

# An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response



## Executive Summary

### Background, scope and methodology

The earthquake that struck Haiti with a magnitude of 7.0 on January 12 created one of the most rapidly devastating humanitarian crises in years. Over 300,000 people are thought to have lost their lives, hundreds of thousands were injured, and almost a million were left homeless. The massive structural damage that affected cities and towns in Haiti is valued at over \$8 billion USD.<sup>1</sup> The human cost was incalculable in terms of trauma, suffering and distress.

There was a huge outpouring of international compassion and major efforts to support and respond were made. In the context of a complex and challenging situation on the ground, CARE and Save the Children (SCF) mobilized a timely disaster relief effort in the worst hit urban and peri-urban areas. Emergency response staff of both agencies were rapidly on site, and in the following weeks, these two agencies, along with many others, launched major humanitarian responses.

In September 2010, CARE International and Save the Children commissioned a joint independent evaluation of their humanitarian assistance. The evaluation used OECD-DAC criteria and cross-cutting themes to assess the aid efforts to date. This evaluation presents a snapshot of the global humanitarian inter-agency response in areas of CARE and SCF intervention, as felt and perceived by a cross section of groups representative of Haitian society. It is important to emphasize that the findings reflect the views and sentiments of Haitians themselves in conversations led by and between Haitians.

The openness of the methodology of the joint evaluation put the experience of Haitian people at its center and then worked from that experience to determine the effectiveness of wider agency efforts including those of CARE and SCF. The innovative approach was neither agency nor project centered and both CARE and SCF took a risk in allowing the use of such an open and non-prescriptive method.

The evaluation team worked with 31 national staff from Save the Children and CARE in a two-day training to build their communication, listening, and facilitation skills. Once the training was complete, the national staff identified and selected 25 representative groups of Haitian society whom they felt were important to meet in order to gain knowledge of the experience of disaster affected populations and to whom positive, negative and neutral impact difference was attributable from their perspectives. These included students, fishermen, IDPs, children, women, and voodoo practitioners, among others. The groups were randomly selected within the geographical programme areas of both CARE's and SCF's responses. These people may or may not have received assistance from SCF or CARE. This is important to underline. It provides a cross section of perspectives and feelings of ordinary Haitians within context on the global humanitarian response to them as people affected by a major disaster. This is critically important for agency staff to understand and to engage with these strong feelings of Haitians. Given the large number of humanitarian actors and scale of the resources mobilized, it is very difficult to isolate one agency from another – often recipients of aid in the focus group discussions did not themselves make these distinctions and so agencies are often viewed collectively.

Facilitated conversations with these groups took place in three locations: Port-au-Prince, Léogâne and Carrefour. All three areas had emergency programs operated by Save the Children and CARE.

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<sup>1</sup> Pamela Cox, vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank, has estimated that the earthquake in Haiti will cost the nation's economy at least 15 percent of its gross domestic product.

Over the course of several days, joint CARE/SCF agency teams of national staff conducted focus group discussions with thematic open-ended questions that allowed the discussion to be non-prescriptive beyond either agency and their projects in order to gain knowledge about peoples real life experience in order to inform the questions for CARE and SCF: “Are We Doing the Right Things?” and “Are We Doing Things Right?” In addition to these discussions, a literature review and a series of key informant interviews with a cross-section of stakeholders were conducted.

The evaluation findings and recommendations offer a timely opportunity to take stock, review and to consider ways to improve the contribution that CARE and SCF can make, within the wider humanitarian effort, in the service of the Haitian people.

The evaluation took place before the recent Cholera epidemic and Presidential elections.

### Key findings

1. **Sincere appreciation by Haitians for the initial emergency response during its first three months:** There is a strong sense from the community conversations that the initial humanitarian response was timely, relevant and appreciated by the Haitian population. This was voiced genuinely time and again by many disaster-affected people, young and old alike, who expressed sincere gratitude for the food, shelter, water, sanitation, cash for work and health services provided by agencies including CARE and Save the Children. Both agencies were mentioned spontaneously by name within some Focus Group Discussions.
2. **Increased solidarity among Haitians:** People in different geographical locations and of varied backgrounds and ages spontaneously expressed the sentiment that they felt a greater sense of belonging to a community of Haitians and that this represented a new outlook on life and sense of reconciliation among sections of society. This may be at least partially attributable to the fact that in the early phases of the disaster response it was Haitians themselves who played the leading role in search and rescue of survivors and care for the vulnerable.
3. **Eight months after the disaster, the initial positively received humanitarian response is now receiving a very mixed reception, as felt by the random cross section of Haitians in the focus groups who were met.** In spite of positive finding 1, Haitians encountered and other stakeholders including within the humanitarian community, increasingly feel that the humanitarian community and Government are not meeting people’s expectations. They feel that humanitarian activities and programs are financially unsustainable and are not helping Haitians to achieve their own goals so that they can move forward from a state of emergency. While there was overall popular appreciation for free services and improvement in these for some groups; other people in Focus Group Discussions repeatedly expressed that their basic subsistence needs were not being met i.e. that they did not have shelter (street children), adequate food, poor quality water or security etc. These feelings of frustration will quickly turn to deep anger and violence if ignored.
4. **Lack of connectedness to context:** Save the Children and CARE both had strong new leadership in management in Haiti, and both agencies are obviously making serious efforts to ensure suitably experienced staff are present on the ground, and this is recognized and appreciated. However, connections to and relationships with the wider Haitian society, government and private sector seemed to be seriously lacking. While senior staff of both agencies have been addressing internal issues linked to rapid programme expansion, it is strongly recommended not to take the “eye off the ball” in relation to the wider contextual dynamics and relationships

necessary to inform good programme work. Some agency staff in Key Informant Interviews often commented on the quantifiable aspects of the initial response such as the speed at which staff arrived on site, while speaking less about qualitative issues such as strength of local relationships and connectivity. Those that did expressed a sense of marginalization, meaning that the response took over. The private sector has participated in the humanitarian response in many ways, including in water supply, money transfer and telecommunications, but a limited selection of people met feels excluded from major aid efforts. The evaluation and field teams met a restricted number of representatives of people from the private sector and here frustration and anger was felt to be high, while knowledge of context and caliber of people met was impressive. This was a view held in particular regard to the impact of the on-going provision of free medical services which has never existed previously on this scale in Haiti. While ordinary people met were delighted at the availability of free medical assistance, it was lamented at government and private sector levels that this was undermining the long-term future of health provision in Haiti. In regards to shelter construction, Key Informants commented that they felt a lack of inclusion in the initial stages of local technical expertise and knowledge. Staff expressed that imported 'HousAlls' in some cases took months to arrive (and are inappropriate in the heat); Within the same time frame and comparable cost, they might explored constructing more appropriate ground level structures with materials available on the local market using local skills.

5. **Uneven coverage:** Several groups, such as the elderly, children on the street, and people in rural areas, seem to be neglected by major aid efforts based on the limited snapshot of people engaged in this evaluation. The evaluation team developed the perception that a predominantly urban humanitarian response overlooked major hosting of displaced peoples in rural areas. Linked to key finding 3, even in urban and peri-urban areas the Haitian field teams encountered people who had received little (if any) or inadequate assistance since the earthquake. This presents a challenge to agencies to ensure that the profile of supported populations is as comprehensive and targeted as it could be within the circumstances. A key learning point is that a major urban response like this one may require a lot of rural knowledge (where people originate from or live in peri-urban settings).
6. **Services and employment as strong drivers for migration:** Haitians place great value on education and will migrate to areas where education and other services are available. While some responders were clearly positive about the construction of new schools and provision of school kits, people surveyed also commented on the closure of schools as a result of the earthquake and this indicates decreased access to education in some areas. 27 out of 31 Haitian field staff ranked education to be what they their felt to be the primary human need in Haiti, and this was reflected in the wider community based conversations. Focus Group Participants also commented that economic migration was a major impact difference that had taken place since the earthquake (described by one group as "pendulum" movements of the population following work). The urban areas are cash based economies. The earthquake and subsequent looting has eliminated businesses and capital assets for trades, upon which many depended for their livelihoods. Many people lamented the rising costs of living and the lack of cash in their pockets. On the other hand, the humanitarian response has itself created a large temporary economy and employment pool for which those who benefit from it are grateful. This evaluation found that people are moving to areas where the jobs and services can be found. Hundreds of thousands of people are known to have left Port-au-Prince for their provinces of origin after the earthquake and are likely to return with their families if service provision is not made in those hosting communities (if this has not already happened).
7. **Lack of knowledge regarding roles and responsibilities of individuals, government, local and international community:** There appeared to be a lack of understanding of roles and

responsibilities among Haitians met in focus group discussions. There was at times a blurring of the role of Government and the humanitarian community without distinction on responsibilities and insufficient appreciation for the role, responsibilities and capacities of communities in a disaster. While recognizing that the Government along with the UN were seriously affected themselves as victims of the earthquake, the humanitarian community is frequently viewed at community level as doing what Government should do, simply because the Government is not engaged enough in service provision. Many staff hired as part of the emergency response at Save the Children and CARE are new to the sector and their knowledge of roles and responsibilities of various actors could be built as per the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Red Cross/ INGO Code of Conduct.

### Key Recommendations

1. **Support the re-establishment of livelihoods so that the response builds solid long-term solutions:** Focus Group Participants repeatedly mentioned issues around a) being dependent on aid and this being insufficient b) expectations and promises about aid not being realized, and c) the lack of cash in their pockets to maintain their basic subsistence rights. Participants in FGDs discussed reduction in incomes, a loss of livelihood means, an increased need for microcredit, unaffordable school fees, low salaries, and a lack of employment opportunities. Much of the growing negativity found at community level regarding the humanitarian response in September 2010 (after the immediate response period) when the evaluation was under-taken, related to Haitians are feeling stuck in an emergency situation while wanting to get back to the livelihood situation or an equivalent that they had before the earthquake.
2. **Communicate better and more inclusively with disaster-affected populations:** Haitians require more information about INGO activities and programs communicated better – they need to shape and fully inform them. Many Focus Groups expressed frustration about lack of coordination among agencies (not CARE/SCF in particular) and about perceived commitments and promises not being kept. This in turn has generated a negative perception of humanitarian actors in general by the focus groups randomly selected, cited by one group as “misunderstandings among INGOs”. This is simply a question about the quality of relationships with communities, communication and information sharing by field workers and coordination among agencies. Focus Groups and Key Informants mentioned several times multiple agencies working in the same camps at the same time and the staff of the respective agencies not knowing what the others are doing there. Likewise discrepancies in agency packages and approaches created a poor perception of the humanitarian community. We need to think creatively about how to communicate inclusively with and how to increase participation with communities – none of this is new to the sector. Efforts to increase qualitative communication will increase agencies’ accountability and transparency. This was a major finding as communities met felt an overall lack of information about issues that affect them.
3. **Increase participation and collaboration in decision making at community and sectoral levels, including with local NGOs, Government and Private Sector:** Linked to the above recommendation, some of the key findings above could be mitigated by a more intense focus on improving and increasing communication as recommended above and participation in decision making in a more collaborative manner. To ensure that aid is empowering and sustainable in the long run, both INGOs are encouraged to strive to work more inclusively with Haitians, so that every step of the project cycle process is informed and shaped by the affected population. SCF and CARE have been doing this and given the clear findings of this evaluation, it is recommended that these efforts are re-doubled. In the selection of participants to be trained for the focus

group discussions, neither agency could provide a single participant from a local NGO, local government, Haitian staff from other INGOs or UN agencies to ensure that the exercise was well and truly inter-agency (whether working in active partnership or not with these other organisations). There is a real opportunity in Haiti at every level to include Haitian actors to benefit from capacity building opportunities, assimilate the positive working practices of other cultures, and for them to shape and inform programming decisions. This is critical if responses are to connect with the real needs and aspirations of Haitians and to have ownership by them, especially now, nearly a year after the earthquake. Lack of local capacity was sometimes cited among non-Haitian key Informants as a major constraint. This is an opportunity to proactively work to do something about increased inclusion, local leadership development and collaboration, which will help to achieve this goal. In a context like Haiti where agencies are often working in an extremely limited area with the same populations, the challenge to agencies for relationships of synergy, collaboration and coordination, is higher than where agencies may work in greater isolation in large rural settings. If agencies do not maximize coordination and collaboration in a non-competitive manner at community level, then wider international experience has shown that communities may be subjected to the same repetitive data and information requests over and over again.

