

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND EVALUATION BACKGROUND

### 1.0 Introduction

This report for the *End of Project Review* for the Local and Global Action for Food Security Project in Africa (LAGAFA) documents successes and challenges experienced by the project in realising its intended goal, outputs, expected results and targets. It further highlights key lessons, success-drivers (best practice) and opportunities that exist for Care to scale-up project activities and sustain its medium-term impact. It concludes by drawing conclusion and proposing recommendations to support Care's learning and change functions and future programmatic and analytical work areas.

### 1.1 Project Background

This Project Review was planned and implemented as an end of Project evaluation. Its focus was to map outcomes of the LAGAFA Project on beneficiary in Zambia, and establish the extent to which the project achieved its each of its strategic advocacy goals and objectives. The need to review the Project arose after the 36 months multi-country €1.9 million Project funded by, by Care Austria came to an end in September, 2012. The overall expectation in Zambia was that the project would contribute to improved FSN outcomes of about 2.6 million beneficiaries through capacity building interventions for evidence-based FSN situational analysis and policy advocacy.

The Project strategy was based on a two pronged approach to policy advocacy, namely, at local practice level and at national-policy- making and implementation level.

- i. At the district or local levels it involved building the capacities of 1 National Civil Society Network with a target beneficiary of 15 grassroots CSOs or co-operatives in Southern Province of Zambia. Ten (10) of the CSOs are in Kalomo District while the other five (5) are in Kazungula. The expected outcomes was that improved capacity of CSO networks would enable them to build and mobilise other networks, partner or build coalitions at local, national, sub-regional, regional and international levels to initiate and undertake FSN advocacy interventions.



At the national level, the project strategy was to work with governmental and non-governmental policy-making, implementing and influence structures to lobby Government in the following three policy advocacy impact areas:

- i. Government of Zambia through the DMMU institute research and popularize the Integrated Food security Phase Classification (IPC)
- ii. Ensure increased budgetary allocation in the agriculture sector to above 10% in 2012/2013 and onwards
- iii. See to it that full application of the market mix in the agriculture market of farmers produces is applied through;
  - Setting up of adequate satellite depots in the community;
  - Creation of marketing linkages and arrangements;
  - Set up and improve infrastructure;
  - Improved communication;
  - Timely payment to farmers;
  - Market creation.

So consistent with the Project's Terms of Reference document the focus of this report is on the effectiveness or medium term impact of the Project interventions in relation to the 3 strategic goals above and to following four results areas:

- CSO Networks strengthened and mobilised;
- Capacity of CSO Networks to analyse FSN situations improved;
- Capacity of CSO networks to develop and implement advocacy strategies improved;
- Capacity of CSO Networks to create and sustain linkages between national, regional and international FSN advocacy initiatives improved;

Within this Project context the consultant, therefore, endeavoured to identify and document contributory factors to any greater or less than achievements in performance of the target groups, attributable to the LAGAFA project interventions. Since "big wins" in advocacy and policy influence work, usually take decades, much longer than the 36 months of this grant period to be realised, *learning - focused advocacy evaluation approach* was used in implementing this review. The preference for this methodology over the traditional



summative, quasi experimental and experimental evaluation designs was justified on the basis that a number of factors influence causal relations between policy influencing initiatives and outcomes.

In undertaking this evaluation the consultant paid special attention to assessing the extent to which cross cutting issues such as gender and equity, education, HIV/AIDS, and the climate change and environment, which have been noted to have a bearing on one's poverty, FSN status and vulnerability to food insecurity, were mainstreamed in the project formulation and implementation process.

## 1.2 Specific Objectives and Assessment Areas

Specifically, the project review process will focus on identifying and establishing the extent to which the project achieved its planned results within the context of its theory of change.

The key outcomes areas to be assessed in line with the project objectives are as follows:

- The capacity of local CSO to reflect on strategies of reduction of poverty and food security and their knowledge about the FNS status of vulnerable people in the target communities;
- The capacity of CSOs to develop FSN relevant strategies and positions on food security advocacy;
- The capacity of CSOs to collecting and analysing FSN relevant data;
- The current level of involvement of CSO in FNS policy development and implementation and the current status of dialogue with governments and donors;
- The willingness of decision-makers to involve CSO in policy-making and implementation;
- The knowledge of CSO on issues at stake in international negotiations connected with food security;
- The status of CSO linkages to networks and stakeholders on regional and international level (related to FSN advocacy work);
- The awareness and sensitivity of CSOs and Governmental Authorities towards gender equality and the level of mainstreaming of gender in existing FSN policies and availability of sex-disaggregated FSN data analysis (gender and power analysis);



- The awareness and sensitivity of CSOs and Governmental Authorities towards HIV/AIDS mainstreaming in FSN policies;
- Evidence of climate change related risks and impacts on FSN in the target region, as well as strength and weaknesses of Government and CSOs in terms of capacity to integrate climate change into their work;
- Assess on-going relevant FSN policy development and implementation processes and recommend potential entry points for CSO engagement through the LAGAFA project;

### 1.3 Survey Design and Methodology

Consistent with the ToRs document, the process this evaluation followed the European Commission evaluation guidelines, as provided in the European Commission project cycle management operational guidelines of 2004, which outlines the following criteria:

- Relevance:
- Efficiency:
- Effectiveness:
- Impact:
- Sustainability:

#### 1.3.1 Relevance

In project monitoring and evaluation, relevance is concerned with establishing the extent to which a development initiative and its outputs or outcomes are aligned to national local policies and programmes including development priorities of beneficiaries. The assessment variable is about establishing the responsiveness and strategic fit of the Project to the corporate objectives, mandate and functions of Care International. It also includes the extent to which the project objectives, its theory of change and results chains were aligned to the national development goals and objectives of the host or implementing countries.

This criterion establishes the alignment of need, i.e., the perception of what was expected as envisioned by the Project designers and implementers and what was actually needed by hosting or beneficiary countries. It is also important in determining the cultural



appropriateness of the interventions to the prevailing socio-economic needs and aspirations of the target group.

### 1.3.2 Effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion was used to measure the degree to which the Project's results chain has been achieved from inputs, outputs, outcomes, to impact based on the existing theory of change. This also includes lessons and best case scenarios that can inform learning and change functions and support possible project up-scaling, replication and generalisability of the knowledge acquired.

As attribution impact to particular activities is difficult and a costly exercise in advocacy projects, the focus of this review was restricted to the project's contribution to the national development agenda. In this respect the in measuring effectiveness the report identifies and documents:

- *Interim measures of success;*
- *Milestones of progress and the richness; and*
- *Quality of management information along the journey to help with good decisions (choosing the right path rather than simply knowing that they have not reached their destination).*

This assessment will cover both the internal and external project environments. In the external environment the project review sought to:

- i. **Measure the projects' ability to gain strengths by working with others, that is building support and allies through:**
  - Evidence-based policy research, analysis and advocacy;
  - Forming advocacy partnerships and coalitions;
  - Developing new generation of leaders through evidence-based policy engagements with political champions and elites;
  - Recruiting individuals and organisations with specialised skills (media strategy, web strategy, reach or grassroots organising; evidence-based policy analysis and influence etc).



**ii. How the project team and partners were able to read or react to advocacy opponents**

- What are the ultimate goals of this initiative?
- What are the outcomes along the path to the intended goal?
- Who are the intended target policy influence groups?
- What is their level of interest/alignment/importance and influence?
- What do they know about the issues at hand?
- How can they be engaged? (reformers, latents, defenders and apathetic);

Similarly, in the internal environment emphasis was paid on:

**i. Assessing and establishing the extent to which the project built the internal capacity for effectiveness. This will dwell on assessing**

- Changes in critical jobs/ staff;
- Rate of staff turnover;
- Strength of internal communication and knowledge sharing;

This helps in establishing the degree to which the project built the internal strength and momentum, enhanced capacity and saw the interventions through to the big win outcomes.

### **1.3.3 Efficiency**

Efficiency is a useful criterion in project M&E. It is concerned with gauging the implementation efficiency of the project activities and the extent with they are value-for-money. Primarily, this aspect focuses on measuring the extent to which resources, that is, funds, Project's consultants, Project's management staff's time and implementation partners had been mobilised and economically organised towards the projects aims, goal and outcomes. Focus is on understanding why some activities were implemented on time while others experienced time and budget overruns.

### **1.3.4 Impact**

Impact measures changes in human development and people's well-being that can be attributed to the Project's interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. In this



context the extent to which the knowledge and capacities of the local CSO was built to undertake situational analysis of FSN advocacy initiatives, raise the red flags to mobilise government to take action.

The importance of evaluating medium term impact lies in generating information and insights for management decision-making and accountability of results to project beneficiaries, Project staff and donors. To measure impact the evaluation dwelt on understanding the before and after project scenarios. This assists in establishing the degree of significance of the projects contribution when benchmarked against findings of the project's formative evaluation or Needs assessment, Baseline Study Report and those of the Project's mid-term reviews.

### **1.3.5. Sustainability**

As an impact evaluation criterion, sustainability seeks to measure the degree to which benefits of the initiative, in this case of the LAGAFA interventions would continue after Care Austria and European Commission's implementation support comes to an end. This aspect of the evaluation provides the indication about the extent to which social, economic, political, institutional and cultural conditions, facilities or capacities have been put in place to support and are conducive to continued results on the target beneficiaries. Consistent with the Programmes theory of change, assessment of project sustainability focused on measuring the degree to which capacity building activities improved the knowledge and skills and provided the resources for supporting on-going creation and operations of CSO Networks and were put in place. This aspect also focuses on the extent to which partnerships were created and the project interventions were mainstreamed in Government development policy and programme frameworks.

It seeks to establish whether there are financial and economic strategies in place to ensure on-going flow of benefits; policy and regulatory framework to consolidate and support continued benefits of the programme; suitable organisational arrangements including public and private sector partnerships; and requisite institutional capacities i.e., systems, staff, synergy with intertwined initiatives and integration in other government and non-governmental poverty reduction programmes.



