>				
		Farmers, agro pastoralists: conflict between the Koporopen community, the commune of the same name, the Koro circle and that of Yawa, the Dourou commune of Bandiagara.	Traditional management mode  Failure of conciliation  Development of justice	Deterioration of social relations  Army confrontation  Cases of human deaths  Service intervention and security.  Violent conflict
Leadership conflicts	<i>Dourou Commune</i>			
	Dobolo Village	Farmers, agro pastors: populations of the same village divided into 2 camps. Partisans of village chief (in a neighborhood) opposed to protesters in another. Conflict	Traditional mode (attempt of management by the notables, the sages) Failed to reconcile with the involvement of the town hall  Case at the level of the administration (Administrative tribunal)	Tears of social relations  Mistrust of the interveners  Failure of certain projects

		born about 6 years ago.		
<b>Kendé Commune</b>				
<b>Kendé Village</b>	Farmers, agro pastors: opposing 2 families of Kendé The allies have grown rank on both sides This conflict was born about 7 years ago	Traditional mode (attempt of management by the notables, the sages) Case is past At the level of the administration, the decision fell in favor of a party	Deterioration of social ties Returns of farming land	
<b>Ségué-Iré Commune</b>				
<b>Sougui Village</b>	Farmers, agro pastors: within the same family Which was enlarged with the supporters of each of the parties, and later the conflict became a village one with the formation of two groups:	Traditional mode (attempt of management by the notables, the sages) Dossier is at the level of the administration	Disagreement between members of the family Division and weakening of the family	
<b>Commune of Soroly</b>				
<b>Bendjeli Village</b>	Farmers, agro pastors: populations of the same village divided into 2 camps. Partisans of village chief (in a neighborhood) opposed to protesters in another. Conflict born about 8 years ago	Traditional mode (attempted management by the notables, the wise) Dossier is passed to the level of the administration, the decision fell in favor of a part	Deterioration of social ties Retreat of some partners Slowing or even halting of development activities	

Commune of Timiniri			
Conflict related to the non-definition of the agro-pastoral area	Conflict between the village of Tentari (Timiniri commune, Bandiagara circle) and the village of Niondoli (Timissa commune, Tominian circle) Easements related to the exploitation of pastoral areas (lodges, pasture area, obstruction of animal passageways). Subsequently the conflict became communal and reached the level of the two circles with the formation of groups of pressure and interest	Traditional mode (attempted management by the notables, the sages) Dossier at the level of the administration and the justice	Disagreement between the villages according to agricultural and pastoral vocations  Testative delimitation of the zones of exploitation  Menace of confrontation
Commune of Pignari Bana			
Conflict related to the Illegal sales of land in violation of customary rules	Conflict between the Degoga family and several members of Koa village concerning illegal sale of land to customers from Mopti military, traders Eventually the conflict became a village one by 2015.	Traditional mode (attempted management by the notables, the sages, Ginna Dogon, the mayor of the commune)  Land speculation and sale of several hectares of land without the knowledge of the elders holding the right of acquisition Dossier at the level of the administration and of justice	Disunity between family members and the villagevillage chief and notables)  Threats of purchasers of land and possibility of confrontation

Table 10: Overview of roles and responsibilities of social, community, political and administrative Actors as well as technical and financial partners

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Roles</b>	<b>Responsibilities</b>
<p><b><u>Social and Community:</u></b>                      traditional leaders,                      traditional Managers ,                      Women, Youth, Elders,                      Contacts,                      traditional associations of                      management of traditional resources,                      producers and their emanations                      organizations (chambers of                      agriculture, Association of peasant                      organizations)                      Association Ginna Dogon                      Association Tabital Pulaku                      traditional network communicators</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• • Promote dialogue and consultation Between actors</li> <li>• • Valuing the principles of customary law in conflict resolution</li> <li>• • Using traditional cousin relations for conflict management (eg Fulani cousinship - Blacksmith, Dogon-Bozo)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• • Mediation and intermediation between actors in order to say The truth and definitively define conflicts;</li> <li>• • Non-violent conflict management;</li> <li>• • Documentation of the cases processed in order to constitute databases</li> <li>• • Information and prevention in time by the administrative and political authorities</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Local Communities:</u></b>                       Members of the communal council                      Members of the circle councils,                      Members of the Regional Assembly</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• • Informing Raising awareness</li> <li>• • Depoliticizing conflicts</li> <li>• • To sensitize and mobilize the State and the partners for the granting of resources for the prevention and the management of the conflicts</li> <li>• To develop mechanisms of the Commissions of prevention of the conflicts at the communal level.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• • Support from local actors for the correct application of laws;</li> <li>• • Advocacy for the correct execution of court decisions</li> <li>• • Support local commissions for conflict resolution</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Administrative and judiciary:</u></b>                      Village and fraction Heads                      Prefects and sub-prefects,                      Justice, Gendarmerie, National                      Guard, technical services for rural                      development</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• • Identify areas Conflicts</li> <li>• • Negotiate, develop and update local conventions</li> <li>• • Provide guardianship and advisory support</li> <li>• • Support the setting up of communal and local land commissions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for the development of agro-sylvo-pastoral areas</li> <li>• Follow-up and supervision of The materialization of the courses</li> <li>• Chairing the Municipal and Local Land Commissions</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>Technical and financial partners</u></b>                      Projects                      NGO's                      Other partners</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical and financial support,</li> <li>• Material support.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for the identification of projects and programs</li> <li>• Support for partner financing and research</li> <li>• Support for capacity building</li> </ul>

Table 11: Conflicts Typology in the Six Villages Investigated in the Region of Douentza

DISTRICT OF DOUENTZA					
s Councils	Villages	Conflicting parties	Frequence and intensity	Matter	Evolution of the conflict/Resolution mechanisms
Douentza	<i>Koumbena</i>	Void			
Koubewel Koundia	<i>Horodou</i>	Void			
	<i>Mougui II</i>	Void			
Dangol Boré	<i>N'doukoye</i>	- Chieftaincy Disputes - Farmers-breeders - Farmers-farmers - Community tensions	- Frequent - Frequent and violent	Chieftaincy and succession Transhumance Access to land Delimitation of Agricultural space	- Customary mechanisms which have proven to be weak and - Ad hoc courts and Supreme Court ) - Customary mechanism
		<i>Gnimignama</i>	- Farmers-Breeders - Farmers-Fishermen - Communities - Chiefdoms - Political conflicts	Violent and frequent	- Destruction of crops - Fishing - Succession - Political pluralim
	<i>Niogolon</i>		- Farmers-breeders - Land conflicts	Frequent, intermittent and less violent	- Free grazing - Access to property

Table 12: Recurrent Conflicts in Tenenkou investigated Villages

District of Tenenko u, Council	Conflicting Parties	Frequency and Intensity	Matter	Impact/Consequence	Evolution/Settlement mechanisms
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<b>of Sougoulbe</b>					
<b>Konna-Mali<sup>75</sup></b>	1- Farmers and breeders. Conflict occurring during Winter season .	Non-violent conflicts.	Free-grazing and lack of grazing lands	Decrease in agricultural production  Intra-community tensions, youths migration	Preventive mechanisms: - Strengthening farm oversight system during winter season; -,Raising breeders' awareness on traditional/informal conflict management structures (Chiefs and notables) when winter approaches -Providing grain and financial support to victims
	2 - Women over village market garden. Women and herders Disputes occurring during dry season	Non-violent conflicts	Lack of water due to dry wells and free-grazing	Decline in vegetable production. Tensions and mistrust between actors Low household incomes Tensions between women and stockbreeders	Preventive mechanisms : awareness raising against free grazing when winter season approaches Customary/informal dispute resolution structures (Chiefs and notables); Koural association; sustainable mediations and resolutions (No complaint avec customary decision for instance).

<b>Cercle de District of Tenenkou, council of Sougoulbe</b>	<b>Conflicting Actors</b>	<b>Conflict frequency and intensity</b>	<b>Matter</b>	<b>Impact/sequence</b>	<b>Evolution/sttlement mechanisms</b>
<b>Konna-Fabé</b>	Konna-Fabe Farmers and Tenenkou breeders	Non-violent but recurrent conflicts erupting during winter seasons.	Crops destruction due to free grazing Insufficient pastures at Tenenkou	Decline in agricultural production, with crop destruction leading to disputes between farmers and herders ; Youths migration and lower household income.	Customary/informal dispute resolution structures (Chiefs and notables); Koural association; sustainable mediations and resolutions (No complaint avec customary decision for instance).

<b>District of Tenenkou ,council of</b>	<b>Conflicting actors</b>	<b>Conflict frequency and intensity</b>	<b>Matter</b>	<b>Impact/Consequence</b>	<b>Evolution/ Settlement Mechanisms</b>
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<sup>75</sup>.Interviewees in Konna-Mali village have highlighted the absence of inter- or intra-community conflict in the village, and stressed social cohesion, cooperation and mutual respect.

<b>Sougoulbe</b>					
Seinde Sallah villages <sup>7677</sup>	Salah farmers and Tenenkou breeders	Non-violent disputes, though youths often resort to violence in keeping the cattle in pounds	Free grazing in rice-growing areas and lack of pastures at Tenenkou	Decline in agricultural production. Resentment between farmers and breeders due to free grazing. Youths migration and decline in household income.	Customary/informal dispute resolution structures (Chiefs and notables); Mediations by religious leaders (Imams), the Chief, wise men, advisors etc. Sustainable mediations and resolutions (No complaint avec customary decision for instance).

<b>Commune de Tenenkou</b>	<b>Conflict Actors</b>	<b>Conflict frequency and intensity</b>	<b>Matter</b>	<b>Impact/consequence</b>	<b>Evolution/ Mechanisms</b>	<b>Settlement</b>
Tenenkou-Binta	1-Farmers and breeders.	Non-violent protest, amicable resolution or community intervention. Conflict taking place during winter season	Crops destruction due to free grazing. Lack of pastures at Tenenkou leading to the exploitation of pastoral tracks	Tensions between actors (destruction of crops oppose farmers to breeders for instance). Decline in household income aggravating poverty in the community, compelling young people to rural exodus	Customary/informal dispute resolution structures (Chiefs and notables); Mediations by religious leaders (Imams), the Chief, wise men, advisors etc. Sustainable mediations and resolutions (No complaint avec customary decision for instance). However, this is not the case at the level of administrative authorities where only those with more financial means win disputes.	
	2- Conflict opposing anglers	Peaceful protests and community resolution	Non-compliance with customary precedence during fishing periods	Disruption of family relationships between actors (fishermen).	Customary/informal dispute resolution structures (Chiefs and notables); Mediations by religious leaders (Imams), the Chief, wise men, advisors etc. Sustainable mediations and resolutions (No complaint avec customary decision for instance).	
	3 Interest conflicts opposing politicians	Leaders and members of political parties	Strictly political or economical interest conflicts	Disruption of family, friendship or even marriage relationships	Customary/informal dispute resolution structures (Chiefs and notables); Mediations by religious leaders (Imams), the Chief, wise men, advisors etc.	

