



Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme

SHARP

EuropeAid/111402/g/Multi: NGO Food Security Programme

Mid-Term Review Main Report

November 2003





Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project, Mid-Term Review

Review Team:

John E Fox, IntermediaNCG, Nairobi

Bernard Macharia Maina, Independent Consultant

Abdirizak Mohamed Hassan, ACACIA Consultants, Nairobi

Acknowledgements

The implementation of projects in Somalia is not easy given the levels of random occurrence of insecurity. However, each of the organisations of the SHARP project as well as the EC Somalia Unit should be congratulated on their perseverance and continued optimism in achieving the objectives of SHARP. It should be noted that the majority of personnel involved are Somalis and the partnership that is evolving between Somali staff members and the expatriate staff of each organisation is by itself a model of how pacification and development can progress in Somalia.

The organisational complications involved in planning and implementing this Mid-Term Review of four separate but coordinated projects in significantly different parts of the Shabelle Valley was never going to be easy. However it was done, and the results are evidenced in these reports.

The Review Team would like to thank the staff of ADRA, CARE, Concern and Cefa for briefing the team, for providing all the documentation, for responding to all our questions, for all the hospitality and, not least, for guiding us through development of a real insecurity situation and for moving us out of harms way.

The RT believes that the work being done is valuable and is helping the people of the Shabelle Valley to improve their livelihoods, not just in agricultural production terms but also in terms of peace building. We believe that the alliance of the EC Somalia Unit and the four SHARP agencies have started something valuable and that it needs to continue, to include other implementing and funding partners and, most important, will include increased involvement of Somali administrative and political leaders.

We wish the programme well and hope that it is able to continue and evolve to the point of providing sustainable improvements to the lives and livelihoods of ordinary families in the Shabelle Valley into the future.

Executive Summary

Four International NGOs (ADRA, CARE, Cefa and Concern World-wide) made coordinated individual bids for an EC call for proposals which has resulted in the cluster of projects popularly known as SHARP (Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme). Each individual project has a duration of two years, and each has a separate Financing Agreement. CARE and CEFA initiated their projects in March 2002; ADRA and Concern officially started in June 2002 but effectively started in September 2002.

Each agency and the title of the individual projects are shown in the main text in Figure 1.

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) was planned in order to allow for an assessment of the progress of each partner and to reflect on the potential for future development of the present arrangements.

The MTR seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the effect of the programme so far, identifying successes and weaknesses in the context of the Somali working environment and making recommendations on the way forward. It looks at the achievements of the individual projects towards their results and purpose, using the indicators stated in the log frames as well as the achievements of the overall programme and provides lessons learned and recommendations for the remaining period of the present projects and a framework for future project/programme design.

The Review Team (RT) uses a Natural Resource Management approach that incorporates the interactions between the natural, human user group and geo-political systems on people's livelihoods.

Review Findings

It is clear from the activity analysis of the individual projects that access to water through rehabilitated canals is being achieved. With this encouragement and the support of training in improved farming techniques, attempts to diversify cropping strategies, the pilot testing of processing, rice, oil products and understanding better the dynamics of the markets is creating impact that could become sustainable in the future, given a wider focus on critical aspects that are presently not being addressed.

The development of a coordinated alliance of compatible work with respect to rehabilitation of infrastructure, improved agricultural technology and an increasing focus on inter-community institutional strengthening, is very positive and indicates a clear direction for future livelihoods improvement activities and for sustainability. However, the present level of cooperation and scale of activities is insufficient to be able to address the basic environmental and institutional problems in the Shabelle Valley. These are many but to mention the main ones:

Ecological Aspects

- The continuing widespread destruction of tree and bush cover, loss of grass cover and increasing soil erosion (and soil fertility) in the catchment are undermining the long-term viability of sustainable livelihoods.
- Localised attempts to cope with flooding within the existing irrigation schemes will only develop pressure on other weak points and create flooding in other parts of the system. These issues need to be addressed at a sub-catchment level and could form part of the

work of the FAO Land and Water Project's mandate to identify and design mitigation measures within the framework of a future NRM project.

- Failure to address the issues of catchment destruction and effective flood protection, as well as effective control of the irrigation water flows with respect to the river and the main canals, will mean continuing siltation in the newly desilted canals and additional workloads for the farmer groups working within the irrigation network.

Socio-Cultural Aspects

The focus of all the projects is on farmers who are irrigating crops. However, the catchment of the Shabelle includes pastoral herders, some of whom practise agro-pastoral activities (some of the herders are farmers and some of the farmers are herders). They also use the riverine resources seasonally and need access to water and to fodder during the dry season and especially during droughts. Ultimately, all the violent conflict in the Shabelle is related to access, use and ownership of natural resources and are unlikely to be resolved unless all the stakeholders come together and work out a way of using these in a fair and sustainable manner.

Policy Support and Institutional Strengthening

The important issue here is that there is no policy support, neither from the TNG government nor from the SACB. The continuing failure to prevent the random anarchy of the warlords and to make progress in the promotion of peace, stability and the formation of a new and effective government is preventing any progress along these lines.

Finally, none of the above issues can be planned for or dealt with effectively without the growth of an effective geo-political framework in the sub-catchment through which the elders and the warlords in the respective three regions are able to agree on a way to live together; to provide effective security and law and order structures; to develop a sub-catchment wide policy framework for catchment rehabilitation and management including a flood control strategy.

Consequently, the fledgling initiative to engage in inter-community dialogue and institution building (Canal Committees, Water Users/ Farmers Associations) and introducing planning and negotiating skills needs to be expanded to a higher level, being the most important feature of the SHARP projects when compared with the technical infrastructure and agriculture elements.

Recommendations for the Rest of the Project Period

Recommendation 1

An attempt should be made to develop common indicators at Project Purpose level that are used across all SHARP projects that measure longer-term changes in household assets and food security. Assistance with this should be sought from specialists.

Recommendation 2

A regular monthly SHARP meeting could be extended for one day to carry out a thorough Stakeholder Analysis of all the important stakeholders in the project. This could be led by a staff member of one of the partner agencies and the outcome documented for use in the development of future projects.

Recommendation 3

Through a SHARP inter-agency meeting, there should be a clarification of the meaning of “backstopping” by Cefa and CARE and a functional terms of reference should be developed that includes the definition of which personnel (positions) in each organisation should be responsible for what, what tasks are considered backstopping, how much time should be devoted to each task, a specific budget developed to enable these tasks to be performed and a modality that allows backstopping activity to be monitored and reported on in Cefa and CARE regular reporting.

Recommendation 4

A joint independent study on the effect of uncontrolled food imports should be designed and carried out. This perhaps ought to be funded and carried out by SACB.

Recommendation 5

A sub-catchment-wide environmental audit could be designed and carried out with a view to contributing to the design of a future sub-catchment-wide Natural Resource Management Project integrated into ongoing SHARP projects.

Recommendation 6

It is understood that the FAO- Land and Water project is intending to do a widespread anthropological study in the Shabelle sub-catchment. It may be possible for them to support a related household economy study that establishes the baseline economic conditions for the different farming typologies identified in this report.

Recommendation 7

A process should be begun which uses the full potential of Project Cycle Management and maximises the community-driven approach by involving key community leaders and elders in the process of project planning. To the extent feasible, problem analysis and basic project formulation should be done in Somalia with Somalis and not in Nairobi.

In order to support this process it would be valuable for SHARP partners to organise a training programme for their own staff on PCM methods, including both field and Head Office staff. It is evident that although all the project proposals to EC were documented in a logframe format, many of the staff in all the organisations are not familiar with PCM as a development planning tool. The training course would have special focus on the horizontal logic of PCM – the role of monitoring and evaluation.

Recommendation 8

Future projects should incorporate both time allocation and budgeting for external evaluations.

Recommendation 9

A monthly meeting of SHARP could be extended by one day to review experiences on credit issues and to formulate a brief on approaches to credit. SHARP could invite a credit specialist either from member agencies or from a specialist agency to lead and participate in the day.

Recommendation 10

In order to assist the irrigation trainers and the Water Users Associations/Canal Committees to know the actual amount of water being abstracted from the river over time, and also for them to appreciate the possible losses in the conveyance system due to different levels of

management, there is need to explore the use of simple water measuring devices such as ruled gauges or Parshall measuring flumes at some sections of the canal. This would also facilitate better water sharing among the farmers.

Recommendation 11

The End-of -Term Review of the current projects should be a “results-to-purpose” review and should concentrate on social and economic impact being created amongst households, both directly and indirectly affected by the project. Two external consultants specialised in social and economic impact analysis should lead the review. Each organisation should provide one staff member with a range of skills such as infrastructure, crop production, gender equity and income generation, as full members of the team covering all project areas.

Recommendations for Future Interventions Beyond These Projects

Recommendation 12

A “Results-to-Purpose” Review Workshop should be held in order to map out a basic strategy for future SHARP development. This should be led by an independent facilitator and documented as a basis of future project designs.

Recommendation 13

There is potential for the development of a linked project that focuses on the training of Somali agricultural engineers, including training in participatory, community-based approaches to irrigated agriculture extension; updated knowledge of irrigated farming practices; the design and management of hydraulic structures; training of Water Users Associations in institutional development and in conflict management skills.

This project could evolve into diploma level courses, perhaps in collaboration with a recognised University in the Horn of Africa and train technicians from anywhere in Somalia. Other NGOs could support this project by including budget lines in future projects to fund local technicians to do the course.

Recommendation 14

There is urgent need to develop a sub-catchment-wide Natural Resource Management Project based on the results of an environmental audit of the sub-catchment. The most obvious way to develop this is to expand the work of the FAO Land and Water Project to include both the environmental audit and the design of the NRM project. This would inform expanded environmental activities in the design of new projects of the individual SHARP partners.


Recommendation 15

The design of future projects should significantly increase the focus on community organisation and participation strengthening by increasing the skills of project staff, community leaders and local authorities in these processes.

Recommendation 16

The Project Advisory and Support Unit (PASCU) of the proposed EC-funded Agriculture Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Project should have a mandate to cover the Shabelle sub-catchment, not just the two districts in Lower Shabelle, in order to support the technical and capacity aspects of NGOs working under SHARP. The proposed project should be a part of, and play a leading role in, supporting SHARP as a whole. An important

role of the unit would be to promote higher-level community-driven management institutions that are able to sustain agricultural productivity in the Shabelle Valley as illustrated below.



Activities would include good governance, conflict transformation, human rights and institutional development support.

Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CC-CAT	Canal Committee- Capacity Assessment Tool
CCS	Community Concerns Somalia
Cefa	Comitato Europeo per la Formazione e L'Agricoltura
CIDPM	Crop Improvement, Development, Processing and Marketing Project
Cins	An INGO in Jalalaxi area of Shabelle Valley
Concern	SHARP Partner Agency
EC	European Commission
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IDM/ ITM	Irrigation Design Manual/ Irrigation Training Module
IUM	Irrigation Users Manual
LNGO	Local Non Governmental Organisation
LSR	Lower Shabelle Region
MTR	Mid Term Review
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NRM	Natural Resource Management
PASCU	Project Assistance, Capacity Building and Support Unit
RT	Review Team
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SAASV	Strengthening Agricultural Activities in the Shabelle Valley Project
SCF (UK)	Save the Children United Kingdom
SWOT	Strengths and Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats Analysis
SYL	Somali Youth League
ToR	Terms of Reference

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	II
ABBREVIATIONS	VII
CONTENTS.....	VIII
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Context of the Review	1
1.2 Terms of Reference.....	2
1.3 Review Approach and Methodology	4
2. RELEVANCE.....	6
2.1 Identification and Formulation Process	6
2.2 Realism of Programme Design	7
3. PROGRAMME PREPARATION AND DESIGN	8
3.1 General Context	8
3.2 Specific Context.....	10
3.3 The Project Design.....	12
4. EFFICIENCY	15
4.1 Activities Analysis	15
4.2 Organisation and Management	20
5. EFFECTIVENESS.....	21
5.1 Overall Effectiveness	21
5.2 Institutional Issues	22
5.3 How Assumptions are Affecting Project Achievements	24
6. IMPACT	26
7. SUSTAINABILITY AND REPLICABILITY	27
8. LESSONS LEARNED FROM SHARP	33
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	34
9.1 Overall Outcomes to Date.....	34
9.2 Future Developments	37
ANNEXES	
A. Terms of Reference.....	42
B. Review Itinerary	50
C. Sampling Methodology and Review Checklists Used	51
D. SWOT Analysis of SHARP by Each Agency.....	58
E. Photographic Images of SHARP Activities	

1. Introduction

1.1 Context of the Review

Four International NGOs (ADRA, CARE, Cefa and Concern World wide) made coordinated individual bids for an EC call for proposals, which has resulted in the cluster of projects popularly known as SHARP (Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme). Each individual project has a duration of two years, and each has a separate Financing Agreement. CARE and CEFA initiated their projects in March 2002; ADRA and Concern effectively started in June 2002.

Each agency and the title of the individual projects are shown below in Figure 1.

SHARP	
Organisation	Project
ADRA	Beled Weyne Food Security Project
CEFA	Strengthening Agricultural Activities in the Shabelle Valley (SAASV)
CEFA	Crops Improvement and Diversification, Processing and Marketing (CIDPM)
CARE	Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project: Sablale, Qorioley, Merka, Awdhegle, Afgoi, Shalambood
Concern Worldwide	Enhancing the Capacity of Local Communities to Achieve Food Security and Self-Reliance, Kurtunwarei District

Figure 1. SHARP Project Implementing Partners

A Mid-Term Review (MTR) was planned in order to allow for an assessment of the progress of each partner and to reflect on the potential for future development of the present arrangements. The timeframe for each project is shown below in Figure 2. No cost extensions have been agreed for each as follows:

ADRA	No extension requested yet
CARE	May 2004
Concern	December 2004
Cefa- CIDPM ¹	June 2004
Cefa- SAASV	April 2004

Agency	Calendar Year 2002		Calendar Year 2003				Calendar Year 2004				Communities		
Cefa	[Shaded]												35
Cefa	[Shaded]												
Quarter	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8					
CARE	[Shaded]												45/ 6 LNGOs
ADRA	[Shaded]												6
Quarter			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
Concern	[Shaded]												12

Figure 2. Timeframe for SHARP Projects

¹CIDPM was not part of the Call for Proposal but funded by the 1996 food security Official Letter through a direct agreement with Cefa.

1.2 Terms of Reference

The MTR seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the effect of the programme so far, identifying successes and weaknesses in the context of the Somali working environment and making recommendations on the way forward. It looks at the achievements of the individual projects towards their results and purpose, using the indicators stated in the logframes as well as the achievements of the overall programme and provides lessons learned and recommendations for the remaining period of the present projects and a framework for future project/programme design. The full terms of reference are given in Annex A.

Comments on Terms of Reference

The ToR specifically requests that the Review Team (RT) assess the progress and achievements of each individual project and the impact of the SHARP programme as a whole. As a result, it was necessary to prepare a stand-alone report for each of the projects. Individual reports have been written for ADRA, CARE and Concern but the two Cefa projects, because they are being implemented in an integrated way, have been written as one report. Following the production of each of the four reports, this main report was written. So there are five reports in total.

The time allowed for carrying out the MTR was extremely short. Because it is assumed that a Final Review² will be carried out, the RT have listed the original planned time, the revised itinerary (because there was a change in schedule) and suggested an appropriate timeframe with a view to the timing of the Final Review in Figure 3 below.

Event	Time planned	Revised	Recomm.	Comments
Initial Meeting with SHARP to review TOR	½ day		½ day	1 month before mission
Gathering DOCUMENTATION	0		1 day	
Start of mission				
Meetings with implementing partners and EC in Nairobi	3 days		4 days	
Gathering documentation	0			
Review of documentation	1 day		3 days	
Travel to Beled Weyne	1 day		1 day	
ADRA review	2 ½		3 days	
Report writing			1 day	
Travel to Merka	½ day to K50			
CARE review	4 days		6 days	
Report writing			2 day	
Concern review	3 days	2	4 days	Due to rain / insecurity reduced to 2 days 1 day used to meet Cefa 1 canal Committee
Report writing	1 day	0	1 day	
Travel to Jowhar	½ day		½	

² Project Cycle Management (PCM) is an integrated management system that uses the logical framework approach. It has both a vertical logic and a horizontal logic. The vertical logic follows the pattern of activities that lead to results that lead to project purpose that leads to an overall long-term goal. The horizontal logic involves the development of specific achievement indicators that are monitored and reviewed (evaluated) in order to test whether results are leading to achievement of project purpose (i.e. whether the logic is correct). The RT are not recommending that a End of Term Review will be held, they are assuming it will be held because all SHARP Partners are using a log frame format in their proposals and in implementation. It is evident by the questions raised by the personnel of the SHARP partners there is a need to train both head office and field staff in the PCM method.

Report writing	1 day	0	2	
Jowhar review	2 days	3	4	
Report writing	1 day	1	2	
Return Merka	1 day			Cancelled due to insecurity
Cefa LSR	2 days		3 days	Cancelled due to Insecurity
Report writing	1 day	0		
Presentation	1 day	0		Held in Nairobi
Return to Nairobi	1 day	1	1	
Report writing	4 days	4	7	
Initial field presentation	½ day		½	
Draft reports submission	0		0	
Report writing		3 days	0	
Final presentation	½ day		½	
Incorporation of comments into draft reports	1 day		2 days	
Final report submission	0		0	
Total days	33	33	49	

Figure 3. Planned and Proposed Optimal Time frame

In particular, the CARE and Cefa reviews needed more time because they are more complex projects and have larger budgets. In the CARE area the team did not visit the CCS work because of the distance and time involved, and it is suggested that a visit to the CCS area should be included during the Final Review.