### 1.4.1 Secondary Data Collection

Secondary data was useful in deepening the consultant's understanding of the project contexts and providing the analytical framework within which the findings of this study are being analysed. Secondary data collection involved a thorough review of published and unpublished documents both internal and external to the project environment. The aim was to understand the project's implementation philosophy, its strategic fit to national FSN policy and programming priorities, strategies and goals.

- The LAGAFA project design document, interim project studies undertaken and the progress reports
- Relevant CARE policies and strategies, most importantly the CARE International Gender Policy 2009, the CARE International Food Security Strategy as well as CARE International Climate Change Strategic Plan, and CARE Austria's Approach to Gender and Women's Empowerment;
- Global and Regional Food Security Policies and strategies such as the Millennium Development Goals, the EC Food Facility Strategy, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Strategies, the United Nation Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) and other relevant Food Security and Nutrition Strategies in the COMESA, SADC and the EAC development blocks
- The National Agricultural Policy (NAP), the National Food and Nutrition Policy (NFNP), The National Gender Policy (NGP), The National Health Policy (NHP), and other FSN related policies.

### 1.4.2 Primary Data Collection

Primary data was the basis of this evaluation. It involved conducting key informant interview with institutional stakeholders and personal interviews or focus group discussions with individual CSO network members in Kalomo and Kazungula districts. This activity focused on collecting fresh end-user perspectives on changes in Government's action and in their own attitudes to FSN issues resulting from the project's interventions. Further, it sought identify gaps and lessons to be drawn to support learning and change functions.





Data was collected through 3 key methods:

- Key informant interviews;
- Semi-structured interview guide (questionnaire); and
- Review of literature; and
- Documentation of perceptions based on the stories or testimonies of project staff and participants across the 3 countries;

### **1.5 Sampling:**

The respondents of this survey were purposely selected due to their involvement in the project interventions and knowledge about the intended goal, objectives and intervention strategies and tactics of the project. This sampling plan was selected because it was deemed to be the most cost-effective-time and money saving, with quick data turn around period. An additional factor was that the consent of the respondent (institutional or individual) was critical in ensuring that they willingly provide the relevant answers to this exercise.

But to ensure that the outcomes are attributable to the project interventions, the consultants in consultation Care International will sample different CSO by sector and gender of the process leads in each country:

- Research and advocacy CSO;
- Governance and Economic Justice;
- Community Livelihoods;
- Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods;
- Integrated Rural Development Programmes;
- HIV/AIDS and Gender;
- Agriculture, Environment and Infrastructure;
- Community based Communication and ICT for development



The next chapter provide and assessment of the context under which the LAGAFA project was designed and operated. It provides the necessary background information and the analytical frame within with the findings of the evaluation are analysed or interpreted.




## CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING THE PROJECT CONTEXT

### 2.1 Introduction

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2012) notes that at least 1 billion people in the World today are undernourished. Over 2 billion suffer from lack of essential vitamins and minerals in their food. Similarly, about 6 million children die every year, which is, 1 child every 5 seconds from malnutrition or related diseases. The latter figure accounts for about one-half of all preventable deaths. In sub-Saharan Africa, the policy paradox of the food nutrition security is that governments allocate reasonable resources of public budgets to smallholder agriculture. But the majority of those that suffer from hunger and malnutrition tend to be the smallholder farmers or landless people, the very target group the subsidies are meant to uplift.

In Zambia, 64% of the small-scale farmers are classified as poor by 2010. With 59.7% of them being extremely poor. In fact data in the chart below shows that no significant differences exist in the levels of rural poverty between the small-scale farmers, the unpaid agricultural workers and inactive population groups.



Source: GRZ (2012) Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2006-2010. Lusaka, CSO.

Reasons explaining the above scenario vary considerably. But among the primary reasons cited by households in Zambia since between 1996 and 2010 in order of severity are:

- Cannot afford agricultural inputs;



- Salaries, wages or agricultural incomes are low;
- Lack of decent employment opportunities;
- Lack of capital to start own business or to expand;
- Lack of capital to start or expand agricultural output;
- Hard economic times; and
- Lack of credit facilities to start or expand own business.

Amongst these vulnerable groups, women and girls, without access to productive resources are increasingly more vulnerable. A Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) report notes that at least 90% of deaths in developing countries are linked to or result from long-term chronic lack of access to adequate food. This is even when famine, armed conflicts and other natural catastrophes are taken into account when explaining deaths.

Paradoxically, persistent chronic food nutrition insecurity occurs at the time when the world has all the advanced technology to produce the food it requires to fully feed its entire population. The interesting irony is that the world today has the food to feed its entire hungry people.

This is supported by the findings of the Chronic Poverty Report (CPR) 2008/09. It asserts that the unprecedented growth in global wealth has occurred alongside the growth in the number of chronically poor people. At the peak of the global food and financial crises in 2008, between 320 and 443 million people were trapped in poverty, often for their entire lifetime. The consequence of this scenario is that many die prematurely from preventable diseases.

For people in chronic poverty, their scarcity exceeds just a lack of income. It consist of multi-dimensional deprivation, ranging from hunger, under nutrition, illiteracy, unsafe drinking water, lack of access to basic health services, social discrimination, physical insecurity to political exclusion. Whichever dimension or form chronic poverty takes chronic poverty and under nutrition occurs in a world that has the knowledge and resources to eradicate it.<sup>1</sup> For example, in Zambia, the Government has spent an annual average of K201. 239 billion on FISP and K106.765 on FRA between 2000/08. This has accounted for 58.3% of the total

---

<sup>1</sup> See Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2008/09) Chronic Poverty Report



agricultural budget during the period. In the 2013 budgetary allocation, the Zambian government has set aside K2, 920 billion to the agriculture sector, of which:


- K255 billion s for the rehabilitation of Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia;
- K500 billion is for the farmer Input Support Programme; and
- K300 billion for the Food Reserve Agency

However, the prevalence of hunger and malnutrition is still widespread.

## 2.2 Food and Nutritional Security Trends

The Global Hunger Index (GHI) Report 2010, demonstrates that between 1990/2011, 15 had reduced their levels of hunger by at least 50% more. At least 2 out of every 5 countries recorded modest progress by reducing their GHI scores by between 25.0 and 49.9%. One (1) out of every 3 countries also decreased their GHI scores by between 0.0 and 24.9 percent. Ironically, of the 6 global best performers, only 1(Ghana) was amongst the 10 best performers in improving their GHI between 1990 and 2011. For example, of the three project countries, Malawi significantly reduced the GHI by between 25 and 49.9%, between 1990 and 2011, while Zambia stagnated; only recording a negligible improvement of 0.7% in the number of hungry people over the period. This is an indication that very little is been done at the level of policy, programming and financing to translate the robust economic growth rates and Zambia's preferred Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination status into enrichment of the quality of life of its people. It is not surprising that Zambia is one of the few lower middle income category whose 80% of its rural poor (60% overall) fall in the category of resource rich but poor people. Burundi on the other hand, has experienced a remarkable decline on the GHI rank with the number of its hungry people increasing by nearly 7% over the period. The state of food nutrition security in the 3 Care Project countries is visually summarised in the chart 1 below:





Source: International Food Policy Research Institute (2011) Global Hunger Index  
The Challenge of Hunger: Taming Price Spikes and Excessive Food Price Volatility.

Discussions on the poor and their state of deprivation isolate five primary factors as driving chronic poverty and the state of food nutrition insecurity in most developing countries. These are: insecurity, limited citizenship, spatial disadvantage, social discrimination, and poor work opportunities. *Even, when other factors are in place, the poor experience limited citizenship. They generally lack meaningful political voice and political representation, which capacity building interventions for policy analysis and advocacy can help nurture. The societies they live in and the governments that exercise authority over them do not recognise their most basic needs and rights.*<sup>2</sup> The influence of each of the 5 isolated factors on reinforcing and deepening hunger and under nutrition is summarized in table 1 below:

<sup>2</sup> See Chronic Poverty Report,(2008/09) Ibid



## Poverty Driver

## Chronically Poor Population Group

<p><b>1. Insecurity</b></p>	<p>The chronically poor are frequently those who live in insecure environments, and who have few assets or entitlements to cope with shocks and stresses. Their coping strategies often involve trading long-term goals to improve their lives (e.g. accumulating assets or educating children) for short-term survival.</p>
<p><b>2. Spatial Disadvantage</b></p>	<p>Remoteness, certain types of natural resource base, political exclusion and weak economic integration can all contribute to the creation of intra-country spatial poverty traps. Spatial disadvantage also occurs across entire nations (which we term Chronically Deprived Countries). Many urban locations, despite proximity to possible advantage, are highly disadvantaged, with poor or non-existent public services, high levels of violence and desperate living conditions</p>
<p><b>3. Social Discrimination</b></p>	<p>Chronically poor people often have social relations – of power, patronage and competition – that can trap them in exploitative relationships or deny them access to public and private goods and services. These are based on class and caste systems, gender, religious and ethnic identity, age and other factors.</p>
<p><b>4. Limited Citizenship</b></p>	<p>Chronically poor people have no meaningful political voice and lack effective political representation. The societies they live in and the governments that exercise authority over them do not recognise their most basic needs and rights.</p>
<p><b>5. Poor Work Opportunities</b></p>	<p>Where there is limited economic growth, or where growth is concentrated in enclaves, work opportunities are very limited and people can be exploited. Such work allows day-to-day survival but does not permit asset accumulation and children's education.</p>

**Source: Chronic Poverty Centre (2008/09) Chronic Poverty Report**



The prevalence of chronic hunger, food and nutritional insecurity amidst affluence and in growing small-scale agriculture subsidies is an evident policy and development priority paradox which calls for scaled-up interventions in the area of FSN. The irony is most evident when one notes that most countries where little improvements in the level of hunger and malnutrition are recorded are signatories to international commitments, through which they have assigned themselves to halving and reducing hunger and malnutrition by:

- “*collectively accelerating steps... to set the world on a path to achieving the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security.*”<sup>3</sup>

Such commitments are reflected through numerous global development frameworks such as:

- *In the 1996 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the Plan of Action of the World Food Summit (WFS), where members pledged to halve the number of undernourished people by 2015.*
- *In 2000, exactly four years later, in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, countries undertook to halve the proportion of undernourished people by 2015.*
- *Before the start of the global food crisis in 2008, experts already recognized that these goals would be difficult to achieve;*
- *the UN’s Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), the NEPADs CAADP Compact, the EC’s Food Facility and related calls for a Global Partnership against Hunger.*

It is line with the above observations that FAO concludes: “***the progressive realisation of the right to food needs a policy advocacy approach.***” ***The Right to food approach to eliminating hunger is summarized by the UN Special Rapporteur as follows:***

*The right to food is the right to have regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively*

---

<sup>3</sup> See the Food and Agriculture Organisation(2012) The right to food and global strategic frameworks: The Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (GSF) and the UN Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA)





*adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensures a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.*

This global standpoint means that ensuring the realisation of adequate food as a universal human right issue needs to combine direct food provisioning(production), protection of related rights and policy and political influence. The overall strategy should involve:


- enhance evidence-based situational analysis to inform early warning systems;
- Mobilising networks of policy actors by building their capacity for policy engagement and advocate on relevant policy reform or prioritization issues;
- Strengthen networks through building coalitions of policy advocacy actors, to sustain FSN policy influence.

The International Poverty Research Centre put it as follows:

*“Reducing chronic poverty is both a policy and political challenge. If the needs and rights of chronically poor people are to be addressed, two related but distinct forms of assistance are required:”*

- *In the short term, to survive and improve the immediate prospects for themselves and their children, they need practical actions that meet their most pressing needs and create a platform for future improvements. This entails policy change, the allocation of additional resources and finding effective ways of delivering services to them.*
- *In the longer term, to promote social and political institutions that give the chronically poor voice (directly or through representatives or enlightened elites) and support their demands, they need assistance in organizing and developing political linkages.*


The foregoing analysis demonstrates that effective economic empowerment and social protection policies require good technical analysis. But they also require the supportive domestic political environment and global action for their initiation, expansion and financing. In many countries FSN policies and programmes have been introduced by dominant political parties, with a key role played by ‘executive champions’, rather than being the result of civil



society lobbying. On-going provision of sound technical advice to policy makers and ‘executive champions’ is a critical activity of the right-to-food agenda. *To foster big wins in policy engagement and influence, this needs to be linked to domestic debates about ideology and national goals. This broader policy approach is well articulated and summarized in the Terms of Reference Documents (ToRs) as follows:*

***“Improving national, regional and global food security requires a combination of immediate and long-term policy and programme interventions by governments and other stakeholders.”***

But despite Zambia being a signatory to the right to food and committing significant resources to maize production through FISP, malnutrition assessed by the prevalence of underweight and stunting in children aged 3-59 months is a critical policy and programming challenge. The chart below provides the nutritional status of children at their critical stage of mental and physical development. Micro-nutrient deficiency lowers mental and physical potential.



Source: Various CSO Surveys.



The principle deficits underlie inadequate micronutrient intake. The diet of many Zambians in rural areas consist of staple cereal or root crops with few foods rich in micronutrients, such as fruits, vegetables and animal source protein. The primary focus on production of maize, cassava, sorghum and millet at the expense of others like beans, groundnuts and vegetables means that on average people may consume enough calories without consuming adequate micronutrients.

The above findings are summarized by the National Food and Nutritional Policy in the text box below:

### **TEXT 1: Food Consumption Patterns in Zambia**

“The food consumption patterns in Zambia are poor. Generally, there is a low frequency of food consumption of usually one to two meals per day, lack of variety in the diet, because 70% of the energy is obtained from the staple maize and consumption of other low nutrient dense foods. The low consumption of food is primarily as a result of low food availability and accessibility.

Women of childbearing age do not receive adequate care. As a result, their health and nutrition status has been compromised. Chronic energy malnutrition, vitamin A deficiency, anaemia and HIV are among the major problems afflicting women. As a consequence, maternal mortality, currently estimated at 591 per 100,000 live births is among the highest in the region.”

The foregoing context pretty much describes the policy, and socio-economic environment under which the that the LAGAFA project was conceived, designed and implemented as a 36 months right to food policy engagement and influence project. It is also within this same environment that its overall performance with respect to its strategic goals and objectives, targets, overall theory of change and opportunities for sustainability that the project is being evaluated.



Chapter 3, which follows, present and discusses the key success and challenge areas of the project in relation to its intended goal and outcomes.



## CHAPTER 3: EVALUATION FINDINGS

### 3.1 Introduction

This section presents and discusses the findings of the LAGAFA Project in terms of its, problem diagnosis, implementation planning, capacity building for policy advocacy and the extent to which the project achieved its intended goal and objectives.

The starting point is to assess the extent of its strategic fit, which is the extent to which the overall goal and objectives were aligned to national development priorities, strategies and community food and nutritional security priorities of the target communities. In traditional M&E terminology this is known as relevance. The second assessment variable is effectiveness, or the extent to which the project achieved its expected goals, objectives and targets. It focuses on both quantitative and qualitative changes in the quality of lives of the people as well as changes in attitudes of the policy-makers, implementers and opinion leaders to community food and nutritional security challenges and priorities.

### 3.2 Evaluating Project's Performance

#### 3.2.1 Relevance

The Project's targeting of the agricultural sector ensured its effective contribution to national development as the sector is a priority sector for achieving sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty in Zambia. Findings reveal that the Project's final outcomes were concurrent with the long-term national vision of achieving an efficient, competitive, and sustainable and export led agriculture sector that assures food security and increased income by 2030. In order to attain this vision the SNDP among other objectives intended to conduct key policy reforms that included reviewing the National Agricultural Policy to align it to changes in the sector; diversify and attain national and household food security and improve the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of crop production and productivity.

The Project was a timely exercise as it coincided with the National Agriculture Policy review exercise. Through LiCSOF's strategic association to the ACF, the Network was able to offer evidenced based contributions in the policy advocacy exercise. Contributions included: the improved marketing systems; increased budgetary allocation to the MACO; adoption and popularisation of the IPC tool by the DMMU; construction and rehabilitation of existing



storage infrastructure and an improvement in the road network specifically in rural areas. Through the Project cooperatives and other farmer organisations have been empowered to become vehicles for agricultural development; and the IPC tool through the piloting exercise has proved to be a cost-effective and demand-driven FNS situation analysis tool that supports the generation and dissemination of early warning data and agricultural statistics. Advocacy at grassroots level has also resulted in the strengthened participation of women in agricultural programmes specifically FISP; and the construction of food sheds in participating communities, consequently ensuring improved food and nutrition security, and GRZ's capacity to implement, monitor and evaluate crop production and productivity.

The placing of special attention to women in areas of production, HIV/AIDS and climate change by the SNDP is based on the fact that women are more vulnerable to low production, HIV/AIDS and climate change. Therefore, LAGAFA's intention to consider cross cutting issues in its implementation was an aspect of further maximising its impact on national development. Nonetheless, in reality there was minimal integration of cross cutting issues into the actual implementation of the Project.

In view of the agriculture sector's high potential to diversify the economy from the dependence on the mining sector into a more sustainable economy LiCSOF's in its policy brief, highlighted the consequences of the Government's current budget allocations to the MACO and advocated for the increased budget allocations to the MACO. The Network observed that underperformance of the agricultural sector which is 2% less than the CAADP's target of 6% is largely attributed to the less budgetary allocation to the sector, for instance in 2012 national budget the Government allocated less than 7% to the agricultural sector. LiCSOF in its policy brief and at the NAP review exercise advocated for the increased budgetary allocation to the MACO from 6% to at least CAADP's target of 10%. CAADP's rationale for allocating at least 10% of the budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector lies in its third pillar that argues for the increasing food supply and reduction of hunger. Accordingly, the allocation of at least 10% to the MACO will trigger an annual growth rate of at least 6% from the 4% annual growth rate in the agriculture sector.

The Project was also in sync with global commitments on food and nutrition security, specifically to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which are essentially an agenda




for targeted improvements in the core areas of human development. The Network's policy brief on the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger was particularly coherent with MGD 1 that targets the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. The projects intention to integrate of cross cutting issues is in line with MDG 3; MDG 6 and MDG 7, which target the promotion gender equality and women's empowerment; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases; and ensure environmental sustainability. The Project had a strategic fit in the global agenda on human development.

### **3.2.2 Effectiveness: CSO Networks Strengthened and Mobilized**

With respect to effectiveness, findings show that in order to effectively strengthen and mobilise CSO networks the Project identified and partnered with the National Association for Peasant and Small Scale (NAPSSFAZ). The value in partnering with NAPSSFAZ was seen from the fact that it is an umbrella CSO Network which country-wide CSO membership across all the 9 provinces as at 2011. This provided the LAGAFA Project with a readily available and accessible district and sub-district level CSO infrastructure which could also be easily used for building national level knowledge building partnerships, coalitions or networks which are very crucial for sustaining evidence gathering, monitoring, disseminating and policy influence interventions. Working with an already existing CSO infrastructure was also important in consolidating CSO voice or the power- in- numbers in order to effectively engage policy-makers, other policy influencers and funders. But at the Project level, Care International worked with 15 beneficiary CSOs in Kalomo and Kazungula Districts of Southern Province of Zambia. Ten (10) of the target beneficiary CSO were in Kalomo District. The Project target was to reach at least 2.6 million people (26% of the population) the majority of whom were smallholder farmers, poor malnutrition –prone households, many of whom tend to be female-headed, or coping with economic and social stress due to a chronic illness or death (T.B or HIV/AIDS). However, the assumption behind the target of 2.6 million people to be reached was not very clear. In this respect, the planning approach was very based on a clear CSO mobilisation and outreach strategy.