<sup>76</sup>It is worth mentioning that in Konna-Fabe and Seinde-Sallah, there was no focus on youths, as young people carry out farm works till nightfall. Women in both villages withdrew into complete silence and made mention of no ongoing conflict (unlike men). More generally, it should be noted that many people interviewed have maintained silence during focus group discussions conducted in the district of Tenenkou, due to mass hysteria associated with prevailing insecurity. They are all afraid of night reprisals and mistrust one another: everybody is unsure of who is who, as it is usually said.

				between actors (fishermen).	
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Table 13: Ongoing Conflicts in Youwarou Investigated Villages



District of Youwarou	Conflict Actors	Frequency/intensity of the conflict	Matter	Impact/consequence of the conflict	Evolution and Settlement Mechanisms
Sobé village	<p>Farmers-breeders</p> <p>Anglers-anglers</p> <p>Anglers-breeders over fisheries</p> <p>Power struggles</p>	<p>Sometimes very violent</p> <p>Assault and battery</p> <p>Property Destruction</p>	<p>Conflicts related to free-grazing</p> <p>Destruction of crops and lack of pastures</p> <p>Dispute over the bourgou</p> <p>Use of non-compliant equipment</p> <p>Poor management of natural resources by a single group</p>	<p>Decline in agricultural production</p> <p>Disruption of social links and social cohesion.</p> <p>Highly costly legal procedure</p> <p>Impoverishment of parties (especially with the involvement of the Gendarmerie and the judiciary system).</p> <p>Mistrust and hostility towards the bozos</p>	<p>Prevalence of chiefs of village and traditional rulers.</p> <p>Elaboration of local conventions on resource conflict prevention and management: fishing conventions among anglers.</p> <p>Declaration of the contentious resource as “no go area”.</p> <p>Mediation and regulation are ensured by religious leaders (Imams) and notables :</p> <p>The council of the wise</p> <p>Castes men</p> <p>Council</p> <p>The Gendarmerie</p> <p>The Sous-Prefet and</p> <p>Courts</p>



Homboloré village	<p>Farmers-breeders</p> <p>Anglers-anglers</p> <p>Anglers-breeders over fisheries</p> <p>Claims over ownership of fisheries between villages.</p>	<p>Sometimes very violent</p> <p>Assault and battery</p> <p>Loss of human lives</p> <p>Destruction of property</p>	<p>Free-grazing of animals</p> <p>Crops destruction and lack of pastures</p> <p>Dispute over the bourgou</p> <p>Use of non-compliant equipment</p> <p>Poor management of natural resources by a single group</p> <p>Disputes over Jowro's management.</p>	<p>Decline in agricultural production</p> <p>.</p> <p>Disruption of social links and social cohesion.</p> <p>Highly costly legal procedure</p> <p>Impoverishment of parties (especially with the involvement of the Gendarmerie and the judiciary system).</p> <p>Mistrust and hostility towards the bozos</p> <p>Closure of collective fisheries.</p>	<p>Prevalence of chiefs of village and traditional rulers.</p> <p>Elaboration of local conventions on resource conflict prevention and management: fishing conventions among anglers.</p> <p>Declaration of the contentious resource as “no go area”.</p> <p>Mediation and regulation are ensured by religious leaders (Imams) and notables :</p> <p>The council of the wise</p> <p>Castes men</p> <p>Council</p> <p>The Gendarmerie</p> <p>The Sous-Prefet and</p> <p>Courts</p>
Férobé village	<p>Farmers-breeders</p> <p>Anglers-Anglers</p> <p>Anglers-anglers over fisheries</p> <p>Pastoral tracks covered by farms</p>	<p>Not really violent</p>	<p>Free-grazing of animals</p> <p>Crops destruction and lack of pastures</p> <p>Dispute over the bourgou</p> <p>Use of non-compliant equipment</p>	<p>Social links prevent conflicts from causing major consequences on communities daily lives.</p>	<p>Prevalence of chiefs of village and traditional rulers.</p> <p>Elaboration of local conventions on resource conflict prevention and management: fishing conventions among anglers..</p> <p>Mediation and regulation are ensured by religious leaders (Imams) and notables :</p> <p>The council of the wise</p> <p>Castes men</p>

Youwarou – Ouro village	Farmers-breeders	Sometimes very violent	Conflicts related to free-grazing	Decline in agricultural production	Prevalence of the role played by village chiefs and traditional leaders (Jowros)
	<p>Anglers-Anglers-anglers over fisheries</p> <p>Pastoral tracks covered by farms</p> <p>Intra-family conflicts over land.</p>	<p>Assault and battery</p> <p>Loss of human lives</p> <p>Destruction of property</p>	<p>Destruction of crops and lack of pastures</p> <p>Dispute over the bourgou</p>	<p>Disruption of social links and social cohesion.</p> <p>Highly costly legal procedure</p> <p>Impoverishment of parties (especially with the involvement of the Gendarmerie and the judiciary system).</p> <p>Mistrust and hostility towards the bozos Closure of collective fisheries.</p>	<p>Elaboration of local conventions on resource conflict prevention and management: fishing conventions among anglers.</p> <p>Declaration of the contentious resource as “no go area”.</p> <p>Mediation and regulation are ensured by religious leaders (Imams) and notables :</p> <p>The council of the wise</p> <p>Castes men</p> <p>Council</p> <p>The Gendarmerie</p> <p>The Sous-Prefet and</p> <p>Courts</p>

Village de Dimakoko	<p>Farmers-breeders</p> <p>Anglers-Anglers-anglers over fisheries</p> <p>Pastoral tracks covered by farms</p> <p>Intra-family conflicts over land</p>	<p>Sometimes very violent</p> <p>Assault and battery</p> <p>Loss of human lives</p> <p>Destruction of property</p>	<p>Conflicts related to free-grazing</p> <p>Destruction of crops and lack of pastures</p> <p>Dispute over the bourgou</p>	<p>Decline in agricultural production</p> <p>Disruption of social links and social cohesion.</p> <p>Highly costly legal procedure</p> <p>Impoverishment of parties (especially with the involvement of the Gendarmerie and the judiciary system).</p> <p>Mistrust and hostility towards the bozos</p> <p>Closure of collective fisheries.</p>	<p>Prevalence of the role played by village chiefs and traditional leaders (Jowros)</p> <p>Elaboration of local conventions on resource conflict prevention and management: fishing conventions among anglers.</p> <p>Declaration of the contentious resource as “no go area”.</p> <p>Creation of consultation frameworks</p> <p>Mediation and regulation are ensured by religious leaders (Imams) and notables :</p> <p>The council of the wise</p> <p>Castes men</p> <p>Council</p> <p>The Gendarmerie</p> <p>The Sous-Prefet and</p> <p>Courts</p>
N’Gounouma village	<p>Farmers-breeders</p> <p>Anglers-Anglers-anglers over fisheries</p> <p>Pastoral tracks covered by farms</p> <p>Intra-family conflicts over land</p>	<p>Not actually violent</p>	<p>Conflicts related to free-grazing</p> <p>Destruction of crops and lack of pastures</p> <p>Dispute over the bourgou</p> <p>Use of non-compliant fishing equipment</p>	<p>Social links prevent conflicts from causing major consequences on communities daily lives.</p>	<p>Prevalence of chiefs of village and traditional rulers.</p> <p>Elaboration of local conventions on resource conflict prevention and management: fishing conventions among anglers..</p> <p>Mediation and regulation are ensured by religious leaders (Imams) and notables :</p> <p>The council of the wise</p> <p>Castes men</p>

## Appendix 6: Graphics





## Appendix 7: Respondents' Nominative List

### Bandiagara District

#### Focus Groups in communes of Pignari, Dourou and Dandoli

Localités	Focus groupe Hommes	Focus groupe femmes	Focus groupe Jeunes
<b>Village de Kilimpo (commune de Pignari)</b>	1. Allaye Degoga 2. Boubacar Karembe 3. Sekou Karembe 4. Amadou Degoga 5. Yacouba Karembe 6. Aly Karembe 7. Amadou Karembe 8. Seydou Degoga 9. Hamidou Degoga 10. Sidiki karembe	1. Djeneba Karembe 2. Maimouna karembe 3. Kadia Degoga 4. Kadidia Degoga 5. Mariam karembe 6. Halimatou Degoga 7. Kadiatou Degoga 8. Fatoumata Degoga 9. Djeneba Karembe 10. Aissata degoga	1. Adama Karembe 2. Sidiki Karembe 3. Boubacar Degoga 4. Amadou degoga 5. Aly Degoga 6. Alassane Karembe 7. Amadou Karembe 8. Abdoulaye 9. Amadou Karembe 10. Adama Degoga
<b>Village de Pah (commune de Pignari)</b>	1. Issa Karembe 2. Souleymane degoga 3. Issa Guindo 4. Amadou Guindo 5. Aly Karembe 6. Sidiki Karembe 7. Boubacar Guindo 8. Youssouf Degoga	1. Aminata karembe 2. Oumou Karembe 3. Massata Karembe 4. Fatoumata Karembe 5. Fatoumata Degoga 6. Fatouma Karembe 7. Dado Poudougou 8. Maimouna Karembe	1. Sidi Karembe 2. Sidi A Karembe 3. Soumaila Karembe 4. Ousmane Karembe 5. Amadou Karembe 6. Boubacar karembe 7. Madou Karembe 8. Aly Karembe 9. Amadou Karembe 10. Ousmane Karembe
<b>Village de Konsogoudo (commune de Dourou)</b>	1. Akanion Kene 2. Ousmane Kene 3. Eguelou Kene 4. Ande Kene 5. Amadou Kene 6. Moussa Kene 7. Seydou kene 8. Salif Kene	1. Yaiguière Sagara 2. Salimata Sagara 3. Nagalou Kene 4. Yantandou Yebezie 5. Yamoile Kene 6. Korka Kene 7. Sodougo Yebezie 8. Fatouma Togo 9. Fatoumata Banou 10. Yapile Togo	1. Seydou Kene 2. Moussa Kene 3. Bekaye Kene 4. Hamidou Kene 5. Mamadou Kene 6. Abdoulaye kene 7. Boubacar Kene 8. Bouba Kene 9. Mama Kene 10. Aly Kene
<b>Village de Korou (commune de Dourou)</b>	1. Ibrahim banou 2. Sarlo Banou 3. Mamadou Banou 4. Amborko Banou 5. Ambougue Banou 6. Ogobara Banou 7. David Banou 8. youssouf banou 9. Souleymane banou	1. Yanindjou Kassogue 2. Fatouma sagra 3. Yanindjou Kene 4. Yapile Kene 5. Sambu banou 6. Katim Sagara 7. Fanta Kassogue 8. Pouroly Banou 9. Hawa sagara 10. Leguemo Kassogue	1. Yaya Banou 2. Pierre banou 3. Amadou banou 4. Emmanuel Banou 5. Bamoussa banou 6. Etienne Banou 7. Bourema Banou 8. Daifourou Banou 9. Mamoudou Banou 10. Youssouf Banou
<b>Village de Gougou (commune de Dandoli)</b>	1. Sana Kelepily 2. Ansegue Nantoume 3. Bakaye Kelepily	1. Koguemo Ouloguem 2. Galanda Banou 3. Anta Sagara	1. Issa Kelepily 2. Soumaila Kelepily 3. Ibrahima kelepily

	4.Oumar Kelepily 5. Maamdou Kelepily 6. Seydou Kelepily 7. Hama Kelepily 8. Tembel Kelepily 9. Oumar Kelepily 10. Salif Kelepily	4. Fatoumata Tembely 5.Sali Tapily 6 Dico Sagara 7. Bintou Kelepily 8. Mariam Sagara 9. Fanta Kelepily 10. Maretou Nantoume	4. Hamma Kelepily 5. Bourema kelepily 6. Hama Kelepily 7. Issiaka kelepily 8. Amadou Kelepily 9. Drissa Kelepily
<b>Village de Sincarma (commune de Dandoli)</b>	1. Tabemo Ouologuem 2.Wagouna Ouologuem 3.Antimbe Ouologuem 4. Sana Ouologuem 5.Hama Ouologuem 6.Domo Ouologuem 7.Ansegue Ouologuem 8. Yelemo Ouologuem 9. Sanelou Ouologuem	1. Wadomo Karembe 2. Kadia natoume 3. Timbe Kelepily 4. Yendi Kassogue 5. Yassa Djiguiba 6. Yapemo banou 7. Kindirmo Ouologuem 8. Doguelo Ouologuem 9. Yissa Banou 10. Mariam Nantoume	1. Dogolou Ouologuem 2. Amadou Ouologuem 3. Samba Kassogue 4. Wanou Ouologuem 5. Ante Ouologuem 6. Sekou Ouologuem 7. Moussa Ouologuem 8. Wama Nantoume