4. **Regularly profile vulnerable groups and check targeting:** Some focus groups and Key Informants stated that some groups had not benefitted from the overall humanitarian response at all and who may have been in need. In fact, some Haitians said that the focus groups served as the first time they had ever met someone from a humanitarian agency. Some even expressed appreciation for the opportunity to have a qualitative conversation about their experience which was not based around data collection by the humanitarian community. A Haitian Key Informant stated that during the initial food distributions (not conducted by SCF) that it was simply a matter of the strongest and fittest accessing food. The elderly and vulnerable were taken care of by local responses of solidarity within the community. CARE and SCF have since made efforts to protect vulnerable groups especially in regard to Gender Based Violence. The Focus Group Discussions and some Key Informant Interviews clearly indicated that there is a need to regularly update the profile of assisted populations and other communities on an inter-agency basis.
  
5. **Support both rural and urban service provision, including education:** CARE and SCF are both working in the education sector which is highly relevant and appropriate in the current situation. The evaluation team did not receive any information or visit sites related to the content of that programming and therefore are unable to provide any input. However, it is clear that access to jobs and services, especially education, will spur migration. Haitians will make high sacrifices in order to send their children to school. Many people move to urban areas simply to access education and this has been a factor in the population increase in Port-au-Prince over the past ten years. Increased access to quality primary and secondary education and wider services in rural areas could help to mitigate rural urban migration and encourage workers in urban areas to keep their families in the provinces. This is a very important consideration in order to relieve the pressure on the main affected urban settlements and given the movements post the earthquake to people's provinces of origin.

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This report was commissioned by CARE International and Save the Children Federation, and supported by the Emergency Capacity Building Project : [www.ecbproject.org](http://www.ecbproject.org) . This report represents the analysis and findings of the author, and not necessarily those of CARE and Save the Children.

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## Acknowledgments

*The evaluation team would like to thank all of the contributors to this evaluation, particularly the thirty one Haitian staff from CARE and Save the Children who conducted the focus group discussions in the field and brought immense insight into the evaluation. Further special thanks go to the key informants and focus group discussion participants who generously gave their time often at short notice, the members of the Steering Committee, the CARE and SCF Offices in Port-au-Prince and CARE Field Office in Léogâne and all CARE and Save the Children project management, administration and logistics staff who made the evaluation exercise possible.*

Front page photo: Fanet Lundi participates in CARE's cash-for-work program in Haiti, July 06, 2010 (Natasha Fillion/CARE).

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## Abbreviations

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
CFW	Cash-for-work
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
ECB Project	Emergency Capacity Building Project
FGD	Focus group discussion
GBV	Gender-based violence
GoH	Government of Haiti
KII	Key informant interview
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally displaced person
INGO	International NGO
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
P-FIM	People First Impact Method
RTE	Real time evaluation
SCF	Save the Children Federation
UN	United Nations
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene

## Introduction

### Background

On 12 January 2010, the epicenter of an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale struck the town of Léogâne, 16 km from the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince. There was no living memory of an earthquake of this magnitude, since the last earthquake of this severity occurred 200 years ago. A new word was coined in the Haitian Creole language to refer to the earthquake: “*goudou goudou*” described the sound made by the tremor.

The disaster was catastrophic in the urban areas of Port-au-Prince, Léogâne, Carrefour and Jacmel, and aftershocks affected the town of Petit-Goave. During the 30-40 seconds that the earthquake shook Haiti, floors of multi-storey buildings sandwiched onto each other. Urban areas were reduced into a panorama of broken concrete, scattered blocks, steel rods and rubble, overhung by a cloud of cement dust.

The earthquake of January 12 2010 created one of the most devastating humanitarian crises in years. Over 300,000 people are thought to have lost their lives (GoH 2010). An additional 300,000 were injured and over 1 million people were rendered homeless. Because the earthquake occurred at 1653hrs, the number of fatalities was likely lower than it might have been at another time of day, as most of the population was outdoors at the time. Major damage, estimated at almost \$8 billion USD (GoH 2010), was suffered by residential, public and commercial properties. Following the earthquake there was a mass migration of an estimated 600,000 persons away from the affected cities to ‘host families’ in provinces of migrants’ origin; others took refuge in spontaneous tented camps that grew throughout urban centers. Eight months on when the evaluation took place, major physical damage is still visible. The earthquake was a formative event in the psyche of the nation, and it continues to affect people’s lives and their attitude towards it.

Several factors created a unique and unprecedented challenge for NGOs. The urban nature of the disaster, the fact that the Government and UN mission in Haiti were initially themselves victims to the earthquake, the massive international public and multi-donor response, and the proliferation of agencies on the ground and working in confined geographical areas have created a very complex operating environment from which major international humanitarian learning should be drawn in order to better inform wider comparable future disaster response.

### Agency Responses

Both CARE and Save the Children mobilized a timely humanitarian response. International emergency response staff, in addition to existing in-country teams, were rapidly on site. CARE’s immediate response focused on the distribution of food, water purification packets, jerry cans, hygiene and kitchen kits, tarps, tents, mattresses, blankets, clean delivery and newborn kits to affected populations in three areas: Pétionville in Port-au-Prince, Carrefour and Léogâne. In the following weeks CARE drafted its first response strategy and engaged in comprehensive WASH activities (construction of latrines and hand-washing stations, installation of water bladders, waste removal, and hygiene promotion); provision of temporary shelter; GBV education and psychosocial support; and Cash-For-Work activities to facilitate rapid access to income and improve the quality of life in the urban areas.

Save the Children (SCF) deployed specialized emergency response personnel to Haiti within 48 hours of the earthquake. The organization rapidly scaled up programming in the directly affected areas of

Port-au-Prince, Léogâne and Jacmel, primarily in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. SCF was able to provide relief to more than 550,000 Haitians, and services provided included education, health, nutrition, child protection, WASH, food, and temporary shelter.

These efforts in the initial response were judged timely, relevant and appropriate by the Haitian people in this evaluation.

### Evaluation Objective and Scope

CARE International and Save the Children commissioned a joint independent evaluation of their disaster assistance. The evaluation took place from 06 to 23 September 2010 in Haiti.

**The objective of the evaluation was to improve the quality and accountability of current and future disaster responses on a joint agency basis between CARE and SCF in Haiti by:**

1. Determining the relevance/appropriateness, coverage, effectiveness, connectedness, and coherence of CARE and SCF's programs. These specific OECD DAC criteria were selected by agency staff.
2. Capturing good practice, learning, and challenges relating to these and selected OECD DAC cross-cutting themes of participation of primary stakeholders; protection; influence/understanding of local context; coping strategies/resilience; gender equality; and the natural environment.
3. Providing a communication and listening experience with disaster-affected communities conducted by agency national staff, without an agency or project bias. This experience allowed communities to articulate their concerns and issues relating to their lives and the humanitarian action, as felt and perceived by them.
4. Triangulating information on issues arising from focus group discussions and Key Informant Interviews so that agencies become aware of and could consider action on the evaluation team's conclusions.

The People First Impact Methodology<sup>®</sup> (see Annex 3) used by the evaluation team in itself provides a practical model that may help agencies to strengthen their accountability practices and to provide quantifiable attribution data, by identifying the drivers of positive and negative humanitarian and development impact difference, as felt by communities themselves. By design, it facilitates a collaborative working environment for participating agencies.

### Methodology

The evaluation approach comprised:

1. A series of **focus group discussions** (FGDs) based on the P-FIM<sup>®</sup> methodology (see annex 3);
2. **Key informant interviews** with a cross section of stakeholders from the Haitian and international communities (see annex 6), including representatives from SCF, CARE, ECB Project agencies and other INGOs, the business community, the government, a donor agency, and sector networks like HAP and Sphere; and
3. A **literature review** (see annex 7).

The key informant interviews explored the areas of the humanitarian response that were perceived to have gone well; those that had not gone well; that which could be improved in the current response; and key recommendations for the humanitarian community. The literature review was a desk-based study of existing literature related to the Haiti earthquake, such as reports and strategies, other disaster experience and evaluation literature. This next section explains in further detail the approach used in the focus group discussions and describes the way in which information gathered is related to the OECD-DAC criteria (ODI, 2006).

All of the 25 focus group discussions were conducted by Haitian staff from CARE and Save the Children. These national staff were trusted and accepted by local populations, speak fluent Creole, the local language, and understand the nuances of Haitian culture. The evaluation methodology did not focus on a specific agency or project so that it could create a more accountable, open and honest encounter with communities. It was not project or agency centred. The goal of these discussions was to gauge what kinds of effects the agencies' work and presence had on the disaster affected population's lives from their perspective and to inform current response by Haitians themselves.

In preparation for the focus group discussions, 31 Haitian field staff from both CARE and SCF received two days of training (13-14 September 2010). The training comprised sessions on people-centered approaches to development, communication, listening, understanding bias, and facilitating, reporting and observing FGDs (further details in annex 3). At the end of the training, participants volunteered to serve in the role of facilitator, reporter or observer. They were then organized into field teams, each with one facilitator, reporter and observer, to conduct FGDs within the target communities.

Léogâne, Port-au-Prince and Carrefour were chosen by the Steering Committee for field visits by these FGD teams, as these were areas where both CARE and SCF had emergency interventions. The groups for the FGDs were chosen by the Haitian staff through an exercise that identified the most important groups in their view for consultation.

**Table 1: Total number of people in focus groups by location**

Location	Male	Female	Boys	Girls	Total
Léogâne	38	18	26	80	162
Port-au-Prince	15	31	4	0	50
Carrefour	21	20	7	0	48
<b>Overall total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>260</b>

**Table 2: Total number of people by group**

Group	Male	Female	Boys	Girls	Total
Camp committee members	4	2	0	0	6

Children	0	0	26	80	106
Children living on the street	0	0	11	0	11
Displaced	5	8	0	0	13
Farmers	8	2	0	0	10
Fishermen	8	1	0	0	9
People with disabilities	1	2	0	0	3
Laborers	13	0	0	0	13
Pharmacists	0	2	0	0	2
Commercial sex workers	0	17	0	0	17
School directors	8	3	0	0	11
Shoe shiners	6	0	0	0	6
Students	12	7	0	0	19
Traders	3	4	0	0	7
Voodoo practitioners	4	0	0	0	4
Women's association members	0	17	0	0	17
Youths	2	4	0	0	6
<b>Overall total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>260</b>

Ten FGDs were conducted in Léogâne on 15 September with a total of 162 participants; seven in Port-au-Prince on 20 September with 50 participants; and eight on 21 September in Carrefour with 48 participants. In total, 25 FGDs were held, comprising 260 individuals. All discussions were held in Creole. Tables 1 and 2 disaggregate the participants according to location, gender, and occupation.