However, the partnership between LAGAFA and NAPSSFAZ was short-lived and Care terminated the contract in January of 2011 due to severe loss of trust in the NAPSSFAZ secretariat or leadership. Lack of clear government systems, misapplication of the sub-grant



funds intended for the implementation of LAGAFA activities, and lack of clear public expenditure and financial accountability systems were cited as the major factors that led to the erosion of trust between the two parties. Although the contract or partnership was terminated with their umbrella association, Care continued to work with 15 beneficiaries CSO through a new CSO, the Livingstone Civil Society Organization Forum (LiCSOF).

LiCSOF was identified as a network partner of choice in March of 2011 and a sub-agreement was effected in October 2011, following an intensive pre-award assessment. The selection of LiCSOF as a Project partner was based and guided by the following observed key strengths which were perceived to enhance the institutional wider appeal, use and value:

- The Forum has legal status and is PADOR (Potential Applicant Data Online Registration) registered;
- Its secretariat is in Livingstone (in Southern province) which placed it in close proximity to the 5 CSOs in Kazungula District and the 10 CSOs (cooperatives) in Kalomo District. The close proximity of the Forum to CSOs presented a cost-effective opportunity for the project without sacrificing on effective delivery of services. This was also seen as an effective way to reduce costs of project implementation related to transportation and accommodation.
- It had 60 affiliates in which many of the members have a national character thus had potential for diffusing the IPC tool through intra-network experiential learning and exchange initiatives. Its national character was also considered important for sustaining the project impact after the end of the project lifespan.

While the change of the Project implementing partner was inevitable given the circumstances already outlined before, it suggests that in the project design and inception stages not much institutional analysis audit and analysis<sup>4</sup> of critical project stakeholders either through the strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) framework or the Interest, Influence


---

<sup>4</sup> Stakeholder Analysis (SA) is a methodology used to facilitate institutional and policy reform processes by accounting for and often incorporating the needs of those who have 'stake' or an interest in the reforms under consideration. With information on stakeholders, their interests, and their capacity to oppose reform, reform advocates can choose how to best accommodate them, thus assuring policies adopted are politically realistic and sustainable.





Importance and Alignment Match (IIAM) framework. The through application of these tools would have guided the project designers to understand the levels of commitment of NAPSSFAZ to the Project and how aligned their mandate, functions and overall interests were to the Project's overall theory of change, goal, objectives and intervention strategies. This analysis tends to have useful benefits during the project design stage in establishing whether the apparent interest in the Project by NAPSSFAZ was an indication of their being a reformer, latent, apathetic or defender. The stakeholder mapping and analysis framework which clearly defines the possible position of each stakeholder at the time of engagement is illustrated in figure 1 below:



**Source:** Based on the Overseas Development Institute's Interest, Importance, Influence and Alignment Matrix for stakeholder mapping and analysis in policy influence, programmes and projects.

A more adequate institutional capacity audit and analysis of the first CSO umbrella network could have helped the LAGAFA Project co-ordinating team to quickly identify potential risks in the partnership in order to take timely risk mitigation measures. A lesson to be learnt from this scenario is that there is need for project formulation missions to identify more than 1 potential co-partner. This selection should be based on a through application of the SWOT



analysis and institutional capacity audit in order support the identification and prioritisation of stakeholder engagement and partnership strategies and interventions.

The evident result of the limited investment in thorough stakeholder mapping and analysis of the critical stakeholder groups and target implementation partner is the switching from NAPSSFZ to LiCSOF Care mid-way in the course of Project implementation. This eroded its effectiveness as considerable time was lost in changing partners and transition phase to LiCSOF – the project rescue partner. Three major challenges were associated with partner switching process:

- Redesigning the project;
- Selecting and screening a new implementing partner;
- Engaging and compelling beneficiary CSOs, originally members of the NAPSSFZ, to become affiliates of LiCSOF.

Despite the loss of time, evidence suggests that the Project Coordination Team used this as an opportunity for Project learning and change functions. This experience led Care Zambia to develop an institutional stakeholder mapping and audit manual to assist future project formulation teams to adequately screen potential partner institution as a pro-active risk mitigation and management strategy and tool. As earlier stated, upon entering into this partnership with the LAGAFA, LiCSOF Project team had to spend substantial time to familiarise themselves with the project's overall goal and objectives, its theory of change, design and implementation strategy. Was compounded the situation was that while LiCSOF was a national- level multi-stakeholder policy dialogue platform it had little to no experience in FSN capacity building for policy analysis and had a low profile in the area of policy advocacy although it was very strong in civic debates. Similarly, ample time was lost by the Project in re-engaging the participating CSOs to become affiliates of LiCSOF. However, with significant resolve the target CSOs were retained under LiCSOF.


The transition from the old to the new project has its own benefits too despite the earlier noted loss of time. The Livingstone Civil Society Forum (LiCSOF) represents NGOs many of which are of national character. So the affiliation of the 10 CSO to LiCSOF was a practical



and variable strategy for strengthening CSO linkages and networks between the 15 primarily grassroots CSO or community cooperatives.

Despite the noted challenges, the effective success rate for the Project should be measured by the extent to which it succeeded in strengthening and mobilising CSO networks towards a shared project vision and strategy – *Expected Result 1: CSO Networks strengthened and mobilised.*

Findings on this assessment variable suggest that the LAGAFA project succeeded in mobilising CSOs and strengthening their capacity to engage in FNS policy advocacy initiatives. For example there has been a growth rate of 80% in the total CSO membership from 579 members in 2010 to 1,040 members in 2011 that can be attributable to LAGAFA interventions. Chart 4 below visually depicts the effectiveness of the project with respect to strengthening and mobilising the target CSO networks towards the FSN policy advocacy and influence objectives and targets.



Source: Care Zambia, LAGAFA Project Documents

So, overall the Project was very successful in mobilising CSO networks. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether significant growth in CSO network membership was as a result of effective mobilisation strategies of the project, its wider public appeal and value, or because of the fact that its targeted agricultural cooperatives - the type of grassroots CSO that tends to self-mobilise around agricultural input subsidy scheme, FISP. However, there was no




evidence to suggest that more members had been recruited into these CSOs by 2012 beyond the 1,040, which was a 2011 figure. This is despite the fact that the project was extended to make up for the lost time and facilitate a planned and more systematic exit.

A gender analysis by membership reveals that overall there were more male CSO members than their female counterparts although in rural Zambia women constitute more than 70% of the smallholder agricultural sector and are almost exclusively responsible for ensuring food and nutritional security objectives of the households. Statistical analysis shows that 50% of the total CSO membership comprised males while female accounted for 42% of the total membership in both districts. This near gender parity in CSO participation in the LAGAFA project is an important positive finding given that entrenched customary systems and traditionally poor Gender Inequality Index in the province. Comparative gender-based growth rates confirm that the project was much more successful in mobilising female CSO members than it was for men. This is supported by statistical evidence which shows that, overall, female membership grew by 130% while membership amongst males grew by only 55%. Such a significant increase among female membership within the project reflected the project's proactive approach to curbing food insecurity as women are in the frontline in food security concerns and female headed households are much more vulnerable to food insecurity than male headed households. The practical focus on women CSO members as a critical project strategy for improving FSN outcomes is further supported by findings of a World Bank study of 2001 which note that Africa has hidden reserves in its people, especially women who provide more than half of its labour. However, they lack equal access to education, factors of production and participation in decision-making.

This is despite the fact that gender equality is noted to be a portent force for accelerating poverty reduction in Africa. This quest for gender inclusive economic policies and programming hinges on the fact that much of Africa's economies is in the hands of women- especially agricultural and informal sectors. But women have less access to productive assets, including land, credit, fertilisers, extension services and education. Further, research evidence shows that women are less likely to control the produce of their labour than men. This reduces their incentives to pursue productive income-earning opportunities, which has obvious implications on the overall FSN outcomes at the household level.




Despite the high growth rates in the female CSO membership in the target districts, the evidence below on shows that women are still underrepresented on decision-making structures of the CSOs. Chart 5 below visually shows this finding.



Cross-country evidence of gender implications of FSN outcomes at household level indicates that income earned by women is more likely to be used productively of household needs such as food, health and education, all of which have a direct bearing on household FSN status and wellbeing. Another important consideration for gender inclusive programming is based on the fact that women face the triple burden of production, reproduction and other care work, which imposes huge constraints of their time-use patterns. Women bear the brunt of processing food, providing water and firewood and caring for the sick and elderly, with the latter assuming greater importance in the era of HIV/AIDS. In terms of logistics and transportation, research evidence affirms that women contribute about two-thirds of rural transport efforts and are estimated to move on average 26 Metric tons-Kilometres a year.

The World Bank's report entitled *Gender and Growth: Africa's Missed Potential* outlines three basic reasons why *gender inequality is a constraint to growth and poverty reduction*:


- *Differences in access to assets limit the options of women farmers to increase productivity, increase incomes and reduce poverty;*



- *Differences in labour remuneration lead to conflict and sub-optimal labour allocation at household level; and*
- *Differences in labour and factors of production limit economic efficiency and output.*

All these point to the patterns of disadvantage that women face compared men in accessing the basic assets and resources needed to participate fully in realising agricultural growth potential to sustain FNS objectives. A more in-depth analysis of membership growth rates by district reveals that Kalomo achieved twice as much growth in the number of CSO network members at 105% than Kazungula whose growth rate was 51%. Further, growth in female membership was highest among women in Kalomo at 177% and least among men in Kazungula at 38%.