### Interviews carried out in villages of Pignari, Dourou and Dandoli communes

Localités	Noms des personnes interviewées
Kilempo (Commune de Pignari)	1. Boubacar Degoga, maire de la commune 2. Boubacar Karembe, imam 3. Djeneba Karembe, présidente des femmes
Pah (commune de Pignari)	1. Issa Karembe, chef de village 2. Aminata Karembe, présidente femmes 3. Ousmane Karembe, président jeunes
Konsogoudo (commune de Dourou)	1. Boureima Sagara, maire de la commune 2. Yaiguere Sagara, présidente femmes 3. Seydou Kene, président jeunes
Korou (commune de Dourou)	1. Ibrahima Banou, chef de village 2. Yanindjou Kassogue, présidente femmes 3. Yaya Banou, président jeunes
Golgou (commune de Dandoli)	1. Thomas Poudiougou, maire de la commune 2. Koguemo Ouologuem, présidente femmes 3. Salif Kelepily, leader dans le village
Sincarma (commune de Dandoli)	1. Tabemo Ouologuem, chef de village 2. Wadomo Karembe, présidente femmes 3. Dogoulou Ouologuem, président des jeunes

**Tableau 4 : Liste de personnes rencontrées au cours de la recherche**

Personnes	Structures	Responsabilités
Mohamed Gaye	Care International	Directeur du Programme Harande
Idriss Leko	Care International	Deputy Directeur du Programme Harande
Tossa Philippe rabilou	Care International	Ingénieur en recherche opérationnelle du projet Harande
Mohamed Toure	Care International	Chargé de la gouvernance et des conflits projet Harande

Hamouta Cornier	Care International	Directeur des Opérations projet Harande
Ibrahim Moussa	Care International	Chef de bureau à Bandiagara
Yaiguire Tembely dite Fifi	YAGTU	Directrice
Boukary Sanogo	YAGTU	Coordonnateur de zone
Boureima Tapily	YAGTU	Superviseur projet Harande
Siriman Konate	Préfecture de Bandiagara	Préfet
Karifa Kone	Préfecture de Bandiagara	Adjoint Préfet
Ndende Ongoiba	Conseil de cercle de Bandiagara	Président
Youssef Tapily	Conseil de cercle de Bandiagara	Secrétaire général
Korka Lougue	ONG Harmonie du Développement au Sahel (HDS)	Directeur
André Kanambaye	Molibemo	Directeur
Oumar dit Ablo Ba	Société Coopérative des éleveurs du cercle de Bandiagara	Président, responsable antenne Tabital Pulaku
Mabourou Koita	Société coopérative des éleveurs du cercle de Bandiagara	Membre
Douro Sylvestre Tembely	ONG Action promotion Humaine (APH)	Directeur
Mamadou Tangara	ONG Action promotion Humaine (APH)	Responsable de la prévention et gestion des conflits
Ignace Kassogue	ONG Action promotion Humaine (APH)	Responsable développement des filières et de consolidation de la sécurité alimentaire
Moussa Zan Samaké	Tribunal de Bandiagara	Procureur de la république
Nouhoum Coulibaly	Gaas Mali	Directeur
Amadou Dembele	Service Agriculture	Chef de service agriculture
Boureima Tembely	Chambre locale d'Agriculture	Président
Asseydou Maiga	Cantonnement forestier	Chef de cantonnement
Amaïvel Guindo	Service local de production et industrie animale	Chef de service
Anapel Ouologuem	Chef de quartier à Bandiagara	Personne- ressource
Dr Noumou Diakité	Sahel Consult	Directeur
Hamadoun Karembe	Commune de Pignari Bana	Maire
Yamadou Diallo	Projet d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et à la Résilience des populations aux crises Climatiques (PASARC)	Coordonnateur de projet
Hadjaratou Sangare	Projet d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et à la Résilience des populations aux crises Climatiques (PASARC)	Chargée du genre
Koh Coulibaly	MINUSMA	Division des affaires civiles -Mopti
Hamidou Cissé	Association pour la Promotion de l'Élevage au Sahel et en Savane (APESS)	Chef de bureau National
Arsike Ouologuem	Association pour la Promotion de l'Élevage au Sahel et en Savane (APESS)	Membre
Hamsalla Bocoum	Fédération régionale des organisations de la filière bétail viande (FOFBEV)	Président
Hady Boundy	Agence de Développement Régional (ADR)	Directeur

Oumar Tapily	Ginna Dogon	Président antenne Bandiagara
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## Douentza District

### List of resource people interviewed

N°	Nom et prénom	Structure	Fonction	Contacts
1	<b>Fousseiny BOCOUM</b>	Mairie de la Commune urbaine de Douentza	Maire de la Commune	
2	<b>Hamidou SANGARE</b>	Mairie de la Commune urbaine de <b>Douentza</b> (village de Koumbena)	Secrétaire Général de la Commune	77 75 16 34
3	<b>Malick OUELOGUEME</b>	Relais du village de Koumbena	Commune urbaine de Douentza	96 56 64 94
4	<b>Mamoudou GUINDO</b>	Mairie de la Commune rurale de <b>Koumbewel Koudia</b> : Mougui II, Horodou	Maire de la Commune rurale	70 85 64 94
5	<b>Touba SANGALBA</b>	Mairie de la Commune rurale de <b>Koumbewel Koudia</b>	1 <sup>er</sup> conseiller	76 35 15 28
6	<b>Abdramane ONGOIBA</b>	Village de Mougui II	Chefferie	
7	<b>Yaya BORE</b>	Mairie de la Commune rurale de Dangol Boré : Gnimignama, Niogolon, N'doukoye	Maire de la Commune rurale	73 02 00 91
8	<b>Yéïssa SANGALBA</b>	Services agricoles	Agent des services agricoles	76 86 62 01
9	<b>Hamma ONGOIBA</b>	Mairie de la Commune rurale de Koumbewel Koudia	Conseiller communal	
10	<b>Sana SANKALBA</b>	ONG NEF	Agent de terrain	75 00 65 12
11	<b>Drissa</b>	Sahel Eco	Animateur	69 77 21 07
12	<b>Boubacar KOTIOUMBE</b>	Sahel Eco	Animateur	76 28 45 95

### List of people interviewed during focus groups

Localités	Nom et prénoms Hommes (10)	Nom et prénom femmes (13)	Nom et prénom Jeunes (12)
<b>Village de Koumbena</b> (village de la Commune urbaine de Douentza)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Malick Ouloguème</li> <li>2. Yeissa Pengoulpa</li> <li>3. Harouna Ouloguème</li> <li>4. Moussa Ouloguème</li> <li>5. Abdoulaye Ouloguème</li> <li>6. Hama Cissé</li> <li>7. Yèpinè Pengoulpa</li> <li>8. Ousmane Ouleguème</li> <li>9. Yaya Dicko</li> <li>10. Hamidou Dicko</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Binta Dicko</li> <li>2. Djénéba Ouloguème</li> <li>3. Aminata Ouloguème</li> <li>4. Korotoumou Ouloguème</li> <li>5. Mariam Ouoguème <b>(Présidente des femmes)</b></li> <li>6. Fanta Pengoulpa</li> <li>7. Fatoumata Pengoulpa</li> <li>8. Fatoumata Dicko</li> <li>9. Houlematou Dicko</li> <li>10. Aissata Ouloguème</li> <li>11. Djédjè Dicko</li> <li>12. Mamou Ouloguème</li> <li>13. Hawa Ouloguème</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Moctar Ouloguème <b>(Président des jeunes)</b></li> <li>2. Amadou Ouloguème</li> <li>3. Tidjane Ouloguème</li> <li>4. Mamadou Ouloguème</li> <li>5. Moussa Ouloguème</li> <li>6. Karaba Cissé</li> <li>7. Youba Ouloguème</li> <li>8. Alassane Ouloguème</li> <li>9. Abdoulaye Dicko</li> <li>10. Hama Dicko</li> <li>11. Nouhoum Dicko</li> <li>12. Mamoudou Dicko</li> </ol>
<b>Village de Gnimignama</b> (village de la Commune urbaine de Dangol Boré )	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Idrissa Tamboura</li> <li>2. Mohomodou Tamboura</li> <li>3. Amidou Traoré</li> <li>4. Aly Traoré</li> <li>5. Ousmane Traoré</li> <li>6. Madou Traoré</li> <li>7. Moussa Traoré</li> <li>8. Siaka Traoré</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Oumou Traoré <b>(présidente des femmes)</b></li> <li>2. Djénéba Traoré</li> <li>3. Binta Sidibé</li> <li>4. Fatoumata binta Diallo</li> <li>5. Aminatou Sangaré</li> <li>6. Aissata Traoré</li> <li>7. Alima Traoré</li> <li>8. Mariam Traoré</li> <li>9. Kadidia Traoré</li> <li>10. Fatou Traoré</li> <li>11. Mamou Traoré</li> <li>12. Mariam Traoré</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Youssouf Traoré <b>(président des jeunes)</b></li> <li>2. Chaka Traoré</li> <li>3. Mody Tamboura</li> <li>4. Mahamoudou Tamboura</li> <li>5. Oumar Traoré</li> <li>6. Alassane Traoré</li> <li>7. Souleymane Traoré</li> <li>8. Hama Diallo</li> <li>9. Hassey Dicko</li> <li>10. Ousmane Traoré</li> <li>11. Seydou Traoré</li> <li>12. Salif Traoré</li> </ol>
<b>Village de Horodou</b> (village de la Commune rurale de Koumbewel Koudia)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Mamoudou Guindo</li> <li>2. Seyni Percoulpa</li> <li>3. Amidou Guindo</li> <li>4. Abdoulaye Guindo</li> <li>5. Moussa Pencoulpa</li> <li>6. Housseiny Guindo</li> <li>7. Harouna Guindo</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Maimouna Guindo <b>(présidente des femmes)</b></li> <li>2. Djénéba Guindo</li> <li>3. Kadidja Guindo</li> <li>4. Fatoumata Guindo</li> <li>5. Fatoumata Guindo</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Amadou Guindo <b>(président des jeunes)</b></li> <li>2. Amidou Guindo</li> <li>3. Abdoulaye Guindo</li> <li>4. Adama Guindo</li> <li>5. Alassane Guindo</li> <li>6. Moussa Guindo</li> </ol>