The facilitators first asked the participants about the impact differences in their lives over the last year, then about impact differences in their lives relating to humanitarian assistance over the past year. Due to the overwhelming impact of the earthquake, the global impact differences that participants identified were often linked to that event and the ensuing humanitarian aid. The questions had been formulated to avoid a project or agency focus and to enable FGD discussion participants to speak about impact differences in a non-prescriptive and non-funneled way and not necessarily defined by the date of the earthquake. The approach was used to facilitate an open discussion with the group about their lives and experience.

The facilitator asked open-ended questions to establish which actors have had the most significant influence over the events and impact differences in participants' lives. The reporter recorded the statements exactly as they were made by the community and the observer played a qualitative role to verify the stage and depth of the communication. The discussions of the focus groups were captured by each team's reporter, each team of three then worked together to confirm and agree what they had heard and findings were then shared in plenary and challenged or validated by colleagues during a collective debriefings. This ensured the objectivity of the process and findings with scope for a very small % margin of error in the focus group findings – they accurately reflect what the people met feel. Full data and attribution results are available on request from [klove@care.org](mailto:klove@care.org).

The findings of the discussions with communities and key informants have been organized under OECD-DAC criteria, as relevant.

### Limitations

The evaluation was limited by many factors, including: a lack of timely prior agency agreement on the evaluation terms of reference which led to a delay in starting field work; a limited range of on

the ground agency relationships as the basis for Key Informant Interviews; short notice given to communities to participate in focus group discussions; and limited access to agency documentation.

The evaluation team struggled to obtain relevant documentation from both agencies and to find Key Informants for interviews. Therefore the number and scope of the key informant interviews did not include many members of the Haitian government, private sector, United Nations, donors, and the diplomatic community. Admittedly, a fuller range of informants would have ensured a more complete analysis.

Some of the focus group discussions had limited participants, due to their unavailability at short notice. Time was also short for the FGD debriefings, so whilst a good level of depth was achieved during these discussions, they were sometimes brief. Again, more could have been gained if there had been more advance planning on the ground.

Ideally, the evaluation would have included a collective review of project logical frameworks against the findings of focus group discussions and key informant interviews. As a follow up to this report, the collective review could be done with staff participants and used as a capacity building exercise. This activity would help agencies to decide whether and how to adapt existing projects.

This evaluation did not specifically consider impact, as it was felt by the agencies to be too early to evaluate the impact of the humanitarian response. Key impact trends are nonetheless already clearly emerging and impact differences should be considered.

There is also the limited geographical scope of the field exercises, which were conducted in Léogâne, Port-au-Prince and Carrefour, with no comparison with non-affected areas. Whilst the key informants gave a global overview of the situation according to their knowledge and perspective, the focus group discussions were all conducted in urban areas, so the information collected has a contextual bias linked to geography. Further exercises could be conducted in rural areas and this is encouraged in order to accurately determine the current status of hosting of people displaced from the towns.

Notwithstanding the limitations cited above, the evaluation provides critical contextual information about CARE and SCF programme areas and the collective humanitarian action, which is essential to informing current response and the shaping of each agencies programme. These findings are not dissimilar to those articulated in the Groupe URD OCHA Real Time Evaluations of the global humanitarian response in Haiti. These are helpful benchmarks to enable agencies to critically take stock of their responses and to integrate lessons learned.

### Utilization

This report, as agreed by the Steering Committee, should be made freely available among the various stakeholders in the interests of serving the affected Haitian population. CARE, SCF, and other interested stakeholders should carefully consider the findings and recommendations which can be used to improve the ongoing humanitarian response.

*Yon sel dwet pa manje kalalou*  
You cannot eat okra with one finger

## Principal Findings

### ■ Sincere appreciation by Haitians for the initial emergency response during its first three months

Haitians in focus group discussions expressed genuine appreciation for the initial international assistance received following the disaster onset. These efforts were focused on life-saving actions and the prevention of further loss of life. The timeliness of these efforts was considered successful overall in preventing any major epidemics and further loss of life. However, wider international learning and experience suggest that the risks of epidemics should not be overstated (ALNAP 2008, Groupe URD 2010). The recent Cholera epidemic originated outside of the earthquake affected area and in a rural environment).

A tremendous effort was made by CARE, SCF and other INGOs to scale up quickly, in spite of the many challenges they faced in doing so. The Port-au-Prince airport, seaport, and roads across the country were destroyed or badly damaged, making distributions and logistics for arriving staff extremely difficult. Additionally, many agency staff had been directly affected, losing family, friends and homes in the earthquake.

Despite these many challenges, the response was mobilized rapidly. Evidence for the appreciation of the humanitarian efforts is demonstrated by the 25 positive impact difference statements made by 12 different focus groups in the three different field sites. Many disaster-affected people mentioned the timeliness of assistance with emergency food, shelter, water, sanitation and health services and mentioned CARE and SCF positively by name. Agency country directors, project managers and ECHO representatives supported that assessment.

The evidence basis for this statement is that Haitians in the FDG's repeatedly made statements acknowledging appreciation for several services, including: access to medical assistance (in early phase); access to food; access to temporary shelter; water services to bathe, drink, sanitation facilities; creation of new jobs; reconstruction of certain schools; distribution of furniture; distribution of school kits to pupils; Schools have received toilets (albeit insufficient coverage of schools).

### ■ Increased solidarity among Haitians

The earthquake has been a huge formative event in the national consciousness of Haitians. It has changed the way Haitians view themselves and each other. This was evidenced by multiple qualitative statements of different focus groups in different locations. Two boys a group in a Léogâne displaced persons camp expressed this saying, "We used to live in the same street and before the earthquake we used to fight all the time. Now we know that fighting is not important and we are friends."



- **Eight months after the disaster, the initial positively received humanitarian response is now receiving a very mixed reception, as felt by the random cross section of Haitians in the focus groups who were met.**

Whilst the initial humanitarian response phase was on the whole received positively, there are very mixed and strong perspectives on the current response phase. When comparing the statements for global changes and changes related to humanitarian aid, much greater negativity is attributed to INGOs in specific discussions of aid (see tables 3 and 4). This is because they are playing such a visible and high profile role. As the change statements show, much of the positivity is linked to the initial phase response and the negativity is found around the current response.

The Haitian staff that participated in the evaluation were surprised by what they heard during discussions, especially by the near violent reaction of participants in one group. The focus group discussion with youths in a displaced camp in Léogâne was threatened with violence until the staff explained that they were not from a particular agency that had raised -and not met - expectations of these youths. People said things such as *“basic needs were met immediately but lacking now.”* *“Promises are not kept. They promised to come back.”* This is a reflection on the humanitarian context as a whole and not directed only to CARE or SCF. It is conceivable that agency staff have and do collect data for proposals and reports and the way that this is done raises expectations, or makes people feel that data has been extracted from them, especially if there is no follow up or updating of communities on what has happened and what plans are. Some Focus Groups reflected that they had never had “an ordinary” conversation like this one that was about them, when they did meet agency staff. There is a wealth of social capital in Haiti and certain groups, for instance students, have great ideas to offer and could contribute with the right types of interventions and strategies.

**Table 3: Consolidated results for drivers of global important changes over the past one year attributed to positive and negative effects as perceived by the focus groups**

Driver of change	Comm-unity	Govern-ment	INGO	Business	UN	Red Cross	Other
Positive change	26%	9%	33%	9%	2%	0%	20%
Negative change	15%	30%	12%	7%	1%	1%	34%

**Table 4: Consolidated results for globally important changes linked to humanitarian aid over the past year attributed to positive and negative effects as perceived by the focus groups**

Driver of change	Comm-unity	Govern-ment	INGO	Business	UN	Red Cross	Other
Positive change	12%	2%	74%	2%	0%	4%	7%
Negative change	8%	41%	39%	3%	3%	4%	4%

The negative responses attributed at least partly to all INGOs and not targeted at CARE or SCF dealt primarily with unmet basic needs (food, shelter, water, ways of generating revenue) not being met; inappropriate aid (food for work); decrease in self-sufficiency; false promises made by NGOs; poor

communication and information sharing; poor management of NGO programs (corruption, poor targeting, poor coordination between NGOs). Migration to search for work and increased insecurity were also raised but often attributed to the community and government.

The situation on the ground now is fundamentally different to what it was in the immediate weeks and months after the earthquake. Eight months on, many people in the focus group discussions expressed increasing anger regarding the relevance and appropriateness of INGO support. As highlighted in the recommendations section, this anger relates to the lack of participation, communication and information sharing with affected populations in ways that build trust and confidence in both directions. Agencies have a major public relations challenge on their hands that should be mitigated. Likewise, people are angry with the government and given the major reliance on aid, this evaluation found a lack of distinction between the roles and responsibilities of different actors. People's lives were devastated by the earthquake; there is common knowledge of massive mobilization of resources; expectations are high; people met are not seeing and feeling the difference in ways that they feel most appropriately meet their needs and aspirations. This was cited 25 times in discussions and particularly prominent amongst those that had small businesses: the voodooists, fishermen and shoe shiners. Fishermen and taxi drivers were cited as people who had viable businesses before the earthquake. Their capital assets were either destroyed or looted. These small scale business people said that they don't want cash for work. They want to re-establish their livelihoods and be independent of aid. They mentioned CARE and SCF negatively by name and also other INGO and UN agencies – this is a collective anger and not targeted specifically at CARE or SCF. However, this is what is felt by representative groups within geographical areas where both CARE/SCF and many other agencies are working. From a security perspective alone, agency staff need to be aware that these feelings are real and strongly felt. These findings are well documented in other Haiti evaluations especially those commissioned by OCHA. There was recurring negative mention of one particular UN agency. Something is obviously not working in how the collective humanitarian community has engaged during the transition phase in Haiti and this challenge needs to be addressed with urgent self-reflection, action and decisive leadership. Many of these are basic lessons accumulated over decades of good practice learning.

A recurring theme is that promises of assistance have been made but aid has not been delivered. This again relates to the way in which agencies are collectively perceived (not singling out CARE and SCF) to be communicating and sharing information. Expectations have been raised and remain unmet. This observation was expressed independently by five different focus groups in three different geographical locations: by fishermen, internally displaced people, students, women's association members and school directors.

### ■ Lack of connectedness to context

Strong ties between the international community and local actors appeared to be lacking, both at the initial emergency phase and in the present. A key observation during the evaluation was that it was extremely difficult to organize key informant interviews with non-INGO staff and especially with Haitian government, civil society organizations and the private sector—all actors considered to be critical to inform a humanitarian response). The few Haitian representatives with whom the evaluation team met had no active relationships with INGOs but expressed interest in engaging with them. Many INGOs have not successfully partnered with organizations outside of the humanitarian community.

Immediately following the earthquake, some relationships between INGOs were in place thanks to an INGO forum called CLIO (the Inter-NGO Coordination Committee) that included several of the

active INGOs in Haiti. However, the network has not been very active, and collaboration between INGOs remains weak and infrequent. Some agencies work more closely together than others, and they consequently have stronger connectedness to the local context. This INGO network remains a place where aid agencies could benefit from sharing knowledge and expertise amongst themselves.

Furthermore, INGOs are not making use of local partnerships with Haitian civil society. Local relationships are critical to understanding the context, shaping and informing the response, and encouraging local acceptance of assistance. Because few of these relationships are in place, a perception of a serious lack of connectedness to the context persists.

SCF is co-cluster lead in education and CARE has been shelter cluster lead and both agencies are active in other clusters and humanitarian fora. Despite repeated efforts the evaluation team simply could not access OCHA and the relationships did not seem to be in place to meet any members of the diplomatic community. The current CARE and SCF Country Directors were experienced leaders who were new to their posts and temporary, therefore the expected relationships between their agencies and the UN and diplomatic community are not yet fully in place. There is likely to be further transition when their replacements arrive. Turnover is also a challenge at other staffing levels and makes long-term and institutional relationship building difficult.