In Kalomo district, Siamusunse Cooperative was the best performer in in terms of mobilising members with a growth rate of 550% in female membership. The worst performer in the member recruitment drive was Mulemuze whose membership grew by 11%. Ironically, this cooperative experienced the worse decline in the number of female membership which fell by 58%. Chart 6below provides a visual depiction of the findings on ER 1: *CSO Networks strengthened and mobilised.*




A further gender segmentation of CSOs in Kalomo district reveals that Siamusunse had the highest growth rates among both male and female members which were at 400% and 1,600%



respectively. The lowest membership growth rate was in the Mulemuze CSO members that actually observed a decrease of 58% among its female members. In this vein, the project had the most beneficiaries in Kalomo among Siamusunse female CSO members.

In Kazungula district, Buyantanshi CSO had the highest growth rates at 127% while the lowest was at 24% recorded by the Manyemuyemu CSO as the graph below illustrates.



A gender segmentation of the growth rates in CSO membership in Kazungula district reveals that Lushomo CSO experienced the highest growth in female membership and the lowest growth in male, membership. Overall, these findings affirm that the Project essentially mainstreamed practical gender needs by intensifying the recruitment women beneficiaries consistent with its ER 1 on strengthening and mobilising CSO members. *The success in reaching a significantly higher number of female memberships by the project is as good proxy indicator for its strong focus on gender equity through-out the project implementation.*



This conclusion is supported by the following striking excerpts from the Africa Human Development Report 2012.

*“The most critical and cost-effective nutrition interventions are not expensive. One is empowering women, which is the far-reaching way to break the cycle of intergenerational deprivation.”*

*“When women have less say in decision than men do, nutrition suffers, household food security deteriorates and access to health care lags.”*

*When women have more influence on household choices, child nutrition often improves.*

*Well-nourished people are more productive and more receptive to learning.*

*Well-nourished children learn better and are more likely to live lives they value.”*


Despite these positive gender-based project outcomes, it is not clear how the Project in Zambia was linked to the National Gender Policy and how it worked with the Ministry of Gender and Child Development to champion both practical and strategic gender needs, especially those linked to policy analysis and influence interventions related to FSN outcomes.

Another important aspect to reflect on when measuring the Project’s effectiveness is to assess the extent to which it achieved the projected target of 2.6 million direct and indirect beneficiaries. This projection is 20% of Zambia’s population, estimated at 13,064,000 and 104% of all households in Zambia which currently stands at 2,491,000. It represents 160% of the total agricultural households in Zambia which stand at 1,631,000.<sup>5</sup> If compared with the population of Southern Province the projected figure involves 1,192% of all rural agricultural households and 915% of all agricultural households in the province. It also constitutes 37% of the population of small-scale farmers in Zambia, who predominantly make-up the membership of the LAGAFA CSO network.

The expectation was that they would consist of

- Small-scale farmers households;

<sup>5</sup> See GRZ (2012) Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report, 2006-2010. Lusaka, CSO, p 129.





- Malnutrition prone and malnourished affected member households;
- Female-headed households and key vulnerable groups affected by HIV and AIDS.

Given that an average Zambian household comprises 6 members, to reach the target of 2.6 million people, the Project should have reached a total of 433,333 households within the CSO network from the district through to the national levels. But instead, the project only managed to mobilise and reach 1,040 members from the 15 CSO partners in both Kalomo and 1,040 households if we assume that each of the CSO members represent a household. These mean that in Southern Province, the project reached a total of 6,240 direct beneficiaries, and no documented evidence exists within the project documentation to demonstrate much wider outreach beyond this figure through provincial, national networks including partnerships, and experiential learning and exchange activities across the three project countries, Burundi, Malawi and Zambia. This represents a success rate of 0.24% meaning that some of the project targets were based on less adequate and less realistic assumptions.

Based on this statistical evidence and reasoning, it is not very clear how the project arrived at the figure of 2.6 million and what strategies and assumptions were planned to reach this total. Firstly, the Project was confined Kalomo and Kazungula Districts of Southern which jointly account for a total of 352,503 people with the latter contributing 98,292 people. This total accounts for only 14% of the projected 2.6 million people. *These findings targeting highlights the need for SMART evidence-based planning during the project conception and implementation phases which are adequately aligned to realistic assumptions and intervention strategies.* This is because the target of 2.6 million appears to be farfetched, especially that no clear assumptions and strategies were outlined in the project document. Its further suggests that very little application of the Context, Evidence and Links(CEL) framework was used in analysing and understanding the project context consistent with the proposed CEL policy advocacy strategy outlined for the Project's advocacy strategy. In other words, this is indicative of the fact that *while the Project did carry out a thorough analysis of the policy environment as a basis for identifying clear policy change areas, inadequate evidence may have been gathered to inform SMART planning and theory of change. This means that the planning process should have been more thorough and driven by achievable and realistic targets. This observation is even more valid given that LAGAFA under the initial umbrella apex network did not work with all the 62 NAPSSFAZ CSO*



members and there is no evidence to suggest that the project managed to forge strong networks or coalitions beyond the national borders.

### **3.2.3 Effectiveness: Capacity of CSO Networks to Analyse FSN Situations Improved**

In order to improve the capacity of the CSO network in analysing FSN situations the project trained member CSOs in FSN and Integrated Phased Classification (IPC) data collection. According to the Africa Human Development Report 2012, achieving food and nutritional security for human development requires policy advocacy in four policy areas:

- Increasing agricultural productivity, especially for smallholder farmers;
- Strengthening nutrition, especially for women and children;
- Building resilience for people and their communities; and
- Promoting empowerment, especially among rural women and marginalised groups.

Agricultural productivity conditions food availability and economic access by increasing supply and bolstering the incomes and purchasing power of the food insecure households. Empowerment affects access to food, through access to information and markets and more equitable allocations of food and resources within families and across communities. Resilience is said to protect access to food during times of economic stress or shocks and cyclical changes to food systems. Nutrition policies set the conditions people need in order to absorb and use the calories and nutrients properly.<sup>6</sup> At the same time evidence suggest that more important determinants of household's nutrition or under nutrition are a woman's education, socio-economic position and nutrition status.

Similarly, the United Nations Inter-Governmental panel of climate change have observed that the everyday life of poor and vulnerable people will be severely affected by climate change. Increased warming reduces the growing season, with implications for all three components of food and nutritional security namely: effects on food availability, impact on access and effect on the nutrient content of the food. Many African countries already face semiarid conditions

---


<sup>6</sup> See United Nations Development Programme (2012) Africa Human Development Report 2012. New York, UNDP. P.21



that disrupt agriculture, but climate change is likely to shorten the growing season even more and force large regions of marginal agriculture out of production.

The foregoing analysis means that planning and implementation of capacity building for evidence-based research, analysis and advocacy for FSN should be based and take into account all the 5 key determinants of FSN namely, food availability, food access, food use, human health and ability to use the food, and gender and empowerment.

Figure 1 below highlights the adverse effects of climate change on FSN outcomes.



**Source: Adapted from Boko and Others (2007) as cited by UNDP (2012) Africa Human Development Report.**

Findings on this assessment variable suggest that the LAGAFA project has been instrumental in reviving CSOs members to become active in FSN and IPC data collection and analysis. Evidence suggests that they were able to develop and disseminate 4 position papers on FSN with disaggregated gender analysis.

The capacity building for evidence-based research and policy advocacy under the LAGAFA project was undertaken through a national training of trainers and district level training of CSOs. A national level training of trainers meeting was implemented through a 3 day workshop that included representatives of the CSO networks from Burundi, Malawi and



Zambia, local NGOs and GRZ staff. The participations of CSO networks from other countries created an opportunity for cross-country experiential exchange and learning among participants on FSN and the implementation of the IPC. The engagement of and participation of GRZ staff at national level training also ensured that the IPC was locally owned and understood to strengthen national and local level FSN coordination mechanisms. Overall, this promoted the IPC's wider appeal, value and use.

Analysis of field findings and a review of Project documents reveal that the project formulation team and the needs assessment survey managed to map, FSN policy priority issues and critical stakeholders for policy context analysis, evidence gathering and analysis and advocacy linkages and coalition building to support project's sustainability plans.

In terms of mapping relevant policies to the LAGAFA project environment, findings underscore that 7 key policies were identified which have practical and strategic FNS implications. These include:


- The National Agricultural Policy;
- The National Environmental Policy;
- The National Food & Nutrition Policy;
- The National Gender Policy;
- The Fisheries Development Policy;
- The Livestock Development Policy; and
- The Forestry Development Policy.

However, two key policy areas that have obvious implications on child nutritional health and survival outcomes not included in the LAGAFA project environment are the National Education Policy, the Lands Act of 1995 and the Social Protection Policy implemented by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health. The National Education Policy is importance because in Zambia incidences of hunger is much more amongst children aged 3 -59 months. According to UNICEF, *the nutritional status of children influences their health status, which is a key determinant of human development. Malnutrition is associated with about 60% of under-five mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, improvement of children nutritional status increases the chances of child survival and is considered as a precondition for their contribution to community as well as human*



*development. Investing in women's education is therefore widely advocated as a key intervention strategy for promoting child health.*

In highlighting the importance of Ministry of Education, the National Food and Nutrition Policy reaffirms that maternal education is associated with decreases in child mortality and improvements in family health and nutrition. Educated women make better use of their time and available resources. At the lower levels many more girls drop out of school than boys, especially in rural areas where young girls find themselves in early marriages. This finding is particularly important considering that high levels of food poverty and malnutrition in Zambia co-exist with consecutive bumper maize harvests. Overall evidence suggests that maize production has generally increased, although productivity remains low. Over the years, production has focused on maize and cassava in all the provinces.