The recruitment of consultants was distributed between the implementing partners because of the distribution of funds for review across the projects, but it would have been better if the team had been recruited as a team. This need not have affected the contracting and accounting issues.

The team should have been recruited and contracted some weeks before the start of the mission, so that they could have met and reviewed the ToR before the initial meeting with the SHARP team and have been in a better position to make meaningful comments.

Comments on the Field Mission

The field mission was coordinated well by each of the implementing partners. The schedule was maintained until the second day of the Concern part of the mission. The end of the first day was interrupted by heavy rainfall in the project area. The second Concern field day did not take place because of heavy rain in the project area and because of a gathering security threat related to Shalambod and Merka Towns. One day of the Concern mission was spent with the Cefa LSR team, but no field visit was made. The report on Cefa activities therefore contains limited reference to the LSR work, and the RT feels they can make no comment on these activities, having had no significant contact with the communities concerned apart from Cessare Maria Canal Committee.

As a result of the emerging security situation the mission plan was revised. The mission continued on to Jowhar and carried out the Cefa-Jowhar review without interruption. However, the planned return to Merka, the visit to Cefa LSR and the planned presentation in Merka was abandoned and following the Jowhar work the team returned to Nairobi. The security monitoring and response to an actual situation was managed well. The RT was informed at all times of what was happening and asked about how we felt about the situation. The coordination between organisations was done well, and the RT felt comfortable about the arrangements being made and the ultimate outcome of the field mission.

It is suggested that future reviews should not take place during the Ramadan period, as this negatively affects the conduct of the mission and interferes with an important religious event.

It is also advised that a future review would be split into two parts with Cefa and CARE reviews taking place and draft reports being written before the ADRA and Concern reviews take place.

An End-of-Term Review should be a Results-to-Purpose – Impact Assessment. The documentation of each of the SHARP projects is thorough and accurate with respect to activities, so that the Impact Assessment should focus on social and economic impact and sustainability.

1.3 Review Approach and Methodology

The RT has used a Natural Resource Management (NRM) approach to the MTR.

*Natural Resource Management*³

Different resources need different management styles but the concept of Natural Resource Management (NRM) rests on the interaction between three independent but interlocking systems. These are:

- **The natural system** formed of the interaction between landform, climate, fauna and flora.
- **The human user system**, based on the biological, social and economic needs of individuals and family groups.
- **The larger geopolitical system**, which determines state and interstate policies and available infrastructure, including services and markets and the opportunity (or not) for the user system to expand territorially in relation to other production systems.

The Natural System

Three features stand out as influential in the natural system:

- The strong influence of climate;
- The wide variety of resources that need to be managed;
- Local variation.

With respect to Somalia, the River Shabelle Valley (like the Juba Valley) represents a vital natural resource unit that has the capacity to play a critical role in the food security status of the country. The unit is represented by the natural catchment of the riverine area and its drainage basin. Of course, the sum total of this ecological unit crosses the internationally recognised border of Somalia with Ethiopia and the upper catchment lies within the Somali Region of Ethiopia.

Given the absence of a recognised government in Somalia and the current complexity of the geo-political system within and surrounding Somalia, this MTR limits its focus to that portion of the catchment within Somalia.

³ Adapted from, Investing in Pastoralism: Sustainable Natural Resource Use in Arid Africa and the Middle East, DJ Pratt et al, World Bank, 1997.

The User System

The user system can be thought of basically as three elements:

- The type of production system (rain fed crop production, irrigated crop production, agro-pastoral, pastoral) practised;
- Existing social-territorial organisation;
- Present population and demographic trends.

Sixty percent of the Somali population are thought to be pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, but a significant portion of the population are riverine farmers that have practised crop production for many hundreds of years, and SHARP activities are focused on these riverine farmers.

The Geopolitical System

The geopolitical system can be thought of as:

- The states' political and administrative structures, along with their policies and operational capabilities;
- The economy and social scenario within which these operate;
- The external entities and forces, which influence state decisions and development programmes.

The role of this system has major significance for Somalia, as 12 years ago there was a total disintegration of the Somali state structures, so that the policy framework of a state and the operational capacity are non-existent.

In a world, which is dominated by nation states that increasingly establish new international institutions through which to compete (and cooperate) in political and economic terms, a nation that is no longer a state is totally exposed and defenceless against the will of others – both within the country and regionally.

This review of SHARP projects, intended to support food security and livelihood improvement for people in the Shabelle Valley, will be viewed as a continuing competition between farmers (resource users) attempting to utilise the available natural resources and the constraints to their efforts driven by nature (the natural system). This competition is made enormously more complex by the wider competition between geo-political stakeholders competing to use or influence the same resources.

2. Relevance⁴

2.1 Identification and Formulation Process

During the early period of the EC Food Security Programme during 1997-2000 investment took the form of isolated, short-term micro-projects in different parts of the country. Since 2000, however, the outcomes of these individual micro-projects have generated patterns of localised success with accumulated lessons learned.

This has led international NGOs to work together on projects that have compatible activities seeking a greater impact. As a result of a call for proposals four organisations submitted proposals for implementation in the Hiran Region and in Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions.

There are three common themes across each of the four SHARP projects:

- Community organisation and participation;
- Irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation;
- Agricultural training and knowledge transfer.

Although all the INGOs have a long history of working in Somalia, for three of these – ADRA, CARE and Concern – the present projects represent a first phase of “transition to development” interventions; whilst for Cefa, which is a specialist agricultural development organisation, the current projects (there are two Cefa projects in SHARP) represent a fourth phase.

The formulation of these individual projects was driven by the imperative of a call for proposals, and the opportunity for in-depth strategising prior to the submission of proposals was limited.

In the Somali context, it probably would have been difficult to have realistically designed such an alliance of organisations working in a coordinated way, because one of the major constraints is the relative isolation between organisations generated by the high transaction costs of meeting and planning together. Nevertheless, the projects were approved, and there were elements of coordination and proposed collaboration built into these.

The time was right to try something like this – parallel projects working in a coordinated fashion in up-stream and down-stream areas of the same river basin. In the first year of the projects most of the implementing partners were focused on recruiting staff, equipping offices, carrying out baseline studies and PRAs with specific communities and initiating planned activities. It probably is only at this time (November 2003) that it is meaningful to review what is happening, how well (or not) things are working and whether there is any value added in working in this way.

⁴ The appropriateness of the Programme objectives to the problems that it is supposed to address and to the physical and policy environment within which it operates.

2.2 Realism of Programme Design

Each of the projects is constrained within a two-year time frame. The rehabilitation and development of agriculture in the Shabelle Valley is of course a long-term task requiring probably two to three, five-year phases (10-15 years). Constraining the process within two-year project cycles is very unrealistic and demands a great deal of commitment on the part of the agencies involved and the EC staff. Even if the EC is limited to two year funding⁵ it would be much more realistic for programmes such as this to be planned within a five year framework.

⁵ The EC is no longer restricted to 2 years funding: 3 years is possible now.

3. Programme Preparation and Design⁶

3.1 General Context

In order to understand something of the complexity of Somalia and the context in which the projects work it is important to review some of the recent history of the country. It is also important to have some understanding of Somali socio-political structure in order to appreciate what happened during the period from 1970's to the present time and why it is so difficult to re-establish a nation-state. So below follows a brief reflection on these two aspects of Somali life.

Recent Somali History

Following World War II a Four-Power Commission was established to dispose of former Italian possessions in Africa. In 1947 the Somali Youth League (SYL) was established with the principal aim of uniting all Somalis under one government and to abolish tribalism. When the Commission visited Mogadishu in January 1948, a memorandum was presented to them from the SYL, which called for the unity of all Somalis in the Horn of Africa under a single government. Their intention was for the Trust Territory of Somalia to be politically united with four other neighbouring African Territories, namely, French Somaliland, the Ogaden, under Ethiopian rule, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya and British Somaliland. As a result of the Commission the General assembly of the United Nations agreed to a ten-year mandate for Somalia from 1950-1960 under Italian administration, with sovereignty thereafter. This meant that the British Somaliland Protectorate needed also to prepare that territory for self-government within a similar, ten year time period – an impossible task to accomplish.

Elections in February 1960, under a new constitution, gave Somalis for the first time a Legislative Council in the former British Somaliland. It had 33 seats. This government had a life of four months only, before it merged with the Trust Territory of Somalia (former Italian Somalia) in July 1960.

During the early years northern Somalis and Isaacs in particular, gained more and more economic and political power in the south, leading to taking over the Premiership in 1967 and holding it until the military took over in 1969⁷. The tendency throughout this period to concentrate aid and trade in the south at the expense of the north gathered momentum under the Darod regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.

The 1974/75 drought and famine (mainly concentrated in the north) contributed to unrest in that region, particularly since the government's relief efforts included the forced resettlement of drought-stricken pastoralists from the north and their relocation in cultivating and fishing settlements in the south (Lower Shabelle Region).

Other more powerful political forces, leading eventually to armed insurrection, were unleashed by the 1977/78 war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the issue of self-determination for the Ogaden (Darod) Somalis in eastern Ethiopia⁸. The ignominious defeat in 1978 and the vast refugee influx of hundreds of thousands of Oromos as well as Darod

⁶ The logic and completeness of the project planning process, and the internal logic and coherence of the project design.

⁷ Blood and Bone, The call of kinship in Somali Society, I.M. Lewis, The Red Sea Press, 1994

⁸ Ibid.

Somalis from the Ogaden prompted bitter recriminations along clan lines in Somalia. It also triggered a seismic shift in super-power alignments in the Horn of Africa with the Russians turning to support the Ethiopians and enabling them to regain control of the Ogaden. This defeat was followed by a huge refugee influx of the best part of a million Ogadeni's (ethnic Somalis and Oromo neighbours and allies) into Somalia in 1978 and 1979. Perhaps half the (Darod) refugees were placed in refugee camps in the centre of the northern regions of the Somali Republic where their "hosts" were people of the Isaaq clan-family, whom they traditionally confronted in their herding movements. These large-scale movements seriously upset Somalia's existing clan demography.

In 1988, Presidents Siyad and Mengistu signed a peace accord, normalizing their relations and undertaking to cease supporting each other's dissidents. This was followed by the onset of civil war in Somalia between the Siyad regime and Isaaq clansmen from the north and the eventual collapse in 1991 of the Siyad Barre regime. Many Ogadeni refugees returned to their kinsmen in Ethiopia (Somali Region today) who were incorporated in the new national regional state system established by the present Ethiopian Government who came to power in the same year 1991.

In the intervening years the entire area has been unstable politically and subject to increasing drought impacts.

Overall then, the geopolitical activities involving international and local colonial powers have for centuries created major disturbances for the Somali people, which has led to serious negative impacts on both the natural and user systems.

Somali Socio-Political Structure

Somalis are natural relativists. They divide their social universe into "those who are close" (*sokeeye*, or *higto*) and "those who are distant" (*shisheeye*). Somalis distinguish between blood related kin (*tol*)- the epitome of closeness and -affines (*hidid*)-who may turn out to be distant relatives. *Tol* is the cornerstone of Somali social relations, providing an individual's primary group identity and loyalty. *Tol* means, "to bind together" and represents the "irreducible" solidarity of those so related by common patrilineal descent so that each individual has an exact place in society. Kin classification is literally counted genealogically. These lineages are traced typically through twenty or thirty named generations to one of the founders of the six main descent groups, which I.M. Lewis⁹ calls "clan-families". These family trees are the basis of the Somali segmentary lineage political system.

Although clan-family membership has political implications, in the traditional structure of society the clan-families never act as united corporate groups for they are too large and unwieldy and their members too widely scattered. So clan-families are segmented by blood relations by reference to apical ancestors and by uterine ties through "complementary filiation". These are referred to as clans. Similarly clans are divided into a series of component lineages. Within the clan the most clearly defined subsidiary group is termed a "primary lineage". Among its segments marriage is forbidden and most marriages are between people of different primary lineages. A primary lineage has typically a genealogical span of six to ten generations.

Within the segmentation of his primary lineage a person most frequently acts as a member of a "dia-paying group". The dia-paying group (*diiya* derives from the Arabic meaning blood-

⁹ Ibid

wealth) is the basic jural and political unit of Somali society. The male strength of a dia-paying group is from a few hundred to a few thousand. This group is essentially a corporate group whose members are united in joint responsibilities to outsiders. The most important aspect of their unity is the collective payment of blood-compensation. If one member of a dia-paying group is injured or killed by another group, or if his property is attacked, the wronged group is pledged to collective vengeance, or if reparation is made, to sharing the compensation paid amongst all its male members. On to this complex structure colonial agencies imposed administrative boundaries that are geographically based. Over time, as history shows, the socio-political map changes its shape.

3.2 Specific Context




Figure 4. Map of Somalia showing the Shabelle Valley, its inhabitants, the present location of SHARP Partners and the rough delineation of the sub catchment area.

The SHARP programme operates in the Shabelle valley, illustrated in the map shown in Figure 4. The map shows the distribution of clans and sub-clans in the programme area, including that of the Bantu farming peoples who have inhabited and farmed in the valley for

hundreds of years. In recent years they have been under significant pressure from surrounding groups with a more pastoral background through the actions of the former military government and the growth and existence of armed militia gangs. Nevertheless, these groups are still in the valley and still trying to maintain a stable livelihood from farming.

Background to Irrigation Systems in Shabelle Valley

Since January 1991, Somalia has had no functioning government and the situation has been one of anarchy, marked by inter-clan fighting and random banditry. Most of the infrastructure – piped water, electricity, roads, bridges, flood protection and irrigation - have been vandalized and neglected and are thus either destroyed or in a state of serious deterioration.

The main productive sectors of livestock and agriculture are respectively suffering from the ban on Somali livestock imposed by the Saudi in September 2000 due to the perceived risk of Rift Valley Fever (there was only one outbreak in Kenya in 1998) and the collapse of the banana industry due to the halting of export activities in 1998. The poor situation of the agricultural sector was then worsened by the effect of the El Nino phenomenon in 1997/98. These circumstances have driven Somalia into a condition of constant emergency in which food production is inadequate to cover the internal need, even during the best farming seasons.

This is despite the fact that in Somalia there is the potential for much higher production if the irrigation system was fully operational and maintained adequately.

GTZ¹⁰ data indicate that before the civil war the irrigated and cultivated land was 71,000 hectares in Middle Shabelle and 172,000 in Lower Shabelle. Assuming an average production of 1.5 – 2 mt/ha and considering two cropping seasons per year, there would be a total irrigated agricultural production of 972,000 mt. per year that, together with the production from rain fed farming, could substantially improve and probably assure food security.

The main irrigation infrastructures along the Shabelle River were originally designed for cultivation of sugar cane, cotton, partially banana and citrus in Middle Shebelle and mainly banana production in Lower Shebelle.

These activities were relying on export for banana and citrus and local processing for sugar cane and cotton. As already mentioned, the export of bananas and citrus stopped in 1998 causing the collapse of the entire sector. The sugar factory in Jowhar was completely destroyed in 1991 and so were all other productive and processing infrastructures. The textile factory in Balaad is the only one remaining, as it was protected by the local community although it has not functioned since the beginning of the war. (Due to external competition the textile sector had started to decline before 1991.)

Without a market for such products the farmers went back to traditional crops, mainly maize and sorghum, and the irrigation network quickly became silted and unusable. For this reason most of the formerly irrigated land has gradually become rain fed production areas. Without going into the complicated details of the banana industry, it is enough to mention that in mid 1997 the ACP-EU accord that allowed Somalia a quota of banana for the European Market was abolished and at the same time the tension between banana producers and Somal Fruit (an Italian company that was the main producer and exporter in Somalia) begun. The banana producers failed to establish a market in Middle-East countries and the

¹⁰ Quoted in Cefa SAASV Project Proposal

failure of the industry was the unavoidable consequence. As the banana industry provided work to 10,000 people involved in production, selection, transport and loading, at least 70,000 people were living out the industry.

The reduction of cash crop farming reduced the capacity of the farmers to ensure maintenance of the irrigation network that led to the blocking of some important canals. This has also affected the small-scale farmers who were receiving water from the main primary and secondary canals, and were required to maintain only the smaller tertiary canals by hand in the past.

Change of agricultural practices needs revision, backed with appropriate layout and design of the irrigation system.

One of the issues frequently emphasized by the farmers is related to the almost unpredictable market price of their agricultural products. They lament that market prices drop drastically when relief food arrives in neighbouring regions, and at times they barely manage to cover the expenses of the farming season. This was exemplified last season with a retail price of US\$ 4 per Quintal (100 kg) of maize as compared to US\$ 17 in 1999

The farmers realize the necessity of diversifying their produce, but often recede from their intentions mainly due to the following:

- Lack of knowledge on alternative production;
- Lack of processing facilities;
- Lack of financial means;
- Lack of contacts with external trading actors and intermediaries;
- Limited possibility for international marketing;
- Internal instability and insecurity.