	8. Mamadou Guindo	6. Mariam Guindo 7. Aminata Pencoulpa 8. Aichata Pencoulpa 9. Oumou Guindo	7. Boubacar Guindo 8. Boureima Guindo 9. Salif Guindo
<b>Village de Mougui II</b> (Commune rurale de Koumbewel Koudia)	1. Touba Sangalba 2. Hama Ongoiba 3. Abdramane Ongoiba 4. Youssouf Ongoiba 5. Moussa Ongoiba 6. Yéïssa Ongoiba 7. Boureima Ongoiba 8. Salif Ongoiba 9. Aly Ongoiba 10. Amadou Ongoiba 11. Ousmane Ongoiba 12. Boubacar Ongoiba 13. Binè Ongoiba 14. Boureima Ongoiba 15. Chaka Ongoiba	1. Salimata Ongoiba <b>(présidente des femmes)</b> 2. Oumou Ongoiba 3. Yénépiè Ongoiba 4. Yapiè Ongoiba 5. Yina Ongoiba 6. Fatouma Ongoiba 7. Djénéba Ongoiba 8. Kadijatou Ongoiba	1. Youssouf Ongoiba 2. Moussa Ongoiba <b>(président des jeunes)</b> 3. Yéïssa Ongoiba 4. Boureima Ongoiba 5. Salif Ongoiba 6. Housseinou Ongoiba 7. Boubacar Ongoiba 8. Halidou Ongoiba
<b>Village de Niogolon</b> (Commune rurale de Dangol Boré)	1. Boureima Diarra 2. Kalfa Diarra 3. Hamady Cissé 4. Bakary Aly Diarra 5. Sedou Diarra 6. Hassey Diallo 7. Nouhoum Diallo 8. Aly Diarra	1. Bassira Diarra 2. Mariam Diarra <b>(présidente des femmes)</b> 3. Oumou Diarra 4. Binta Diallo 5. Fatoumata Diallo 6. Korotoumou Diarra 7. Djénéba Diarra 8. Nagnouma Diarra	1. Amadou Diarra <b>(président des jeunes)</b> 2. Abdoulaye Diarra 3. Sékou Diarra 4. Mamoutou Diallo 5. Mahamadou Diallo 6. Bakary Diarra 7. Alassane Diarra 8. Tidjani Diarra
<b>Village de N'doukoye</b> (Commune rurale de Dangol Boré)	1. Souleymane Traoré 2. Allaye Cissé 3. Sékou Traoré 4. Moussa Tounkara 5. Aly Coulibaly 6. Massamba Tounkara 7. Hamadou Tounkara 8. Abdoulaye Tounkara 9. Birama Samaké 10. Abdoulaye Coulibaly 11. Hamey Dicko 12. Mody Sangaré	1. Férima Traoré 2. Yakaré Tounkara <b>(présidente des femmes)</b> 3. Djénéba Coulibaly 4. Assanatou Dicko 5. Araba Tounkara 6. Houleymatou Dicko 7. Aby Coulibaly 8. Aissata Tounkara	1. Vieux Tounkara <b>(président des jeunes)</b> 2. Mamadou Tounkara 3. Salif Coulibaly 4. Sékou Traoré 5. Noumoukè Coulibaly 6. Djigu Tounkara 7. Fodé Tounkaré 8. Boubacar Cissé 9. Yilda Sangaré 10. Mamourou Coulibaly 11. Lassina Traoré 12. Abou Tounkara

## Youwarou and Tenenkou Districts

### List of People interviewed in Mopi and Sevaré

Prénoms & Nom	Localités	Responsabilités	Contacts
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Oumarou K.	Mopti	Maire commune de Dongo	76332353
Moussa Sidibé	Sévaré	Secrétaire général Chambre régionale d'Agriculture Mopti	75048494
Ibrahim Sangaré	Sévaré	Animateur délégation locale chambre d'agriculture Bankass	
Djéidane Kelly	Ténenkoun	Président délégation locale chambre d'agriculture	74041646
Mamadou Diané	Sévaré	Chargé de gouvernance PADINII CARE	66530428
Abdrmane Diop	Sévaré	Chargé des programmes ONG NEF	66726399
Daouda Théra	Sévaré	ONG AFAR	76327722
Abdoulaye Tembely	Sévaré	Vice-président ONG AFAR	66787851
Daouda Sanankoua	Sévaré	Maire commune de Deboye	65005721
Ousmane Diallo	Sévaré	Directeur régional génie civil	66718273
Amady Samaké	Sévaré	Chef division DRGC	66854483
Bréhima Sogoba	Sévaré	Chef division DRGC	66728188
Adama Sénou	Mopti	Directeur régional plan statistiques	76041983
Mamadou Touré	Mopti	Chef division DRSIAP	76241540
Amadou Djiré	Mopti	Coordinateur Système d'Alerte Précoce	66111279
Guédiouma Samaké	Mopti	Chef division législation et contrôle, direction régionale de la pêche	66765042
Amadou Daou	Mopti	Chef secteur pêche Ténékoun	79209598
Daouda Koné	Sévaré	Chef division vulgarisation agricole, direction régionale agriculture	76460629
Sana Kassogué	Sévaré	Chef division production et industrie animale	66804897
Mamadou Traoré	Mopti	Sous-préfet de Diafarabé	79227712
Moussa Coulibaly	Sévaré	Juge de Ténékoun	76313995
Bourama Togo	Sévaré	Sahel Consult	
Noumou Diakité	Sévaré	Directeur Sahel Consult	66763799
Coumba Aly Sow	Konna Mali	Ménagère	
K B	Kona Fabé	Paysan	

**List of communes visited by CARE enumerators :**

**Cercle de Ténenkoun**

- Konna – Mali
- Konna – Fabé
- Seindé – Sallah
- Ténenkoun
- Binta – Ténenkoun
- Ouro – Boubou
- Sougoulbé
- Diafarabé
- Tilembeya
- Nouh – Peulh

## Cercle de Youwarou

Date	Personne	Fonction	Organisation
18 Aout 2016	Landry Brou, Sylla Ousman	Coordinateur Opération d'Urgence ; Chargé Sécurité Alimentaire	FAO
19 Aout 2016	Nanthilde Kamara	Chargé Mapping Vulnérabilité Alimentaire	PAM
19 Aout 2016	Marilyn Knieriemen	Directrice Pays	Heller Keller International
26 Aout 2016	Ibrahim Bakayoko, Eric Goun Abel,	Chargé Protection et Cohésion ; Coordinateur Sécurité Alimentaire et Relèvement économique	Conseil Danois des Réfugiés (DRC)
29/08/2016	Sékou Diop	Coordinateur Projets d'Urgence	Conseil Norvégien des Réfugiés (NRC)
29/08/2016	Youssef Yana	Chargé de Projet ICLA	Conseil Norvégien des Réfugiés (NRC)
29/08/2016	Lassina Traore	Chargé Projets Santé	Agence Française de Développement
30/08/2016	Amadou Kamara, Michael Mc Broom, Alimata Coulibaly, Moussa Bambara	Chargé Programme Résilience ; Chef Programme Résilience ; Chargé Paix, Démocratie et Gouvernance ; Directeur a.i. du bureau	
30/08/2016	Juergen Koch	Chef de Bureau	GIZ
30/08/2016	Joseph Ngalamulume	Chargé Projets d'Urgence	World Vision
30/08/2016	Hamid Vidal Mansaray	Directeur	World Vision
14/09/2016	<b>Fransje Molenaar</b> <b>Thibaud Van Damme</b>	Researchers	Clingendael

- Youwarou – Homboloré
- Sobé
- N’Gounouma
- Diamkoko
- Youwarou – Ouro
- Férobé

## Interviews with international partners

## Appendix 8: Primary data collection tools

### Research questions – based on the ToRs and research framework

<p>Overarching research question: Analysis of formal and informal institutions underpinning conventional and non-conventional citizen-states interaction over resources critical to food security, economic prosperity and stability in northern Mali</p>			
<p><b><u>Topline research question 1 :</u></b></p> <p><b>How the power relations between conventional and unconventional actors and networks interacting within formal and informal institutions to influence both the evolution of the current active conflicts and the governance of resources in Mopti region?</b></p>	<p>Sub-questions: conflict focused</p>	<p>Sub-questions: PEA focused</p>	
<p>Analysis of formal and informal institutions (norms, rules, decision making processes, standards) involved in conflict, dispute prevention/resolution as well as in the governance of resources critical to food and nutrition security, creation of opportunities for economic prosperity, and stabilisation in Northern Mali</p> <p><i>A particular attention should be paid to:</i>  <i>Formal peace agreements; formal rules framing state decentralization reform and policies in Northern Mali; formal agreements on the methods for accessing and using productive resources, i.e. water, pasture, fertile</i></p>	<p><b><u>Objective:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mapping and analysis of formal and informal institutions sustaining distribution of power and resources amongst the main ethnic/social groups in northern Mali;</li> <li>- analysis of formal and informal institutions propelling social and political claims/interests of main armed groups – analysis of their links with the different ethnic groups in northern Mali ;</li> <li>- Mapping and analysis of the social/political stratification of northern mali</li> <li>- Mapping and analysis of community mechanisms for prevention and management of local conflicts in northern Mali.</li> <li>- Assessing the effectiveness and</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objective:</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mapping of formal and informal social and political institutions that sustain the governance of resources in northern Mali ;</li> <li>- Identifying the formal and informal institutions governing access, use and ownership of productive resources;</li> <li>- mapping and analysis of formal and informal institutions sustaining power struggle amongst the political and elite classes of the different ethnic groups over control of resources and government benefits critical to inclusive economic development and stabilisation in northern mali;</li> <li>- analysis of informal and formal norms and rules that influence the current approaches to decision making in the governance of resources critical to food security,</li> </ul>	

<p><i>farming lands, etc); Caste systems within the highly stratified societies of Northern Mali; “Joking relationships”, in particular the sinankunya system ; The Korugan Fuga Charter and similar sets of orally transmitted norms and principles shaping interactions between rulers and formal structures; Informal forms of reciprocity and social capital, including mutual help, family and community assistance, which may form bonds bypassing formal hierarchies; Social bonds created through the initiation rituals and membership of hunters associations, secret societies, lodges and so forth; Religious allegiances to faith communities, religious sects, brotherhoods ; Gender norms and relationships and in particular the patriarchal forms of authority.</i></p>	<p>legitimacy of identified mechanisms;</p> <p><b>Sub-questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Which legal and traditional mechanisms do frame the relationships between social groups? Ethnic groups? Kinship solidarity? Religious communities?</li> <li>- What are the local norms, customs and practices which do encourage peaceful coexistence and cooperation within and amongst ethnic groups ?</li> <li>- What are the factors preventing participation to engage in inter-community initiatives meant to prevent and manage conflicts threatening security and economic development ?</li> <li>- What is the role of religious institutions in social and political instability in northern Mali?</li> </ul>	<p>economic development and stability in northern Mali</p> <p><b>Sub-questions on customary institutions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What are the formal rules framing state decentralization reform and policies in Northern Mali?</li> <li>- Which are the existing ethnic group-based mechanisms and inter-community mechanisms for prevention and management of resource in Northern Mali?</li> <li>- What are the current incentive systems sustaining the formal and informal governance of resources critical to food security, economic development and stabilisation in northern Mali?</li> <li>- Which are the traditional/informal incentives sustaining citizen participation in local governance of resources and peaceful management of inter-community conflicts over resources?</li> <li>- Which are the formal and informal forms of reciprocity and social capital that sustain the existing kinship system in northern mali;</li> <li>- How the on-going conflicts have affected the ways informal and formal institutions make decision over access, allocation and control over resources ;</li> <li>- What is the role and influence of informal and formal institutions in the provision of essential humanitarian and development responses during and immediately after episodes of crises/violence?</li> <li>- Which formal and informal institutions are framing the ways women and youth</li> </ul>
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		particularly access and control productive resources?
<p><i>Analysis of formal and informal (conventional and non-conventional) stakeholders/ actors in relation to security of people; resources and commodities essentials to food and nutrition security, economic development and pacification/ stabilisation in northern mali</i></p> <p><i>A particular attention should be paid to: Decentralized authorities (region; cercle, district; communes; villages; fractions); Chiefs and other traditional authorities and clan elders in segmentary lineage systems; Customary and magistrates courts and dispute resolution bodies; Community and local policing and judicial bodies, for instance the ethnic and community 'mutualities'; Hunters and similar associations ;Women's associations and young men's groups; Neo-traditional ethnic or community bodies, offering various forms of protection; Traditional healers, spirit mediums, anti-witchcraft practitioners and practitioners of the occult; Religious leaders and enforcers of religious morality; Voluntary associations and civil society organisations; Vigilantes, local militias or community protection groups ; Paramilitaries; non-state armed groups; Criminal mafias, ex-fighters and gangs offering or imposing protection</i></p>	<p><b>Objective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mapping local actors involved in the current active conflicts and violence in northern Mali,</li> <li>- Analysing existing relationships amongst them with potential direct or indirect impact on the population and development interventions.</li> </ul> <p><b>Sub questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Who are the past and existing actors contesting central government authority and state power in most parts of northern Mali?</li> <li>- Who are the actors involved in conflicts between agricultural farmers and pastoralists but also between fishermen and merchants living along the banks and islands of the Niger River, including traditional conflicts around the so-called "bourgoutières"?</li> <li>- Who are the different formal and informal groups involved in trafficking and other illegal activities?</li> <li>- What are the power relations among the main stakeholders in the conflicts in Northern Mali and how have they impacted stability and local development of Mopti and surrounding regions?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Objective:</b></p> <p>Mapping and analysis of alliances between the different local stakeholders over access, allocation and control of resources.</p> <p><b>Sub-questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Which are the informal and formal stakeholders involved in the management of resources critical to food and nutrition security?</li> <li>- Which are the informal and formal stakeholders involved in inter-community and inter-ethnic group contestations over access, allocation and control of resources;</li> <li>-Which are the main actors impeding the implementation of local and national policies sustaining inclusive access to resources and opportunities for inclusive socio-economic development and peaceful coexistence amongst ethnic/social groups in northern Mali?</li> <li>- What are the dynamics that prelude and preclude disruptive events to local/central government and/or non-state actor-led socio-economic development interventions?</li> <li>- Which are the main informal and formal stakeholders (decision and opinion makers) involved in the long-standing inter-community and inter-ethnic group contestations over access, allocation and control of resources and political authority ?</li> </ul>