Source: CSO (2012) Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 2006/2010

Similarly, the Lands Act especially as it relates to customary tenure is central to FNS interventions in Zambia as evidence suggests that 30% of women lose 50% of their land upon illness or death of their spouse. This is because women's rights under customary tenure are largely restricted to use rights rather than outright control or ownership. This finding suggests that any medium to long-term strategy for FSN interventions to be sustainable



should link practical gender needs of access to strategic gender priorities relating to economic empowerment. To support this UNDP puts it as follows:

“Land tenure influences social equity and agricultural productivity, with on-going social and economic implications for food FSN. Women and poor people are most at risk of forfeiting their land rights. Some customs dictate that women’s rights to land only come through their relationships with men, even when the law protects these rights. There is plenty evidence that demonstrate the empowering women is a highly efficient way to achieve progress across the multiple dimensions of food security.”

This analysis means that while a pretty exhaustive list of policies were identified under the LAGAFA from the capacity building and policy advocacy point of view, critical gaps had remained in analysing the critical factors driving FSN insecurity at least at the local levels in order to contribute to long term FSN objectives and sustain project impact. Another gap relates to the training of trainers approach to capacity building which in most cases is more suitable when the project environment involves actors which higher literacy rates. Given that in Zambia the project primary targeted community-level agriculture cooperatives, the project policy advocacy training strategy at the district levels should have taken a more mentoring approach in order to adequately link policy to practice. The project duration of 2/3 years is also generally considered of a short-term nature to have significant impact on policy influence. Best practice in policy influence and advocacy demonstrates that to have significant impact, policy influence work must focus on quick wins and must take a longer term approach which usually involves five years.

With regard to mapping relevant policy advocacy stakeholders, findings suggest that the based on earlier outlined policy areas, the LAGAFA Project adequately mapped and analysed the critical policy-makers, implementers and policy influence stakeholders.

- Office of the Vice-President(Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) and Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU);
- Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock;
- Ministry of Finance and National Planning;
- Ministry of Health;
- Ministry of Lands, Environment and Natural Resources




- Ministry of Gender and Child Development;
- Agriculture Consultative Forum;
- Livingstone Civil Society Forum;
- Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection;
- Caritas and Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- Parliament.

Again, while the list of institutional stakeholders appears exhaustive, there seems to have been some misperception and therefore mistrust by the DMMU in the Office of the Vice-President, about the project intentions. The irony is that it is the DMMU that the Project advocacy strategy expected to institutionalize and popularize the IPC through its application is FSN situational analysis survey.

This highlights an evident gap within the project environment in mapping, analysing, and identifying effective strategies of engaging them. This resulted in indifference or apathy for the LAGAFA Project by DMMU and therefore eroded critical opportunities for popularising the IPC tool despite its strongly marketed benefits. Systematic mapping and analysis of critical stakeholders, clearly categorising them into sympathetic; adversarial, apathetic and dormant stakeholder groups, should have been a useful tool during the Project's formulation phase in order to foster wider buy-in, wider appeal and use of the IPC tool. This categorisation would have assisted the Project coordination and implementation staff to timely identify critical risk points in the partnership strategy to be able to continually adjust or refine their engagement strategy individual stakeholder's interest, alignment, importance and influence. This type of mapping often assists in identifying critical/essential stakeholders and the recommended stakeholders which eventually results in the development of an effective strategy of engagement for each type of stakeholder.

Critical stakeholders such as GRZ could play a vital role in diffusing ownership of the IPC tool, through its vast institutional infrastructure and implementation of early warning systems and disaster mitigation mandates. DMMU should therefore have been effectively and adequately engaged throughout the project implementation stages, especially during the project formative phase. The strategy of engagement should have focused on clearly spelling out the role of DMMU within its mandate, increasing awareness of FSN and the IPC tool, and invitation to collaborate and be lead in the piloting of the tool with LAGAFA at training and



throughout the implementation stages. The Project however, engaged GRZ staff at training level which introduced some barriers to effective local ownership and building on existing national FSN coordination mechanisms due to their insufficient knowledge of the IPC tool.

At the district levels the LAGAFA succeeded in training 2 different groups in FSN and IPC data collection and analysis. The first group comprised DMMU staff in Kalomo and Kazungula, and 19 CSO participants in Kazungula and 13 from in Kalomo. The second training involved 32 participants comprising representatives of LiCSOF, member CSOs and community members assisted by another CARE project called C-FAARM. This implies that at most there were 2 representatives from each CSO whom were expected to effectively train other CSO members they were representing. However, given that the IPC tool was a new concept which proved to be complex for individuals with a modest education background and CSOs have membership of up to 191 the targeting of at most two representatives for each CSO was not a very ineffective strategy, especially for imbedded sustainability within grassroots organisations or CSOs.

Another notable barrier was the language of for the training curricula amongst the exclusively Tonga speaking CSO members. To limit the language barrier and promote greater inclusiveness, local trainers spent time designing an effective training framework to cover all FSN and IPC data collection and analysis aspects in the local language. Despite the communities acquiring some level of knowledge of the FSN and IPC application, evidence shows that most CSO members were unable to refer to FSN and IPC Training Manuals which are in English. This erodes the opportunity for imbedded extension training within the CSOs in order to make full and effective use of the ToT training, disseminate the knowledge and popularise the tool. The lesson learnt here is that training frameworks and reference materials for grassroots communities must be designed, translated and delivered into the host community's local language. The localising of training materials is likely to increase impact of training and chances of sustaining this impact. It further points to the need for capacity building interventions targeting community-level institutions to take a more hands-on approach based on hand-holding or mentoring of the target beneficiaries. This is likely to unleash community's transformative confidence to question, engage and compel policy makers to create political space for their voice.





Besides these challenges findings reveal that all the 15 CSOs Network members have been active in the FSN and IPC data collection and analysis, although levels of commitment vary by individual CSOs. Following the training on FSN and IPC data collection and analysis a 24 day IPC field tests were conducted in Kalomo and Kazungula districts. The technical working group comprised 38 stakeholders in which 32% were women and 68% were men. Dissemination meetings were held in Kalomo and Kazungula with a total attendance of 32 of which 22% were female and 78% were male CSO members. Assuming that 2 stakeholders represent 1 CSO it can be concluded that these women are at most likely from 6 CSOs thus 40% of targeted CSOs. This highlights a gender gap within the Project during the IPC field tests implying that women still lagged behind in critical project interventions and within decision-making structures of the target CSOs. This observation is supported by findings of the Baseline Report which observed a decrease in the participation of women at leadership levels within the member CSOs. The Report notes that women comprised just about one-third (34%) of total executive members of the target CSO leadership. Given that about 70% of agricultural activities and food processing are done by women the project should have effectively strategized the best tactics of effectively increasing women's participation in the project beyond just scaling-up their numbers. As it is gender mainstreaming in the project was something akin to token gender representation and therefore underlines gender blindness in the implementation phase. This finding is further reinforced when an analysis of gender participation is done at the implementing institution level.

At the institutional level, evidence underlines that staff composition at LiCSOF comprised of only 20% women and 80% of men. This goes to show that although in principle, the Project's intent was to target and integrate cross cutting issues which were simply treated as tokens in the project, in reality there was little integration into the project.

During the IPC field tests a cross section of stakeholder were engaged and participated. Stakeholders included: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; Red Cross;; Ministry of Health; Department of Public Health in the council; Department of Water affairs; Southern Water and Sewerage Company; Zambia Police and Zambia Prison Services; Immigration Department; MCDMCH ; District Commissioner's Office; MLENR ; Office of the President; LiCSOF; CARE International; and District HIV/AIDS Task Force. These were part of the technical working group. This strategy helped to popularise the IPC tool in district and sub-



district level structures and communities. This move by the project also contributed to the intervention's quality of knowledge by enriching the discussions and obtaining multiple perspectives. However, the DMMU and ZVAC which were assigned the task of popularising the IPC tool in the LiCSOF advocacy strategy as part of the strategic to achieving strategic goal 1 were not represented during the IPC field tests. To ensure imbedded sustainability and wider public appeal of the IPC and to enhance its public ownership the project coordination and implementation team should have organised the field tests in partnership with ZVAC and DMMU. These two institutions combine government mandates of monitoring FSN situations through vulnerability assessment and identifying and implementing timely disaster management and mitigation measures. This proposed strategy would have immediately integrated placed what was learnt during the district level training in Government programme and would have been a very effective tactical move to ensure acceptability, diffused ownership and sustainable value and use of the tool.

Another critical gap is that the implementation of the IPC was conducted in 4 days and involved only 19 participants, of which only which 5% were women. While 4 days was adequate time to pilot the tool's implementation, the attendance of 19 people for a target beneficiary of over 500 members in each district was a less viable strategy for localising and popularising the tool given that the mapping and implementation exercises were in two different districts. Similarly, the glaring underrepresentation of women in the implementation piloting phase is an evident gap between the implementation philosophy and theory of change based on mainstreaming gender equity and actual practice which appears to be gender blind. Gaps related to engaging critical policy and programming stakeholders (DMMU and ZVAC), insufficient representation of traditional authorities, and the nearly absence of women numbers, eroded opportunities successful performance.

With respect to the effectiveness of policy advocacy interventions, LAGAFA targeted to analyse and develop 4 position papers, comprising 3 position papers and 1 disaggregated gender analysis. Evidence shows that the project's performance was very satisfactory at 75% achievement late, considering that considerable time was spend on switching partners and redesigning the project. By September, 2012, 2 position papers had been developed and 1 gender assessment was conducted on FSN analysis tool (IPC). This is a represent 100 achievement rate in terms of policy engagement for policy influence and possible reform.



Based on the evidence from CSOs at the grassroots levels the network developed two FSN policy briefs:

- i. The Marketing system in the agricultural sector policy brief has its main thrust on: purchase and payment of farmer's produce; government and private sector partnership; storage facilities; and access to markets.
- ii. The Eradication of extreme poverty policy brief has its main thrust on: storage facilities; budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector; and adoption of the IPC tool;
- iii. The write up on the IPC Food analysis tool, had its main thrust on: the need for proactive rather than reactive FSN analysis tools. These activities were within the parameters of the (SNDP) that focuses on significantly addressing challenges of realising broad-based pro-poor growth, employment creation and human development.