The SHARP projects, then, seek to make an impact on the food security of the communities in the Shabelle Valley and to create surpluses to improve food security in other parts of central and southern Somalia. For this intent, the process is appropriate, but it would create greater and more sustainable impact through larger investments over longer periods of time.

3.3 The Project Design

The overall Programme Objective is:

“The standard of livelihood improved in rural areas in a sustainable manner”.¹¹

The programme purpose is defined as:

“Food Security at household level strengthened through enhanced agricultural practices and the maintenance of improved infrastructure”.

Each of the individual projects has developed indicators with respect to the project purpose. Most of these indicators are more appropriate at the results level and none has developed indicators related to “improved food security at the household level”. Neither have the baseline studies gathered data with respect to a definitive project purpose indicator that relates to household food security/livelihoods improvement.

¹¹ See ToR.

Food security is only part of the wider concern of livelihoods improvement, and to develop an effective indicator for these is not a simple task. Nevertheless, it is suggested that an attempt to develop such an indicator, based on the collective experience of SHARP partners, that is used across all the Sharp projects is carried out as soon as possible. This could be defined as “measuring changes in household assets” and should be based on trends rather than point indicators.

Household economy can be described as a combination of satisfying minimum food needs and other essential expenditures, as well as the creation of assets that can be held in reserve to overcome gaps in the means to satisfy immediate needs (savings). By measuring the relationship of an agreed “basket of non food essential expenditures” such as tea, sugar, salt, school fees, health expenditures, watches, radios bicycles or changing levels of debt for irrigation inputs against the level of agreed minimum reserve assets such as accumulation of small stock, it is possible to develop a trend line from the baseline data through the project period and to measure individual points against that trend line. Without the development of such agreed indicators there is no way at present to measure whether the project is meeting its purpose or contributing to an overall goal.

Project Design Strategy

There is a clear logic to the rehabilitation strategy, which is described below in highly simplified form as follows:

- Rehabilitation of the canals makes available more water for crop production;
- More water allows more families to produce more food more efficiently; but
- Families must produce more to pay for maintenance of the irrigation network in the future;
- Failure to produce more will lead to less water being available;
- Less water means less production and less production means less food, food security and loss of livelihoods.

In deciding to rehabilitate¹² it was necessary to determine whether to open the systems so as to allow adequate water availability to the (maximum) irrigable area for each system or to allow adequate water flow for current demand and current water management scenario. In designing for rehabilitation it was important to determine how much of the water requirement the system could currently meet and how much was available from the source (the river).

For the Shabelle Valley rehabilitation Cefa recommended **to design for current use and an adequate potential to allow for adequate expansion that will happen in the short term.**¹³

Limited design data from historical sources were obtained and it was deduced that:

- Design discharge was based on 1.0 to 2.5 l/s/ha;
- Bed slopes used range from 10mm/ km to 300 cm/ km (0.001% to 0.3%);
- Design canal depth varies between 0.5 m to 2.5m.

¹² “Rehabilitation” is defined as opening the irrigation canals to allow for adequate water flow.

¹³ Draft Shabelle Valley: Irrigation System Rehabilitation Design Manual, CEFA/ EU Somalia Unit.

Field measurements for partial rehabilitation include:

- Canal bed width,
- Canal top width,
- Canal depth, and
- Canal length.

As a rule of thumb, if bed depth and maximum water depth increase by 10%, 20% or 30%, the canal capacity (flow rate) will increase by 30%, 60% or 100% respectively.¹⁴

The main infrastructure rehabilitation of the project has focused on specific parts of the system, whilst the agriculture training and knowledge transfer work has focused on contact farmers. Community capacity and participation activities are new, but in some places highly effective.

¹⁴ Ibid

4. Efficiency¹⁵

4.1 Activities Analysis

Typology of SHARP Implementing Partners

So far each organisation has focused on the fundamental business of recruiting staff, setting up offices, negotiating with local authorities and communities and establishing activities. It is only now after 12-16 months that each partner can observe to some extent how the others do things.

CARE and ADRA are relatively large organisations that come from a strong humanitarian assistance background and have a history of engagement in a wide variety of sectors such as domestic water, health, education and who get involved in development where the situation demands and where they can attract the necessary funding. Their main donor is USAID, which itself has a strong humanitarian focus, and in Somalia has no orientation towards a transition to rehabilitation and development.

Concern also engages in humanitarian response but has a strong emphasis on development and in many places has generally managed to achieve a balance between the different policies and strategies needed to carry out both types of activity in the same organisation and in the same place. Concern has a wide public funding network and has a capacity to raise unrestricted funds. They also have a framework funding agreement with the Irish Government, which is flexible and allows emergency support when necessary – but otherwise development funding as a priority. Concern also has the mandate to decide on how to use these funds. For many organisations there is a major internal clash of culture between the development actors and the humanitarian response actors that is difficult to reconcile in one organisation. Concern appears to be able to do this effectively in Somalia. The organisation strategy of Concern is that the Country Representative, and the Head Office is in Mogadishu. The support staff in Nairobi reports to the Country Office.

Cefa has never been involved in humanitarian response. It has always been a development organisation specialised in the introduction and training of agriculture. It is a relatively small organisation but highly focused. Being an Italian agency it has a certain cultural edge in Somalia especially in Lower and Middle Shabelle. Quite a number of local people speak Italian (many of Cefa's expatriate staff are not Italian) and past history and cultural affinity make for good relations. They are a very decentralised organisation, so that the Country Director and the field staff have considerable operational freedom. Their Head Office in Bologna has to be involved in decisions about what projects will be started or ended, but the responsibility for fund raising is local and the management is decentralised to the projects, allowing for much more innovation and flexibility in implementing.

Cefa has been working in irrigated agricultural development in the Shabelle Valley for more than 10 years, so the current projects are derived from that experience.

It is these organisations that agreed to come together in the SHARP programme and are now working together.

¹⁵ The cost, speed and management efficiency with which inputs and activities were converted into results, and the quality of results achieved.

The activities analysis for each individual project is detailed in the individual project reports but an overall assessment of activities is given here.

Overall Strengths

- All four projects are established and operating. Generally each project is implementing according to their individual work plans.
- Recruiting appropriately qualified staff has been a problem for all but, nevertheless, staff members have been recruited and are in position. There continues to be a problem of staff turnover and key members of staff moving on to other projects. This may be because of the general situation in Somalia and the shortage of jobs for qualified staff, but it may also be related to job insecurity due to the short term, emergency nature of most projects and competition between agencies.
- Planned activities are largely underway. The major focus at the start up of each project has been to carry out baseline surveys and to carry out PRAs in communities/villages where project activities were to take place.
- Each partner agency has attempted to make an effective balance of using international staff and national staff partly because of budget management, partly because of the need to mix experienced staff and partly because of the need for language and local knowledge. This has been done well and the working relationships between national staff and expatriates appear to be effective.
- The recent history of international NGOs and local communities in Somalia is mixed with some agencies having obtained international funding to carry out activities and provide services that are needed but were rejected by the intended communities. There are clear lessons learned being used by the SHARP partners. Whatever the value of a project, however much funding is required, it is essential to start off on the right foot. The communities concerned must be aware of why an agency has come; they expect to be involved in the discussion about how a project will be implemented; an agency needs to engage through the right channels (usually the elders) in order to begin work and to establish good working relationships and support. Without all this, some organisations never get past the establishment stage. An important factor in this respect is to recruit suitable staff. In the case of all the SHARP projects, these hurdles have been overcome and good links with local leaders and communities have been established and are being maintained.
- Good relationships have also been created between the SHARP partners themselves. It needs to be recognised that INGOs and LNGOs can be aggressive in competing with each other. Competing for funds, for staff and for reputation. Each of the four SHARP partners has a different tradition and has different policies and different ways of doing things, so it is not easy, nor necessarily successful, for a programme like SHARP to become established and to function well. Normally, it takes a considerable effort on the part of donors (and host governments) to facilitate such organisations to come together and establish some kind of group identity. It is only when the individual managers and staff members start to make inter-personal links that any kind of operational collaboration can be established. In the case of SHARP, which is limited by the absence of good communications and the ability of staff from the different organisations to come together, this establishment phase has gone well and regular monthly meetings are held in Merka. This has been aided by the fact that CARE, Concern and Cefa all have offices in Merka and it has been more cost effective overall for meetings to be held there and for ADRA to travel. These monthly meetings have concentrated on the documented cross-organisational sharing, such as the sharing of technical manuals and their further

development. Training/familiarisation courses have been held where Cefa has introduced infrastructure issues, CARE has introduced the community Irrigation Users Manual to the other partners. Other issues, such as coordinated security monitoring and the meaning and use of “community contribution”, have been debated and have informed the operational activities of each organisation.

- The current arrangement of individual agencies designing and implementing their own projects but coordinating their activities and sharing information and knowledge is right for the present time, because it allows each agency to implement the way it knows without the need for too much compromise or constraint from being part of a collective alliance.

Overall Weaknesses

All the organisations use the terms “participation” and “participatory”. However, there are different interpretations among them of what the words mean.

Is SHARP about “delivering services to beneficiaries who need to be helped” or is it about “building partnerships with involved stakeholders in order that they can develop themselves” with support from partner agencies? This question has not been asked at the SHARP level, and it seems that these differences are not jointly recognised. If the implementing partners are to continue the alliance beyond the present phase, this question will need to be resolved because it addresses the culture and policies of the organisations themselves and inevitably involves senior staff in country and head offices. These differences, even now affect the way activities are implemented on the ground. Communities are generally quick to recognise different approaches and are adept at finding ways to manipulate them to their own advantage. Preferably, this question ought to be addressed and clarified before a new round of projects is negotiated and funded. The difference between the two approaches is that between an emergency-rehabilitation approach and a community-driven approach.

Cefa is a specialised agricultural development agency, and it has back-up from an organisation that can provide strong technical advice on issues such as the hydraulic infrastructure of irrigation systems. It also has been working with infrastructure rehabilitation for several years in the Shabelle Valley. This is, of course, recognised in the SHARP alliance, because Cefa was asked to provide backstopping support to the other agencies in this field. The other agencies are generalists and are new to the business of pumps and pipes, canals, gates and flood control. Cefa was supposed to provide “backstopping” but nowhere is it written down in the project proposals what backstopping means. The other agencies hired engineering staff according to their own understanding and Cefa has tried to provide advice for their activities but, basically, the level of communication and the lack of clarity of mandates and the absence of ToRs have made the task difficult to execute efficiently. It is not anyone’s fault, as such, but in reality it is difficult for four independent organisations working together for the first time to cope with an inter-agency situation and to get used to the idea. It should be noted that 11-16 months is not a long time for this process to gain strength given that there is no defined inter-agency structure in place.

Both Cefa and CARE were meant to provide “backstopping support” to other agencies, with respect to infrastructure rehabilitation and community irrigation methods.

Collectively, there has been a lack of clarity as to what this specifically meant, so these inter-agency roles have not been effectively carried out. It is a difficult task for an individual employed by one organisation to provide services to other organisations in different parts of

the country without clear terms of reference and without a specific budget. It would be necessary to establish these conditions if this role were to become more effective.

Varying Experiences with Infrastructure Rehabilitation

ADRA has not gone very far in infrastructure implementation, and it does not have a very complex workload. However, delays in detailed planning and gaining EC approval are largely due to inadequate engineering skills on their team. The Cefa engineer has provided advice to ADRA staff but backstopping does not mean doing the job for those being backstopped – it means providing technical advice to those who are doing the job. The key issue here is about understanding the quality of drawings and information needed to approve a design and being familiar with the process of developing tender documents.

CARE has national engineering staff and delegates all implementation to six LINGOs. They too have national engineers, but these engineers are not trained in the design and management of hydraulic structures. On issues related to physical construction they are well trained but they have no background training in hydraulic structures. Consequently, wherever these skills are needed, solutions are based on guesswork. This is true particularly with respect to flood control structures, the correct dimensions and setting of culverts and sluice gates. Concern had problems in managing the implementation of their structures (new canal construction and rehabilitation of sluice gates and culverts) but they have since recruited a qualified agricultural engineer and now their work is progressing well.

Cefa has a well-constituted engineering team that is well qualified to cope with the level of structures being implemented; however it should be noted that Cefa has learned from several years of involvement with such structures what level and composition of such a team is needed.

Both Cefa and Concern use quantity surveyors on their staff. However, these are more useful under the guidance of an experienced engineer.

Varying Experience in Agricultural Training and Knowledge Transfer

As with the infrastructure work, so it is with the agricultural training and knowledge transfer. Cefa over several years has learned what skills it needs and what team composition it needs in this field. The other three organisations are implementing these activities for the first time.

Over the period of four phases Cefa has managed to build up an effective team of local trainers and a good rapport with the farming community in Jowhar. Consequently, the quality of the training process of introducing new crops and improved cultivation methods is well done and the transfer of knowledge is effective. Two years ago the Cefa work focused on infrastructure and crop production and not on community organisation and institutional strengthening. In the current projects they have taken this aspect to the centre of everything they do.

ADRA and Concern, starting six months behind Cefa and CARE, are hardly out of the establishment phase, and so it is difficult at this stage to make significant comment – except to say that the activities they are pursuing are likely to lead to positive impacts.

ADRA's strength lies in the introduction of participatory methods, with which they are making significant progress. When it comes to crop improvement training, it is evident that the basic skills of their trainers are outdated and based on the T&V approach (which is not a

participatory method) that presumes that educated trainers know more than farmers and their job is to “teach” farmers that are not assumed to know a great deal. The participatory methods training is having an effect on their performance in terms of “how” to train but what is lacking is the technical aspects of “what” is to be taught. The basic approach is to start with the planting material that farmers know and concentrate on improved production methods, basically planting in rows rather than broadcast, testing different between row and within row spacing, use of composting, use of neem-based pesticides, etc. There is nothing wrong with this, but thought should be given to what happens next. They also focus on training women farmers on irrigated vegetable farming and also training in nutrition and good diet issues.

HIJRA (a CARE-supported LNGO in Afgoi area is cautiously introducing a savings and credit scheme through which members of the participating groups can borrow \$200 and use it in a way of their own choosing. Some of the women are investing in irrigated vegetable production.

The RT thinks these are valuable interventions. First, because they are addressing women’s needs; second because they are encouraging income diversification (some of the women are using their loans to buy donkey carts and to engage in transporting of manure and other goods for which there is a demand); third because they are directly addressing the issue of household food security (Programme Purpose) by training mothers in the elements of a balanced diet.

The main focus in the Concern area is increasing the availability of water for irrigation to encourage an increase in families farming in a more productive manner. Unfortunately, the RT were not able to make a second day field visit because of the heavy rain restricting movement. The RT did not have enough exposure to be able to make significant comment of progress so far.

CARE operates through building the capacity of local NGOs. The LNGOs in this case have had considerable support from CARE in the past and have had confidence enough to go into partnership with them in this project. It has taken considerable time to carry out training of the CARE team, training of the LNGO teams, and through them to establish training of community contact farmers. As with ADRA, the training approach is based on T&V.

A significant problem in the CARE project is that by involving six LNGOs in five districts (the plan involved six LNGOs) the project is too spread out, involving budget utilisation over too wide an area. The budget given to each of the six LNGOs is too limited to create significant visible impact. Both LNGOs and community leaders have said as much to the RT.

The LNGOs are oriented towards delivering services to communities. The main interest is in providing the infrastructure aspects of the project and it is this aspect that both LNGOs and communities regard as being too small. The agriculture technology and knowledge transfer work is delivered without much emphasis on follow-up in the form of training courses that are “delivered” rather than participatory in form. The trainers teach the farmers rather than discuss issues and jointly decide how to move forward. The number of trainers relative to the contact farmer group is limited, meaning the opportunity for effective follow up of contact farmers, and consequently the transfer of messages from them to others, means the assumption of knowledge transfer from contact farmers to other farmers may not be realistic.

4.2 Organisation and Management

Each organisation has its own structure, as described in the individual reports. Coordination structure is represented in the field by a monthly meeting between chosen representatives of each organisation and held normally in Merka. CARE, Concern and Cefa have offices in Merka. So it is more convenient, and probably more cost effective, to do it this way. The meetings operate on a rolling agenda and attendance depends on the topics being discussed, so that the most relevant person attends. At the Nairobi level, meetings are held on a 'needs basis' and involves also links to SACB meetings.

So far, all the meetings are focused on project implementation issues and those activities that are specifically related to cooperation between members, such as the development of an Irrigation Users Manual (IUM) developed by CARE and shared with the other organisations, an Irrigation Design Manual (IDM) provided and an associated irrigation training module related to the IDM (ITM) developed by Cefa. The IUM contains a Canal Committee Capacity Assessment Tool introduced by CARE. These have been received well by the partners and are being used, tested, and local adaptations are being developed. As specific activities are implemented case studies are being developed. For example the Canal Committee Training related to Kali Dere Canal rehabilitated by Cefa is being documented as a case study and will contribute to the improvement of the IDM/ ITM. Concern is using the IUM and is developing individual irrigation users training modules. So far, three have been developed and are being used.

Each organisation has rightly concentrated on establishing its own activities within the individual logframes to date and, in that respect, the level of coordination is adequate. However, there has been little time for coordinated discussion about the future needs of the rehabilitation of the Shabelle Valley as an inter-agency exercise. There is already some concern about the future availability of funding and the continuity of activity beyond the present projects.