Another concern for agencies is the changing profile of the population they are serving. Without an accurate picture of beneficiaries, agencies will be unlikely to provide assistance that is appropriately connected to the local needs. The population living in camps has changed over time. One key informant interview indicated that although 20% of people now living in camps have a reasonable alternative, they continue to live in the camps regardless. One explanation for this is that the conditions in camps may be better than the residents' previous conditions, as they can live rent free and have access to sanitation services and water provisions. Camp populations have shifted as people have moved in and out. Camps were reported to continue to grow even though there have been no further seismic events.

### ■ Uneven coverage

Assistance coverage is and has been uneven, and vulnerable populations have often been left out of distributions and assistance. Key informants, as well as the OCHA real time evaluation, have noted that during the initial food distributions, the oldest and weakest were unable to compete at the distribution queues. Key informants also highlighted that following the initial wave of response, there was in some cases duplication of assistance by various agencies and not necessarily CARE or SCF and in others no further support. The FGD findings indicate that at least six focus groups in all three locations felt that critical needs were not being met. Children living on the street in both Port-au-Prince and Carrefour voiced similar concerns.

Some key informants raised concern that most agencies' responses were more focused on urban areas, ignoring rural areas. Rural areas received large numbers of IDPs and served as host communities for displaced peoples, yet have received little assistance. The focus INGOs have placed on urban areas may have drawn Haitians into urban centers, further straining the urban infrastructure, and therefore the urgent need to ensure up to date profiles of the populations receiving assistance. The July 2010 OCHA RTE makes strong recommendations for the humanitarian support to "Go Rural" as a strategy to take the pressure of the towns. This makes sense to have a balance of programming between the rural and urban areas given the large outflows of people to provinces of origin post the quake – again an up to date profile of provincial communities is required.

### ■ Services and employment as strong drivers for migration

Field exercise findings indicated that people are moving to where they think they can find salaried work and access to services (or better quality services) – there is a risk that this will be in the urban areas and thus increase pressure on those populations and infrastructure there. Haitians highly value education and will make substantial sacrifices to ensure that their children have access to schools. Twenty-nine of the thirty-one CARE and SCF evaluation national staff ranked education and knowledge as the most critical aspect for ensuring a dignified life. Eleven FGDs also referred to education as a critical issue for them. A 2010 survey conducted by Mercy Corps of 19,000 IDPs hosted in the provinces found that 85% wanted to return to Port-au-Prince in order to access education. CARE and SCF are working in this sector which represents a key pressure point.

### ■ Lack of knowledge regarding roles and responsibilities of individuals, the government, the local and international community

There is a widespread lack of understanding of the role of the different actors in a disaster both outside and within agencies. This lack of clarity emerged over the course of discussions with the agency staff and from the focus group discussions, which revealed confusion about the activity of INGOs and other actors. There is no distinction in popular understanding between the different roles and responsibilities of government, private sector, UN and NGOs, and in the long term, this could cause INGOs a considerable number of problems, particularly if negative perceptions of these various actors persist.

The roles of the many actors in a disaster as defined as follows: the primary responsibility in a disaster is for the affected population themselves to do what they can to respond (Sphere, 2004). It is the responsibility of the State to meet the needs and ensure protection of its citizens; where a state is unwilling or unable to meet the basic needs of its citizens, it is the role of the international community, including INGOs, to provide support. The Haitian State is currently unable to fully meet the needs of its citizens and the INGOs are therefore providing support. However, the evaluation revealed that these roles and responsibilities were not fully understood by the general population nor by some agency staff themselves.

**Piti, piti, wazo fe nich li**  
*Little by little the bird builds its nest*

## Principal Recommendations

The principal recommendations are all related.

### ■ Support the re-establishment of livelihoods so that the response builds solid long-term solutions

Food has been available throughout the disaster and its aftermath, except for the days immediately following the earthquake. The affected urban areas are cash-based economies and prolonging the life of any existing food for work programs may undermine the local economy. The cash for work (CFW) programs that are now common are better able to meet current population needs, but nevertheless have a mixed reception.

Cash for work programs were and are appreciated by many, but a range of Key Informants and Focus Groups now feel that clearing rubble and other such initiatives are decreasing in relevance and appropriateness. Some Haitians expressed the need for more appropriate forms of cash for work and establishment of livelihoods that do not rely on perceived handouts. For instance, the vetiver initiative ([www.vetiver.org](http://www.vetiver.org)) is a grass planting project to prevent hillside erosion that may be worth review as an alternative activity for CfW. A group of fishermen who had lost assets expressed frustration about cash for work when all they wanted was to be able to function independently. These individuals would strongly prefer low-interest financial services and are dissatisfied with the CFW option. Other participants at the community level expressed serious concern over decreasing levels of self-sufficiency, especially among youth.

Relief efforts should be developmentally sound and designed with a long-term view at the outset. To some degree, especially among displaced populations in the urban tented camps, people appear caught within a wider policy vacuum on finding a long term solution. While the needs of vulnerable groups need to be met, attention must be paid to the wider context. Senior leadership in CARE and SCF are aware and sensitive to this.

Equally, the response needs to be mindful to not undermine private sector services - pharmacists, small hotel owners and others expressed that they felt that their livelihoods were being destroyed by competing with free aid. By increasing interaction with Haitians who want to feel that they can contribute to a solution with their experience, assets and ideas, NGOs could mitigate some of this anger. In this sense, Haiti is no different to any country which has an established way at which trade and business works - independently of long term aid.

Is it important that INGO internal humanitarian and development departments work together to provide a coherent approach along the emergency-recovery-development continuum. This will help to ensure a smooth transition from relief to recovery. The risk otherwise is that Haitian populations feel trapped in a cycle of aid in urban areas that increases dependency on it – this view was expressed in the focus group findings.

### ■ Communicate better and more inclusively with disaster-affected populations

Aspirations and expectations of the disaster-affected population are very different now in the transition phase. The current situation requires substantial connection to and communication with the Haitian population to ensure that the rehabilitation and recovery efforts are relevant, appropriate and empowering. By increasing Haitian participation in the design and implementation of their programs, agencies foster resilience. These efforts also help to quell the growing anger and resentment towards the humanitarian community. Whilst SCF and CARE are working with communities to improve accountability, the findings of the FGDs indicate that current efforts need to be substantially stepped up, so that affected populations participate even more actively at every stage of the project cycle, including the design of accountability mechanisms. This discussion and networking should also include the Haitian private and local government sectors.

Information sharing about INGO activities through dialogue (such as face-to-face meetings) and media (such as radio and posters) should be extended to beneficiaries and non-beneficiary populations alike. A clear communication strategy should be developed in emergency preparedness plans or designed quickly after an emergency will help to manage expectations.

Haitian agency staff must be at the forefront of the engagement with communities. Agencies should support national staff by developing their skills and where possible build the capacity of local partners. Further, agencies should work with civil society actors including other INGOs that have established positive relationships with communities. Collaborating on an inter-agency basis and increasing the numbers of community development staff, like the ones trained for this evaluation, could help to improve dialogue with and connection to affected populations. These external dialogues will work well if internal dialogue between field staff and managers works well.

### ■ Increase participation and collaboration in decision making at community and sectoral levels, including with local NGO, Government and Private Sector

Many people interviewed expressed their feeling that the Haitian Government has failed to lead on policy, planning, coordination and decision making, i.e. to provide an operational framework for humanitarian action. There is a risk that critical analysis and decision making will be made by INGOs in isolation (especially expatriates). Haitians at all levels, both within agencies and in the wider society, must be included in taking decisions that affect them. By widening decision-making processes, local government and local NGO capacity will be built in this regard.

Both Save the Children and CARE could identify and create opportunities to organize collaborative trainings or planning events that include staff from other agencies, local government and local NGOs. Extending these relationships helps to form inter-organizational relationships and ensure local perspectives shape projects and programs.

Other joint activities linking agencies, government, UN, local NGOs and other stakeholders could include emergency preparedness planning, disaster risk reduction activities, needs assessments and evaluations. The Emergency Capacity Building Project ([www.ecbproject.org](http://www.ecbproject.org)) has some good examples of inter-agency collaboration and activities, all of which strengthen relationships and ultimately improve emergency response.

INGOs need to be extremely careful of the risk that prolonged assistance in some sectors that could undermine existing private sector services and delay locally-led recovery. Greater networking and

collaboration with private sector actors could help better inform agency response so that it is relevant and appropriate to local conditions and does not harm the local economy. For example, some key informants felt that local companies could have been better utilized at the outset to design and construct transitional shelters with less reliance on expatriate technical input. At a minimum more inclusiveness of local understanding and input).

Several other major evaluations of the humanitarian response including this one highlight the need for better collaboration with local capacities both in terms of local government, civil society and business actors. Since funding is available in such large quantities, many INGOs could seek local partners, and yet the number of local civil society organizations is quite small. This discrepancy creates the risk of a “scramble for local capacity.” Another risk is that local partners who work with INGOs may become a mirror image absorbed by the policies, procedures and identity of the international partner, losing the identity and commitment that generated their existence in the first place. Despite these risks, partnerships between Haitian civil society and INGOs are critical. Both INGO and local partners should be transformed and shaped by complementarities of strengths through mutually beneficial partnerships. Current agency staff may not have the skills required for the very different approach of working with partners, and agencies should develop programs to build those skills for staff to support success in partnerships.

If agencies do not already have established relationships with national partners, given the complex coordination challenges, it may be more effective to consider sub-contracting funds to other INGOs who already have well established relationships with local organizations, e.g. ACT member agencies. Parts of the private sector feel excluded from agency efforts. While this may be an issue of lack of organization on their part, they have strong negative feelings about this exclusion nevertheless. In the initial onset of the disaster all people did what they could, including owners of private companies. Some hotel owners, for example, supported their own staff with salary advances and meals. They feel that they could have played a greater role by being included at the outset in discussions and could still better inform and serve current responses. For example, there have been private sector plans for the development of geographical areas and sectors of Haiti prior to the earthquake, and these should be taken into consideration now.

#### ■ Regularly profile vulnerable groups and check targeting

Two focus groups and key informants raised concern over the quality of aid targeting, and identified gaps in coverage. It is important to build and maintain close contacts with communities served so as to regularly profile the population and identify vulnerable groups. Improving the profiling will permit better program design around long-term solutions. It will also help to ensure that agency priorities and strategies are consistent with actual needs. Focus group discussions raised concerns about certain groups that had not received assistance from any agency:

- unaccompanied children living on the streets, whose numbers have increased after the earthquake (compounded by higher numbers of children on the streets during the day due to the lack of functioning education facilities in urban areas);
- the elderly;
- people living with disabilities or chronic conditions whose medical treatment was interrupted by the earthquake;
- widows;
- teachers; and
- youths, particularly those with early pregnancies and those in camps, who have no access to education, vocational training or other meaningful activity.

Both agencies are tracking protection and vulnerability issues and on-going vigilance is encouraged as one focus group discussion reported cases of alleged aid for sexual favors and corruption through cash for work. A key informant reported of cash for work programs being manipulated for political gain.

■ **Support both rural and urban service provision, including education**

Support to all aspects of service provision including agricultural extension. Primary and secondary education in the provinces and urban centers also emerged as a recommendation from key informants who know Haiti very well. Strengthening the education system would reduce rural-to-urban migration and IDPs returning to Port-au-Prince. Since school directors pointed to teachers as an overlooked group, consideration should be given to mechanisms to support teachers and school directors. Agencies could consider support in the form of training and housing etc so that the human resources integral to education are valued and remain in place. The education system in Haiti is highly privatized, and thus agencies must take care to avoid undermining the existing private education system. Both CARE and SCF are working actively in the education sector and these points made during focus group discussions may be considered by both agencies. The evaluation team did not have enough time to visit projects sites or access to literature to know if the comments are relevant.