Further, the project identified 2 major public programmes, FISP of the MAL and Nutrition Surveillance Program (NSP) under the MOH. This means that the project sought to achieve long-term sustainable of its results and impact by integrating its interventions with Government programmes and partnering with relevant institutions. The project also took an active role and was effective in advocating for issues surrounding FISP implementation, such as evidence-based situational analysis and red flagging risks, lobbying for improved marketing arrangements and infrastructure, and lobby Government to increase budgetary allocation to FISP to meet to 10% CAADP compact benchmark. Evidence show that 80% of CSOs attested to conducting advocacy at programme level on matters directly related to FISP while the remaining 20% were pretty inactive in advocacy activities. Overall, very little was done at programme level advocacy in relation to gender, HIV/AIDS and climate change. Gender, HIV/AIDS and climate change concerns were at most practiced at awareness level in the project where messages were communicated through discussions, poems and sketches. Thus minimal impact was made on issues and concerns of gender, HIV/AIDS and climate change.

Accordingly, the Network has maintained its membership in the Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Network (FANRPAN) and the Agricultural Consultative Forum (ACF) the two institutions identified and acknowledged to being the major policy forums



advocating food security in the country. But as earlier stated, the project's engagement and partnership outlook with DMMU at most look to be lukewarm. This has evident adverse implications on the extent to which the IPC tool is likely be popularised and widely applied as an early warning and policy advocacy tool for FSN in Zambia, when LAGAFA funding is completely withdrawn.

### 3.2.4 Impact


Impact is measured at three levels:

- i. the extent to which the IPC was taken on board as an early warning and policy advocacy tool;
- ii. the extent to which the partnership strategy strengthened LiCSOF's governance structure and system and its capacity to conduct evidence-based policy advocacy;
- iii. The degree to which LAGAFA was able to achieve its 3 strategic advocacy goals and objectives outlined in the LiCSOF's advocacy strategy.

#### 3.2.4.1 Dissemination of IPC Tool

Findings suggest that before the LAGAFA project CSOs involvement in FSN and advocacy was very limited. CSOs conducted FSN situational analysis using traditional methods that relied on: observing weather patterns; people looking for peace work; availability of wild fruits; poor children's school attendance; children's weight; and number of household meals per day. These methods while prevalent at the time, tend to be unreliable and more reactive in nature, and did not involve any systematic record keeping of observations. For example, a Mubanga CSO member representative said, *"To know whether there is hunger we look at the weights of a household's children."* But this method gives the FSN situation when households are already experiencing hunger and in crisis. The traditional methods of assessing community's vulnerability to FSN crises did not serve as adequate and timely early warning systems and were a less compelling tool to support policy advocacy and initiative positive policy response.

The implementation of the IPC tool has induced an attitude shift from the unreliable, ineffective and hearsay-based evidence which generally governments dismiss as uninformed and politically inclined. To a significant degree, the IPC tool has provided a readily available tool for providing early warning system for FSN related disaster management and mitigation measures. Increasingly, local CSOs are applying evidence-based situational analysis in FSN



and other areas of concerns of the communities, documenting findings, writing reports, and presenting the findings in a convincing way to the appropriate officials and policy influencers. However, still a large majority of CSOs, especially at provincial and national levels are not conversant with IPC tool and use primary use. This has made even the local CSO to continue to use traditional methods of conducting FSN situational analysis in combination with aspects of the IPC tool that they can recall. The CSOs little understanding of the IPC tool, let alone the analysis and policy engagement procedures has limited the impact the project would have achieved at the local level. The limited engagement of the ZVAC and DMMU in the field testing and implementation phase of the IPC, the training tool design language, modest literacy and educational attainment, and CSO's preference of food production rather than food policy advocacy interventions significantly eroded the impact of the project on the target communities. The lesson for the future is that it is important to translate critical capacity building and training materials into the widely used local languages to facilitate easier diffusion of knowledge and provide an opportunity for imbedded extension services and counselling. Another important lesson is that it is important to timely and continuously engage and work with different levels of stakeholder groups from the national, provincial, district and sub-district levels in order to increase opportunities for local ownership, wider public appeal and value. Diffused local ownership and wider value is likely to enhance opportunities for CSO - implanted extension services, and sustaining project impact once the project's funds are withdrawn. Similarly, it is evident that the LAGAFA project was designed and implemented within the features and goals of the FISP with modest innovation away from the social protection, poverty reduction philosophy of government. While the target group was the same with FISP beneficiaries, the LAGAFA environment would have sought to pilot and demonstrate the feasibility of "farming as a business model," amongst the small-scale farmers or CSO members and help them diversify into other high-value cash crops to increase productivity, incomes and wealth. These in turn would contribute to improved member household FSN status.

Nonetheless, there are remarkable indications that LAGAFA did improve the ability for local CSO carry out evidence-based diagnosis of the FSN situations, document evidence and use it as a basis for engaging policy makers and implementer for possible reform option. As a result beneficiaries CSOs have taken on a more active role and policy space in the development



process. CSOs have been actively involved in programme advocacy will policy advocacy has been occupied by LiCSOF. The Network has confidently been involved in discussions of FSN at national level through its association with the ACF and FANRPAN.

#### **3.2.4.2 Governance Structure, Systems and Capacity of LiCSOF to Undertake FSN Advocacy Strengthened**

Evidence based on project documents, focus group discussions and key informant interviews with CSO in the field demonstrate that before LAGAFA LiCSOF governance structures and systems were feeble. It did not have the capacity to collect, analyse and effectively package evidence to support its policy influence and advocacy activities. Similarly, despite operating in an exclusively agricultural environment dominated by small-scale and poor farmers, LiCSOF had no specialised expertise and familiarity in FSN. LiCSOF acknowledged that prior to the LAGAFA intervention its staff and board had inadequate knowledge in FSN analysis methodologies, particularly on the IPC tool. LiCSOF's strength and area of expertise was in civic debates.

Through the LAGAFA project LiCSOF underwent training on Euro-Aid management and Competency Based People Management Programme that resulted in the Network's improved efficacy and efficiency in its financial operations and reporting. LiCSOF contributed to improved stakeholder mapping and analysis approaches; record keeping; financial accountability and transparency systems within the Network secretariat and individual member CSOs. LiCSOF also developed an advocacy strategy paper that laid the framework, identified threats and opportunities for effective advocacy. This helped in improving the understanding of policy- making cycle and what entry points are available to the Network and member CSOs. Consequently, LiCSOF and member CSOs have been empowered to become vehicles for agricultural development occupying a vital niche in the development process which creates a link between the grassroots and policy influencers.

#### **3.2.4.3 Extent of Achievement of Strategic Advocacy Goals and Objectives Outlined in the LiCSOF's Advocacy Strategy**

Evidence based on the review of project documents highlight that through a series of planning meetings Care and LAGAFA identified three policy analysis and advocacy issues, within the context of FISP. The three related to:




- Lack of an integrated, early warning and comprehensive food security and nutrition analysis tool, which makes it difficult for ZVAC and DMMU to timely identify food insecurity and effect disaster management and mitigation measures;
- High levels of extreme poverty amongst small-scale farmers, benefiting from FISP, which result from inadequate budgetary allocations, and misapplication of funds within the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, which in turn aggravates food and nutritional security;
- Inadequate budgetary allocation to agricultural storage infrastructure (shed) results in significant post-harvest losses to small-scale farmers, which in turn erodes their incomes and makes them vulnerable to food and nutritional insecurity.

In relation to the foregoing issues, hypotheses or proposed solutions were mapped and strategies and tactics devised to inform possible policy reform measures.

As a proposed measure to the first policy advocacy issues, the Project expected the DMMU to institute research and popularize the IPC tool by December, 2012. The project strategy was to lobby or persuade the Office of the Vice-President under the DMMU through the parliamentary committee and various stake holders such as ACF, JCTR, Caritas, and CSPR. The popularisation of the IPC tool was expected to equip Government with an early warning system on climate changes in order to adequately prepare for climate change management and mitigation measures. It would also help to democratise the policy engagement space by increasing the involvement of farmers, community leaders and private sector in the adoption, implementation and monitoring of food security analysis tools.

Finding on the project achievement of this strategic goal shows that while LAGAFA successfully mobilized community level CSO, build their capacities and successfully lobbied for representation on the ACF and FANRPAN discussions, its relations with ZVAC and DMMU have utmost been lukewarm or indifferent. The tool has therefore not been fully popularised at the national level and lack of involvement of the office of the vice-president and ZVAC means that even the long-term sustainability of the IPC tool dangles in balance. Care should therefore explore a clear exist strategy or extend the LAGAFA project and bring in some innovative approach to FSN interventions that combines, diversified agricultural



production, increasing incomes, and agricultural employment opportunities and agricultural policy prioritisation advocacy. The extension period should seek to effectively engage and partner with FANRPAN, ZVAC, DMMU, MAL, NFNC and ACF at the national, LiCSOF at provincial level and various district and sub-district level structures. An additional 2 year extension should help to eliminate the apathy in some government institutions and help fully integrate the tool in Government programme. This will also ensure that Care achieves value for money as effective policy advocacy is a long-term activity. Evidence shows that despite challenges with the selection of local level partners, the project was useful to communities.

Secondly, to address policy and implementation gaps related to the second policy advocacy issue, inadequate budgetary allocation to the MAL, the project sought to ensure that Government increased budgetary allocation to the agriculture sector to above 10% percent in 2012/2013 and onwards. The policy advocacy strategy was to lobby government through the Ministry of Finance to increase its budgetary allocation in the agricultural sector to at least 10% annually as recommended by CAADP. The goal was that the increased budgetary support would increase the productivity and viability of the sector for the country to realise sustainable food security and nutrition levels.