5. Effectiveness¹⁶

5.1 Overall Effectiveness

The Programme Purpose is:

“Food Security at household level strengthened through enhanced agricultural practices and the maintenance of improved infrastructure”.

So far each organisation has successfully established itself and is pursuing implementation of activities as planned in the project designs. Some are well in control of the activities (the ones who started first) and others are just going beyond the start-up phase. The level of effectiveness in this regard varies. As described earlier, ADRA is newly involved in Beled Weyne, Concern is newly involved in agricultural rehabilitation but within the framework of a multi-sectoral medium-term programme. CARE is newly engaged through its network of LNGOs, and Cefa is carrying out medium-term and expanded interventions as a continuation of earlier work. With respect to Cefa’s work, there is a clear indication of a developing partnership with farmers in Jowhar, including the promotion of farmers associations for canal maintenance and for crop processing and marketing.

It is still too early to comment on the demonstrated effectiveness in the other projects, but this should be more evident by the Final Review six to eight months from now.

Issues discussed with farmers, canal committees and elders during the field mission, make it clear that the task of main canal rehabilitation is simply too big a task (in terms of organisational capacity and labour cost) for individual communities to undertake and investment in the main canal cleaning to be justified. There is evidence in the Jowhar area and in the Cessare Maria network that farmers are able to maintain smaller canals if there is a prospect of water being available through the main canals. One of the real problems, however, is that maintenance of main canals requires individual canal committees to come together in the form of larger Water Users Associations at a sub-network and network level. At the individual group level, each community demonstrates high levels of internal organisation and initiative in carrying out management tasks, but at higher levels the potential for cooperation is more high risk and difficult to achieve without some kind of overall body that has a system-wide mandate. In order to manage the networks, community’s capacity to maintain infrastructure will need initiation of a network management system. It is difficult to say where this body would emerge from at present. The larger scale banana farmers demonstrate clearly their capacity to manage canal maintenance to the extent that is of value to them. They also demonstrate their willingness to take water management decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of the poorer farmers. These wealthy farmers represent about 5-10% of the total farming population, and they have little regard for the rest – other than as a source of cheap labour.

This situation has serious implications for further sustainable investment:

- The maintenance of main canals cannot be sustained without a level of organisation and authority that does not exist.

¹⁶ An assessment of the contribution made by Results to achievement of the project Purpose, and how assumptions have affected project achievements.

- The social structure prevents the possibility of such organisation and authority being created without outside help.
- Without assured access to water, farmers cannot produce enough for their families to live and to provide for the maintenance to sustain the canals they depend on.
- The maintenance of canals also depends on a minimum critical mass of farmers able to maintain each sub-network and a higher grouping able to maintain the primary canals.
- If water is assured, then farmers can benefit from training in better farming technology and knowledge transfer but, without it, the new knowledge is not useful.
- If the water is there and farmers have better farming knowledge they cannot expand their production because they don't have the money to invest in inputs; in some cases they need money to pump water at critical times to bring a crop to harvest.
- If they manage to get the money to invest in production they are better off, because they have produced enough food for their families to eat; but if the price of crops in the market is depressed by the actions of others then there is no point in producing for the market unless they can produce something that the market wants such as good quality oil crops. If they can't sell surplus produce, they will reduce production to subsistence levels. If they do that they cannot individually and collectively raise enough income to pay for canal maintenance; the canals will deteriorate and they will no longer have access to water.

The projects being implemented are seeking to achieve the three results of:

- Community organisation and participation;
- Irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation;
- Agricultural training and knowledge transfer.

The technical aspects of irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation and agricultural training are well understood and appropriate to the area. There are issues that need to be discussed and agreed by the SHARP partners, but there is also a limit to how far a group of NGOs should go in the development of policy and strategic planning that is properly the work of a government authority. The involvement in community organisation is new to all the SHARP partners and is just beginning to take effect, but it would seem that, if all the technical infrastructure and agronomy efforts are to become effective, then there needs to be much more concentration on the issue of community organisation and participation.

Clearly, the work that has started to come together under the SHARP initiative is increasingly effective and is creating impact. But it is a journey that is only just begun. At this stage the outlines of a future direction is beginning to emerge. The solutions to individual issues are being identified and also the further problems that need to be analysed. Two years ago most of the work being done was rehabilitation and only some of it development. Today, although there is plenty of rehabilitation work still to be done, there is also an increasing amount of development work that needs to be placed in a development framework.

5.2 Institutional Issues

There are three levels at which organisations can relate in order to create impact beyond the level of individual effort. These are communication, cooperation and collaboration. The SHARP partners are functioning at the second level. At the field level there are regular meetings and these relate to issues defined in each logframe requiring specific ways in which the four partners share information, and cooperate with each other. If there is to be further progress towards the most effective (collaboration) level, it would require that a joint

situation analysis is carried out to reflect on the overall situation in the Shabelle Valley, that a joint problem and solution analysis is developed, and that a SHARP logframe is evolved. The SHARP logframe could then be translated into the individual project logframes in the context of a common strategy.

The present cooperation structure is adequate to facilitate sharing information and occasional joint training, but inadequate to implement a higher-level collaborative programme. It would require that SHARP has a facilitating structure that is able to encourage strategy development, forward planning and promote donor mobilisation beyond the efforts of individual partners.

With short-term projects, quite often too many activities are defined in too short a time, so that the staff available concentrate their energy on just meeting the implementation obligations of the logframe. They rarely have time to focus on strategy building and forward planning. Ultimately, when the money starts to run out and another call for proposals is on the horizon, a rush and intense flurry of activity goes into generating another proposal in order to meet the deadline. This is hardly beneficial for the long-term prospects of an important development initiative. The first casualty is that local partners are eliminated from the dialogue and one or two people claiming to have fully involved local communities hammer out a draft proposal. Eventually, when this process is complete and funds have been secured, the field staff and the communities are informed as to what the next phase looks like. All of this is hardly conducive to encouraging participation and a real sense of local ownership in future activities. To avoid this it is important to begin a process of participatory dialogue regarding future interventions well in advance of the need to submit a proposal. This process usually needs a period of some 18 months and in a 24-month project that means starting the planning phase six months into the start up of the current phase.

If there is a real commitment to participation and local ownership this process will be described and included as an activity in the logframe, and it will have an appropriate budget to match. It will be given equal priority with all other activities.

In the SHARP context there is another rather serious issue to be addressed. The EC Somalia Unit has rightly encouraged organisations to cooperate; this is a valuable and innovative approach. However these are transitional “rehabilitation to development” projects and require adequate time to become effective and to create sustainable impact. The forward planning process of the EC Somalia Unit takes place between Nairobi and Brussels and is independent of commitments made in the current round of funding. This means that the SHARP partners will have to submit proposals as individual projects and compete with other agencies that have nothing presently to do with the SHARP process. These proposals will be decided on by personnel in Brussels that are perhaps not clear about the potential of SHARP and will make decisions independently. There is a high risk here that some of the partner agencies will be eliminated from the process and the growing alliance and its effectiveness will be put at risk.¹⁷

There is an important need for the SHARP project to be regarded by the EC as an identifiable sub-programme within the EC Food Security Programme and for funds to be proportionally

¹⁷ EC Somalia Comment: Projects submitted through a call for proposals are technically appraised by EC Delegation staff (and not headquarters). Moreover, there is in principle a possibility for consortia to submit a proposal.

allocated to the sub-programme so that the momentum being created is not lost inside the wider framework.

5.3 How Assumptions are Affecting Project Achievements

Although there is an overall Project Goal and Purpose, there is no SHARP-level logframe – and, therefore, no Results, Indicators or Assumptions. Some of the SHARP-level activities are identified in the individual logframes and described as “backstopping”. These involve Cefa with respect to infrastructure rehabilitation, and CARE with respect to the IUM and institutional capacity assessment methodologies.

Nevertheless, important assumptions have been made in the individual logframes that affect the whole project and are repeated here because of their relevance.

Minimal security risk allowing regular access to the project sites (ADRA)

That there will be no mass displacement of the farming communities in the targeted area: (ADRA)

Local political socio-stability remain at acceptable levels (Cefa)

Security risk and instability due to the absence of an effective law and order system is a major risk, not just to individuals and external organisations but to the entire group of users – and to the purpose and goal of the SHARP project. It almost falls into the category of a “killer” assumption, meaning that the risk of it happening is so high that the project should not be undertaken. Even so, over the last few years NGOs have been operational and have been able to make considerable progress with the backing of a number of donors. The interesting thing is that the more these NGO projects continue, the more this assumption becomes less of a risk. The activities undertaken are increasingly influencing the security situation. The community organisation strengthening component in this current round is showing potential in directly influencing this assumption. This aspect of SHARP has considerable potential for further strengthening and requires the upgrading of staff and local leaders in the participatory development and management skills necessary to be successful. There is a sense amongst the projects staff that security and peace building is important, but it is somebody else’s job. The RT feels that peace building and conflict transformation is an essential part of the task of community organisational strengthening and should be brought into the logframes of individual projects and into a future SHARP logframe.

- **Partner NGOs, CARE and CEFA, provide the needed technical backstopping based on the project’s timeline (ADRA)**

Even within an alliance such as SHARP, it is risky for an individual organisation to put its operational capacity into the hands of others. This is proving the case in Beled Weyne. This promotes the idea of an umbrella SHARP technical capacity to provide support across all organisations at the effectiveness, impact and sustainability levels.

- **That there will be no unusual natural disaster (ADRA, Cefa)**

This assumption is probably thought of in terms of droughts and floods, but these are short term natural and man-made events (some floods are caused by the natural characteristics of the river; others are caused by the actions of human users). The real disaster is the continued and unseen destruction of the Shabelle catchment being brought about by deforestation, increased soil erosion leading to increased silt loads in the river system, increased need to desilt irrigation canal systems, and increased workloads and costs for farmers. This is both a

long term and unusual disaster that needs to be addressed. If it is not brought within the framework of SHARP and addressed, then the short term investments being made in infrastructure rehabilitation, including the future Lower Shabelle Agricultural rehabilitation and diversification will be wasted if this issue is not addressed.

- **International agencies do not bring in large amount of food from outside the region (CARE)**
- **Food is available in the local markets at affordable prices (CARE)**
- **Market conditions stable and not influenced by external factors (Cefa)**

The facts are that food (maize and rice) continues to be brought in from outside the region and that markets are not stable. In the absence of a government these continuing issues should be addressed by the SACB. International agencies obtain free food from international sources. There is no way that the small-scale farmers can compete with this. Ideally, humanitarian assistance organisations would obtain support to buy local food to strengthen the local economy, but as long as the overhead costs that keep these organisations operational are tied to the delivery of free food (free to the organisations concerned) it is unlikely that this most obvious contribution to Somali recovery will take place.

At a minimal level there is need to conduct a joint independent study on the impact of uncontrolled maize and rice imports on the household economy of farmers. It might also include a separate study on the impact of international livestock export bans from Somalia on household economy.

CARE has made a valuable suggestion to the EC that they would like to buy maize from local farmers in order to use it as food for work in food deficit areas. This might be a valuable step forward. The details below in Figures 5 and 6 are from CARE work in the area during 1999-2003 and show that local purchase would play a valuable role in improving food security given the quantities involved.

Free Food distribution			
Year	MT	Beneficiaries	Region
1999	5,921	39,477	Bay, Bakool, Gedo
2000	14,610	60,385	Gedo region
2001	11,154	46,101	Gedo region
2002	19,765	46,632	Gedo region
2003	14,074	25,000	Gedo region

Figure 5. Free Food Distribution

Food for Work			
Year	MT	Beneficiaries	Region
1999	7,445	114,544	Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Hiran
2000	4,708	72,434	Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Bay, Bakool
2001	7,532	70,000	Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Bay, Bakool
2002	6,663	44,759	Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Bay, Bakool
2003	6,200	33,480	Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Bay, Bakool, Gedo

Figure 6. Food for Work Distribution

6. Impact¹⁸

The SHARP project Overall Objective is:

“The standard of livelihood improved in rural areas in a sustainable manner”.

The effective establishment of a series of projects related to agriculture-based livelihoods improvement is in itself an important impact in the complex dynamics of the natural, user and geo-political systems in the Shabelle Valley.

Although peace is not restored and law and order is not fully practised, the SHARP projects are focusing the attention of ordinary people, elders and (in a peripheral way) on war lords as to how to improve household production and livelihoods.

It is clear from the activity analysis of the individual projects that in some cases access to water through rehabilitated canals is being achieved. With this encouragement and the support of training in improved farming techniques, attempts to diversify cropping strategies, the pilot testing of processing, rice, oil products and understanding better the dynamics of the markets is creating impact that could become sustainable in the future – given a wider focus on critical aspects that are presently not being addressed.

Much of this evidence is focused in Jowhar at the moment, simply because the Cefa projects are more established over a longer time period. However, it can be expected that similar progress can be achieved in the Concern and ADRA areas within a five-year time frame. With respect to the CARE project, again the project is too new on the ground to demonstrate real impact, and this cannot be expected without a continuity and development of activity over a five-year time horizon. What can be said now is that there is impact being created but this is at the level of the six LINGOs they are working through and at the contact farmer level. It is not demonstrable at the farmer level yet. At the present scale of coverage – six districts – there is unlikely to be impact created unless the volume of investment is increased to a level of €100,000-€150,000 per year per district. Alternatively, with present levels of funding, the number of districts should be reduced to two.

Details of these comments are elaborated in the individual project reports.

¹⁸ The effect of the project on its wider environment, and its contribution to the wider sectoral objectives summarised in the project's Overall Objectives.

7. Sustainability and Replicability¹⁹

Ecological Aspects

The development of a coordinated alliance of compatible work with respect to rehabilitation infrastructure, improved agricultural technology and an increasing focus on inter-community institutional strengthening is very positive and indicates a clear direction for future livelihoods improvement and for sustainability. However, the present level of cooperation and scale of activities is insufficient to be able to address the basic environmental and institutional problems in the Shabelle Valley. These are many, but to mention the main ones:

- The continuing widespread destruction of tree and bush cover, loss of grass cover and increasing soil erosion (and soil fertility) in the catchment are undermining the long-term viability of sustainable livelihoods.
- Localised attempts to cope with flooding within the existing irrigation schemes will only develop pressure on other weak points and create flooding in other parts of the system. These issues need to be addressed at a sub-catchment level and could form part of the work of the FAO Land and Water Projects mandate to identify and design mitigation measures.
- Failure to address the issues of catchment destruction and effective flood protection, as well as effective control of the irrigation water flows with respect to the river and the main canals, will mean continuing siltation in the newly desilted canals and additional workloads for the farmer groups working within the irrigation network. In a relatively short period (3-4 years) the investments made by the SHARP partners, and those designed to be made under the proposed Lower Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation and Diversification Project, will be rendered ineffective, and any future programme will need to overcome the same issues in order to make sustainable change.

Socio-Cultural Aspects

The focus of all the projects is on farmers who are irrigating crops. However, the catchment of the Shabelle includes pastoral herders, some of whom practice agro-pastoral activities (some of the herders are farmers and some of the farmers are herders). They also use the riverine resources seasonally and need access to water and to fodder during the dry season and especially during droughts. Ultimately, all the violent conflict in the Shabelle is related to access, use and ownership of natural resources and cannot be resolved unless all the stakeholders come together and work out a way of using these in a fair and sustainable manner.

The Shabelle River, which crosses Hiran, Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions, is the main source of water for irrigation. Despite the importance of irrigation practice, the performance of the system is very low due to poor management practices and the constraints met by farmers in generating sufficient income to maintain the infrastructure.

- Irrigation system rehabilitation in Hiran, Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions needs to be viewed from two different perspectives: small-scale farmers and large-scale farmers.²⁰

¹⁹ The likelihood of a continuation in the stream of benefits produced by the project, particularly continuation of the project's activities and achievement of results, and with particular reference to development factors of policy support, economic and financial factors, socio-cultural aspects, gender, appropriateness of technology, ecological aspects, and institutional capacity.

²⁰ Cefa Project Proposal/ Financing Agreement.

In Middle Shabelle there are traditional small-scale schemes. The only large sugar cane state farm in Jowhar was totally destroyed, and the 10,000 ha cotton farm in Balad was subdivided in 1993 into small-scale farms. The subdivision process was done by the community and Local Authorities and agreed upon by all parties concerned.

In Middle Shabelle, machinery for canal rehabilitation does not belong to the farmers, and the small number available results in a high rental rate. Irrigation by gravity is possible only during the period of maximum level in the river (according to the Draft Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation Manual, p 31, Cefa. Water only flowed into the Kalidere Canal for two months between January and August 2002) and more often use of water-pumps is required.

In Lower Shabelle there are many medium and large private schemes mainly for production of bananas, with quite a large amount of machinery such as bulldozers and excavators that can be rented at a very reasonable rate. In some cases beneficiaries along the main canals include owners of the machinery who are often interested in resuming irrigation in their farms and are willing to provide a substantial contribution in terms of work sharing.

In other cases the beneficiaries are small-scale farmers who can only contribute with manpower and, therefore, different methodologies have to be adopted according to the different situations.

In the course of recent years many canals have been rehabilitated by various international organizations, but often not maintained by the farmers when co-financing is over. Although the EC implementing partners adopt the same policy, requiring community contribution and participation, there is still room for improvement, whereby coordination with all other stakeholders could be strengthened – ensuring that the community awareness and capacity building is effective and steered towards the same objectives.