<p><i>Analysis of the role and influence of formal and informal (conventional and non-conventional) networks on local decision making critical to community resilience to climate and human induced stresses and shocks.</i></p> <p><i>A particular attention should be paid to: Extended family and kinship; ethnies, clans and tribes; religious networks, sects and brotherhoods; Men's and women's secret societies and ritual bodies; informal and cross-border networks; Inter and intra-generational networks, Patron-client ties; Transnational including diaspora networks ;Criminal networks and warlord alliances.</i></p>	<p><b>Objective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mapping and analysis of relationship within and amongst the main conventional and non-conventional networks that fuel violent conflict in northern Mali</li> <li>- Mapping and analysis of relationship between conventional and non-conventional networks with government and non-government authorities</li> <li>- Mapping and analysis of different categories of existing networks that fuel violent conflict;</li> </ul> <p><b>Sub-questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Which are the main networks (kinship, ethnic, caste, illicit) involved in or fueling current active conflict in Northern Mali?</li> <li>- How are they interacting with state authorities both at the government and at the local level?</li> <li>- Which networks are likely to mitigate them?</li> <li>- Analysis of the capacity of citizens to cope with and respond to recurrent climate and human induced conflicts in northern Mali: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- how the relationships with the networks identified have impacted the current active conflicts in northern Mali;</li> <li>- how the on-going conflicts have affected the ways informal and formal institutions make decision over access, allocation and control over resources ;</li> <li>- what is the role and influence of informal and formal institutions in the provision of essential humanitarian and development responses during and immediately</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b>Objective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mapping and analysis of conventional and non-conventional solidarity networks</li> <li>- Mapping and analysis of conventional and non-conventional clientelism/patronage networks ;</li> <li>- Analyze the relationship of identified networks with informal and formal governance structures/institutions involved in the management of resources critical to food and nutrition security.</li> </ul> <p><b>Sub-questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Which are the networks based on kinship?</li> <li>- Which are the networks based on caste system?</li> <li>- Which are the solidarity networks based on ethnicity?</li> <li>- Which are the networks based on illicit practices?</li> <li>- How existing ethnic based clientelism/patronage networks interact with critical resources for food and nutrition security, resilience strategies and creation of opportunities for economic activities ?</li> <li>- What are the relationship between identified conventional and non-conventional networks with informal and formal governance structures/institutions involved in the management of resources critical to food and nutrition security?</li> <li>- how identified networks relate with development interventions in Mopti region ?</li> <li>- how some of these networks negotiate community support to sustain their illicit activities?</li> <li>- how identified networks relate to the political and customary elite of different ethnic/social groups ?</li> <li>- what are the strategies used by citizens and their networks to continue benefiting from services - including protection – supported by informal and formal governance institutions;</li> </ul>
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	<p>after episodes of crises/violence</p>	<p>- how identified networks influence equal gender access, allocation and control of resources and how women and youth relate to identified clientelism/patronage networks to access and control productive resources?</p>
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<p><b>Topline research question 2</b> :</p> <p><b>How individuals, households, and communities perceive the impact of violent conflicts and contestation of authority on Northern Mali socio-political relationships as well access to the critical resources?</b></p>	<p>Sub-questions: conflict focused</p>	<p>Sub-questions: PEA focused</p>
	<p><b>Objective:</b> Capturing the local perceptions regarding the impact of conflicts and violence on socio-political order.</p> <p><b>Sub-questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ how current forms of violence have affected the relationship within and amongst ethnic/social groups;</li> <li>○ which factors (incentives) are precipitating inter-community violent conflicts and sustaining the different actors?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Objective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Understanding the relationships between conflict and economic development in Mopti region,</li> <li>- Mapping and analysis of active and latent contestations amongst ethnic/social groups in the governance of resources critical to food and nutrition security</li> </ul> <p><b>Sub-questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ How ongoing conflicts have affected the division of labor and productive functions within and in-between ethnic groups;</li> <li>○ What are the social marginalization in access and use of productive resources caused by current active conflicts in Mopti region</li> <li>○ how are perceived decision making with respect to the protection and realization of the rights to equal access and use of productive resources and assets within and amongst existing social and ethnic groups in Mopti region;</li> <li>○ what are the strategies (mobilization of traditional or new networks) adopted to cope with the conflicts affecting their livelihood and social protection capabilities?</li> <li>○ how relationships amongst key actors involved in active conflicts in northern Mali affect gender relations over access and utilization of</li> </ul>

	<p>enhanced roles in on-going conflict;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o how contestations of authority and power affect the relationship between the ethnic-based local governance apparatus in northern Mali and the formal government apparatus (services) for the implementation of government policies and programs geared towards the stabilization and pacification of northern Mali?</li> <li>o what are the implications of current conflicts on the hierarchies amongst classes, and groups' capabilities to cope and withstand the shocks;</li> <li>o how the conflicts have affected the</li> </ul>	<p>productive resources and assets (including women and youth rights to access and own productive resources).</p>
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	<p>relations of dependence within and between ethnic groups, notably between the traditionally privileged classes and the rest of the population within and across ethnic groups.</p>	
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## Protocole d'entretien individuel

*Instructions : Présentez-vous, présentez l'étude et le projet Harande et votre rôle dans l'étude.*

- I. Rôles et responsabilités dans la GRN et/ou la prévention et la gestion des conflits
  1. Quels rôles jouez-vous dans la GRN, la prévention et la gestion des conflits – particulièrement les conflits qui affectent la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelles, et les moyens de production essentiels à sécurité alimentaire,?
  2. Qui sont les acteurs formels et informels impliqués dans la gouvernance des RN ?
  3. Quels sont vos rapports avec ces différents acteurs formels et informels ?
- II. Conflits et institutions de régulation
  1. Quels sont les types de conflits qui affectent les moyens de production et l'utilisation des ressources essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans la région de Mopti dans la région de Mopti ?
  2. Quels sont les types de conflits existants dans la localité ?
  3. Qui sont les acteurs clés dans les conflits identifiés ?

[Identifiez :

    - les acteurs partie au conflit,
    - les acteurs qui influence directement les conflits
    - les acteurs qui sont impactés par les conflits
  4. Quelles sont les manifestations du conflit (violent ou latent)
    - les manifestations violentes du conflit
    - les manifestations non-violentes du conflit
  5. Quelles sont les causes majeures et secondaires des conflits identifiés?
    - les causes majeures des conflits identifiés
    - les causes secondaires des conflits identifiés
  6. Quelles sont :
    - les conflits à caractère récurrent et non violent?
    - Les conflits à caractère cyclique et violent ?
  7. Quelles sont :
    - Les causes des conflits récurrents ?
    - Les causes des conflits violent ?
  8. Quelles sont les relations entre les différents acteurs impliqués dans les conflits identifiés ci-hauts?
  9. Quels conflits inter ou intra-communautaires affectent-ils la sécurité alimentaire et la sécurité des moyens de productions communs ?
    - Les conflits inter communautaires qui affectent la sécurité alimentaire

- Les conflits inter communautaires qui affectent les moyens de production communs – terres, eaux, pâtures, etc.
  - Les conflits inter communautaires qui affectent les ressources de production ;
  - Les conflits intra-communautaires qui affectent la sécurité alimentaire
  - Les conflits intra-communautaires qui affectent les moyens de production
  - Les conflits intra-communautaires qui affectent les ressources de production?
10. Lesquels des conflits identifiés sont à l'origine des violences inter groupes ethniques/sociaux ? ?
11. Quelles activités et réseaux criminels contribuent-ils à alimenter les conflits ?
- a. Les activités et réseaux criminels qui contribuent à alimenter les conflits récurrents ?
  - b. Les activités et réseaux criminels qui contribuent à alimenter les conflits cycliques et violents ?
12. Quels sont les mécanismes de règlement des conflits ?
- [Identifiez :
- les mécanismes de résolution des conflits informels ;
  - les mécanismes de résolution des conflits formels.
13. Quels sont les acteurs impliqués dans les différents mécanismes de règlement de conflits ?
- les acteurs étatiques clés impliqués dans la résolution des conflits
  - les acteurs coutumiers clés impliqués dans la résolution des conflits
  - les acteurs non-étatiques (civils, tels les ONG) clés impliqués dans la résolution des conflits
  - les autorités religieuses dans la gestion/résolution des conflits.

### III. Incidence sur la vie des communautés

1. Quelles sont les conséquences de ces conflits et leur impact sur les relations sociales et l'activité économique au sein de votre localité ?

[Cherchez à comprendre en détail quel sont les liens entre les conflits et les moyens de subsistance des individus, ménages, et communautés.

Si vous le croyez approprié, posez une question sur l'existence de groupes armés dans le milieu]

2. Comment les liens de parenté et les réseaux de solidarité ont-ils évolué face à ces conflits ?

3. Quelles sont les solutions que vous avez apportées afin de contourner les obstacles provoqués par les conflits ?

[Essayez de dégager des éléments de résilience des individus, ménages, et communautés face aux obstacles créés par les conflits et ce que ces éléments impliquent dans le quotidien. Entrez dans les détails.]

4. Y a-t-il des projets ou actions de développement arrêtés ou suspendus à cause de ces conflits ? Pour quelles raisons spécifiquement ?

[Cherchez à comprendre l'impact des conflits sur des actions de développement qui visent à la résilience et à l'amélioration des moyens de subsistance des ménages et communautés]

#### **IV. Les mutations en cours et la gestion des ressources naturelles**

1. **Quelles sont les différentes autorités traditionnelles impliquées dans la gestion des ressources au sein de votre localité ?**
  - Leurs relations mutuelles sont-elles coopératives ou conflictuelles ?
  - Quelles sont les relations de ces autorités traditionnelles avec les autorités étatiques ?
2. **Quels sont traditionnellement les règles d'exploitation et d'accès aux ressources dans votre localité ?**
  - Les conflits violents ont-ils eu un impact sur ces modes de gestion traditionnels ?
3. **Comment co-existent les systèmes d'exploitation (agricole, pastoral, de pêche) dans votre localité ?**
4. **Comment les liens de parenté influent-ils sur la gestion des ressources naturelles dans votre communauté ?**
5. **Quels sont les réseaux impliqués dans la gestion des ressources :**
  - Les réseaux communautaires ou de parenté ?
  - Les réseaux illégaux ou clientélistes ?
6. **Quels sont les changements apportés par la décentralisation dans la GRN ?**
  - Quel est l'impact des cadres légaux instaurés sur les modes traditionnels d'exploitation et d'accès aux ressources ?
  - Existe-t-il des conflits entre les deux systèmes ?
7. **Que pensez-vous du transfert de compétences en GRN de l'Etat aux collectivités ?**
8. **Etes-vous au courant des actions de l'Etat malien en matière de sécurité alimentaire dans votre localité ?**

[Recueillir les perceptions et le niveau d'informations des acteurs locaux sur les mécanismes étatiques de prise en charge de la sécurité alimentaire]

9. **Y a – t – il eu une amélioration dans la GRN ?**
10. **Que faire pour améliorer la sécurité alimentaire dans la localité ?**

[Cherchez à comprendre la perception des acteurs sur les interventions des ONG au niveau local]

## Protocole de questions – Focus Group

### I. Conflits et mécanismes de régulation

1. Quels sont les types de conflits existants dans la localité ?
2. quelles sont les manifestations du conflit
  - les manifestations violentes du conflit
  - les manifestations non-violentes/latentes du conflit ?
3. Quelles sont les causes des conflits à caractère récurrent et non violent et les causes des conflits à caractère cyclique mais violent ?
  - les causes des conflits à caractère récurrent?
  - Les causes des conflits à caractère cyclique et violent ?
4. Qui sont les acteurs clés dans les conflits identifiés ?