The woman knows the firewood, the bark knows the tree.

Findings Related to the DAC Criteria

1.0. Findings Relating to Coherence

Criterion	Definition
<b>Coherence</b>	The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations. <small>(DAC definitions here and below adapted from ALNAP 2006)</small>

Both Save the Children and CARE are to be commended for their strong and experienced leadership at the country level. There has been rapid expansion of programmes requiring high levels of recruitment. The availability of employment in the humanitarian sector has been welcomed by the people met. From the experience with the Haitian participants of both agencies in the field exercises there is an openness and eagerness for on-going skills development in the sector and an opportunity to promote humanitarian principles. The leadership of experienced managers is critical because of the exponential growth in the aid effort. Staff and program size have increased tremendously and rapidly since the earthquake. As a result, a large number of newly hired Haitian staff have little or no experience with the NGO sector or with the policies, norms and practice within their new agencies. In fact, many have little or no familiarity with international humanitarian standards. Many international staff have been recruited as well, many of whom are on first or second deployments, and may have equally limited experience and knowledge. Both agencies have found the recruitment of French-speaking suitably qualified international and national staff to be very challenging. Positions often remain vacant during long stretches of time. Contracts with those recruited were often short-term and positions are unaccompanied and unsuitable for dependent children. However, as living conditions improve and security procedures are relaxed, it should be possible to retain international staff for longer periods. INGOs have begun to regularize their contracts accordingly.

Not only are agencies confronted with a lack of experienced staff, but they are also challenged by a general lack of coherence in and a disjointed approach by the humanitarian community at large in Haiti. During the initial emergency response, over 1,000 organizations flooded in to provide aid. The UN cluster system was overwhelmed by the number of agencies that participated in early meetings. Other agencies chose not to participate in the clusters, particularly those that had their own unrestricted funding. This led to different aid packages being provided. Key informants recommended that the Haitian government or UN should have played a stronger role in regulating organizations, as there were several concerns about the quality of assistance provided by less experienced NGOs.

Key informants raised the concern that agencies on the ground did not incorporate enough of the learning from relief experiences in previous similar disasters, such as the Bam earthquake in Iran in 2003. Many (though not all) of the challenges in Haiti were challenges that the humanitarian community has faced before and has documented in evaluations and after action reviews, many of which are publicly available. Equally important will be the documentation of lessons learned from the Haitian emergency response so that the experience can help inform future relief efforts. For

instance, as they reflect on this response, they should document lessons learned in Haiti about the challenge of carrying out a population census in an urban disaster.

### 1.1. Recommendations Relating to Coherence

#### ■ Learn from previous disasters and document lessons learned for the future

If they have not done so already, all key management and leadership staff should read the ALNAP 2008 Lessons Learned from Earthquake Disasters, especially those working in the shelter sector, to ensure that previous failures are not repeated. ALNAP and the ECB Project are useful resources; both host evaluation and lessons-learned databases, searchable by type of emergency, period, region or lesson focus.

In addition to learning from the past, humanitarian staff should document their learning for future. Good and not so good practice in Haiti should be documented and disseminated widely among humanitarian stakeholders. This knowledge can be drawn on in future urban disasters and earthquakes.

#### ■ Know the sector standards

In this emergency where staff recruitment scaled up quickly, it is likely that some new staff will have little or no experience with the sector and be unfamiliar with sector standards. Key informants expressed that the humanitarian response often did not meet Sphere standards, perhaps in part because of the lack of knowledge on relevant standards. All agency staff should be introduced to and understand the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief, particularly to familiarize themselves with the role and responsibilities of INGOs, UN, the Red Cross and the government. Even in an emergency, national and international HR departments should be able to organize a short briefing on these topics for new staff.

Given the lack of understanding by the staff and population on the role and responsibilities of INGOs and other actors, and with reference to an earlier recommendation on communication strategy, the Code of Conduct should be popularized through the use of locally relevant media, music, and art. This may help mitigate the perceived central position of NGOs in driving the vision of Haiti for the future.

#### ■ Build resilience through disaster risk reduction

The humanitarian response needs to consider a wider range of disaster risk reduction programs. It is obvious, for example, that building codes and practices must be improved, and all similar efforts to increase resilience should integrate with existing local practices and knowledge. Because risk reduction against seismic activity is prominent in peoples' minds and hearts, other hazards such as flooding and erosion should not be overlooked. The general public in Haiti currently has an increased awareness of vulnerability to hazards, creating an excellent opportunity to mainstream disaster risk reduction into NGO programming. This approach would also encourage the nascent government structures to be consistent with the Hyogo Framework (ISDR, 2005). All risk reduction work must be integrated with local Haitian expertise.

**Ignorance doesn't kill you, but it does make you sweat a lot**

**2.0. Findings Relating to Relevance and Appropriateness**

Criterion	Definition
<b>Relevance/ Appropriateness</b>	Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy). Appropriateness is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly.

Key informants remarked that urban camps developed spontaneously, and as a result have been expensive to service and problematic. These camps are insecure environments and are riddled with problems of land ownership. Nevertheless, NGOs provide services to these camps. Key informants shared that agencies were “doing what they know” by managing camps and supporting IDPs within those camps. Camps, however, may not be the most appropriate way of managing large populations in an urban context. The scale and urban nature of this emergency is relatively unprecedented. Due to a lack of communication and understanding about what the future holds, Haitians living in camps may be playing a lottery, remaining in the camps with the hope of free land and home. But as long as the population remains in this uncertain status, Haitians’ frustration will likely continue to grow.

In future global catastrophes of a similar urban nature, humanitarian responses could be improved by examining what private sector mechanisms worked well in assisting disaster-affected populations after the Haitian earthquake. For instance, private transport systems enabled survivors to leave Port-au-Prince to travel to their provinces and families of origin; cash transfers from the Haitian Diaspora provided critical support to relatives on the ground in the urban cash-based economy of Haiti; mobile phone networks provided essential and often life-saving communication; and street vendors sold food on the streets the day after the earthquake. A better understanding of the private sector’s role in the emergency will help INGOs to work more closely with this critical sector.

**2.1. Recommendations Relating to Relevance and Appropriateness**

■ **Advocate for and inform a return strategy**

A return or relocation strategy, which is the responsibility of the government, should be developed early on. If it is not, disputes over tenancy and relocation become even further compounded with the potential to have increased negative effects. INGOs, then, have a role to play in petitioning the government to create this return strategy. By working together, agencies would be in a solid position to carry out further advocacy.

Agencies should also inform such a strategy. To gain traction in the face of this complex issue, INGOs could have greater interaction and dialogue with affected populations to identify local solutions from the perspective of the affected population. Options that build on local capacities may exist, and these could be supported by INGOs. INGOs have a role to play in gathering and communicating this information with the government.

Policies and programs such as a return strategy should be designed in dialogue with the concerned communities, and INGOs must follow up with these parties so that they are fully engaged and informed about what is being planned in regards to relocation. None of the participants in the focus

group discussions had ever held a free, unimpeded and beneficial conversation with NGO staff. Much more could be done to involve beneficiary populations in a real and meaningful way in all stages of the project cycle.

### ■ **Plan and implement a communication strategy**

In order to ensure dialogue, information sharing, and communication with the population and other relevant stakeholders, a communication strategy alongside an accountability strategy could be incorporated into emergency preparedness planning (EPP) or developed at the onset of a disaster if absent from the EPP. In view of the dynamics of expatriate staff in an emergency, it is important that national staff plays a significant role in any communication strategy, in both its planning and implementation. Given the existing and growing level of frustration, it is obvious that more could be done to involve Haitian staff and affected populations more fully in the design of accountability and other systems and tools that will be rolled out.

Far greater community-based training and work, adapting for example P-FIM<sup>®</sup>, could take place on an inter-agency basis with inclusion of key agencies, local NGOs and local government personnel. This kind of work can help improve communication with communities and ensure that projects are appropriate, responsive and support self-reliance. The Haitian staff involved in the evaluation found the methodology and work together on an inter-agency basis very powerful. There was consensus that staff very much wanted to improve their community development skills and felt those skills were important for their work.

### ■ **Build better linkages between relief and development**

As part of the transition from relief towards long-term recovery, development and humanitarian actors need to work more closely together and maximize linkages in order to support sustainable solutions. Prior to the earthquake, plans and progress had been made on NGO coordination through for example the Heads of Agency meetings, the CLIO (Inter-NGO Coordination Committee) and the UN clusters. It is important that these coordination forums and networks are utilized and that the right level of leadership is present and able to make decisions on the key initiatives.

The current humanitarian engagement in Haiti should build on and strengthen previous and existing emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction efforts. It would be interesting for INGOs to better understand coping mechanisms in order to design programs around those coping mechanisms. This would prevent organizations from driving the response by “doing what they know” (the Jeene 2009 evaluation provides an interesting example of a program designed around existing coping strategies in DRC). This is a very empowering approach that increases relevance and appropriateness.

Recommendations earlier in this report highlight the need to focus on regularly reviewing profiling of vulnerable groups; long-term recovery and development initiatives; and strategic engagement externally and empowerment of Haitians in shaping their future.

**Aprè dans tanbou lou**  
*After the dance the drum becomes heavy*

**3.0. Findings Relating to Coverage**

Criterion	Definition
<b>Coverage</b>	The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are.

The Haitian earthquake has shown that the humanitarian system can mobilize funds quickly and roll out a massive response to cover basic needs and prevent further devastation and loss of lives. The generosity of the public and key institutional donors has been exceptional. However it is not clear how these funds have been allocated and spent. Many large-scale funds have largely been channeled into the World Bank and others will be through UN agencies. Further transparency is needed, and INGOs should advocate for transparency.

Since CARE and SCF had existing programs in the Haitian Provinces and relatively little urban programming, agencies lacked connectedness to the urban context. Pre-existing local relationships and networks in urban areas would have allowed agencies to maximize and take advantage of local knowledge. Both agencies had internal emergency structures and that worked very well, enabling a timely deployment of international staff with 48 hours and a rapid scale-up to carry out multi-sector emergency response.

Having the right local and international people in the right place allowed for successful responses, and recruitment was a critical factor in the response. Both international and national staffing significantly and rapidly increased. After an initial period of rapid transition of senior international staff, both agencies have appointed senior and experienced interim country directors. Newly recruited Haitian staff members are largely inexperienced in the humanitarian sector and are unfamiliar with the cultures and policies of their respective agencies, as well as the Code of Conduct and other sector standards mentioned previously. Inexperience was also found among international staff. A cadre of seasoned staff were placed within various teams, somewhat mitigating the challenges of this scale up. Long-term contracts are now being issued to reduce staff turnover and continual transition. Both agencies are taking measures to ensure that systems and procedures catch up with the staff and program expansion.

In terms of context, there has been a substantial focus on the visible needs in urban areas. Other agencies purposely focused the increase in scale and scope of their programs in the provinces given the scale of disaster-affected population being hosted by family networks. The evaluation team did not have access to information on the programming specifics of both agencies work in rural areas. Both agencies have internal emergency preparedness plans in place, but these are individual plans. There is a wider lack of inter-agency coordination as well as coordination with the government and other actors on this issue. Globally better coordination and collaboration will increase coverage in future disasters.