Economic and Financial Matters

The RT believes that it is possible to achieve levels of production that are sustainable and that allow for families to produce enough to pay for sustainable irrigation network maintenance (assuming an effective management system and an improving marketing situation).

During the field visit, the RT asked groups of farmers and elders some basic questions about household economies. We found there are basically three types of irrigation farming situations.

Type 1

In Beled Weyne the farmers use a variety of petrol/ diesel driven pumps²¹ from which they draw water directly out of the river. They grow maize, sorghum and sesame, but production is limited. They are able to command about 3 ha of land per family and take water almost 1 km away from the river. Their canals are relatively small, but there may be a shortage of labour – so maintenance is a problem. Land preparation is done by hand.

²¹ These vary from single cylinder Honda type petrol pumps that deliver 15 l/s that can cover up to 1.5 ha; to single /double cylinder diesel pumps (Kerlosker) delivering 38-70 l/s covering up to 16 ha; and six cylinder Lambordini pumps delivering 138 l/s and covering up to 16 ha.

Type 2

In Jowhar and Afgoi, farmers' access water from a main canal directly off the river. When the river flow is high, the water flows into the canal by gravity. When it drops, they pump water into the canal through hired pumps. The farmers wait for the rain to start a growing season in order not to overload the soil with rainwater and irrigation water. When farmers can afford it (\$ 7/hr) they pay for tractor hours to cultivate the land; otherwise they use hand cultivation methods.

Type 3

Below the Janaalle barrage in Lower Shabelle farmers either can't get water at all or they get it with difficulty because of the poor status of the system. In the case of the Cessare Maria canal that has been recently rehabilitated this situation has been largely overcome. When they can access water it comes by gravity, but is subject to variability depending on the river level, irregular barrage control, irregular sluice gate control and high levels of silt. These farmers also use tractor hire when they can afford it, but the high cost involved means that land preparation is less than optimal.

Each of these irrigation-farming types incurs different types of costs in order to produce different types of output. The small-scale farmer who only grows maize and sesame on 2-3 ha of land cannot produce enough to satisfy family needs and to contribute to maintaining the wider irrigation network. However, with the improved farming methods being introduced, it is being shown that it is possible to double yields of maize and therefore to produce the same amount on half the land area with half the investment costs to satisfy family food security needs. This would leave the rest of the land free to grow cash crops to increase incomes and provide for farm inputs – thus reducing the need to borrow.

For better off farmers (with more land) it allows the same possibility to satisfy household food security needs and to increase crop diversification so as to increase livelihood assets and reduce the exposure to negative market prices caused by the lack of control on markets and the activities of others. It also holds out the possibility of production surpluses that use the market as a means to make more food available to wider numbers of households in central and southern Somalia.

The RT believes, however, that it is necessary to carry out an in depth economic baseline study that would allow the development of specific indicators that can clearly show whether impact and sustainability issues at the household level are being met.

During the field visit the RT asked farmer/elder groups about their basic economic framework.

Sagaalad / Hijra; in Afgoi area (Type 2 Farmers)

It costs US\$ 7/ hour for tractor hire and it takes:

- 4 hour/ ha for disc harrowing,
- 2 h/ha for harrowing,
- 2 h/ha for furrowing.

Taken all together, it costs an average US\$ 320/ ha on inputs (for maize). Market prices at harvest are about US\$ 8/ (50kg) sack. (During the Deyr period they can get about US\$ 9/

sack.) So if they sold all their crop they could get $1.06 \times 8 = \text{US\$ } 848/\text{ha}$ under old production levels and $2.36 \text{ Q} \times 8 = \text{US\$ } 1,888/\text{ha}$ if the increased production levels are reached²².

A medium sized family farms an average 2-5 ha and needs 1 sack/month to maintain the family or 20 sacks per year, including sales, to buy other family needs. The problem is that the average family does not have the cash to provide the inputs for full production and operates according to the level of inputs they can obtain. Often they borrow to get the inputs so that when they get a harvest they have to pay back what they owe. This means they have to sell at times when the market price is low. They also work for the large commercial farmers that pay them US\$ 0.2/ hour or US\$ 0.6/ hour during the rainy season when labour is scarce. If a family has 3 ha under maize they can produce (in a good year) 24 sacks per year, which is above their basic need.

A major problem mentioned was the impact on the market of dumping. WFP regularly releases food aid prior to harvest time and those who supposedly need the food sell it on the market, thus depressing prices. This was mentioned in all areas. The free gifts from Libya to the TNG of maize and rice also bring uncontrolled imports onto the market, undermining local prices.

Discussion with elders in Saredo area (Type 3 farmers)

The average family has 11 people and farms 1.5-2 ha of land. The average crop yield is 10 Quintals/ha (20 sacks of 50 kg). The demonstration package showed this can be raised to 20 Quintals (40 sacks). All families are operating below the Janaale Barrage and use gravity irrigation (and pumps when the water is low).

One family needs 36 Quintals per year to cover food needs and to cover other expenses. In the opinion of the elders, present production is not enough to satisfy family needs (20 sacks is less than the critical 36, but 40 sacks is above). It would be possible to increase land area per family and to extend water distribution. However, they do not have capital for land preparation,

The group was asked whether the training, improved culverts and increased yields, had helped them. The answer was No (this from a contact farmer with increased yields). Yields have been increased, but market prices have fallen. Before, with a yield of 10 Q/ ha they got \$ 7/ Q. Now with 20 Q/ ha they get \$ 3-4/ Q. ($10 \times 7 = \$ 70$; $20 \times 3 = \$ 60$; $20 \times 4 = \$ 80$)

They are growing sweet potatoes, vegetables, cowpeas, groundnuts and fruit trees. It was suggested they could grow all vegetables as high value crops and buy low cost maize in the market. Uniformly, everyone said No, because they cannot take the risk of having no maize to feed their families.

These discussions cannot be taken as representative but a more widespread analysis could be made that might be more representative.

It is understood that the FAO Land and Water Project is intending to do a widespread anthropological study in the Shabelle sub-catchment. It may be possible for them to support a similar household economy study that establishes the baseline conditions for the different farming typologies.

²² To date the farmers have not achieved these rates. The farmer who rents the demo plot has seen such yields, but other farmers have not attempted to replicate these yet.

Access to credit for inputs

Generally small-scale farmers make enough from their production to feed their families; enough to pay for other things such as sugar and tea, clothes and school fees – but not enough to create savings. For very many they have to borrow at the beginning of the season to pay for inputs; then at harvest they have to sell to pay off debts, as well as borrow to obtain the inputs needed to plant the next crop. They say that the government used to provide that credit but now there is nothing. This is a serious constraint, but getting into farming credit is complex. Some of the NGOs – ADRA and HIJRA - are introducing credit at a limited level. Concern is trying to work with credit in kind through providing tractor hours repayable in grain after harvest. It would be valuable to explore what is working, what is not working, and whether anything could be done to address these constraints.

Undermining of Market Prices

There is a considerable amount of grain (maize and rice) coming into the country through WFP, USAID, commercial imports and gifts in kind to the TNG from countries such as Libya. The main complaint from the farmers is that WFP provides food during harvest time. The food insecure people give food to sell it on the market because they do not need so much food. This depresses the market. The government dumps food on the market in order to raise revenue to run the government. In any case, the losers are the farmers.

Gender Aspects

Somali Society is very specific in terms of gender roles and attempts to change this rapidly can only contribute to strained relationships. This will remain so for a long time to come. As far as the projects of SHARP are concerned, attempts to influence gender relations can only expect to operate at the level of NGO staffing policy, specific activities designed for women along the ADRA lines, and by involving women in training activities. In this respect ADRA, CARE and Concern all have a policy of engagement with issues related to gender equity in staffing and special activities involving women. Cefa has no gender policy as such, but is making significant attempts to involve women in training at field level and in providing support to women for example the Banaany Women's Group maize mill. There are no senior female staff in the Cefa structure in Shabelle Valley projects; however there is now a female expatriate Capacity Building Officer in Cefa Somaliland.

A significant way to promote gender equity is to use gender disaggregated data with respect to baseline studies and reporting on training activities, as well as to carry out a specific gender analysis studies.

Policy Support and Institutional Strengthening

The important issue here is that there is no policy support, neither from the non-existent Somali government nor from the SACB. The continuing failure to prevent the random anarchy of the warlords and to make progress in the promotion of peace, stability and the formation of a new and effective government, is preventing any progress along these lines. Finally, none of the above issues can be planned for or dealt with effectively without the growth of an effective geo-political framework in the sub-catchment through which the elders and the warlords in the respective three regions are able to agree on a way to live together; to provide effective security and law and order structures; to develop a sub-catchment wide policy framework for catchment rehabilitation and management, including a flood control strategy. Consequently, the fledgling initiative to engage in inter-community dialogue and institution building (Canal Committees, Water Users/ Farmers Associations) and introducing

planning and negotiating skills needs to be expanded to a higher level, being the most important feature of the SHARP projects with respect to the technical infrastructure and agriculture elements.

8. Lessons Learned from SHARP

It should be remembered that SHARP is still relatively new on the ground, but it brings together partners with a wide range of past experiences.

1. The balance between the three themes is changing: infrastructure rehabilitation; agricultural training and knowledge transfer; and community organisation and participation.
2. Whilst there is need to continue with the technical aspects of agricultural training and infrastructure rehabilitation, the impact over a short period of time of shifting towards a community-driven approach to development is significant. Increased focus on this approach is likely to lead to further significant impacts and to improvement of the chances of sustainability of all projects.
3. Learning, both of communities and families and organisations takes time. The SHARP partners include three organisations that are establishing themselves in the development aspects of food security development. The present Cefa project is the result of 10 years of learning that is very evident in its current project status.
4. There is some evidence that community organisations are able to maintain canal systems, largely by themselves when they operate within a sub-network big enough to create and sustain momentum for improved production and maintenance.
5. It is evident that it is not difficult to double yields in maize production by using simple improvements in cultivation practices together with improved cultivars.
6. There is evidence that farmers are willing to diversify into cash crops where their subsistence production is assured (growing higher yields of maize on smaller areas) and where there is a demand for those cash crops. The results so far from the introduction of oil crops are promising.
7. The efforts made to rebuild government in Somalia from the top down are unlikely to succeed, and it would be better to use the community organisation and participation approach to strengthen traditional institutions with new skills and structures from the village to the district to the region – using the process oriented tools being used in SHARP. Such approaches can only succeed through building close working relationships on the ground and cannot work by using remote control approaches from Nairobi.

9. Conclusions and Recommendations

9.1 Overall Outcomes to Date

The individual agencies of SHARP are making a good progress with respect to their activities and towards the planned results.

Good progress is being made in understanding the complex interactions taking place between the physical infrastructure network and establishing priorities for rehabilitation needs that unlock the energies of the communities that live within the sub network command areas. Sustainable methodologies are being evolved that are able to improve the efficiency of opening up new areas that generate improved increases in agricultural productivity, whilst increasing the chances of future infrastructure maintenance from increased family incomes. Likewise, participatory agricultural training methods are being evolved that are sensitive to both socio-cultural needs and the development of a gender-balanced approach.

These improvements are being driven by i) an increased sense of developing engineering standards, ii) wider experience of the peculiarities of farming practices, but most of all iii) the more widespread engagement in community organisation and participation methods. The project needs to maintain the gains made in the engineering and agricultural training aspects whilst considerably strengthening the community organisation and participation in the remainder of the project and in planning future interventions, because this is the key to long-term sustainable impact.

Details of the progress made at individual project level are given in the individual project reports.

At the SHARP interagency level, a good start has been made by each project and there is increasingly effective information exchange related to activities. Each of the projects rightly focused on establishing offices, recruiting staff and building working relations with local leaders and communities during the establishment phase.

Each SHARP organisation is aware that all the communities they are working with have a particular view as to what an NGO is and what it does. They see NGOs (local and international) as well as UN agencies, as being deliverers of goods and services. To the extent that the goods are useful they are grateful beneficiaries. If the goods and services are not perceived as useful they are seen as unhelpful and are not particularly welcome. Changing these attitudes is a major task of SHARP, and efforts are being made to address this. However, there are different policies and practices existing between the different organisations that have the potential for them to be divided especially in Lower Shabelle where there is a greater overlap of agency activity. There are even misconceptions by SHARP members concerning the way other members are working that have not been properly discussed and clarified yet. These differences should be identified and resolved through one of the regular SHARP monthly meetings.

Strengths of SHARP

The SHARP partners are members of a loose alliance brought together by common funding from the EC Somalia Unit Food Security Programme. The main thing that holds them together right now is the EC funding and the inter-project obligation to provide information

to each other. However, there are signs of the beginnings of a dynamic working relationship that goes beyond the base requirements of the Financing Agreements. The individual staff members are learning to trust one another and to work across the individual organisational boundaries, to share information and to seek guidance from each other.

Weaknesses of SHARP

It probably would have been unrealistic to expect that the individual partners would spend much time on forward planning, as they have all focused on getting activities underway and on the detailed issues of training, infrastructure rehabilitation. However, now that this is all going well, it is already time to begin a process of reflection and the development of strategies for the way forward.

During the field visits a SWOT analysis was carried out by each organisation with respect to SHARP as a whole. The detailed analysis is shown in Annex D, but a summary version is shown below in Figure 5.

Infrastructure rehabilitation/ agriculture training and knowledge transfer

With respect to the backstopping work there is a lack of clarity with respect to the role of “backstopping”. There is very clearly a need for engineering backstopping for ADRA, CARE (and its LNGOs). Concern has adequate technical engineering skills. However, technical backstopping means that the individual organisation has sufficiently qualified engineering skills within its own staff that are able to understand the advice being given by more experienced engineers. It does not mean that those doing the backstopping come and do the job; it means they come and review and advise those being backstopped in order to maintain adequate standards of design, tender document preparation, bid analysis and selection and works implementation supervision. In this regard both ADRA and CARE need to review their present staffing structure with the intention of improving the skill levels in hydraulic structure design capability. With respect to agriculture training and knowledge transfer, there is considerable learning potential in bringing together the different organisations’ staff to review their experiences in using the IUM, and the CC-CAT tools. These experiences would then need to be incorporated into the current IUM, particularly in the form of case studies.

With regard to improvements in productivity:

- In the Afgoi area a medium sized family farms an average 2-5 ha and needs 1 sack of maize/month to maintain the family or 20 sacks per year including sales to buy other family needs. If a family has 3 ha under maize they can produce (in a good year) 24 sacks per year, which is above their basic need. In a bad year they might produce half of this amount.
- In the Kurtunwarey area, one family needs 36 sacks per year to cover food needs and to cover other expenses. Using traditional methods they grow on average 20 sacks per family per year, but using the newly introduced methods they can get 40 sacks per year. But in the opinion of the elders this production is not enough to satisfy family needs (20 sacks is less than the critical 36 but 40 sacks is above) because, although the yields are double the market price over the year halved.

It is doubtful whether the current arrangement of staff from one organisation backstopping those in the others could really be effective under local circumstances. The logistics and time involved makes this very difficult. There is certainly a need for such support but a Technical Support Unit might be better to provide this than the regular staff of individual projects.

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning at catchment level • Enables a broader perspective • Stronger potential for bargaining power/donors • Unified approach i.e. cost sharing, training process, tendering (price information) • Share information/ideas • Share skills • Freedom to act individually as organizations • Empowers INGOs and Local NGOs • Increased training of communities in participatory methods • Facilitating group dynamics and team work • Sharing information manuals • Coordination meetings held in Merka, 2 in Nairobi • New methodologies (CC-CAT) • Ability to negotiate with Local Authorities enhanced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No defined structures (needs to be defined) • Need for definition of meaning of community contribution • Large area of coverage • Inadequate resources for task • Short time frame • Needs time to increase local management capacities • Not enough time to prepare canal committees • Poor planning at project start • Difficulties with providing backstopping • Lack of harmony in principles and practice operation • Capacity building of staff not a major priority.
Opportunities	Threats/ Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Catchment level planning • Coordinated bidding for funds • Possibility of a consortium • Other agencies could become members • Develop forward planning • Possibilities for research, advocacy and technical assistance • Should expand to cover rain fed areas • Can capitalise on good will among the partners • Reactivating the skills and responsibilities of the communities and national staff • To build links between different communities • To reduce conflict, improve security • To engage with Local Authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk of small organisations being “swallowed” by big ones • Marketing constraints once production is increased • Continued instability • Lack of coordination policy • Projects logframe driven • Communities resistance to change • Donors reluctance to shift to 5 year project cycle

Figure 5. Summary of SWOT Exercises on SHARP

Overall Assessment of SHARP projects

An overall assessment of the individual projects is summarised below in Figure 6 and drawn from the individual project reports.

SHARP Partner	Community involvement in planning and implementation	Quality of infrastructure constructed	Community values the project	Contribution to food security	Quality and effectiveness of training	Gender considerations	Project cost efficiency	Impact and sustainability potential
ADRA	B	C	B	C	B	B	B	NA
CARE	B	B/C	B	C	C	B	C	C
Concern	B	B	B	NA	NA	B	B	NA
Cefa (Jow)	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B
Cefa (LSR)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Figure 6. Overall Assessment of SHARP projects

Comments on Overall Assessments

ADRA

ADRA is just at the end of the project establishment phase. They have a problem with having adequate engineering skills in their team, and this is unbalancing their capacity to deliver practical outcomes that local people regard as tangible. It is therefore too early to make an assessment on the contribution to Food Security. Although the level of training is adequate, training alone will not improve food security. Similarly, it is not possible to assess impact and sustainability potential.