Findings on these LAGAFA strategic objectives shows budgetary allocations to the agricultural sector was 6.8% during the base year, 2009 and increased marginally to 7% in 2010(include for 2011/12). Over the years it has averaged around 6%. But during the 2012/13 budget, Government allocated K1, 865.4 billion to agriculture, forestry and fishing. Of this K500 billion was for FIS and K300 billion was for the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). This total accounts for 5.7% of the total agricultural spending. This means that the LAGAFA strategic goal 2 was not achieved by the project. Even when the K255 billion which was allocated to the rehabilitation of Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) is included, the total amount represents only 6.6% of the overall planned agricultural expenditure. It, therefore, falls short by between 3-4 percentage points of the CAADP compact benchmark. Something that the Government has also done in the agricultural sector is to reduce the tax on fertilisers by 15% which is likely to provide to relief to select farmer categories and improve their access to farming inputs. A complimentary reform proposed by the Project was to delink MAL from the Government treasury to Parliament. The findings on this goal suggest that






while there was some policy relevance in pursuing this goal, overall, it was very ambitious and may have been based on limited knowledge of the policy-making process and key players in the policy-making process in Zambia. This is also evidence by the fact that to achieve such an objective target would require more than 3 years of serious engagement and citizens mobilisation. LAGAFA had neither the voice nor the political clout to achieve this very ambitious goal within 3 years, also considering the partnership challenges with DMMU. Secondly, the strategy outlined by LiCSOF and Care did not exactly spell how the project intended to engage Permanent secretaries in each target ministry as chief advisors to their Ministers and in-charge of preparation of policy briefs. Secondly, it was not clear how the project would engage the policy analysis and co-ordination division.

Similar findings are observed on the achievement of strategic goal 3 on accelerating investment in agricultural marketing arrangement, storage infrastructure, and creation of marketing linkages, easing of transport logistics and making timely payments to farmers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that very little has been allocated to the improvement of agricultural infrastructure and promotion of market linkages. The distribution of fertilisers and payment of farmers for the maize delivered to FRA have also been characterized chaotic for the 2012/13 growing season.

#### **3.2.4.4 Sustainability**

The project built the capacity of the CSO network and its member CSOs in the use of evidence based advocacy. The Network and ultimate CSO beneficiaries have been empowered beyond FSN. This is because evidence-based situational analysis and policy advocacy can be applied to a variety of sectors. The increased institutional and programming capacity of the CSO Network LiCSOF, including its capacity to network, build coalitions and partnership on FSN related policy advocacy issues is one of the biggest achievements of the LAGAFA interventions. LiCSOF can now engage and collaborate with ACF, FANRPAN and other policy advocacy actors at national and sub-regional levels. It improved and transparency governance and reporting systems have raised its profile and are also likely to attract other organisations and donors to work with LiCSOF and its member CSOs.



At the same time, opportunities for sustaining the projects outcomes is threatened by the limited outreach of the CSO members who were trained and have the knowledge to carry out imbedded extensions training to other CSOs. This is further compromised by the fact that the training manuals and reference materials were printed in English when the target beneficiary groups are of modest literacy and educational levels.

A third potential threat to the sustainability is project outcomes is the limited buy-in of the IPC by the DMMU and ZVAC. These are the most high-level institutional structures charged with the mandates and functions related to conducting vulnerability assessments and disaster management and mitigation. DMMU is also the institution that the project expected to institutionalize the IPC tool by mobilizing CSO partners such as ACF, JCTR, CSPR and other to apply the IPC in their assessments.

A related threat is that the foremost preoccupation of grassroots CSO like the ones targeted in Zambia is increasing productivity and production. Capacity-building and policy advocacy interventions are, therefore, more likely to be sustainable if they are combined with interventions that seek to increase food production, incomes and diversify diets to ensure optimal FSN outcomes and impact. The exclusive project's focus on advocacy while bearing fruits, may not have delivered much community benefit, given the loss of time and the language barrier in the training approaches used. This was made worse by the small number of the CSO members that actually participated in the ToTs. A much more hands-on training strategy based on mentoring of select CSOs member in advocacy and FSN situational analysis using the IPC tool would have enhanced the project's impact and beneficiary outreach. Translating and printing the training manuals in Tonga, or Toka Leya would have further helped diffuse the IPC and increase opportunity for local level early warning systems which are necessary in averting FSN related disasters.

All these observations may erode opportunities that exist for sustaining the projects impact.

### **3.3 Conclusion and Lessons Learnt**

The LAGAFA project was a very relevant project to the Zambia's national food and nutritional security objectives. Overall at the global and regional and sub-regional levels it was strategically aligned to the MDG goal 1, CAADP compact pillar 3. At the National



level, it was strategically aligned to the National Health Policy, the National Food and National Policy, the Agricultural Development Policy, the National Gender Policy and other relevant policies related to FSN. In this respect it was very relevant. But the time of its implementation, 3 years was too short for any policy advocacy intervention to realise tangible goals and outcomes and seek to sustain them.

Its objective of piloting the IPC as an evidence-based, early warning tool to inform policy advocacy activities in support of national FSN objectives was a novel initiative.

Its 3 strategic goals and objectives that sought to increase public expenditure to the agricultural sector to at least 10% of the annual budget and lobby government to accelerate investments in rural agricultural infrastructure such as storage shed to minimise post-harvest losses amongst small-scale farmers was also in line with Government policy standpoint and very noble.

The project, therefore, succeeded in building the capacity of local CSOs and in mobilising them to become thoughtful local voices for policy change in the area of FSN. The focus on partnership with LiCSOF also proved worthwhile. It strengthened the governance systems of LiCSOF, improved its reporting and accountability procedures. It also strengthened its capacity to mobilise the local CSO network members, build networks and coalitions with other policy actors and create opportunities for sustaining project outcomes and impact. However, important lessons emerge from its implementation process.

The first lesson is that it is important for a FSN policy advocacy project to combine with practical food production, evidence gathering and advocacy, especially when the target group is of low literacy and educational attainment levels. In this respect, LAGAFA should have sought to link practice to policy by piloting FSN initiatives that combined agricultural diversification into high value crops to support increased incomes and market linkages especially with multinational chain stores.

Secondly, the project targeted to get DMMU and ZVAC on board in order to assimilate the tool and popularise it. But there was little effective engagement with the two institutions in the project formulation and inception phases to foster buy-in and localise ownership. This



has eroded the opportunity for diffused ownership of the IPC by DMMU and to popularise it across the country.


Thirdly, the design and printing of the capacity building framework should take into account the obtaining local circumstances, such as literacy levels, practical and strategic FSN needs, language and other socio-cultural norms. The printing of the training manuals and materials in Tonga and Toka Leya for example could have greatly improved the project outreach and imbedded extension as IPC knowledge would diffuse through informal networks to ensure its wider use and sustainability. The fourth lesson to draw is that policy capacity building for policy advocacy takes a long time and it is necessary that the project designers and implementers fully understand the policy making and reform process in each country. This would help to come up with more specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time bound goals, objectives and targets. This is in relation to policy advocacy strategic goal 2 which sought delinking MAL from treasury in the Ministry of Finance to Parliament. This objective was rather ambitious to be implemented and achieved within 3 years.

### **3.3.1 Recommendations:**

- i. The IPC is a novel tool for evidence-based early warning of FNS. The CSO networks communities which are the front line have shown the will to use the tool to mobilise the evidence and other networks to support their policy engagement for FSN policy prioritisation. Since agriculture is the economic main stay for 91% of the economic active people in Zambia, Care should consider scaling-up the LAGAFA interventions in other districts to develop the local-level critical mass for sustaining the project outcomes. Developing a similar 3 year FSN project that brings on board and diffuses the IPC tool and core LAGAFA activities is likely to augment opportunities for sustaining project outcomes and impact on FSN in the long-term.
- ii. Care, should identify, leverage some of its current projects or programme activities that have obvious implications on FSN to scale-up LAGAFA interventions and seek to engage and strengthen its relationship with ZVAC and DMMU, the two institutions that have the institutional infrastructure and mandate to popularise the IPC tool.



- iii. Care International should seek to localise or adapt its capacity building intervention through translating the training curricula and reference materials into languages vary close and familiar to the target beneficiary groups. This is likely to create opportunities for diffusing initiatives or tools through existing informal and formal networks and enhanced imbedded extensions services.
- iv. Food production, poverty and nutritional insecurity continues to be a ravaging problem for over 60% of small-scale farmers and over 80% of rural populations. At the same time, the World Bank and government has made policy statements on supporting wealth and job creation through value-addition. In line of this policy commitment, Care should consider projects that support select CSO member networks to diversify into high-value crops that support sustainable incomes generation, increase food productivity and create decent employment in rural areas. Focus should be on those high-value cash crops that have ready market, like soya, beans, vegetables etc and a component strategy should be how Care International can use such project to strengthen rural supply value-chains.
- v. Capacity-building for policy advocacy that target constituencies with modest literacy levels may takes between 3-5 years to materialise. The overall strategy for Care into the future is to identify quick win areas that add to the overall goal for policy reform and adopt a more hands-on approach that mentors and builds the transformative confidence of grassroots organisations to effective link policy to practice.
- vi. Care should continue to work with select smallholder farmers in the LAGAFA Project districts of Kazungula and Kalomo to expand vegetable production and commercialization by leveraging the EVPC Project.
- vii. Care International should mobilise funding to support interventions meant at build on LAGAFA's efforts to enable farmers to organize and advocate to local and national government to reform current agricultural policies and programmes, so they contribute much more significantly to food and nutrition security.



- viii. Care International should actively take part in the CSO Scaling-Up Nutrition Alliance, to scale-up its advocacy work on FSN issues, including reform of Agriculture programmes.