Some parts of the private sector are struggling because of the widespread and free availability of goods and services in some places. The health sector especially was mentioned. This is a serious issue that should be further researched to confirm or reject and subsequently address. Key informants indicated that some of the relief items (such as bottled water, hardware materials and

pharmaceuticals) and services imported were available locally, and these could have been better utilized if there had been a better contextual understanding and pre-existing relationships on the ground. This was also found in the OCHA real time evaluation and Bell evaluation. Again, local knowledge and relationships prior to the disaster would have helped agencies; understanding which actors do what and where will help agencies to utilize local resources. In any country there is a regular and established system of trade that can be used to maximum advantage as one of the first points of reference, especially now.

### 3.1. Recommendations Relating to Coverage

#### ■ Invest in relationships

INGOs with existing relationships with the local private sector and local NGOs found these to be highly beneficial to them during the response and allowed them to increase coverage. Local partners provided crucial assistance in designing, informing and implementing major operational responses. Building such relationships early and joint emergency preparedness planning and involvement in disaster risk reduction activities is key. A mapping of private sector resources and networking with these actors will allow agencies to be able to use materials and services locally. The private sector should not be overlooked, as to do so risks affecting it negatively. In some cases, enterprises have reportedly gone out of business. Hospitals and clinics were specifically mentioned by key informants and pharmacies in the FGDs.

The Haitian government has been strongly criticized for its absence during the response. INGOs should attempt to build trust and develop a more inclusive approach by working with the government. It is important to highlight that INGOs should consider working with national as well as local government entities to increase coverage. Local government contacts, such as the municipalities, may present tangible opportunities for constructive and practical local level collaboration. CARE and others have begun to undertake this approach.

#### ■ Invest in emergency preparedness

An important lesson learned is that agencies must engage with local capacity and engage existing local knowledge, connections and relationships in all sectors. In order to “build back better” and leave a legacy of resilience, disaster risk reduction must be considered. Joint emergency preparedness planning should be undertaken to put in place agreements that outline how stakeholders should collaborate in future sudden onset disasters. In Indonesia, for instance, ECB Project agencies have drafted disaster response engagement protocols which are being tested by the current emergency responses. These protocols could be a model for joint preparedness planning in Haiti.

Disaster risk reduction needs to be mainstreamed into programming. A particular opportunity for this is to include it in school curricula, as per the recommendations and experience of the 2007 UN ISDR paper *Towards a Culture of Prevention: Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School - Good Practices and Lessons Learned*.

#### ■ Empowerment for decision making

Key informant interviewees commonly felt that there is a culture of “decision making by committee” in many of the Haiti humanitarian forums. Consequently there is a lack of traction and results in key areas. INGOs must ensure that the right people with decision-making responsibility are at key meetings so that decisions can be made and synergies among actors is achieved.

#### ■ Apply conflict analysis to programming

Because Haitian society is characterized by high levels of violence and FGDs report an increase in insecurity since the earthquake, a conflict analysis should be used to better understand the context. If basic needs and aspirations are not met, then violence and crime are likely to continue to increase. Hopes have been raised for a better future and substantial international resources have been raised and allocated. If the aspirations remain constant and the resources begin to decline over coming years with poor performance, then popular frustration is likely to increase. This type of analysis within a disaster risk reduction framework should inform agency strategies that are currently being reviewed or developed.

Also particularly applicable here is the earlier section’s recommendation on supporting education in both rural and urban settings.

*Tanbou prete pa janm fè bon dans*  
*A borrowed drum never makes good dancing*

## Cross-Cutting Themes

Many of the findings and recommendations related to this section, due to cross-cutting nature, are already presented earlier. This section focuses on those that have not appeared earlier.

### 4.0. Findings Relating to Participation of Primary Stakeholders

(For definitions see ALNAP 2006)

Disaster-affected populations feel a lack of clear information about what agencies are planning and doing; agencies have not successfully communicated about their work with these populations. For many of the participants in the FGDs it was their first contact with NGO staff. There is growing dependency in some encamped populations, high expectations and a “wait and see” culture that is growing, since they are not hearing from aid agencies otherwise. There is a perception in some cases that INGOs conspired with local political forces to create encamped populations. These perceptions could become more dangerous if left unmitigated.

Some Haitians and senior INGO leaders strongly feel that although local capacity was severely reduced, there were existing networks that could have been better built upon to inform and shape the initial response. Instead, large numbers of expatriate staff were brought in by INGOs. These individuals often had no French skills and no experience in Haiti, especially during the full onset emergency period. It was felt that INGOs tended to look outside of Haiti for quick fixes, solutions and relationships. This issue underlines the importance building on pre-existing local relationships and knowledge as essential to inform a rapid and appropriate response that maximizes existing local capacity.

### 4.1. Recommendations Relating to Participation of Primary Stakeholders

#### ■ Increase community engagement by empowering national staff capacity

Maximize the contribution, participation, and knowledge of Haitian staff in decision making at all levels. Agencies can play a key role through their work in supporting local people and partners, which in turn increases the self-esteem of the local population and ultimately makes programs more effective. If NGO staff are able to encourage local people to analyze and tackle their own issues in their own ways, the long-term affects will be significant. Staff should receive systematic training in humanitarian values, community participation and development, facilitation skills and leadership development.

Involve Haitian staff and affected populations more fully in the design of accountability and other mechanisms (see, for instance, the *Good Enough Guide* for resources and tools at:

<http://www.ecbproject.org/goodenoughguide>).



Earlier recommendations are also relevant here, particularly on implementing a communication strategy; increasing dialogue, information sharing and communication with populations; greater community-based training, including all relevant stakeholders; and external strategic networking.

## **5.0. Findings Relating to Protection and Gender**

Issues relating to protection and gender emerged in the evaluation. The focus group discussions raised concerns about the increased numbers of unaccompanied children living on the streets. They noted higher numbers of children on the streets during the day as a result of the lack of functioning education facilities in urban areas. Additionally, some informants reported the disruption of medical treatment by the earthquake for those living with disabilities and with chronic medical conditions. FGDs and KIIs reported an increase in early pregnancies in displaced camps. One of the FGD teams heard a report of alleged aid for sexual favors and corruption through cash for work, as mentioned earlier. There may be certain vulnerable groups who are being overlooked in the response. FGDs also mentioned a decrease in security and increase in gender-based violence (GBV). Agencies have been slow to put in place accountability and protection measures; this is being addressed now.

### **5.1. Recommendations Relating to Protection and Gender**

INGOs should investigate the claims about the alleged aid for sexual favors and corruption of the cash-for-work programs to determine how widespread the problems may be. As the elections approach, it is essential that aid not be manipulated for political gain. Programs should be designed with protection issues in mind.

The earlier recommendation to regularly reassess vulnerable groups and check targeting is also relevant here.

## **6.0. Findings Relating to Influence/Understanding Local Context**

INGOs can be strong drivers in shaping the local context. One key informant gave the example of INGOs creating and managing camps because this is what they know how to do, even if camps were not the most appropriate response given the urban nature of this disaster. Discussions revealed that the hope or expectation that agencies will rebuild people's houses could be one of the drivers for people staying in the camps.

Wider learning corroborated by focus group findings confirm that small businesses offer significant employment opportunities and that affected small scale entrepreneurs have suffered from loss of assets and lack of access to low interest capital to re-establish themselves. There will be repercussions well into the future.

### **6.1. Recommendations Relating to Influence/Understanding Local Context**

Various recommendations made earlier are relevant here, including:

- Share clear information on roles and responsibilities of agencies, UN, government and other key actors, and what aid each entity is able to provide;

- Work with or establish networking meetings to share information, best practice, and standards, to build government's role in coordination and policy, and to build local agency involvement from the outset;
- Use beneficiaries and local technicians and experts to inform standards to ensure that technical interventions are relevant and appropriate;
- Ensure INGOs do not compete for local partners and further undermine local input and participation;
- Ensure commitment by involving senior leadership at all stages of decision making; and
- Ensure that checks and balances are in place so that interventions, especially in the shelter sector, are not signed off on until there is proper confirmation that local knowledge, experience and views inform the intervention.

### 7.0. Findings Relating to Coping Strategies/Resilience

The greater part of the initial search and rescue response to save lives in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake was carried out by Haitian citizens themselves. It has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts that disaster-affected population are the first responders (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Synthesis Report, 2007). The international media largely overlooked efforts by nationals, focusing instead on the search and rescue efforts of foreign teams.

International cash transfers from the Diaspora to relatives in Haiti also played a key role by putting money into the hands of survivors in Haiti in the early days following the earthquake. It is unclear to what degree remittances have continued, and how agencies can work with the Diaspora, but it is an issue of further consideration.

Many spontaneous camps sprung up in the aftermaths of the earthquake, but a significant number of Haitians in the affected urban centers also relocated to their rural communities of origin in the provinces using the private transport system. In some cases communities themselves sent transport lorries to collect people from the towns. It is important to understand this dynamic and monitor where these people who migrated are now and what their plans and hopes are. This should be taken into account for any program design – both urban and rural – as aid programs may create a draw or push for population movement.

Social cohesion and solidarity among Haitians themselves were felt to have increased, particularly in the camps. An increase in solidarity was reported by the camp committee focus group and manual laborers groups, whilst the camp committee members, street children, children and members of the women's associations have a new outlook on life with more tolerance and love for their neighbors. One participant in a women's association mentioned the people's generosity, referring to the local community rather than to international efforts. She described, for instance, how communities looked after their elders who were not able to get to distribution lines. Nonetheless, other groups expressed the opinion that the international compassion and solidarity communicated through the global media had a positive significance for the Haitian population.

### 7.1. Recommendations Relating to Coping Strategies/Resilience

It is not clear whether agencies can build on this solidarity and understand local coping mechanisms. A study on coping strategies, as mentioned earlier, would be a strong way to design programs that are relevant, appropriate and empowering to Haitian communities.

People in the business community in Port-au-Prince have reopened restaurants, guesthouses and hotels for which business may be better than before the disaster. However, other small and viable businesses may have not been able to re-establish themselves due to the major loss of capital assets. Business advisory services and advocacy for the establishment of small and medium sized low interest loans may be an area for consideration for INGOs. By supporting the Haitian economy, responses will be better connected. The power of businesses to create employment is highly important and should not be overlooked.

## Conclusion

CARE, Save the Children, and many other INGOs launched timely humanitarian responses. Agencies quickly scaled up staff in Haiti and mobilized funds to begin programming. While Haitians approved of and appreciated the initial flow of aid and programming, the tide has greatly turned over the last several months, and there is growing anger and resentment in communities across Haiti directed at INGOs. Billions of dollars have been committed, and expectations have been raised, but many Haitians feel let down, despite massive aid efforts.

INGOs can begin to address popular dissatisfaction by taking several actions. INGOs must share more information regularly and better with Haitian communities—with program participants and non-participants alike. Staff should more regularly profile the communities they are serving to ensure that programs meet the needs of the target population. National staff should be at the forefront of these efforts.

Agency staff, both international and national staff, should receive training on sector standards and codes of conduct.

Aid programs should be adapted so that they are more relevant and appropriate for the Haitian context. Sustainable livelihoods programs that promote dignity and independence from aid should be a priority. Haitians targeted by INGO programs should be involved in all stages of said programs.

Agencies should recognize the importance of working with the government, civil society, and private sector, and this effort should start by mapping local capacity and resources. INGOs need to work with the government, but also serve as an advocate for vulnerable Haitian people. INGOs would do well to work more closely together themselves. Indeed, many of the recommendations of this evaluation can be tackled collaboratively, making the best of agency resources. Working through collaboration also helps INGOs to avoid duplication.