CARE

CARE is implementing under the serious difficulty of trying to cover too large a geographical area with the resources available. Because commitments have been made to the LINGOs and communities concerned, it is difficult to do anything about the situation within this phase. Basically this is a design fault that should be rectified in a future phase. This is naturally affecting performance, including the contribution to food security, quality and effectiveness of training and project cost efficiency. It is also affecting impact and sustainability potential.

Concern

Due to heavy rains and an emerging insecurity situation, the RT were unable to spend long enough in the Concern area to make an effective assessment, particularly on project contribution to food security, quality and effectiveness of training and impact and sustainability.

Cefa

The RT was able to visit the Jowhar area of Cefa work. The community involvement in planning and implementation is rated as A because the methods and approach being used are increasingly based on a community-driven approach. It should be remembered that Cefa have taken several years of continuing experience to evolve this approach and to build up their staff team skills to be able to use it. The RT was unable to visit the Cefa Lower Shabelle Area and so no assessment could be made.

9.2 Future Developments

The programme needs to function at a wider, sub-catchment level (Ethiopian border to Lower Shabelle), needs to be supported by medium term funding, and needs to attract other operational partners in order to generate sustainable impact.

In particular, the collective projects at present need to incorporate:

- An environmental component that analyses the current deteriorating catchment conditions and addresses the excessive siltation and a comprehensive solution to the flooding caused by both the siltation and by short-term local flood protection efforts. In this regard the SHARP partners would do well to analyse the data being gathered by the FAO Land and Water Project and to encourage this group to take a more active planning role in future activities.
- A broader livelihoods approach, that addresses the Millennium Development Goals especially primary education, clean water and sanitation and reduced child and maternal

mortality rates. In this respect the SHARP partners would do well to note the strategies of both Concern and ADRA.

- Addressing underlying conflict issues through expanded involvement in the community organisation and participation process

SHARP needs to operate on a medium- term horizon of five years and needs the support of a specialised Capacity Building and Support Unit that is independent of but related to the individual members.

A SHARP level workshop should be held involving other interested parties such as FAO Land and Water Project, FSAU, SCF (UK) and Cins to discuss Results-to-Purpose issues and review programme direction.

Through this workshop it should be possible to evolve a SHARP strategy. For instance, it is not necessary for each organisation to repeat crop trials in each area. Significant work has already been done, particularly by Cefa and SCF (UK), in order for a basic farming practices manual to be developed and adopted across the Shabelle Valley. These organisations could teach the others how to do it based on their experience. The field research activities do not need to be learned anew by each organisation but already known cultivars and cultivation practices could be replicated through the other projects.

“Diversification” doesn’t just mean new crops. It means “job diversification” as well, particularly involving processing and support services such as donkey carts being used to provide drinking water and manure distribution services, animal traction land preparation, marketing services and other business oriented services. In this regard, the role of savings and credit and income generating activities need to be explored more systematically.

It may not be necessary for every organisation to repeat the same type of activity geographically. It might be better for each organisation to focus on its comparative strengths with respect to those of the other organisations. For example, the developing expertise of Cefa in processing and marketing could be used at a sub-catchment level rather than limited to one or two districts.

Food security is only part of the wider concern of livelihoods improvement, and to develop an effective indicator for these is not a simple task. Nevertheless, it is suggested that an attempt to develop such an indicator that is used across all the Sharp projects is carried out as soon as possible.

The proposed EC project in LSR should be regarded as a sub-project of SHARP. It too cannot survive by itself for the same sustainability reasons that apply to the present projects and needs to be part of the SHARP framework in order to address the same higher level issues at impact and sustainability levels

The PACSU (Project Assistance, Capacity Building and Supervision Unit) of the proposed LSR project (Agricultural Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle) should itself have a sub-catchment wide mandate to address essential institution building, natural Resource management and market development issues.

Through the medium of the PACSU, its mandate could include technical support and coordination for the existing SHARP partners and other players such as FSAU, FAO flood

monitoring, future NRM Programme; specialists in education, health and water, pastoral production etc. as well as to encourage other donors to participate in other sectors of the programme. An important aspect of this unit should be that its main office and staff be based in the Shabelle Valley in order to strengthen planning and working relationships with local leaders and institutions.

There is need for the EC to rationalise what is happening on the ground. EC is supporting a Food Security programme at a rehabilitation stage, but SHARP projects are long-term development interventions that need increased levels of funding and long-term technical support, including a concerted effort to improve local governance structures and human resource development.

Recommendations for the Rest of the Project Period

Recommendation 1

An attempt should be made to develop common indicators that are used across all SHARP projects that measure longer-term changes in household assets and food security. Assistance with this should be sought from specialists in this area.

Recommendation 2

A regular monthly SHARP meeting could be extended for one day to carry out a thorough stakeholder analysis of all the important stakeholders in the project. This could be led by a staff member of one of the partner agencies and the outcome documented for use in the development of future projects.

Recommendation 3

Through a SHARP inter-agency meeting, there should be a clarification of the meaning of “backstopping” by Cefa and CARE and a functional terms of reference should be developed that includes the definition of which personnel (positions) in each organisation should be responsible for what, what tasks are considered backstopping, how much time should be devoted to each task, a specific budget developed to enable these tasks to be performed, and a modality that allows backstopping activity to be monitored and reported on in Cefa and CARE regular reporting.

Recommendation 4

A joint independent study on the effect of uncontrolled food imports should be designed and carried out. This perhaps ought to be funded and carried out by SACB.

Recommendation 5

A sub-catchment wide environmental audit could be designed and carried out with a view to contributing to the design of a future sub-catchment wide natural resource management project integrated into ongoing SHARP projects.

Recommendation 6

It is understood that the FAO, Land and Water Project is intending to do a widespread anthropological study in the Shabelle sub-catchment. It may be possible for them to support a related household economy study that establishes the baseline economic conditions for the different farming typologies identified in this report.

Recommendation 7

A process should be begun which uses the full potential of project cycle management and maximising the community-driven approach by involving key community leaders and elders in the process of project planning. To the extent feasible, problem analysis and basic project formulation should be done in Somalia with Somalis and not in Nairobi.

In order to support this process it would be valuable for SHARP partners to organise a training programme for their own staff on PCM methods including both field and Head Office staff. It is evident that although all the project proposals to EC were documented in a logframe format, many of the staff in all the organisations are not familiar with PCM as a development planning tool. The training course would have special focus on the horizontal logic of PCM – the role of monitoring and evaluation.

Recommendation 8

Future projects should incorporate both time allocation and budgeting for external evaluations.

Recommendation 9

A monthly meeting of SHARP could be extended by one day to review experiences on credit issues and to formulate a brief on approaches to credit. SHARP could invite a credit specialist either from member agencies or from a specialist agency to lead and participate in the day.

Recommendation 10

In order to assist the irrigation trainers and the Water Users Associations/Canal Committees to know the actual amount of water being abstracted from the river over time and also for them to appreciate the possible losses in the conveyance system due to different levels of management, there is need to explore the use of simple water measuring devices such as ruled gauges or Parshall measuring flumes at some sections of the canal. This would also facilitate better water sharing among the farmers.

Recommendation 11

The End-of-Term Review of the current projects should be a Results-to-Purpose Review and should concentrate on social and economic impact being created amongst households both directly and indirectly affected by the project. Two external consultants specialised in social and economic impact analysis should lead the Review. Each organisation should provide one staff member with a range of skills such as infrastructure, crop production, gender equity and income generation as full members of the team covering all project areas.

Recommendations for Future Interventions beyond these Projects**Recommendation 12**

A “Results-to-Purpose” Review Workshop should be held in order to map out a basic strategy for future SHARP development. This should be led by an independent facilitator and documented as a basis of future project designs.

Recommendation 13

There is potential for the development of a project (related to SHARP) that focuses on the training of Somali agricultural engineers including training in participatory, community based approaches to irrigated agriculture extension; updated knowledge of irrigated farming

practices; the design and management of hydraulic structures; training of Water Users Associations in institutional development and in conflict management skills.

This project could evolve into diploma level courses, perhaps in collaboration with a recognised University in the Horn of Africa and train technicians from anywhere in Somalia. Other NGOs could support this project by including budget lines in future projects to fund local technicians to do the course.

Recommendation 14


There is urgent need to develop a sub-catchment wide Natural Resource Management Project based on the results of an environmental audit of the sub catchment. The most obvious way to develop this is to expand the work of the FAO Land and Water Project to include both the environmental audit and the design of the NRM project. This would inform expanded environmental activities in the design of new projects of the individual SHARP partners.

Recommendation 15

The design of future projects should significantly increase the focus on community organisation and participation strengthening by increasing the skills of project staff, community leaders and local authorities in these processes.

Recommendation 16

The PASCU of the proposed EC funded Agriculture Development and Diversification in Lower Shabelle Project should have a mandate to cover the Shabelle sub-catchment, not just the two districts in Lower Shabelle, in order to support the technical and capacity aspects of NGOs working under SHARP. The proposed project should be a part of and play a leading role in supporting SHARP as a whole. An important role of the unit would be to promote higher-level community driven management institutions that are able to sustain agricultural productivity in the Shabelle Valley as illustrated below.



Activities would include good governance, conflict transformation, human rights and institutional development support.

Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference for Evaluation of Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme

Deleted: HARP Project

A. Introduction

Somalia has been structurally food insecure for the past 20 years – a situation that has been aggravated by the civil war and continuing civil unrest and natural disasters. Today, food insecurity is largely a result of widespread poverty and absence of a political and economical enabling environment. National food availability in Somalia is not assured: in 2003, the gap between the cereal production of 379 384 MT and the estimated demand of 600,000 mt has been partly filled by commercial imports and, to a limited extent, by food aid (about 13 500 MT since the beginning of the war). Access to food at household level remains the major problem for Somalia’s most vulnerable groups because of their low purchasing power and already weakened coping mechanisms. Internally Displaced People, returnees, rural minorities, urban poor and poor pastoralists are the most affected and vulnerable to external shocks. Levels of malnutrition vary in Somalia on a seasonal basis and between different areas and population groups. Nevertheless, while global acute malnutrition rates have reached 30% during times of food insecurity in recent years, rates during times of relative food security have remained between 12% and 15%.

To address the above, the EC is funding a food security programme. The Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme (SHARP) is part of this larger programme.

The evaluation will concentrate on the SHARP, which is being implemented by a group of four International NGOs: ADRA, Concern Worldwide, CEFA and CARE in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions of Southern Somalia.

Deleted: is is an

Deleted: of the EC funded food security improvement programme, popularly called

Deleted: Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (SHARP).

Deleted: an umbrella

Deleted: and participation

Both CARE and CEFA were assigned a backstopping responsibility of supporting all four partner INGOs on community organisation and irrigation management (CARE) and technical infrastructure rehabilitation design (CEFA).

There are three main parts to the project:

- Community organisation and participation
- Infrastructure rehabilitation
- Agricultural training and knowledge transfer

Deleted: extension

Deleted: <#>¶

Deleted: an overall impression of the effects of the project

The evaluation should provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the programme so far, identifying successes and weaknesses in the context of the Somali working environment and come up with recommendations on the way forward, both for the remainder of the programme as well as for a possible additional phase. The evaluation must take into consideration that two INGOs (Concern and ADRA) are closer to a mid-term review whilst the other two INGOs (CEFA and CARE) are nearer to a final evaluation.

Deleted: project

Deleted:

Deleted: partners

Deleted: against their log frames

Deleted: and

Deleted: project

Deleted: and document

Deleted:

Deleted: Somalia Unit

It should look at the achievements of the individual projects towards their results and purpose using indicators stated in the logframes as well as the achievements of the overall programme and draw lessons learned and recommendations. The evaluation will hence provide the INGOs implementing SHARP and the EC delegation with sufficient information

as to the achievements of the individual projects and the overall programme and provide lessons learned and recommendations for future project design.

B. Programme background

Four INGOs (ADRA, CARE, CEFA and Concern Worldwide) jointly bid for a call for proposal EuropAid/111402/g/Multi: NGO Food Security Programme 2000. This resulted in the programme now popularly known by its acronym, SHARP (Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project).

Each project has duration of two years. However, due to delays in the European Commission headquarters, the 4 contracts were not signed at the same time. CARE and CEFA starting date is 1st of March 2002 whereas ADRA and Concern effectively started 1st of June 2002. As a result, the partners' projects are at various stages of implementation and their respective completion dates differ.

The overall programme objective (valid for all agencies) is defined as "The Standard of livelihood improved in rural areas in a sustainable manner", while the programme purpose is defined as "Food Security at household level strengthened through enhanced agricultural practices and the maintenance of improved infrastructure"

The Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme (SHARP) is a community-based intervention aimed at improving the food security of vulnerable households and communities in the middle and lower Shabelle regions of southern Somalia. To address the problem of food insecurity in the regions, SHARP concentrates its efforts on: Improving irrigated agriculture infrastructure (canal rehabilitation, construction and/or rehabilitation of culverts, barrages, sluice gates, bridges, installation of pumps, etc.); Strengthening the management of irrigation system operation and maintenance; promoting improved agricultural practices, improved seed varieties and diversifying crops and vegetables to increase production levels and coping mechanisms of farmers in a sustainable manner.

i. CARE

Title: Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project

Amount: €1 236 671 (+ €229,043 from CARE)

Starting date: 1/03/01

Project purpose: Increased agricultural production and marketing of produce at the local and household level through managing and maintaining rural roads, irrigation and promoting flood protection awareness and practices

Results:

1. Needs assessment survey and baseline update completed for project planning and community sensitisation.
2. Technical and financial assistance (including training) to facilitate rehabilitation and improvement in rural infrastructure delivered to partner agencies and local communities.
3. Agricultural training package developed in conjunction with partner agencies and implemented.
4. Pilot environmental protection training package designed and transmitted to partner agencies for dissemination and implementation.
5. Training of partner agencies in the tools and techniques necessary to implement and manage projects under the SHARP.

Coordination mechanisms established and technical backstopping provided to INGOs in the area of community associations and irrigation management.

CARE implements its activities in formal partnership agreements with six local NGOs (CCS in Sablale, AgroAction in Qorioley, SAREDO and Bani Adam in Merka, TARDO and Hijra in Awdheghele and Hijra in Afgoi and Awdheghele districts). The local NGO implements activities in partnership with local authorities, village elders, canal committees and women groups. CARE's role is to strengthen the local NGOs in needs assessments, planning, proposal preparation, implementation and monitoring of project activities.

CARE works in 45 communities spread across five districts in the Lower Shabelle region (Sablale, Qorioley, Merka, Awdheghele, and Afgoi districts).

CARE has a backstopping role for the 4 international NGOs in community associations and irrigation management.

ii. Concern Worldwide

Title: Enhancing the Capacity of Local Communities to Achieve Food Security and Self-Reliance, Kurtunwarei district, Lower Shabelle region, Southern Somalia

Amount: €699,728 (+ €126,372 Ireland Aid + €67,211 from CONCERN)

Starting date: 1st of June 2001

Purpose: Improved food security at household level through capacity building of community-based organisations".

Results:

Training and on-the-job support provided to improve the capacity of community based organisations to manage and maintain irrigation structures and flood control systems.

Technical and material support provided to community based organisations for rehabilitation of canals, canal gates, culverts, and approach roads and weak embankments

Concern Worldwide implements project activities through their staff in partnership with local community institutions such as canal committees, river embankment committees and village elders. Concern works in 12 villages in Kurtunwarey district, Lower Shabelle. The overall financial project budget for the 2 years is €893,311.

iii. CEFA

Title: Strengthening Agricultural Activities in the Shabelle Valley, Southern Somalia

Amount: €1 334 000 (+ €140 672 from CEFA + €148 109 community)

Starting date: 1/03/2001

Results

1. Project target interventions selected and co-operation with beneficiary communities ensured.
2. Training packages developed for rehabilitation and maintenance of irrigation network as well as backstopping or other targeted projects provided.
3. Irrigation infrastructures are rehabilitated and maintained by the communities.
4. Flood protection assessed and rehabilitation package developed in the target areas.
5. Training package for suitable and diverse crop production developed, tested and introduced to include processing and marketing.

CEFA is aiming at improving irrigated farming communities' livelihood in a sustainable manner and providing institutional development to canal committees and agricultural know-how to farmers.

Over the first year of the project period a lot of effort was put in ensuring that mechanisms were put in place that would guarantee sustainability of the project's rehabilitated irrigation systems – ensuring their continued regular maintenance and renewal of irrigation infrastructure by the farmers.

Participatory approaches mainly Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Participatory Irrigation Methods (PIM) were adopted as the vehicles to ensure that the farmers would fully identify with and own the process of irrigated agriculture infrastructure rehabilitation and its subsequent maintenance and operation. Farmer training, through farmer-managed demonstration plots, project managed trial plots and farm visits were adopted as the means through which agricultural know-how was imparted to the participating farming communities. The CEFA project is implemented in both Middle and Lower Shabelle.