[Identifiez :

  - les acteurs partie au conflit,
  - les acteurs qui influencent directement les conflits
  - les acteurs qui sont impactés par les conflits.
5. Quelles sont les relations entre les différents acteurs de conflits ?
  - Relations qui soutiennent les conflits récurrents ?
  - Relations qui soutiennent les conflits violents ?
6. Quelles conflits inter ou intra-communautaires affectent-ils la sécurité alimentaire et la sécurité des moyens de productions communs ?
  - Les conflits inter communautaires qui affectent la securite alimentaire
  - Les conflits inter communautaires qui affectent les moyens de production communs – terres, eaux, patures, etc.
  - Les conflits inter communautaires qui affectent les ressources de production ;
  - Les conflits intra-communautaires qui affectent la securite alimentaire
  - Les conflits intra-communautaires qui affectent les moyens de production
  - Les conflits intra-communautaires qui affectent les ressources de production?
  -
7. Lesquels des conflits identifiés sont à l'origine des violences inter groupes ethniques ou entre groupes sociaux ? ?
14. Quelles activités et réseaux criminels contribuent-ils à alimenter les conflits récurrents d'une part et les conflits violents d'autre part?
  - a. Les activités criminelles qui contribuent à alimenter les conflits récurrents ?
  - b. Les activités criminelles qui contribuent à alimenter les conflits violent ?
15. Quels sont les mécanismes de règlement des conflits ?

[Identifiez :

  - les mécanismes de résolution des conflits informels ?
  - les mécanismes de résolution des conflits formels ?
16. Quels sont les acteurs impliqués dans les différents mécanismes de règlement de conflits ??
  - les acteurs étatiques clé impliqués dans la résolution des conflits
  - les acteurs coutumiers clés impliqués dans la résolution des conflits

- les acteurs non-étatiques (civils tels les ONG) clés impliqués dans la résolution des conflits
17. quelles sont les interactions entre acteurs étatiques, coutumiers et non-étatique/civil dans :
    - la résolution des conflits liés à l'accès et au contrôle des ressources de production
    - la résolution des conflits qui affecte la sécurité des moyens de production ?
  18. quelles sont les interactions entre acteurs étatiques, coutumiers et non étatique/civils qui affectent la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelles
  19. quel est le délai minimum de résolution des différents conflits identifiés ?
  20. Quelles sont les voies de recours en cas de non satisfaction de la manière dont un conflit lié à l'accès ou au contrôle des ressources de production a été tranché ? .]

## II. Incidence sur la vie des communautés

- Quelles sont les conséquences de ces conflits et leur impact sur les relations sociales et l'activité économique de votre communauté ?  
 [Cherchez à comprendre en détail quel sont les liens entre les conflits et les moyens de subsistance des individus, ménages, et communautés.]
- Quelles sont les conséquences de ces conflits et leur impact sur la sécurité des moyens des subsistances des personnes ?
- Qui sont les groupes ethniques/sociaux les plus affectés par les conséquences des conflits identifiés
- Comment les liens de parenté et les réseaux de solidarité ont-ils évolué face à ces conflits ?
- Quelles sont les solutions que vous avez apportées afin de contourner les obstacles provoqués par les conflits qui affectent votre moyen de subsistance et votre sécurité alimentaire?  
 [Essayez de dégager des éléments de résilience des individus, ménages, et communautés face aux obstacles créés par les conflits et ce que ces éléments impliquent dans le quotidien. Entrez dans les détails.]
- Y a-t-il des projets ou actions de développement arrêtés ou suspendus à cause de ces conflits ? Pour quelles raisons spécifiquement ?  
 [Cherchez à comprendre l'impact des conflits sur des actions de développement qui visent à la résilience et à l'amélioration des moyens de subsistance des ménages et communautés]

## III. Les réformes en cours et la gestion des ressources naturelles

11. Quelles sont les différentes autorités traditionnelles impliquées dans la gestion des ressources au sein de votre localité ?

**12. Quelle est le degré du respect et acceptation des décisions des différentes autorités traditionnelles identifiées dans la question précédente ?**

**13. Quels sont traditionnellement les règles d'exploitation et d'accès aux ressources de production essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire et au développement économique dans votre localité ?**

**14. Quels sont les réseaux formels impliqués dans la gestion des ressources et la production dans votre localité ?**

**15. Quels sont les réseaux informels impliqués dans la gestion des ressources et la production dans votre localité ?**

**16. Avez-vous constaté un changement depuis le processus de décentralisation dans la gestion des ressources naturelles (GRN) ?**

[Analysez les perceptions et le changement des pratiques locales – s'il y en a - en termes de GRN]

**17. Quelles solutions spécifiques adopter pour une meilleure GRN dans votre localité ?**

[Analysez les interventions qui pourraient être mises en place afin d'une gestion pacifique et durable des ressources naturelles].

## Appendix 9: Quantitative Research Guide

**Instructions pour l'enquêteur :** Avant d'administrer le questionnaire, présentez l'objectif de l'enquête et remettez le formulaire de consentement pour signature.

### Consentement de l'enquête

- Oui – Administrer le questionnaire
- Non – Fin de l'interview

Date : \_\_/\_\_/\_\_\_\_

Cercle (dopping menu – liste de tous les cercles ciblés)

- Tenenkou
- Bandiagara
- Yowarou
- Douanza

Commune

Village

.....

### I.2.1 Age

- a) 15-25 ;
- b) 26-35 ;
- c) 36-45 ;
- d) 46-55 ;
- e) 56- +

### Sexe

- a) Homme ;
- b) Femme.

1) **Quels sont les conflits à caractère récurrent que vous observez dans votre village/localité–  
crochez Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
- b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
- c) Conflit entre agriculteurs et éleveurs ;
- d) Conflit entre agriculteurs et pêcheurs ;
- e) Conflit entre éleveurs et pêcheurs ;
- f) Conflits de pouvoir ;
- g) Violence des groupes armés ;
- h) Conflits familiaux ;
- i) Conflits de voisinage ;
- j) Ne sait pas, ne répond pas ;
- k) Autre – confirmer.

2) **A quelle période de l'année les conflits identifiés ci-haut sont les plus visibles et sévères ? Par  
ordre d'importance**

- a) Durant la saison hivernale ;
- b) Pendant la période de récolte ;
- c) Après la période de récolte ;
- d) Pendant la saison sèche.
- e) Autre – confirmer

3) **Quelles sont les moyens de productions des produits essentielles pour la sécurité alimentaire  
et nutritionnelle dans votre localité ? Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Entrants agricoles ;
- b) Équipement agricole ;
- c) La terre ;
- d) Noyau reproducteur (pour les éleveurs) ;
- e) Entrants piscicoles ;
- f) Entrant zootechniques ;
- g) Capital financier ;
- h) Autre – confirmer

4) **Quelles sont les moyens privilégiés par les différent groupes ethniques/sociaux dans votre  
localité ? (croissement de deux menus – groupes ethniques/sociaux et moyens de  
production)**

- a) Entrants agricoles ;

- b) Équipement agricole ;
- c) La terre ;
- d) Noyau reproducteur (pour les éleveurs) ;
- e) Entrants piscicoles ;
- f) Entrant zootechniques ;
- g) Capital financier ;
- h) Autre – **confirmer**

5) **Quelle sont les conflits récurrents qui affectent les moyens de productions essentiels pour la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle dans votre village/localité. **Par ordre d'importance****

- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
- b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
- c) Conflit entre agriculteurs et éleveurs ;
- d) Conflit entre agriculteurs et pêcheurs ;
- e) Conflit entre éleveurs et pêcheurs ;
- f) Conflits de pouvoir ;
- g) Violence des groupes armés ;
- h) Conflits familiaux ;
- i) Conflits de voisinage ;
- j) Autre – **confirmer**

6) **Quelle sont les conflits récurrents qui affectent l'accès aux produits essentiels à la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle dans votre village/localité ? **Par ordre d'importance****

- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
- b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
- c) Conflit entre agriculteurs et éleveurs ;
- d) Conflit entre agriculteurs et pêcheurs ;
- e) Conflit entre éleveurs et pêcheurs ;
- f) Conflits de pouvoir ;
- g) Violence des groupes armés ;
- h) Conflits familiaux ;
- i) Conflits de voisinage ;
- j) Autre – **confirmer.**

7) **Quelles sont les groupes socio-professionnels qui sont affectés par les différents conflits qui affectent la production des produits essentiels pour la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans votre localité ? **(donner croisser avec une rubrique de groupes socio-professionnels)****

- a) Agriculteurs ;
- b) Eleveurs ;
- c) Pêcheurs ;

- d) Artisans ;
- e) Commerçants ;
- f) Autres – **confirmer.**

8) **Quelles sont les groupes socio-professionnels dont leurs accès aux produits essentiels à leur sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle est affectée par les conflits à caractère récurrents. Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Agriculteurs ;
- b) Eleveurs ;
- c) Pêcheurs ;
- d) Artisans ;
- e) Commerçants ;
- f) Autres – **confirmer.**

9) **Quelles sont les réseaux conventionnels formels et informels au sein des différents groupes ethniques/sociaux important qui sont les plus impliquer dans les conflits récurrents identifiés ci-haut ? Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Associations socio-professionnelles ;
- b) Regroupement d'organisations communautaire de base ;
- c) Mouvements sociaux ;
- d) Autre – **confirmer.**

10) **Quelles sont les réseaux conventionnels formels et informels qui coupent/traversent les différents groupes ethniques/sociaux important qui sont les plus impliquer dans les conflits récurrents qui affectent la production et l'accès aux produits essentiels à la sécurité alimentaires et nutritionnelles ? Combinaison menus. Par ordre d'importance.**

- a) Associations socio-professionnelles ;
- b) Regroupement d'organisations communautaire de base ;
- c) Mouvements sociaux ;
- d) Autre – **confirmer.**

11) **Quels types de relations soutiennent les réseaux conventionnels/non-conventionnels formels et informels au sein des différents groupes ethnique/sociaux important.**

(a) Relations qui soutiennent les réseaux conventionnels formels **Par ordre d'importance**

- Lien de famille ;
- Lien ethnique ;

- Intérêt professionnel ;
- Intérêt de pouvoir ;
- Intérêt économique ;
- Question identitaire ;
- Autre – **confirmer**.

(b) Relations qui soutiennent les réseaux conventionnels informels **Par ordre d'importance**

- Lien de famille ;
- Lien ethnique ;
- Intérêt professionnel ;
- Intérêt de pouvoir ;
- Intérêt économique ;
- Question identitaire ;
- Autre – **confirmer**.

(c) Relations qui soutiennent les réseaux informels non-conventionnels du type banditisme organisé.

**Par ordre d'importance**

- Lien de famille ;
- Lien ethnique ;
- Intérêt professionnel ;
- Intérêt de pouvoir ;
- Intérêt économique ;
- Question identitaire ;
- Autre – **confirmer**.