The methodology used in this evaluation in itself provided an opportunity for national staff at both CARE and Save the Children to engage with disaster-affected populations in a meaningful, qualitative way. For the staff at both agencies, collaborating on an inter-agency evaluation proved to be a transformative experience. Importantly, working relationships were established across agencies. Leaders at CARE and Save the Children in Haiti should take advantage of the momentum built during the initial collaboration brought about by this evaluation and take further action to collaborate.

## Annex 1

# Terms of Reference

## Haiti Joint Evaluation

### CARE USA and SCF USA supported by the Emergency Capacity Building Project

#### Rationale

CARE USA and SCF USA have a relatively clear understanding in Haiti about what has gone well and what has not gone well in their disaster response activities and strategies. They also appreciate that there are gaps in current knowledge and methods to proactively determine on-going and future needs and opportunities and how these can and should be addressed. Clear lessons have already been learned from the global humanitarian experience and practice to date that have improved effectiveness and efficiency in the initial response to a disaster. However, it is agreed that it is important to review how lessons learned have been applied and how improved performance should be addressed and adopted on an agency and inter-agency basis going forward; and to build advocacy and add to 'best practice' within the wider ECB Phase II initiative. Ultimately, the evaluation seeks to improve humanitarian response in ways that builds a foundation for the people of Haiti to take ownership of their own recovery, address vulnerability and ensure that future development support is consistent with present humanitarian action.

The Haiti disaster has a particularly urban character. As such, there are specific characteristics of the Haiti January 2010 earthquake disaster and response that can contribute to the body of global humanitarian learning to improve quality and accountability of future urban disaster response in similar quick onset catastrophes.

#### Background

The impetus for this evaluation came from multiple actors including CARE and SCF USA within the overall Emergency Capacity Building II Project. It will be led by an external independent consultant with 2 staff from ECB II working with a Steering Committee of 2 and Haitian field exercise participants. The character of the evaluation process will be open, participatory and collaborative. The CARE After Action Review has already identified challenge areas and it remains to put in place a clear plan of action to address these: These are lack of community participation throughout the project cycle particularly by vulnerable groups; weak consultation and complaints mechanisms; slow establishment of M&E systems; knowledge of accountability poor at service staff levels e.g. security personnel. A lack of wider stakeholder coherence has already been identified in relation to WASH messages and shelter standards.

#### Evaluation Objectives

The objective of the evaluation is to improve the quality and accountability of the current and future disaster response on a joint inter-agency basis by:

1. To provide a depth experience of communication and listening within and to disaster affected communities (accountability will be concretely demonstrated in the exercise and the accountability skills of Haitian staff further developed) - so that by those qualitative conversations our disaster response is *de facto* evaluated from within the communities perspective and attributed in a quantitative way "from the outside looking in".
2. To demonstrate genuine downward accountability by allowing communities to articulate their most deeply felt concerns and issues and be heard by agency staff – opportunities may also emerge in the process that highlights horizontal accountabilities among communities themselves by the conversation focus groups have between themselves. The field exercise will tangibly by its non-agency and non-project specific approach and people centered focus (© People First Impact Method 2010) provide a practical model that may prove useful to agencies in Haiti to advance their practice of accountability. This will have

all the characteristics in a concrete way of setting standards in best practice of accountability so that we maximize lesson learning and improvements in our programming from this evaluation. These findings will in a constructively unadulterated way be fed back to CARE and SCF US combined with practical considerations and recommendations. Communities will have the opportunity to express changes and pressure points in the language and terms of their world view and culture positive, negative and benign - as a result of the disaster response. In this way the evaluation process itself will be a learning process about the practice of accountability and fundamentally build on the engagement of Haitians with Haitians.

3. To provide further triangulation of sectorial and other information on key issues that may emerge from field exercises so that CARE and SCF are aware of these factors/effects of their work and can consider further action or wider advocacy.
4. Based on field exercise findings to determine the Relevance/Appropriateness; Coverage; Effectiveness; Connectedness; and Coherence of CARE and SCF's programs as per the DAC criteria.
5. Based on field exercise findings to capture good practice, learning and challenges relating to the cross cutting themes of participation of primary stakeholders; protection; influence/understanding of local context; coping strategies/resilience; gender equality; and the natural environment.

By the end of the evaluation agencies will have an increased knowledge on the areas above and additional issues that may emerge within the evaluation/workshop processes. These findings will be freely shared among the various stakeholders in the interests of serving the affected Haitian population:

### **Responsibilities**

1. The external Team Leader and ECB Team will facilitate an open and collaborative evaluation process so that an open, honest, sharing & learning environment is created to gain maximum sharing towards maximum learning and improved performance.
2. The Team Leader and ECB team will work with a Steering Committee made up of a single representative from each of the two participating agencies.
3. The external Team Leader and ECB Team will suggest a methodology and process for the evaluation to be considered by the Steering Committee. This will be regularly reviewed and improved for best results.
4. The ECB Joint Evaluation Guidelines tool (being developed) will be used as reference, and the team leader will contribute to the body of knowledge on this tool by debriefing the ECB Evaluation Coordinator after the evaluation is complete.
5. Other ECB initiatives (e.g. Guide to Mainstreaming DRR & CCA within Agencies) will be referenced and the evaluation report will feed into this on-going debate.
6. Other internationally tools (e.g. GEG, SPHERE Standards, HAP etc) will be referenced.
7. The Steering Committee will review and provide feedback on each stage of the evaluation approach and methodology.
8. Steering Committee members will be ambassadors of the evaluation process and findings within their agencies in Haiti and more broadly e.g. within the wider ECB II structure.
9. Steering Committee members will promote and secure commitment to the evaluation from the relevant leadership within their organizations.
10. Steering Committee members will secure technical input into the approach and methodology from their respective agencies to the degree necessary and appropriate.
11. Steering Committee members will secure and coordinate the availability of Haitian staff and communicate and advance the availability of Haitian staff for the field exercises.
12. Haitian participants in the methodology training and field exercises will provide an essential core component of the evaluation findings.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

The evaluation methodology is fully elaborated in Annex A subject to amendment by the Steering Committee.

### **Deliverables**

1. As outlined in the methodology, thirty field staff from both agencies will have increased capacity in community-based evaluation techniques.
2. A final report will be produced in consultation with the Steering Committee and will be released by the end of October.

**Anticipated end users of the report findings**

Haitian Communities  
Haitian Government  
National Civil Society Organizations  
Senior NGO humanitarian leaders and managers in Haiti  
ECB II  
UN agencies in Haiti  
Donors in Haiti  
Global humanitarian community  
Humanitarian Evaluation Community  
CARE US and SCF US  
Universities

**Report Ownership**

The report will essentially reflect the authentic voice of Haitian communities about the past and present effects of the disaster on their lives, their aspirations for the future and how they perceive their role, the role of government and the international community (e.g. INGOs, UN etc.) in addressing their emergency and full recovery needs. It will be their report. The joint commitment, effort and work of the participating agencies and particularly the Haitian staff participants will be fully recognized. Use of tools and approaches developed by the consultant and colleagues prior to the evaluation will be fully recognized.

If there are any unplanned findings that reflect negatively on any other agency not participating in the evaluation, then the names of these agencies will not be documented publically. The lessons learned on how to improve practice will be captured. It will be left to the CARE and SCF Country Directors to bring those findings privately to the attention of the agencies concerned in a spirit of constructive collaboration.

**Potential Evaluation constraints**

- Staff and agency availability & support at all levels
- Discomfort among some agencies that evaluation activities will take place in communities where they also work (to the degree possible they will be informed in advance)
- Social unrest
- Hurricane season

## Annex 2

### Haiti Joint Evaluation Methodology

The proposed methodology will be:

- Community centered and based
- Non agency centric
- Non project centered
- Based on local Haitian capacity

The approach is informed by the spirit, values and approaches advocated by the Disaster Policy of the government of Haiti; the Emergency Capacity Building Project; the Sphere Humanitarian Charter, Red Cross Code of Conduct and Common Standards; Humanitarian Accountability Project; Hyogo Framework for Action; CARE and SCF Humanitarian Policies. The four points above are core to the People First Impact Methodology outlined in Annex A.

Specifically the methodological framework will cross reference the ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies using the OECD-DAC Criteria.

#### **Coherence**

#### **Relevance/Appropriateness**

#### **Coverage**

Effectiveness

Impact

Coordination (not formal DAC criteria)

Efficiency

Connectedness

As a result of a prior ranking exercise undertaken by participating agencies it was felt that at the current stage of the response that coherence; relevance/appropriateness; and coverage would be given particular priority.

**Efficiency** and **Coordination** will not be included in the evaluation. The reasons for this are that these criteria have been covered in single agency After Action Reviews and Real Time Evaluations. Coordination has been additionally covered by the Cluster Group Approach evaluation. Participating agencies feel as a result of the above that they know what aspects of efficiency and coordination need to be improved. It would therefore be cost and time inefficient to take a look at these criteria.

The criteria of coverage would first be evaluated by a desk based review of the available policies of the participating agencies. This information would be triangulated with the findings of focus group discussions at field level and key informant interviews.

Through an inter-agency ranking exercise it was decided to focus on the following eight DAC cross-cutting themes.

- Participation of primary stakeholders
- Protection
- Influence/understanding local context
- Coping strategies/resilience
- Gender equality

HIV/AIDS is left out as it was considered that it would come under coping strategies and protection. Prevalence rates are fairly low and it is considered that there are some other vulnerable groups who require attention. The single agency RTE's have already reviewed Human Resources and Management.

The methods used by the evaluation team in order to achieve the objectives of the evaluation TORs will be:

**1. Key Informant Interviews 2-4 days +**

- Key Informant Interviews (informants and finalization of questions will be agreed by the Steering Committee) will be carried out by the evaluation team.
- Findings reviewed by Steering Committee.

**2. Desk based review of policies relevant to coherence criteria**

- To be carried out by the evaluation team.
- There will be an automatic verification of policy coherence in the field exercises.
- Findings reviewed by Steering Committee.

**3. Community based field exercise**

The field exercises will be critical to ensure that community perspectives on humanitarian action inform the evaluation findings in a core way (from the outside looking in). This will be conducted in an informed and skilled way led by Haitians with evaluation team support. Haitians from multiple organizations (not necessarily from the three participating agencies) who have good basic community development understanding and skills; who are known, accepted and trusted by the communities they will be deployed to. They should be of mixed ages, gender and experience and available for a minimum of four full days.

- A matrix for the capturing of key information from FGDs will be provided by the Team Leader to the Steering Committee for amendment if necessary and confirmation.
- Two day Practical training of Haitian field workers from multiple agencies (Local government and CSOs if possible) as Facilitators, Reporters and Observers for community based Focus Group Discussions. Training will include deepening appreciation of the right to life with dignity; primacy of the community; communication skills; bias and open questioning techniques. Attention will be given to understanding quality and levels of communication with communities; how to identify this; and capture the key statements relating to what experience and perceptions are critically important for the exercise.
- Selection of representative disaster affected social groups by Haitian participants and allocation of thematic question areas.
- A series of community based discussions on one to two DAC criteria and themes with a wide range of representative community groups e.g. youth; women; children; elders; entrepreneurs etc.
- Field participants will determine in training who the natural groups are that constitute the different communities where field exercises will take place.
- Field participants will determine in training which criteria and which themes will be most appropriate and relevant to each group.
- These DAC criteria and themes will be translated into local languages in a way that is intelligible within the local culture.
- Some of the DAC criteria and cross cutting issues will not need to be given explicit attention. For example impact and coherence issues will be clearly evident from the FGDs.
- Half day field exercises with representative groups in various geographical locations (which may include a non-disaster affected population for comparison and to determine if there are unknown social dynamics and effects being created outside of the disaster affected population - but as an effect of humanitarian assistance to particular groups).
- The methodology will allow flexibility to allow discussion on issues that groups feel critically important to them (community centered) and extension agents will know how to do that at end of training (open questioning techniques).
- One and a half day analysis and attribution exercises with field workers.
- Following each field exercise there will be thorough steering committee review on findings against the TOR objectives and DAC criteria and cross cutting themes in order to ensure the evaluation process is on track and that the methodology is effective. This will enable the evaluation team to build in modifications and changes and ensure that expectations on the ground are being met.