This project is closely linked to another EC funded project implement by CEFA: "Crops Improvement and Diversification, Processing and Marketing in the Shabelle Valley Project – Contract No. LO-17641-96-13". The two projects complement each other, one with a focus on community mobilization and crop production activities and the other with a focus on irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation and farmer training. It was agreed to combine implementation after the conclusions and recommendations arising from the evaluation of previous phases of crops project implemented by CEFA.

CEFA is also the backstopping agency for technical infrastrure rehabilitation designs.

iv. ADRA

Title: Belet Weyne Food Security Project Belet Weyne district, Hiran region, Southern Somalia

Amount: €650 098 (+ €62,280 from ADRA + €10 000 local community contribution)

Starting date: 1/06/2001

Results

1. Irrigation infrastructure rehabilitated with community contribution and communities organised and trained to maintain them.
2. Farmer's needs-based training package for improved agricultural production designed, implemented and adapted.
3. Women's needs-based training package for women on household nutrition/health and home gardening designed, implemented and adapted.
4. Shabelle River monitoring system designed and implemented with active community involvement.

ADRA currently operates in 6 villages in Beletweyne in Middle Shabelle. It implements its projects directly in partnership with local communities through village committees, irrigation/canal committees, local authorities and village elders. ADRA has facilitated the formation of Agriculture committees and Health/Nutrition committees. ADRA has also included in its project design components of health and nutrition and monitoring of Shabelle River.

C. Objectives of the Evaluation

The project evaluations will in particular assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the interventions. The evaluation should, as far as possible considering the duration of each project to date, emphasize on impact and sustainability.

Deleted: B

The final reports will be used to improve project implementation where required and for future programme design.

D. Specific issues to be studied

In recognition of the project proposals and log frames, the evaluators will assess individual projects progress and achievements and will assess the impact of the programme as a whole. Utilising participatory methods as much as possible, special reference will be made to the following:

Deleted: The evaluation is a requirement of the EC Somalia Unit and its main purpose is to provide recommendations for application on future projects. The four NGO partners are at different stages in the progress of their programmes due to differing start dates and this needs to be taken into account by the evaluating team.¶

(a) Projects relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

The evaluators will:

- Conduct a review of the project, considering the appropriateness of the project purpose and the results in respect to the core problems identified in the project document; taking into account the physical and socio-economic environment in which the project operates.
- Assess the appropriateness and relevance of the method used by the 4 INGOs (direct implementation through project staff versus sub-granting to local NGOs), taking the individual INGOs mandate under the project into consideration.
- The quality of results and how activities were converted into results with reference of the verifiable indicators of the logical framework and considering previous phases.
- The efficiency of project implementation considering timing, targeting, technical solutions and community involvement.
- Assess appropriateness of technical solutions for irrigation system rehabilitation.
- Assess the appropriateness of irrigation water designs and pump sizes
- How stakeholders perceive and value the project.
- The quality of day-to-day management (management of the budget, of personnel, relations and coordination with local authorities and beneficiaries)
- The cost and value-for-money
- Assess the effectiveness of backstopping support provided by CARE in community organisation and irrigation management and CEFA in infrastructure technical design to other SHARP partners and provide recommendations to strengthen the roles and support
- The quality of monitoring
- Appropriateness of indicators to measure the achievement of project purpose

Deleted: Objectives for the evaluation include:¶

(b) Project impact and sustainability

The evaluator will:

- Describe the sustainable result for the beneficiaries of the projects' activities especially in canal committee's management and infrastructure rehabilitation.
- Assess the economic impact of the projects on household incomes and poverty reduction
- Analyse the project approach to gender and its impact on gender related issues.
- Assess the possible impact on environment
- Describe the ownership of objectives and achievements by stakeholders
- Analyse if the projects made necessary adjustments in their project design and logical framework after identification of communities' needs in a participatory manner.

- Describe the level of community participation in planning, decision-making and implementation of project activities.
- Analyse the capacity building component of the project including appropriateness of training methods and suitability of messages and curriculum. Identify whether farmers and canal committees adopt training messages.
- Describe the degree of community involvement during planning, implementation and monitoring in the different approaches.
- Assess the community and farmers' contribution and processes used by INGOs to ensure it.
- Check the adequacy of project budget for its purpose.
- Document the best practices and lessons learned by the different projects.
- Assess the mechanism of inter-agency collaboration at the Nairobi and field level and its adequacy.
- Review the roles of EC and how have they supported the processes.
- Review the adequacy of the institutional arrangement for interagency collaboration in the project documents of all partner agencies.

E. Methodology

1. Briefing by EC and implementing agencies in Nairobi
2. Review of reference documents

Each of the 4 NGOs should provide the following sets of documents in Nairobi for the start of the evaluation.

- Regulations, project financing agreements, evaluation guidelines
- Project document
- Latest copy of project log frame.
- Baseline reports
- Quarterly and annual progress reports.
- Financial reports.
- Capacity assessment tools developed by agencies e.g. CARE- 'NGO Capacity Assessment Tool' and 'Canal Committee Capacity Assessment Tool'
- Community Management of Irrigation Systems; manual prepared by CARE.
- Irrigation Design Manual prepared by CEFA Somalia
- Irrigation Design Training Module prepared by CEFA Somalia
- Pipe Culvert Design Guidelines prepared by CEFA Somalia
- Proceedings of training and workshops.
- Training manuals (staff and farmers)
- Reports of capacity assessments for canal committees and NGOs
- Needs assessment reports
- Sub-grant proposals for NGOs.
- Approved cost proposals.
- EC Food Security programme evaluation November 2002
- Any other relevant documents

3. Field Work

- Interact with field staff of all agencies

Deleted: Using the logical framework for each NGO, analyse the results and the progress towards results and assess how far they have contributed towards the achievements of the projects' goal and purpose¶

Deleted: Analyse the effectiveness of the implementation approaches adopted by the different INGO partners towards the realization of projects' goals and purposes on a sustainable basis ¶

Deleted: Sustainability:¶
Are the implemented activities likely to be continued by the communities with their own labor and resources?¶
What are the institutional mechanisms developed and strengthened towards the sustainable enjoyment of the project promoted benefits? ¶
What tools and measures are developed and implemented to assess and strengthen the institutional capacity of the relevant local institutions (canal committees, women's groups)? ¶

¶
Gender and diversity¶
Has the project tried to promote gender awareness and greater involvement of women in decision making processes among the participating communities and local institutions?¶

¶
Analyse the effectiveness of the implementation approaches adopted by the different INGO partners towards the realization of projects' goals and purposes on a sustainable basis.¶

¶
Efficiency¶
Document the different approaches adopted by the different agencies and analyse the appropriateness of any changes made during the implementation of activities.¶
Are the implementation approaches efficient and practical in the given context?¶

¶
Sustainability¶
Do the implementation methods promote greater community ownership and sustainability?¶

What is the degree of community involvement during planning, implementation and monitoring in the different approaches?¶
What is the level of community contribution in the implementation of project activities? ¶

Can the level of community contribution support sustainable development? ¶
Are there adequate project budgets to accomplish the planned results? ¶
What modifications were made to make the budgets and plans realistic?¶

Does the implementation approach support local institution and the development of local human resources?¶

¶
Assess the effectiveness of backstopping supports provided by CARE and CEFA as regards to community participation and community mobilization and technical design to other SAHRP partners a ... [1]

- Interact with local NGOs as relevant
- Conduct focus group discussions with different groups at the communities

Focus group discussions should include canal committees, local associations (e.g. Rice Growers Association), women groups, elders, general farmers benefiting from the project. There should be adequate women representation and participation during discussion.

A stakeholder workshop should be held in the field (probably in Merca in Lower Shabelle) which allows participants to comment on the findings so far and make recommendations to the evaluation team.

F. Expertise Required

There should be a team of 3 consultants. The consultants involved in the evaluation should all:

- Have a good understanding of Somalia, its history and the resulting impact this may have on the working environment.
- Have an understanding of operating in an insecure environment
- Have practical experience in assessments, planning and implementation of interventions,
- Is familiar with Project Cycle Management and evaluations
- Have excellent analytical and writing skills
- Be willing to travel extensively in the working areas of the four INGOs.
- Be a team worker who can produce a report and presentation together with other consultants involved in the evaluation.
- Fluent in English (both reading and writing).
- Understanding of the Somali language is an advantage

Expert 1: Community organisation and participation

University degree in sociology or anthropology or other relevant related subject;
 Minimum of 10 years professional experience in developing countries, including previous experience working in Somalia;
 Demonstrated knowledge in participatory tools (PRA methods)
 Demonstrated experience in community development / community targeting / rapid rural appraisal

← --- Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

Expert 2: Infrastructure rehabilitation

University degree in engineering or related sciences
 At least 10 years of professional experience, preferably with experience in Somalia.
 Extensive experience in construction of irrigation systems and of infrastructures (Experience in the Horn of Africa is an added advantage).
 Be conversant with community based irrigation management and irrigation management transfer and participatory irrigation methods

Expert 3: Agricultural techniques

University degree in an agricultural subject, rural development or relevant social science.
 At least 10 years of professional experience, preferably with experience in Somalia.
 Excellent understanding of agricultural practices, problems related to farming and irrigation management.
 Be conversant with tropical agriculture and arid and semi arid farming practices

One of the three experts will be identified and appointed as the Team Leader, based on previous experience in leading evaluation missions and his/her ability to lead this team of experts.

G. Reporting and Feedback

The outputs of the evaluation should include a presentation in Nairobi to the partner INGOs and the EC Somalia Unit and a report, which evaluates each INGO program individually and the SHARP programme as a whole and which documents the main findings, lessons learned and recommendations.

The consultants will produce the following outputs:

Review the suggested methods, TOR, reference documents and develop and present an outline of the methodology and reports and present to the EC and partner agencies within two weeks of commissioning of the evaluation. This should include their understanding of the task and include a work plan based on the proposed tentative time schedule.

Document main findings, lessons learned and recommendations individually for each INGO and for the overall programme.

Prepare a **draft report** whilst in the field and make a preliminary briefing to a stakeholder meeting about the initial findings. Compile feedback and incorporate it in the report.

Update the evaluation report and present to the EC and partner agencies in Nairobi.

Incorporate comments from the Nairobi presentation and produce a **final report**.

The consultants need to produce 7 hard copies of all reports produced plus 7 electronic copies in Adobe Acrobat and MS Word on CD of the final report.

H. Work Plan and Time Schedule

The tentative time schedule is attached and a work plan and time schedule will be agreed between the INGOs and the consultants after the commissioning of the evaluation once the consultants have produced a report detailing their understanding of the task and a work plan. However the evaluation is not expected to take longer than a month.

Annex B

Review Itinerary

Time frame for Shabelle project evaluation

The total evaluation is expected to last one month, including (international) travel. The tentative starting date is November 6th, 2003. The tentative completion date is December 5th, 2003 (draft report submission), with a presentation scheduled for 15/16 December in Nairobi.

Working Day	Calendar day	
1 – 4	Nov 6 – Nov 9	Briefing with EC, ADRA, CARE, CEFA, Concern; UN Security briefing; material reading.
5	Nov 10	Travel from Nairobi to Beletweyn; visit ADRA project areas. ADRA arranges to transport and lodging.
6 – 7	Nov 11 – 12	Visit ADRA project areas (cont.). ADRA arranges transport and lodging.
8	Nov 13	Visit ADRA project areas. Travel from B'Weyn to K50. CARE arranges transport (incl airport pick-up) and lodging.
9 - 12	Nov 14 – 17	Visit CARE project area. CARE arranges transport, lodging.
13 – 15	Nov 18 - 20	Visit Concern project area. Concern arranges transport, lodging
16	Nov 21	Report writing in Merka.
17	Nov 22	Visit Concern project area. Travel from K50 – Jowhar (Concern arranges transport to airport). In Jowhar visit CEFA office and project areas. CEFA arranges transport and lodging.
18 – 19	Nov 23 – 24	Visit CEFA project areas. CEFA arranges transport and lodging.
20	Nov 25	Report writing in Jowhar. (IID)
21	Nov 26	Travel from Jowhar – K50. CEFA arranges transport (incl. Airport pick-up) and lodging. Visit CEFA project areas.
22 – 23	Nov 27 - 28	Visit CEFA project areas.
24	Nov 29	Report writing in Merka
25	Nov 30	Presentation/workshop on (preliminary) evaluation findings in Merka for INGO field staff.
26	Dec 1	Return to Nairobi from K50.
27 - 29	Dec 2 – 4	Complete draft report writing, incorporating workshop inputs.
30	Dec 5	Morning: Draft report distribution to EC and INGOs; preparation of presentation.
31	Dec 15 or 16	Presentation to EC and INGO Nairobi staff in Nairobi.
		Four weeks break (includes X-Mas break) for EC and INGOs to provide detailed feedback.
32 – 33	Week of January 12, '04	Final report completion, incorporating EC and INGO inputs.

Note: The INGOs will form a coordination team to formalize the schedule. CARE has agreed to take responsibility for the overall coordination.

Annex C

Sampling Methodology and Review Checklists Used

1. List of SHARP partners and distribution of communities/ villages.23

SHARP ²⁴			
Project Start Date	Organisation	Sub Project	No. of Communities
	EC	Donor and TA	4 INGO's
1/06/02 (Effective in August 2002)	ADRA	Beled Weyne Food Security Project	6 villages
01/ 03/02	CEFA 1	Strengthening Agricultural Activities in the Shabelle Valley (SAAS)	16 villages (within the 35 villages of CIDPM)
10/02/ 02	CEFA 2	Crops Improvement and Diversification, Processing and Marketing (CIDPM)	35 villages
01/03/02	CARE	Shabelle Agricultural Rehabilitation Project: Sablale, Qorioley, Merka, Awdhegle, Afgoi, Awdagle	Through 6 LNGOs to 45 communities
01/06/01	Concern Worldwide	Enhancing the Capacity of Local Communities to Achieve Food Security and Self-Reliance, Kurtunwarei District	12 villages

2. Sampling framework

The total number of villages/communities across SHARP is 98 according to project documentation and confirmed by discussions with each of the SHARP partners.

The Evaluating Team (ET) estimate that it can effectively interview 30 communities/villages within the allocated time plan and still have time for discussions with project staff, Local Authorities. So the number to be visited per individual organisation was initially allocated proportionally as shown in the chart below. This was then discussed with each SHARP member organisation and agreed. Specific indicative time tables were agreed during the initial discussions at the beginning of the evaluation.

Some variation from the arithmetical proportion was agreed because of the days allocated in each Project area and because of travel distances on the ground and the synergies that exist between specific communities and their relation to irrigation infrastructure.

ADRA	CEFA (CIDPM)	CEFA (SAAS)	CARE	Concern Worldwide
6 communities	35 communities	(inside 35 of CIDPM)	45 Communities	12 villages
Total number of villages/communities = 98				
Proportion of total per each SHARP Member is shown below:				
6.1%	35.7%	0	45.9 %	12.2 %
Proportional number of villages/ community groups to sample:				
(2) 4	10	0	13	(4)
Agreed with each organisation:				
2 on the East Bank 2 on the West Bank	6	4	6 NGO's 12 communities	4

Distribution of field visits between SHARP partners

²³ Throughout the Report, reference to the coalition project is written as "SHARP", references to the individual partner projects are written as "Project" and to the individual community/villages and their activities are written as "micro-projects".

²⁴ 5 Projects because there are 5 Financing Agreements.

Partner Agency	Communities/Villages		Field days allocated by TOR
	Total	Sample	
CARE	45	12	4
Concern	12	4	3
ADRA	6	4	2.5
CEFA 1	0	4	3
CEFA 2	35	6	2
Total	98	30	14.5

3. CARE distribution between LNGOs

CARE operates through a network of six local NGOs who collectively work with 45 villages/communities. The CARE sample of 12 micro-projects was further allocated between the six LNGOs. They work with as shown below.

CARE Partners- 12 Sampling Communities from 45					
HIJRA	CCS	SEREDO	Bani Adam	Agro-Action	TAREDO
7	4	7	10	8	9
15.6%	8.9%	15.6%	22.2%	17.8%	20%
Sampling proportion					
1	1	1	2	1	2

4. Evaluation methodology

The TOR describes clearly the overall approach of:

- Meetings in Nairobi with the major stakeholders (98 communities, 4 INGOs, 6 LNGOs and EC Somalia Office);
- Field visit schedule;
- Stakeholder workshop in Merca;
- Draft report writing;
- Presentation in Nairobi;
- Comments inclusion;
- Final report.

The methodology used at Head Office, field and community levels was planned as follows:

1. Proportional sampling as described above.
2. A checklist for the consulting team designed for Head Office, Field Office, Local Officials and communities as described below.
3. Follow up team meetings at the end of each day that generated profiles for each micro-project visited. This includes a rating system for each community defined by the consulting team.
4. Accumulation of individual community profiles will lead to an analysis and conclusions of each of the 5 Projects.
5. Accumulation of profiles for each project will lead to analysis and conclusions regarding SHARP as a whole and is demonstrated in the report.
6. Each analysis at “Project” and “SHARP” levels sought to be as inclusive and participatory as possible, but the final outcomes were the considered opinion of the consulting team.