**12) Quels sont les acteurs importants qui gère ou influence les décisions des réseaux importants identifiés au sein des différents groupes ethniques/sociaux important dans votre localité ?**

(a) Les acteurs importants dans les réseaux conventionnels formels. **Par ordre d'importance**

- Leaders d'opinion ;
- Leaders communautaires ;
- Leaders religieux ;
- Les élus locaux ;
- Organisations de la société civile ;
- Autorité coutumière;
- Autre – **confirmer**

(b) Les acteurs importants dans les réseaux conventionnels informels. **Par ordre d'importance**

- Leaders d'opinion ;
- Leaders communautaires ;
- Leaders religieux ;

- Les élus locaux ;
- Organisations de la société civile ;
- Autorité coutumière;
- Autre – **confirmer.**

(c) Les acteurs importants dans les réseaux informels non-conventionnels du type banditisme et autres organiser. **Par ordre d'importance**

- Leaders d'opinion ;
- Leaders communautaires ;
- Leaders religieux ;
- Les élus locaux ;
- Organisations de la société civile ;
- Autorité coutumière ;
- Autre – **confirmer.**

**13) Quelles types de relations soutiennent les réseaux non-conventionnels formels et informels qui alimente/accélère les conflits récurrents qui impacte la sécurité de moyens de production et l'accès aux produits essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle dans votre localité?**

- Lien de famille ;
- Lien ethnique ;
- Intérêt professionnel ;
- Intérêt de pouvoir ;
- Intérêt économique ;
- Question identitaire ;
- Autre – **confirmer.**

**14) Quelles types de relations soutiennent les réseaux non-conventionnels formels et informels qui alimente/accélère les conflits récurrents qui impacte la sécurité des personnes, la coexistence pacifiques, et l'accès aux opportunités économiques dans votre localité ?**

- Lien de famille ;
- Lien ethnique ;
- Intérêt professionnel ;
- Intérêt de pouvoir ;
- Intérêt économique ;
- Question identitaire ;
- Autre – **confirmer.**

**15) Quels sont les éléments précurseurs des différents conflits récurrents identifiés qui ont un impact sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans votre localité? **Par ordre d'importance****

- a) Retour précoce du bétail en zone agricole ;
- b) Occupation des terres agricoles par les transhumants au de-là des périodes habituelles ;
- c) Non délimitation des pistes de transhumance ;
- d) Occupation des espaces protégés ;
- e) Occupation des couloirs de passage ;
- f) Occupation des espaces de pêche ;
- g) Tariessement précoce du fleuve ou des marres ;
- h) Autre – **confirmer**.

**16) Quels sont les éléments déclencheurs importants des différents conflits récurrents identifiés qui ont un impact sur la coexistence pacifique, et sur les opportunités économiques dans votre localité ? **Par ordre d'importance****

- a) Dégâts champêtres ;
- b) Occupation des espaces pastoraux ;
- c) Occupation des couloirs de passage ;
- d) Accès aux terres agricoles ;
- e) Occupation des terres agricoles au de la des périodes habituelles de transhumance ;
- f) Retour précoce des animaux en zone agricole ;
- g) Occupation des espaces protégés ;
- h) Vols, banditisme, braquages ;
- i) Agression et attaque armé ciblé ;
- j) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
- k) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
- l) Conflits de pouvoir ;
- m) Violence des groupes armés ;
- n) Conflits familiaux ;
- o) Conflits de voisinage ;
- p) Autre - **confirmer**

**17) Quels sont les mécanismes de prévention des différents conflits identifiés dans votre localité ? **Par ordre d'effectivité/importance****

- a) Intervention d'une autorité étatique ;
- b) Intervention d'un cadre de concertation ;
- c) Intervention d'une autorité traditionnelle ;
- d) Intervention d'une autorité religieuse ;
- e) Résolution à l'amiable ;
- f) Intervention de la famille ;
- g) Parenté à plaisanterie ;
- h) Activité inter et intracommunautaire de promotion de la paix

i) Autre – confirmer.

**18) Comment jugez-vous l'accessibilité/recours à des différents types de mécanismes de gestion des conflits récurrents dans votre localité ?**

- a) Très accessible – les protagonistes en font recours dès que nécessaire ;
- b) Accessible – les gens en font recours plus ou moins ;
- c) Pas du tout/peu accessible – les protagonistes n'en font pas recours.

**19) Comment jugez-vous la légitimité – confiance en – des différents types de mécanismes de gestion des conflits récurrents dans votre localité ?**

- a) Forte légitimité – pleine confiance et les décisions sont respectées ;
- b) Légitimité mitigée – peu de confiance, les décisions sont parfois contestées ou pas respectées ;
- c) Pas de légitimité – pas de confiance ;
- d) Autre – confirmer.

**20) Qui sont les acteurs locaux importants impliqués dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit identifiés Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Autorité traditionnelle ;
- b) Autorité religieuse ;
- c) Conseil des sages ;
- d) Communicateurs traditionnels ;
- e) Elu locaux ;
- f) Autre – confirmer.

**21) Qui sont les acteurs étatiques importants impliqués dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit identifiés Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Tribunaux ;
- b) Autorité déconcentrée de l'état ;
- c) Services de sécurité ;
- d) Autre – confirmer.

**22) Quels sont les acteurs locaux et étatiques les plus influents – écoutés – dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit identifiés**

- a) Autorité traditionnelle ;
- b) Autorité religieuse ;
- c) Conseil des sages ;
- d) Communicateurs traditionnels ;

- e) Elu locaux ;
- f) Tribunaux ;
- g) Autorité déconcentrée de l'état ;
- h) Services de sécurité ;
- i) Autre – confirmer

**23) Quels sont les conflits violents que votre localité a connu et/ou connaît en ce moment qui ont affecté les relations de coexistence pacifiques entre les différents groupes ethniques/sociaux dans votre village et commune?**

- (a) Les conflits à hautes intensité de violence qu'a connu de par le passé récent qui affectent les relations sociales entre les différents groupes ethniques/sociaux dans votre localité **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
  - b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
  - c) Conflits de pouvoir ;
  - d) Violence des groupes armés ;
  - e) Conflits familiaux ;
  - f) Conflits de voisinage ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer.**
- (b) Les conflits actuels à haute potentialité de violence que connaît votre commune qui affectent la coexistence pacifique entre les différents groupes ethniques/sociaux **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
  - b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
  - c) Conflits de pouvoir ;
  - d) Violence des groupes armés ;
  - e) Conflits familiaux ;
  - f) Conflits de voisinage ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer.**
- (c) Les conflits actuels à haute potentialité de violence que connaît votre commune qui affectent la sécurité des personnes dans votre localité/commune. **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
  - b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
  - c) Conflits de pouvoir ;
  - d) Violence des groupes armés ;
  - e) Conflits familiaux ;
  - f) Conflits de voisinage ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer.**

**24) Quels sont les conflits à caractère violent identifiés qui affectent la sécurité des moyens de production et l'accès aux produits et service de base essentielles pour la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle dans votre localité ?**

- (a) Les conflits identifiés qui affectent la sécurité des moyens de production essentielles pour la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
  - b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
  - c) Conflits de pouvoir ;
  - d) Violence des groupes armés ;
  - e) Conflits familiaux ;
  - f) Conflits de voisinage ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer**.
- (b) Les conflits identifiés qui affectent la sécurité de l'accès aux produits essentielles pour la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
  - b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
  - c) Conflits de pouvoir ;
  - d) Violence des groupes armés ;
  - e) Conflits familiaux ;
  - f) Conflits de voisinage ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer**.
- (c) Les conflits identifiés qui affectent la sécurité de l'accès aux services de base essentiels pour la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Conflit entre deux ou plusieurs ethnies ;
  - b) Conflit au sein d'une même ethnie ;
  - c) Conflits de pouvoir ;
  - d) Violence des groupes armés ;
  - e) Conflits familiaux ;
  - f) Conflits de voisinage ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer**.

25) Quelles sont les ressources de productions et les services de base les plus affectés par les conflits à caractère violent identifiés dans votre commune ? Par ordre d'importance

- a) Entrants agricoles ;
- b) Equipement agricole ;
- c) La terre ;
- d) Noyau reproducteur (pour les éleveurs) ;
- e) Entrants piscicoles ;
- f) Entrant zootechniques ;
- g) Capital financier ;
- h) Autre – confirmer.

26) Quels sont les acteurs importants directement impliquer dans les conflits à caractère violent identifiés dans votre localité ? Par ordre d'importance

- a) Leaders d'opinion ;
- b) Leaders communautaires ;
- c) Leaders religieux ;
- d) Les élus locaux ;
- e) Organisations de la société civile ;
- f) Autorité coutumière ;
- g) Autre – confirmer.

27) Quels sont les réseaux d'acteurs importants directement impliquer dans les conflits à caractère violent identifiés qu'on retrouve dans votre commune/village ? Par ordre d'importance

- a) Associations socio-professionnelles ;
- b) Regroupement d'organisations communautaire de base ;
- c) Mouvements sociaux ;
- d) Autre – confirmer.

28) Quelles sont les réseaux d'acteurs impliqués dans les conflits à caractère violent identifiés qui ont un caractère très formel (bien structurer/organiser) conventionnel (jouir de l'acceptabilité des citoyens) et informel (se forme sporadiquement en fonction de l'intérêt) non-conventionnel ? Par ordre d'importance

- a) Associations socio-professionnelles ;
- b) Regroupement d'organisations communautaire de base ;
- c) Mouvements sociaux ;
- d) Autre – confirmer.

29) Quelles sont les réseaux formels et informels directement impliqués dans les conflits à caractère violent qui ont un impact direct sur les moyens de production, l'accès aux produits et services de base essentiels à la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle, coexistence pacifique entre les différents groupes ethniques/sociaux et accès aux services de base. Par ordre d'importance.

- a) Associations socio-professionnelles ;
- b) Regroupement d'organisations communautaire de base ;
- c) Mouvements sociaux ;
- d) Autre – confirmer.

30) Quelles sont les réseaux formels et informels directement impliqués dans les conflits à caractère violent qui s'attaquent aux interventions de développement soutenu par les partenaires au développement dans votre commune et dans la région de Mopti Par ordre d'importance

- a) Associations socio-professionnelles ;
- b) Regroupement d'organisations communautaire de base ;
- c) Mouvements sociaux ;
- d) Groupes armés ;
- e) Autre – confirmer.

31) Quelles sont les types de relations qui soutiennent les réseaux formels et informels impliqués dans les conflits à caractère violent qui ont un impact direct sur les moyens de production, l'accès aux produits et services de base essentiels à la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle, coexistence pacifique entre les différents groupes ethniques/sociaux et accès aux services de base dans votre commune ? Par ordre d'importance

- a) Lien de famille ;
- b) Lien ethnique ;
- c) Intérêt professionnel ;
- d) Intérêt de pouvoir ;
- e) Intérêt économique ;
- f) Question identitaire ;
- g) Autre – confirmer.

32) Quels sont les éléments précurseurs des conflits à caractère violent dans votre localité/commune ?

- a) Retour précoce du bétail en zone agricole ;

- b) Occupation des terres agricoles par les transhumants au de-là des périodes habituelles ;
- c) Non délimitation des pistes de transhumance ;
- d) Occupation des espaces protégés ;
- e) Occupation des couloirs de passage ;
- f) Occupation des espaces de pêche ;
- g) Tariessement précoce du fleuve ou des marres ;
- h) Autre – **confirmer.**

**33) Quels sont les types de mécanismes de gestion des différents conflits à caractère violent dans votre localité ?** **Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Intervention d'une autorité étatique ;
- b) Intervention d'un cadre de concertation ;
- c) Intervention d'une autorité traditionnelle ;
- d) Intervention d'une autorité religieuse ;
- e) Résolution à l'amiable ;
- f) Intervention de la famille ;
- g) Parenté à plaisanterie ;
- h) Activité inter et intracommunautaire de promotion de la paix
- i) Autre – **confirmer.**

**34) Comment juger vous l'accessibilité des différents types de mécanismes de gestions des conflits à caractère violent dans votre localité ?**

- a) Très accessible – les protagonistes en font recours dès que nécessaire ;
- b) Accessible – les gens en font recours plus ou moins ;
- c) Pas du tout/peu accessible – les protagonistes n'en font pas recours.