The External Team Leader has previously conducted several inter agency evaluations and tools for the above methodology are already developed and tested with success. Training Session Plans and full documentation will be provided to participating agencies provided that the source is acknowledged (© People First Impact Method 2010: Gerry McCarthy and Paul O’Hagan).

### **Geographical Focus**

The quality and triangulation of clear findings and recommendations will be better, the more field exercises that are conducted. In the time frame available we could conduct two field exercises and ideally three e.g. Port-au-Prince and Leganes – subject to Steering Committee agreement. One field exercise should take place in a program area where all three agencies are working. This will help verification of coherence issues in practice. Further field exercises can take place in the location of any agency program area.

## Annex 3 People First Impact Method



### What is the People First Impact Method (P-FIM)?

The approach was developed by Gerry McCarthy (based in Nairobi, Kenya, East Africa) and Paul O’Hagan (based in Banjul, Gambia, West Africa). Between them they have substantial international humanitarian and development experience in senior leadership and practitioner roles. P-FIM is a simple low cost methodology that fully allows communities to speak for themselves, in identifying impact differences in their lives and what the drivers of those impact differences are attributable to. In this way the starting point is people/communities themselves and not organizations or projects – it is a simple powerful tool that highlights issues agencies can be poorly aware of. P-FIM enables development and humanitarian actors to accurately ‘take the temperature’ in order to align interventions with local priority issues, ensure they are ‘in touch’ and where they can have the greatest possible impact. P-FIM simply recognizes the primary driving force of people and communities at all stages of an intervention as essential.

### Potential P-FIM Benefits to Agencies:

- (i) Impact measured **in the context** where a programme is delivered
- (ii) The action doubles as **P-FIM Training** for participating local agencies and agency personnel
- (iii) A series of P-FIM actions will provide a basis for advocacy/mainstreaming of **people first** approaches.

P-FIM takes a target geographical area (e.g. a 1 to 3 year program). Local people are trained on P-FIM who have basic development skills, understand language and culture and are trusted. Given the importance of active listening, open questioning, observing and understanding bias etc, two full days are dedicated to train facilitators, reporters and observers for focus group discussion in the community. Field work takes place on the morning of the third day. The last day and a half is for reporting and consolidation of findings including, where required, cross-referencing with communities. The method (i) enables a qualitative process where primary impact differences are openly discussed with representative community groups and recorded - positive, negative or indifferent (ii) the method then works backwards to determine in a quantitative way where impact difference is attributed e.g. leaders in the community, government actions, local business, NGO, UN, Red Cross/Crescent etc. The method makes no assumptions about impact and what drives it - with often surprising impact results revealed. It is community owned and driven.

There are two biases that often colour project and organisational impact evaluation approaches:

- (i) **What impact are we actually having?** Typically organizations and their programs are the focus of impact/ evaluation measurement to meet standard donor, quality and accountability requirements.
- (ii) **How can we know the actual impact of a project/programme if we only consider projects and organizations?** What about the depth and breadth of what is around the project or organization in terms of impact differences? P-FIM measures impact in the context of the project and as such, the impact of the project can be tested.

While participatory approaches and accountability at community level are being given increased importance, the standard organization/project focus is emphasised by donors and agencies. A typical end of project impact evaluation involves external (and sometimes local) evaluators who carry out desk and field exercises to determine the positive or negative qualitative and (mostly) quantitative impact achieved by a project (which in itself has important value). However, by over focusing on the organization and project and the role of external consultants - the full honest views of local people and communities on what is working or not working and what other factors (which might not be actions of the project) have caused impact - are typically unheard or not considered. It is not the fact that an evaluation is external that guarantees objectivity, but whether there is an existing qualitative relationship of trust with people. Only on that basis will objective knowledge of impact

be discerned. P-FIM fundamentally asks “So what?” questions . . . “So what difference has that made to people’s lives?” and “who is really responsible for the impact difference?”

**Why People First Impact Method (P-FIM)?** Our fundamental question is “**Are we doing things right and are we doing the right things?**” To put this into a programme/project context, the assumption column of a log frame requires that agencies fully consider the wider context to ensure that programs are relevant it can be said that *‘impact lives in the assumptions.’* Weak assumptions lead to inappropriate responses. P-FIM references ‘project cycle approaches’ and effectively links with other evaluative/impact tools in humanitarian and development contexts. It is a simple methodology that can bridge a gap within existing approaches to put people first.

The foundation and pedigree of P-FIM draws on concepts from Existentialist, Personalist Philosophy and Psychosocial Methods. It is rooted in inter-disciplinary principles fundamental to the universal value of the person. It is complementary to best practice quality/accountability initiatives and evaluative tools such as Sphere, Participatory Impact Assessment (Tufts), HAP etc. It is an integrated and holistic view of human life, values, freedom and potential; people’s needs and rights recognized in UN Conventions and Charters. Key concepts are: putting people first; local trust relationships are fundamental; the right to life with dignity; a non agency centric and non project specific approach; an integrated holistic appreciation of human development; and quality and depth of communication with people is essential with respect and understanding of people must be our starting point and be sustained.

**For more information contact:**

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## Annex 4

### Haiti Inter Agency Evaluation (CARE/SCF US)

#### Key Informant Interview Plan

The purpose of the Key Informant Interviews is to determine global perceptions and things of key stakeholders on the DAC criteria of Coherence, Relevance/Appropriateness and Coverage of humanitarian assistance over since January 2010. This information will be triangulated with community perspectives and desk based review of key relevant documents. It is envisaged that each interview will last no more than one hour.

#### Proposed Key Informants to be validated and added to by the Steering Committee

- Relevant Haitian Government Officials (named by SCF and CARE)
- Relevant Haitian Civil Society Leaders (named by SCF and CARE)  
These might include religious leaders such as the Archbishop of Port-au-Prince (if appointed) etc
- UN Resident Coordinator
- UN OCHA Head of Mission
- Diplomatic Corps  
These might include the following:  
US Ambassador; European Commission Delegate; Brazilian Ambassador; British Ambassador etc
- Heads of Donor Agencies (named by SCF and CARE)  
These might include USAID OFDA, ECHO, DFID etc
- Heads of INGOs (named by SCF and CARE)  
These might include CRS, World Vision, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, LWF, International Caritas (CITSE members) etc
- International Federation of the Red Cross
- Key INGO Emergency Programme Managers (named by SCF and CARE)
- National Red Cross Society Executive Secretary
- National NGO Directors (named by SCF and CARE)
- Global Humanitarian Accountability Representatives (named by SCF and CARE)  
These might include HAP and Sphere (RedR/Bioforce Unit)

#### Key Informant Questions

Brief introduction on purpose of visit stating that we are part of an independent evaluation team seeking to capture learning and recommendations to improve current and future humanitarian response for CARE/SCF US and more widely. That this includes field exercises, key informant interviews and desk based review (said in uncomplicated language).

1. What do you feel has gone well in the response in relation to the disaster response?  
Further open and specifically focused questions based on their response with the DAC criteria in mind e.g. Why do you think things went well?
2. What do you feel has not gone well in relation to the disaster response?  
Further open and specifically focused questions based on their response with the DAC criteria in mind e.g. Why do you think some things did not go well?
3. What do you feel could be improved in relation to current response?  
Further open and specifically focused questions based on their response with the DAC criteria in mind e.g. How do you think things can be improved?
4. Are there any recommendations that you feel we should make (leave interviewee with the last word)?

Closing and expression of appreciation for their time and contribution

## Annex 5 Field Exercise Participants

1	Destin Williane	Enquêtrice	CARE
2	Pierre-Michel Arlène	Enquêtrice	CARE
3	Tranchant Dieter	Enquêteur	CARE
4	Maxilien Samuel	Enquêteur	CARE
5	Perrin Joël	Enquêteur	CARE
6	Paul Nephtalie	Enquêtrice	CARE
7	Macunette Jasmin E.	Enquêtrice	CARE
8	Bernard Crenn	Conseiller	CARE
9	Cheriscat Jean Noël	Enquêteur	Save the Children
10	Scep Arion	Enquêteur	Save the Children
11	Placide Stephania	Enquêteur	Save the Children
12	Dorisca Esson	Ingénieur superviseur Safer Construction	Save the Children
13	Laurent Léonce	Technicien	Save the Children
14	Vilpigue Ginel	Enquêteur	Save the Children
15	Régine Senatus	Assistant Administrative	Save the Children
16	Placide Alain	Enquêteur	Save the Children
17	Fenelon Patrick	Officier Suivi et Evaluation Urgence	CARE
18	Georges Nelson	Team Leader - Child Protection	Save the Children
19	Zamy Pierre Jocelyn	Coordonnateur Mobilisateur Communautaire	Save the Children
20	Massenat Balaam	Enquêteur	Save the Children
21	David Emmanuel Michel	Formateur	CARE
22	Roland Emmanuella	Enquêteur	Save the Children
23	Michaëlle Emmanuel	Coordinatrice de Recensement	CARE
24	Daniel C. Jean	Officier de Formation et Gestion de Performance	Save the Children
25	Geneviève Blaise	Officier Qualité/Redevabilité	CARE
26	Micheline Garcon	Superviseur Nutrition	Save the Children
27	Charles Lechemy G.	Team Leader – HP	Save the Children
28	Joseph Alex	Accountability Officer	Save the Children
29	Jean Lauradin	Data Entry Officer	Save the Children
30	Evariste Syphroiner	Mobilisateur Education	Save the Children
31	Dorestan Alex	Enquêteur	CARE

## Annex 6 Key Informants

	Name	Title	Organization
1	Michele Oriol	Sociologist	Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT), Government of Haïti
2	Samy Cecchin	Technical Adviser	ECHO in Haiti
3	Ton van Zutphen	Haiti Emergency Response Director	World Vision in Haiti
4	Gansly Jean	Project Manager	Oxfam GB in Haiti
5	Brian Oakes	Country Director, Haiti	Mercy Corps in Haiti
6	Alex Milutinovic	Deputy Country Director Haiti	Mercy Corps in Haiti
7	Annika Gabriel	Executive Assistant	Mercy Corps in Haiti
8	Gary Shaye	Country Director	Save the Children in Haiti
9	Sylvia Raulo	Country Representative	Norwegian Church Aid in Haiti
10	Helen Seignior	Accountability Focal Point	Save the Children in Haiti
11	Rosario Iraola	Responsable SPHERE pour l'Haïti	SPHERE in Haiti
12	Maryse Chancy	Business woman: hotel owner; on the board (and former vice-president) of chamber of commerce; former president of hotel association.	Private Sector in Haiti
13	Prosperity Raymond	Country Manger	Christian Aid in Haiti
14	Emily Rogers	Roving Accountability Field Officer	HAP in Haiti
15	Lucien Lefcourt	Deputy Shelter Cluster Coordinator	Shelter Cluster/IFRC
16	Peter Bujis	Regional Director, Latin America	CARE, Latin America Region
17	Annie Foster	Assoc. VP for Humanitarian Response	Save the Children US
18	David Gazashvili	Deputy Director	CARE USA
19	Andre Mackenzie	Cash for Work Project Manager	CRS in Haiti

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