5. Overall rating scheme for agencies

Community Involvement in project selection and implementation	Quality of Infrastructure	How community stakeholders view and value the Project	Contribution to improving food security
Quality and effectiveness of training and knowledge transfer	Gender considerations	Project cost efficiencies	Impact and sustainability of the initiative

6. Rating system

A = Fully Initiated by community/community based organisation
B = Community initiative supported by local leaders/ intermediaries
C = Promoted by local elite or external stakeholders with community consultation
D = Promoted by local elites or external stakeholders with no community consultation

7. Questioning checklist

HEAD OFFICE (EC, Concern Worldwide, CARE, Cefa and ADRA)

FIELD OFFICE (Agency Staff, LNGO staff)

1. In your opinion, to what extent is the SHARP project demand driven? Were needs assessment surveys carried out; do reports exist for these?
2. Is the delivery system sustainable?
3. What methods did you use to create awareness about the project amongst local leaders and communities?
4. What methods are being used to empower local communities and direct beneficiaries?
5. How many projects have been initiated and how many completed so far?
6. What specific strategies are in place to mitigate floods and food insecurity?
7. What mechanisms are being developed to ensure continuity of the projects at community level?
8. What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the project?
9. Have there been any changes in approach since the start of the project?
10. Verification of status of projects to date (from project records)
11. What are the positive effects of the SHARP?
12. What are the negative aspects of SHARP?
13. What is the value added of working in this way?

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

1. How did you learn about the SHARP Project and what do you know about it?
2. How does the project relate to your own local priorities?
3. What are the priority issues for your community and area?
4. What is your opinion of how the project is being implemented (is it meeting your own expectations)?
5. What changes would you recommend for improving the projects performance?
6. What are the specific projects being implemented in your area?
7. To what extent will the project contribute to household poverty reduction
8. To what extent are flooding and food insecurity a problem in your area?

COMMUNITY LEVEL (including Village Elders, Canal Committees and women's groups)

1. How many organisations are operating in your area?
2. How long have you been living in the area?
3. Is there a community committee for the *project*?
4. What criteria were used to appoint the committee?

5. How often does the committee meet?
6. Who are the members of the committee (women representation)?
7. What is the quorum for the committee and what happens if there is no quorum?
8. Who sets the agenda for the meetings and how are decisions made?
9. What are your main sources of livelihood; have these changed over the last few years?
10. How do you define "poverty" in your area? [wealth ranking], whom do you consider to be rich; whom do you consider to be poor?
11. Is the number of poor people increasing, why?
12. What are the main changes and events in the last 10 years?

The Micro-Project

1. How did you learn about the SHARP project?
2. How was your project identified?
3. Is there a project committee?
4. How was the committee formed?
5. What were the criteria for membership of the committee?
6. How did you know that the project was approved and who approved it?
7. How many people know how much the project cost?
8. How much of the budget has been spent?
9. How much did the community contribute to the cost?
10. Who was involved in implementing the project?
11. What difficulties were experienced?
12. Who was responsible for reporting and management at the community level?
13. What is the current status of your project?
14. What are (or will be) the benefits brought by the project?
15. Who among the community have benefited most from this project and why?
16. Who among the community have benefited least? Why?
17. Who were excluded from the project and Why?
18. Is the project meeting the needs of the community? If no how could things be improved?
19. Is the project sustainable? Who will maintain and manage the project in the future?
20. Are sustainable cost recovery arrangements in place?
21. What do/ did you like and not like about this project?

Separate checklists were made for infrastructure development and crop training and knowledge transfer.

8. Draft questions for the infrastructure development

Questions for the scheme

Intake

1. Is there a permanent or a temporary weir? Materials used?

Conditions of weir

2. Are there problems with water abstractions during low flow of river?
3. Do flood flow create problems\

Main canal/pipeline from intake to scheme

4. What is the flow in the main canal at the intake site?
5. What is the flow in the canal near the scheme area?
6. What is the length of the canal from the canal to first irrigated plot?

7. What is the present state of maintenance of the main canal?
8. Are there problems with the main canal?
9. What are the structures in the main canal and their maintenance?

Structure	Maintenance/Conditions
A	
B	
C	
D	

Water distribution in the scheme

10. Is the water flow in the main canal diverted to secondary canals?
11. If yes, are there distribution structures? State of maintenance?
12. How many secondary canals are there? Length? State of maintenance? Soil type?
13. Is there leakage /vegetation/siltation/leakage through bunds/
14. Is there a timetable according to which the individual farmers are allowed to take water?
How effective is it?
15. Do the farmers at the top end of canals get more water than at the tail end?
16. Are there by-laws that concern the water distribution?
17. Scheme handed over to farmers on.....

Water availability and on farm water management

18. Do farmers think that they get enough water?
19. What is the irrigation method used?
20. What are the differences in level between one basin to the next?
21. What is the water depth the farmers apply when they irrigate?
22. In your opinion what is the efficiency of water use (conveyance /distribution/application)
23. How is water distribution in the farm (organized /not well organized?)
24. Have the farmers /field staff been trained on on farm water management?
25. Do the farmers have a water users association?
26. How is the drainage situation? Is their ponding or do farmers complain about ponding?
27. Does the scheme have a water undertaker?
28. Is water equitably distributed among farmers/are there irrigation groups/blocks?

Project history

1. Who did/do the following activities and when were they/are they done?
2. Initiated the scheme/ investigations (feasibility studies and surveys)?
3. Scheme design and preparation of tender documents?
4. Implementation/operation and maintenance?

Finances for operation and maintenance

1. Where does the scheme obtain funds for operation and maintenance?

Basic engineering investigation

1. What are the sources of the following data?
 - Topographic data
 - Geological data
 - Water resources (hydrological /groundwater)
 - Sources of flooding/river fluctuation
 - Drainage system design criteria

- Soil survey-Geotechnical data availability
- How is the various data stored?

What other supporting infrastructure exist?

1. Such as wells for drinking water /boreholes
2. Energy supply (rural energy)/wind mills /Biomass?
3. Transportation system – animals/road transport?
4. Trading centre - source /availability of spare parts/fuel etc?

Project management/infrastructure construction

1. Who did the construction?
2. In case of contractors, was any pre qualification done?
3. How often are the site (progress) meetings held?
4. Are minutes (records) kept in such meeting?
5. Is there strict adherence to schedules/workplan?
6. Was any training done before project formulation?
7. What chain of communication exists?
8. What networking mechanisms exist among the NGOs/CBOs and other stakeholders?
9. Who dictates development pace?
10. Have reference manuals been developed?

Technology transfer

1. Has any training been undertaken on the use of structures or equipment such as pumps?
2. Have local artisan been involved in construction?

9 Agronomy checklist

Field Office (Project Staff)/ Local Authorities

Technology transfer

1. Training Manuals?
2. Training Methods?
3. Number of trainings carried out?
4. Problems related to training?
5. Level of uptake by farmers?

Productivity issues/food security issues

1. Baseline data on crop varieties used? Quantities?
2. Market prices of crops at start of project?
3. Availability of produce in the market place today?
4. How are things changing in terms of food availability and capacity of households to purchase/obtain?

Farmers' Groups

Agronomy

1. What methods of cultivation do farmers use?
 - Tractors
 - Traditional
 - Animal traction
2. Are these methods efficient?

3. Are you able to prepare land in good time relative to the season?
4. Where do you get your planting materials?
5. What seed storage methods do you use?
6. Has SHARP introduced any new varieties? What do you think of these?
7. What methods of planting do you use? How did you learn these techniques?
8. What plant spacing per ha do you use? What Kg/ ha seed rate do you use?
9. What weeding practice and interval do you use?
10. What are the main pests and diseases; and how do you control them?
11. Do you get sufficient water for your crops at the time you require?
12. What problems do you have with harvesting your crops? How could these problems be overcome?
13. Are yields increasing or decreasing?
14. What storage methods do you use?
15. How much of your crops do you lose during storage? What can be done to reduce these losses?
16. What does it cost you to buy in one season:
 - Seeds
 - Tools
 - Cultivation costs
 - Water
 - Pesticides
 - Labour- cultivation, planting, weeding harvesting, storing
 - Any other?
17. What income do you gain from sale of crops in the market? At what prices? Price trends? Price fluctuations? (lowest and highest)
 1. How much grain do you consume in a season (market price equivalent) kg and market price?
 2. What do you gain from your saleable crop in a season?

Household food security? (Women's group)

1. What do you know about the SHARP project?
2. How have you been involved in the planning and implementation of the project?
3. Is there any malnutrition amongst your families? Has there been in the past?
4. How has the project helped you to improve your access to food in the market, in the Household?
5. Have there been any monetary gains for you?
6. What household costs do you have in a season?
 - Oil
 - Sugar
 - Tea
 - Medicines
 - School fees
 - Transport

Annex D

SWOT Analysis of SHARP by each Agency

SWOT analysis of SHARP as seen by CARE

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support agricultural development • Has potential for coordination of irrigated farming • Coordination between INGOs and providing -systems and procedure i.e. technical capacity training by CEFA, community mobilization manuals by CARE) etc • Information sharing, resources sharing i.e. seeds • it provide empowerment to the community and INGO and LNGO staffs(how to fish) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vast areas of coverage • Not adequate resources (need 3-4 times the current allocation) particular for infrastructure • Short time frame to address the project purpose/goal • Need time to increase capacity for management) • Not enough time to prepare/practically train the canal committees • Agricultural extension impact changes need a long time • Poor coordination at higher level
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Area coverage can concentrate in fewer districts (Mahaday,sablale) • Can concentrate and widen coverage within the villages • Not covering rain fed • There is scope of increasing production by 3 times • Can capitalize on existing goodwill among the partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marketing of produce once increased production is achieved (relief food from WFP affecting the market • Instability (security) in the areas • Lack of coordination policy

SWOT analysis of SHARP as seen by CEFA

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Been training communities to be involved and participate • Has facilitated group dynamics/team work • Enhanced problem solving • Seasonal planning in crop production, timeliness of planting • Introduction of new crops has resulted in diversification/ marketing • Sharing information manuals i.e. Design manuals, community organization manual • Design manuals developed and shared is assisting in harmonization of designs • Establishment of standards (designs guidelines) • Development of format for design proposal writing • Mutual understanding (requirements for machinery for construction) • Farm management training /skills improvement.(farm management guidelines being developed) • On - farm irrigation water management manual being developed • Coordination meeting held 7 in Merka 2 in Nairobi • Basic operation principles has been established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor planning at project start • Difficult to provide backstopping (lack of basic skills for the target group) • Project preparation process • Absence of clear strategy and approach in project implementation has resulted in more consumption (time and money) • Lack of harmony in principles and practices of operation • Gap between principles and practices of NGOs (links with the communities) • Lack of uniformity and understanding in community contribution
Opportunities	Threats (challenges)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactivation of skills and responsibilities of the communities and National Staff • To increase food security • To build technical capacity by training of staff and communities i.e. PRA • To link different communities (clans/regions) likely to enhance better utilization of resources • To reduce conflicts if good approaches are applied • Community empowerment can lead to improved food security. • For improved security (regular meeting are taking place) • For environmental protection/ embankment protection • To engage with local Authorities • Empowerment of women • For improving information flow on flood hazard, famine) i.e. Between communities, national staff international communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insecurity • Increased risk among communities if implementers don't have adequate skills • Incompatible principles and approaches of NGOs • Projects very much LOG FRAME driven

SWOT analysis of SHARP as seen by ADRA

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A resource pool • Planning at catchment level • Enables a broader perspective • Stronger potential for bargaining power/donors • Unified approach i.e. cost sharing, training process, tendering (price information) • Share information/ideas • Share skills • Technical backstopping • Facilitate to strengthen members • Freedom to act individually as organizations 	<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of effectiveness to plan because of ECHO schedules • No defined structures (needs to be defined) • Technical backstopping /when you need / how you need • No conclusion on community contribution • Need for definition of community contribution
<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of resources –clarity of responsibility • backstopping CARE/CEFA not defined i.e. TOR budgeting • catchments level planning • coordinated bidding • possibility of consortium • other agencies could become members • forward planning • possibility of empowering local authority • research ,technical assistant, advocacy 	<p>Threat</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk of organization feeling swallowed up

SWOT Analysis of SHARP as seen by CONCERN

<p>Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New methodology-CCCAT –knowledge/technology transfer • Has attempted to establish designs standards • Harmonization of approaches (CC&P) • Standardization of pricing (costing) • Building of relationship at staff levels • Offer possibility of collaboration at project level (intake located in another NGO zone and village in another) • Easier to address security issues among INGOs/local authority • Ability to negotiate with local authorities Enhanced 	<p>Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project cycle (2 years) too short should be minimum 4- 5 years • Delay in approval (designs/tender documents etc by EC • Community mobilization not easy to achieve (in cash) • Capacity building (training) of staff not a major priority
<p>Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage sharing of experiences which result to capacity building • Improvement in quality of service delivery • To scale up/attract more donors & more funds • To move to integrated planning • More power to influence i.e. Marketing • Contribute to stabilization of security due to distribution of resources (benefits) to the communities in wider areas • To plan for a wider areas i.e. up to the whole of Shabelle basin • Data documentation and storage for future use • Approach of community mobilization /participation likely to reduce dependence • To have a longer i.e.(5 years)project cycle management • Establish SHARP support unit • To build staff capacity 	<p>Threat (challenges)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communities resistance to change • Conflicts and insecurity (clans etc) • Donor reluctance to move to 5 years project cycle • Instability in marketing and pricing and currency fluctuation • Limited skills of staffs • Availability of machinery i.e. Excavators etc • Quality of machinery (poor o& m)/plant operators • Increased silt load in the river(Shabelle) • Operation and management of barrages(no direct control) • Maintenance of barrages and the surroundings

Combined

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning at catchment level • Enables a broader perspective • Stronger potential for bargaining power/donors • Unified approach i.e. cost sharing, training process, tendering (price information) • Share information/ideas • Share skills • Freedom to act individually as organizations • Empowers INGO's and Local NGO's • Increased training of communities in participatory methods • Facilitating group dynamics and team work • Sharing information manuals • 7 coordination meetings held in Merka, 2 in Nairobi • New methodologies (CC-CAT) • Ability to negotiate with Local Authorities enhanced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No defined structures (needs to be defined) • Need for definition of meaning of community contribution • Large area of coverage • Inadequate resources for task • Short time frame • Needs time to increase local management capacities • Not enough time to prepare canal committees • Poor planning at project start • Difficulties with providing backstopping • Lack of harmony in principles and practice operation • Capacity building of staff not a major priority.
Opportunities	Threats/ Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Catchment level planning • Coordinated bidding for funds • Possibility of a consortium • Other agencies could become members • Develop forward planning • Possibilities for research, advocacy and Technical assistance • Should expand to cover rain fed areas • Can capitalise on good will among the partners • Reactivating the skills and responsibilities of the communities and National staff • To build links between different communities • To reduce conflict, improve security • To engage with Local Authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk of small organisations being "swallowed" by big ones • Marketing constraints once production is increased • Continued instability • Lack of coordination policy • Projects logframe driven • Communities resistance to change • Donors reluctance to shift to 5 year project cycle

Sustainability:

Are the implemented activities likely to be continued by the communities with their own labor and resources?

What are the institutional mechanisms developed and strengthened towards the sustainable enjoyment of the project promoted benefits?

What tools and measures are developed and implemented to assess and strengthen the institutional capacity of the relevant local institutions (canal committees, women's groups)?

Gender and diversity

Has the project tried to promote gender awareness and greater involvement of women in decision making processes among the participating communities and local institutions?

Analyse the effectiveness of the implementation approaches adopted by the different INGO partners towards the realization of projects' goals and purposes on a sustainable basis.

Efficiency

Document the different approaches adopted by the different agencies and analyse the appropriateness of any changes made during the implementation of activities.

Are the implementation approaches efficient and practical in the given context?

Sustainability

Do the implementation methods promote greater community ownership and sustainability?

What is the degree of community involvement during planning, implementation and monitoring in the different approaches?

What is the level of community contribution in the implementation of project activities?

Can the level of community contribution support sustainable development?

Are there adequate project budgets to accomplish the planned results?

What modifications were made to make the budgets and plans realistic?

Does the implementation approach support local institution and the development of local human resources?

Assess the effectiveness of backstopping supports provided by CARE and CEFA as regards to community participation and community mobilization and technical design to other SAHRP partners and provide recommendation to strengthen the roles and support.

What are the tools and documents developed by supporting agencies (CARE and CEFA) to provide the assigned supports to the other partners?

Are the tools and documents adequately oriented and understood by the partner agencies?

How far have the manuals and tools been adopted by the different agencies?

Are the tools and documents practical and easy to understand?

Do the tools and techniques promote greater degree of institutional strengthening at the local level?

Are the tools and techniques consistent with the local practices and skills?

Do the agencies possess relevant skilled personnel to adopt the tools and manuals?
Is there adequate institutional arrangements made by all agencies for interagency supports?
Are the systems and practices consistent with the local culture and practices?

Document lessons learned including that of interagency collaboration.

What are the best practices and lessons learned by the different projects?
What is the mechanism of inter-agency collaboration at the Nairobi and field level? Is it adequate?
What are the roles of EC and how have they supported the processes?
Is there adequate institutional arrangement for interagency collaboration in the project documents of all partner agencies?

Provide recommendations for the extension of the projects and modification of implementation approaches in future project.

Is the current duration of the project adequate to realize the stated project purpose? Make appropriate recommendations.
What are the appropriate implementation mechanisms or methodology in the given context of Somalia?