**35) Comment juger vous la légitimité – confiance en – des différents types de mécanismes de gestion des conflits à caractère violent dans votre localité?**

- a) Forte légitimité – pleine confiance et les décisions sont respectées ;
- b) Légitimité mitigée – peu de confiance, les décisions sont parfois contestées ou pas respectées ;
- c) Pas de légitimité – pas de confiance ;
- d) Ne sait pas, ne répond pas.

**36) Quels sont les acteurs locaux et étatiques importants impliqués dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit à caractère violent identifiés.** **Par ordre d'importance**

- (a) Les acteurs locaux importants dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit à caractère violent identifiés. **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Leaders d'opinion ;
  - b) Leaders communautaires ;
  - c) Leaders religieux ;
  - d) Les élus locaux ;
  - e) Organisations de la société civile ;
  - f) Autorité coutumière ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer**.
- (b) Les acteurs étatiques importants dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflits à caractère violent identifiés **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Leaders d'opinion ;
  - b) Leaders communautaires ;
  - c) Leaders religieux ;
  - d) Les élus locaux ;
  - e) Organisations de la société civile ;
  - f) Autorité coutumière ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer**.

**37) Quels sont les acteurs locaux et étatiques les plus influents – écoutés – dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit à caractère violent identifiés ?**

- (a) Les acteurs locaux les plus influents dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit à caractère violent identifiés **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Leaders d'opinion ;
  - b) Leaders communautaires ;
  - c) Leaders religieux ;
  - d) Les élus locaux ;
  - e) Organisations de la société civile ;
  - f) Autorité coutumière ;
  - g) Autre – **confirmer**.
- (b) Les acteurs étatiques les plus influents dans les mécanismes de gestion de conflit à caractère violent identifiés. **Par ordre d'importance**
- h) Leaders d'opinion ;
  - i) Leaders communautaires ;
  - j) Leaders religieux ;
  - k) Les élus locaux ;
  - l) Organisations de la société civile ;
  - m) Autorité coutumière ;
  - n) Autre – confirmer.

**38) Quelles sont les institutions formelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la gestion des ressources essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans votre localité et commune ?**

(a) Les institutions formelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la gestion des ressources de productions essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans votre localité/commune ? **Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Structures étatiques ;
- b) Collectivités territoriales ;
- c) Projets et Programmes ;
- d) Institutions gouvernementales nationales ;
- e) Institutions internationales (ex. PAM, FAO) ;
- f) Les élus locaux ;
- g) Autre – **confirmer.**

(a) Les institutions formelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la gestion des services de bases essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle dans votre localité/commune ? **Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Structures étatiques ;
- b) Collectivités territoriales ;
- c) Projets et Programmes ;
- d) Institutions gouvernementales nationales ;
- e) Institutions internationales (ex. PAM, FAO) ;
- f) Les élus locaux ;
- g) Organisations de la société civile ;
- h) Autre – **confirmer.**

(b) Les institutions formelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la sécurisation des ressources de production essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans votre localité/commune? **Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Structures étatiques ;
- b) Collectivités territoriales ;
- c) Projets et Programmes ;
- d) Institutions gouvernementales nationales ;
- e) Institutions internationales (ex. PAM, FAO) ;
- f) Les élus locaux ;
- g) Organisation de la société civile ;
- h) Autre – **confirmer.**

**39) Quelles sont les institutions informelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la gestion des ressources essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans votre village et commune ?**

- (a) Les institutions informelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la gestion des ressources de productions essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans votre localité/commune ? **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Organisations communautaires de base ;
  - b) Organisation de la société civile ;
  - c) Institutions traditionnelles et coutumières ;
  - d) Groupe d'âge ou sociétés initiatiques ;
  - e) Autre – **confirmer**.
- (b) Les institutions informelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la gestion des services de bases essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire/nutritionnelle dans votre village/commune ? **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Organisations communautaires de base ;
  - b) Organisation de la société civile ;
  - c) Institutions traditionnelles et coutumières ;
  - d) Groupe d'âge ou sociétés initiatiques ;
  - e) Autre – **confirmer**.
- (c) Les institutions informelles de gouvernance impliquées dans la sécurisation des ressources de production essentielles à la sécurité alimentaire dans votre localité/commune ? **Par ordre d'importance**
- a) Organisations communautaires de base ;
  - b) Organisation de la société civile ;
  - c) Institutions traditionnelles et coutumières ;
  - d) Groupe d'âge ou sociétés initiatiques ;
  - e) Autre – **confirmer**.

**40) Quelles sont les institutions formelles de gouvernance qui soutiennent la participation inclusive des citoyens dans votre village? **Par ordre d'importance****

- a) Structures étatiques ;
- b) Collectivités territoriales ;
- c) Projets et Programmes ;
- d) Institutions gouvernementales nationales ;
- e) Institutions internationales (ex. PAM, FAO) ;
- f) Les élus locaux ;
- g) Organisation de la société civile ;
- h) Autre – **confirmer**.

**41) Quelles sont les institutions formelles de gouvernance qui soutiennent la participation des femmes dans les processus de prise de décision dans votre village? Par ordre d'importance**

- i) Structures étatiques ;
- j) Collectivités territoriales ;
- k) Projets et Programmes ;
- l) Institutions gouvernementales nationales ;
- m) Institutions internationales (ex. PAM, FAO) ;
- n) Les élus locaux ;
- o) Organisation de la société civile ;
- p) Autre – **confirmer.**

**42) Quelles sont les institutions informelles de gouvernance qui soutiennent la participation inclusive des citoyens dans votre village ? Par ordre d'importance**

- a) Organisations communautaires de base ;
- b) Organisation de la société civile ;
- c) Institutions traditionnelles et coutumières ;
- d) Groupe d'âge ou sociétés initiatiques ;
- e) Autre – **confirmer.**

**43) Quelles sont les institutions informelles de gouvernance qui soutiennent la participation des femmes dans la prise de décision dans votre village ? Par ordre d'importance**

- f) Organisations communautaires de base ;
- g) Organisation de la société civile ;
- h) Institutions traditionnelles et coutumières ;
- i) Groupe d'âge ou sociétés initiatiques ;

Autre – **confirmer.**

**Fin du questionnaire**

Table 1: Overview of Institutions and Actors Involved in the Management of Food Security Resources in the Region of Mopti

	<b>Managing Institutions</b>	<b>Managing actors representing the institution</b>	<b>Resources</b>	<b>Areas</b>
<b>CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS</b>	Master of pastures (Jowro)	Descendant of the first occupant in the Fulani tradition (Suudu Baaba)	zones encompassing grazing areas, lodges and tracks according to the Leydis, (socio-ecological entity comprising a major group of cattle rearers with allies, and space subjected to land-use regulations)	Discontinuous areas with characteristics of respective agro-ecological areas (Delta-non-flooded area). A space created with the agro-pastoral codification resulting from the Dina of Sékou Amadou.
	Master of the Land (Bessema)	Chosen by the Jowro	Agricultural area linked to the authority of the Jowro	Agricultural land
	Master of the Waters (Baba awgal/ji-tu)	Chosen by the Bozo fishermen	Fishing area linked to the Jowro's authority	Fishery
	Ginna (Dogon extended family)	Head of family or lineage	Agricultural area linked to first occupancy of the land	Agricultural land
	(Alamoudio, Ogo-kama, Bara Hogon)	Dozo supervisor of the bush	Forest area jointly managed by many Dogon villages	Environment
	<b>Political/Moral Authority</b>	<b>Players acting as political or moral authority</b>	<b>Role</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
	Village leader	Designated by the first occupant lineage and recognized by administrative authorities	Traditional authority (generally of founding family's descent. This can change as the society changes or according citizen's choices).	Relaying the administration in charge of conciliation
	Council of Wise Men	Group of most elderly people	Customary authority (designated according to customary rules)	interpretation of customs, for mediation or conciliation
	Hogon	Oldest man of the lineage	The Patriarch (a specific institution in the Dogon country)	Moral recourse for conflict settlement
	Hunters Brotherhood;	Members designated according to initiation and secret rites	Forest resource management	
	Brotherhood of Masks	Members designated according to initiation and secret rites		conflicts
<b>LEGAL INSTITUTIONS</b>	<b>Local collectivity</b>	<b>Actors representing the institution</b>	<b>Jurisdiction</b>	<b>Community organisation</b>
	Council	Mayor and Communal Council	may receive an estate from the government – possible articulation with customary estates of natural resource	Made up of villages
	District	President of the Cercle and his Council	(may receive an estate from the State- Possible articulation with councils estate)	Made up of councils
	Région	Président et conseil régional	(may have access to a domain retroceded by the State. Possibility to have interaction with other district)	Inter cercles

Table 2: Causes of Conflict in the Mopti Region

Normative Causes	Technical-Operational Causes	Societal Causes	Local Political Causes	Causes of State Governance Deficit	Security Causes
Absence of writings and formalization of "customary properties", modes of	Competition between different types of exploitation	Challenging the traditional order of social organization;	Political instrumentalisation of competition in the exploitation of resources and disputes related to	Inadequate or disproportionate response of the security forces to the growing insecurity resulting from	Sequelles left by the occupation of Part of the region by terrorist

bequest or land lending;			the agro-pastoral area	the crisis born in 2012	groups from the North
Failure to respect traditional land-yielding practices (precedence, sharecropping, royalty ...)	Inadequate national forest management schemes	Dislocation of large complex family (restricted and extended family units, rancor between families due to past conflicts).	Political instrumentalisation of chieftainship conflicts	Incapacity of the State to mediate competition or to regulate access to resources (land, pasture and community security)	Circulation of small arms
juxtaposition of traditional practices and new uncontrolled legal mechanisms	Inadequate development policies centered on Agriculture to the detriment of pastoralism			Low familiarity of the local administrative and judicial authorities with the laws that they are in charge to enforce	Islamic radical proselytism
	Lack of pasture space in these dry zones			Absence of any representative of the State in Outside of urban communes	Increasing tensions between local communities, especially the rural community, and the Armed Forces (FAMA)
	Lack of agricultural land			Notorious lack of control of state representatives on arms circulation	
	Degradation of exploitable resources due to climate change			Demolition of state authority marked by the passivity of the administration in the face of exacerbated conflicts	

Table 3: Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Mopti Region

Management Mechanisms and Conflict Resolution			
	<i>Traditional Mechanisms</i>	<i>State Mechanisms</i>	<i>Mechanisms Involved in Civil Society</i>
Conflict of Leadership (or Legitimacy)	Council of the Wise Religious leaders; Griots; Blacksmiths Tree of palaver	Mediation of locally elected representatives Justice	Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association. Deental Association
Conflicts related to the exploitation of resources	Village chief and his council Council of the Wise Eating the ground Swearing under the fig tree	Land commissions (COFO) Police / gendarmerie Justice	Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association. Deental Association Eveil Association

	Tone		
Conflicts linked to the definition of the agro-pastoral space	Griots	Land commissions (COFO) / Police gendarmerie Justice	Awake Association
Conflicts linked to inter-community tensions	Sinagouya (pleasant cousinship); Mandé Charter in certain communities (Bambaras, Dogons, Malinkés, bozos)	Institutional justice	RECOTRAD, Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association Deental Association
Conflicts related to intra-community tensions;	Sinangouya (pleasant cousinship) Initiatory societies		RECOTRAD, Tabital Pulaaku Association Ginna Dogon Association Deental Association
Violence potentially belligerous linked to the impact of the crisis triggered in the North in 2012		Armed Forces	